B-36 Altitude Performance

[MKSheppard]

Wikipedia claims:

"Featherweight III had a longer range and an operating ceiling of at least 47,000 ft (14,000 m), especially valuable for reconnaissance missions."

Reality:

7th Bomb Wing Operations Order 61-53 was a routine training mission originating at Carswell Air Force Base [in July 1953].

In Phase I of this exercise three "Featherweight" aircraft, one from each tactical squadron of the 7th Bombardment Wing, were to attack three vital control centers of the Air Defense Command (ADC), including the headquarters of ADC.

Utilizing Carswell as the pre-strike and post-strike base, one of the three aircraft was to attack Albuquerque, New Mexico; another aircraft was to attack Colorado Springs, Colorado, and the third aircraft was to attack Buffalo, New York.

Aircraft of the Eastern and Central Air Defense Forces were also to take part in Phase I of Operation "TAILWIND", the code designation of this mission, conducting intercept from several of their bases.

After "hitting" their targets and successfully completing all requirements of the mission, the aircraft were to return to Carswell.

Phase II of Operation "TAILWIND" required 18 B-36 aircraft to fly to Savannah, Georgia, and thence over the Atlantic Ocean to their attack on New York City. Aircraft of the Eastern Air Defense Force (EADF) were also to take part in Phase II of this exercise by conducting intercept from several of their bases. After attacking New York City, the aircraft were to return to Carswell.

Colonel George T. Chadwell, 1887A, the 7th Bombardment Wing Commander, acted in the capacity of Strike and Task Force Commander, while Colonel George R. Buckley, 7842A, Deputy Wing Commander, acted as the Deputy Strike Force Commander.

The aircraft commanders of Phase I were Major Frederick E. Bachmann, Jr., 13479A, 436th Bombardment Squadron; Major Wells F. Zerdecki, A0372196, 432nd Bombardment Squadron; and Major Thomas A. Bell, 10459A, 9th Bombardment Squadron.

The two formation leaders of Phase II were designated as Lt. Colonel George E. Cameron, 15693A, 436th Bombardment Squadron, first squadron formation leader, and Lt. Colonel Clifford Schoeffler, 18179A, 9th Bombardment Squadron, as the second squadron formation leader.

In preparation for the mission, maps, photo-mosaics, and briefs were made up. An Air Order of Battle map of the EADF and a Fighter Reaction Profile were made.

The target materials available on Phase I of Operation "TAILWIND" were limited to 1:500,000 sectional charts with the exception of Albuquerque. In addition to the Albuquerque sectional chart, a vertical photograph and the old Army Air Force bombing chart were available.

The target materials available on Phase II of Operation "TAILWIND" were considered adequate. Available materials included vertical and radar photography, and a radar intensity analysis chart scale 1:100,000.

All three 7th Bombardment Wing aircraft on Phase I of "TAILWIND" successfully completed all requirements of their mission. The following are summaries of each individual mission of Phase I.

[Simulated Bomb Load: Mark VI - Q = 0, Simulated HOB: 2000 ft]

========
Raid #4A
========

Raid #4A (Albuquerque) was delegated to aircraft 1083, commanded by Major Thomas A. Bell and Crew S-04 of the 9th Bomb Squadron.

[50-1083 // B-36H-1-CF]
[Offset Radar Bombing Target was Center of hangar at south end of ramp 35-02-45N, 106-36-18W.]

Aircraft departed Carswell at assigned time of 1619 hours, 10 July 1953, completing mission as briefed, reaching H-Hour Control Point at 0642Z. Aircraft attained a pressure bombing altitude of 51,000 feet. Penetration of ADC (WADF) was effected without incident. No fighters were encountered. Albuquerque was successfully attacked, and analysis of radar scope photography gave this aircraft a Circular Error (CE) of 875 feet on its assigned target.

=========
Raid #4B
=========

Raid #4B (Colorado Springs) was delegated to aircraft 1093, commanded by Major Wells F. Zerdecki and crew S-19 of the 492nd Bomb Squadron.

[50-1093 // B-36H-5-CF, Accepted June 1952]
[Offset Radar Bombing Target was Center of built up area at Peterson Airport, 38-48-30N, 104-42-40W. ]

Aircraft departed Carswell at assigned time of 1527 hours, 10 July 1953, completing mission as briefed, reaching the H-Hour Control Point at 0642Z. Aircraft attained a pressure bombing altitude of 50,000 feet. Penetration of WADF (ADC) was effected without incident. No fighters were encountered. Colorado Springs was successfully attacked and analysis of radar scope photography gives this aircraft a CE of 1,500 feet on its assigned target.

=========
Raid #4C
=========

Raid #4C (Buffalo) was delegated to aircraft 1086, commanded by Major Frederick E. Bachmann, and crew S-21 of the 436th Bombardment Squadron, departed Carswell at 1220 hours, 10 July 1953, completing mission as briefed, reaching H-Hour Control Point at 0640Z.

[50-1086 / B-36H-1-CF - Accepted May 1952]
[Offset Radar Bombing Target was Southeast tip of island 42-57-30N, 78-56-05W.]

Aircraft attained a pressure bombing altitude of 49,090 feet. Penetration of EADF (ADC) was accomplished without any fighters intercepting bomber enroute to target. On the withdrawal from the target, aircraft 1086 was not effectively attacked until descending to 36,700 feet.

From this point on, the bomber was attacked continuously by F-94, F-86, F-80, and F-8F's. No effective passes were made while bomber was within designated "unfriendly" area. Analysis of radar scope photography gives this aircraft a CE of 400 feet on its assigned target.

All three 7th Bombardment Wing aircraft on Phase I successfully completed all requirements of mission. All three targets were theoretically destroyed.

Destruction of the ADC headquarters at Colorado Springs and the two vital control centers at Buffalo and Albuquerque would definitely affect ADC's ability to command and coordinate the defense of the United States against air weapons attack by an enemy. Evidently these high altitude strikes completely took the ADC by surprise as no effective defenses were encountered.

Consequently, Phase I was considered highly successful in all respects.

=========
Raid #313
=========

Raid #313 (New York City) was delegated to 19 aircraft; several of the 11th Bombardment Wing aircraft were included. All 19 aircraft scheduled departed Carswell at the exact time designated, with one exception, aircraft 5736 (11th Bomb Wing) which was delayed due to alternator trouble. This aircraft finally departed at 0858Z, which was 61 minutes after originally scheduled take-off time. There were no other problems or difficulties encountered during the taxi take-off phase of the mission.

One aircraft, 1084 (11th Bomb Wing), was a pre-target abort. It aborted in the climb to altitude while at 3,200 feet because number five engine was feathered in the rendzvous area due to loss of oil; however, aircraft continued on mission until number four engine had its propeller runaway in the climb and could not be feathered.

After electing to abort, aircraft returned to Carswell Air Force Base, landing without incident at 2055Z.

[OOC: Try explaining your abort to the Bomb Wing Commander...]

Weather adversely affected the success of the mission. Due to intense weather over the Atlantic area, which made formation penetration of frontal systems a constant problem, caused several deviations en route from orbit area to H-Hour Control Point.

Weather in target area (10/10th undercast with some clouds up to 40,000 feet) presented a problem with formation. All navigational aids were used and peak performance was achieved in this category.

[Radar Offset Bomb Targets were:

(A) Center of end of pier 40-39-46N, 74-04-09W.
(B) Center of George Washington Bridge 40-51-08N, 73-57-08W.]

Eighteen aircraft bombed the target in two squadrons of nine aircraft each as scheduled.

Mission313.jpg

Only the lead aircraft of each squadron had a DZ to aim at; the other aircraft within the squadron were to drop on the leader. This procedure for having the squadron drop on the leader did not prove too successful since the leader dropped no bombs that could be seen, and all UHF radio communications were jammed. For these reasons and the fact that because of weather no vertical photography was obtained, and the only aircraft that could be scored accurately were the two squadron leaders.

In an attempt to obtain a bombing pattern we are going to assume each aircraft dropped with his leader and plotted each bomb impact in accordance with the aircraft position within the squadron at bombs away. The only scores available were those of the squadron leader as obtained from the radar film, and they are as follows: first squadron CE 12 miles, and second squadron CE 2,000 feet.

Another bombing problem was presented by the short bombing run from the IP to target (61 miles).

Since the course to the IP was from out over the ocean instead of paralleling the coast and required a 33 degree turn over the IP, this caused the leader of the first squadron in his attempt to maintain his formation to still be in a turn around his IP to target at bombs away. The steering needle was evidently never centered prior to bombs away. One of the recommendations on this mission will be that a pre-IP on the coast should have been used or an IP at least 120 miles from the target.

The aforementioned problem was unique in that on past missions it has been our procedure when flying formation tactics to break up the formation at cross-hair distance and have each aircraft make its individual run on its assigned DZ as is presently scheduled on the Emergency War Plan. If in the future we are going to attempt to bomb on the leader in formation as we did on this mission, more bomb run planning will be necessary.

After bombs away some aircraft deviated from the briefed route and altitude back to Carswell in the interest of flying safety. A complete analysis of the mission will have to be conducted before a better picture of the return to Carswell can be obtained. However, all aircraft landed at Carswell without mishap in a period of 42 minutes. With the exception of one aircraft, all had well over 2,000 gallons of fuel left.

===================
Fighter Activity
===================

For the purpose of this mission, "enemy" territory was designated in the Operations Order, at 36° 40N 72° 26W on route into target, with the enemy territory ending at 40° 00N 72° 00W on the withdrawal route. In the execution of 61-53 (TAILWIND, Raid 313) many fighter attacks were made on the bomber force while the strike force was over friendly territory. In the orbit area the forces were attacked by US Navy fighters. In order to analyze the fighter reaction effectively on Operation "TAILWIND", only those fighters assigned EADF in the "enemy" territory designated was used to analyze ADC's fighter reaction on our raid.

The first major fighter encounter was made by eight F-94s, three F-86s, and one F-9F when the bombers were approximately 150 NM from target over the Atlantic. The F-94s pressed the attack aggressively from 6 o'clock low, and the F-86s made several fly-bys. The bombers were at 41,000 - 42,000 feet at this point. None of these attacks were considered effective based on crew interrogation.

The second major encounter started just short of the IP with four F-86s and four F-94s attacking the bomber force aggressively. Two of these passes were considered effective (F-86).

The third major encounter occurred in the target area with six F-94s and eight F-86s attacking the bomber force. Attacks were pressed aggressively; however, no crew members considered passes effective.

A total of 34 fighters attacked the bombers over enemy territory. None of the F-94 attacks were considered effective.

All F-94 attacks were pressed from 6 o'clock low coming up contrails for tail attack on the bombers. Tail gunners reported they would have been easy targets for B-36 tail guns. F-86 attacks were pressed much more aggressively and from all clock positions. Two of the F-86 passes were considered very effective. Based on analysis, it is apparent that the 7th Bombardment Wing would have lost three to four bombers to the fighters on this mission.

[MKSheppard]

What's interesting is that some aircraft overperformed in some cases -- but they weren't able to maintain those altitudes -- hence their lower pressure altitudes @ time of bomb release.

PDF_263.jpg

[kdahm]

Interesting. Considering the drop height, I think the CEP for the recon flights may have been optimistic, but I have no data to back up that gut estimate except WWII bomber performance.

[OOC: Try explaining your abort to the Bomb Wing Commander...]

"Well, it's an exercise and there are safety of flight considerations for two engines out on the same wing. If this were an actual raid, or an ORI, continuation to the target would have been more important even at the risk of the plane."

[Lukexcom]

If there's any sort of URL link to a credible-source site that has this same info, then I think that's good enough to have that section of the Wiki page updated to "a demonstrated operational ceiling of 51,000 ft (15,500 m)".

Fortunately the Wiki page does state that the "RB-36-III" (pretty sure they mean the RB-36H-III) could achieve 58,000 ft.