Username: Brother Stormhammer
Nickname: Regular
Number of Posts: 34
Date of Post: (08/12/07 13:26:55)
I know that there are several different limits on ship designs...there's the 'possible' limit (How big a hull can we build, how big a power plant can we build, etc), and the 'practical' limit (what's the biggest ship we can dock, what's the biggest ship we can afford, and probably a host of other things). Carriers would also seem to have another limit, based on the largest number of aircraft that can be launched/recovered with an axial flight deck, or with the more modern angled deck.
Now that I've demonstrated my considerable lack of understanding, the questions:
Given mid-1940's technology, what would be the upper limit on number of aircraft operating from a single ship?
What's the largest practical aircraft carrier that can be built n the above-mentioned timeframe?
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Username: PMN1
Nickname: Old Friend
Number of Posts: 671
Date of Post: (08/12/07 13:39:02)
IIRC, Friedman mentions the airgroup of the Midway's being too large for effective operations - when built, howver, as aircraft size increased, that became less of a problem.
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Username: Nik aka Speaker To Cats
Nickname: Old Friend
Number of Posts: 946
Date of Post: (08/12/07 13:49:52)
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Habakkuk
;- )
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Username: Brother Stormhammer
Nickname: Regular
Number of Posts: 34
Date of Post: (08/13/07 00:58:27)
That's not a ship...that's something God would use to keep His tea glass cold!
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Username: Theodore
Nickname: Keeper of the Secret Handshake
Number of Posts: 4922
Date of Post: (08/13/07 14:42:30)
Ninety aircraft seems to have been the practical limit for WWII operating practice with axial decks.
As noted, the Midways were really too big to operate their original air groups effectively.
The advent of the angled deck and the accompanying changes in operating procedure would have allowed for more aircraft, but in the meantime aircraft got bigger and began requiring the services of catapults, which meant that the practical limit stayed around ninety.
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Username: MBecker01
Nickname: Old Friend
Number of Posts: 793
Date of Post: (08/13/07 15:26:39)
Ninety aircraft seems to have been the practical limit for WWII operating practice with axial decks.
Meaning if the hypothetical Yamato-class supercarriers get an angled fight deck 130+ planes will work?
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Username: Theodore
Nickname: Keeper of the Secret Handshake
Number of Posts: 4922
Date of Post: (08/13/07 17:59:20)
Not unless they develop the operational doctrine to do it, and that's by no means a foregone conclusion - the Japanese never managed to operate more than about 72 aircraft from even their biggest carriers. Consider Shokaku and Essex: two carriers about the same size, but one operating no more than 72 aircraft and the other routinely operating 90+. The Americans operated 25% more aircraft because they had better doctrine.
As for a notional Yamato-class supercarrier...well, Shinano wasn't very super. The only things remarkable about her were her tonnage and her inefficiency. Her flight deck wasn't even the longest in the IJN, although it was the widest anywhere. Of course, that was offset by her slow speed. Partly because she was so slow, partly because she was so heavily armored, and partly because the IJN had some very silly ideas about how to use her, Shinano's intended air group numbered only 47 planes. An angled deck wouldn't help matters much - she'd only get slower.
More to the point, the Japanese would have to change their entire way of thinking about operating carriers and their air groups and face a technological imperative before they could even conceive of the angled flight deck or a use for it. The USN and RN developed the necessary conceptual and doctrinal framework during WWII and were standing on the threshold of the technological imperative by the end of the war. The IJN never did either.
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Username: radiationhazard
Nickname: The Great Navigator
Number of Posts: 29
Date of Post: (08/26/07 13:19:54)
I'm afraid I don't quite see how a carrier can be "too big to operate their air groups effectively." Can someone explain it to me? Thanks
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Username: Lord Herrick
Nickname: The Great Navigator
Number of Posts: 2488
Date of Post: (08/26/07 13:51:40)
More the other way around.
Big carrier = 100+ planes = air group too large for effective command and control.
Essentially at that level of tech, you had too much ship for the air group that was practicable.
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Username: MBecker01
Nickname: Old Friend
Number of Posts: 793
Date of Post: (08/26/07 14:01:31)
Hmm, maybe you need an angled fight deck to handle that many planes?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angled_fli ... al_classes
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Username: Theodore
Nickname: Keeper of the Secret Handshake
Number of Posts: 4922
Date of Post: (08/26/07 14:38:19)
LH is right - I got it backwards. Midway's original air group was too big to be operated effectively by an axial-deck carrier. The size of that air group was driven in part by the large size of the ship, which had in turn been driven by the requirement for heavy armor.
As for why such a large group couldn't be operated effectively by an axial-deck carrier - it comes down to launch and recovery times. US carriers typically flew off deckload strikes, which usually amounted to half the air group, sometimes more.
Such a large number of aircraft took a long time to launch and recover. A Midway deckload would be 72 planes, which would take a total of one hour to launch and recover. An Essex deckload would be 45 planes, which would take about 38 minutes to launch and recover.
The problem is that US operational experience showed that you only had about four hours a day for flight operations.
In four hours, a Midway could launch and recover four deckload strikes totalling 288 aircraft, while an Essex could launch and recover six deckload strikes totalling 270 aircraft (and have eight minutes left over to launch and recover CAP and ASW patrols.)
Huh.
I think the conventional wisdom is wrong...or at least not telling the full story. This is drawn from a contemporary statement that the fleet was flying off six deckloads a day, with the result that a Midway would take six hours to fly six deckload strikes but an Essex would only take four hours to fly off six deckload strikes. However, and what I didn't realize until I ran the numbers just now, is that a Midway could generate the same number of sorties as an Essex.
So I guess it comes down to operational priorities - more strikes or more sorties? Four one-hour turns into the wind or six 40-minute turns into the wind?
Veering off into some slightly informed speculation, there may have been concerns about operating Midway and Essex class carriers together because of the different operating characteristics of their air groups. Either the Essexes would have had to fly off bigger strikes (which might not have been feasible) or the Midways would have had to fly off smaller strikes (which would have been inefficient relative to their capacity. On the other hand, it might have been better - a Midway flying six 45-plane strikes per day would have launched three groups of aviators twice each, whereas an Essex would have launched two groups three times each. The larger air group could also absorb losses more easily.) I guess if the Essexes had to conduct six evolutions a day and the Midways only four, there's no reason the Midways couldn't just go along for the ride on two of those flights, but you'd end up with uneven strikes. One Essex and one Midway operating together at a six-strike pace would fly six 90-plane strikes; if operating at their own paces they'd fly four 117-plane strikes and two 45-plane strikes.
Maybe the Midways and their air groups weren't too big after all...
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Username: M Stockwell
Nickname: Regular
Number of Posts: 31
Date of Post: (08/26/07 20:38:32)
1st Post - So don't slaughter me out of hand.
The longer it takes to launch a strike, the more fuel is burned by the earlier aircraft in the launch. In the 1940's there was no such thing as aerial refueling operationally. That was the limiting factor. In a deck load strike (or any other coordinated strike) you launch aircraft in the order of their range, i.e. TBMs, SB2Cs, F6Fs in that order for a more or less typical Air Group.
That was a major part of the Midway Air Group's problem. Lots of aircraft, but too long a launch cycle. Catapaults at that time were used more on escort carriers than on light or fleet carriers. Also the cats were hydraulic not steam operated.
One of the great ironies of carriers is that the RN was the major tech innovator (Carriers to start with, angled deck, steam cats, mirror landing system), but the USN and IJN were the great tactical innovators. By mid-war (WWII), the USN was firmly in command of carrier ops.
The angled deck was probably second only to the invention of the carrier itself as the greatest technical innovation. No more crashes into the deck park while landing (at least in theory - never underestimate someone's ability to create a First Class FUBAR).
The Midways were sensational for their time, not least of which was their enormous AA batteries. But it would take a number of modernization cycles for them to reach their true potential.
For a good idea of modern flight operations, read "Flight of The Intruder" by Stephen Coonts. He was there, did that. It will give you a good idea of both the potential and limits of aerial refueling.
I served as an aerial nav in a KC-130 squadron (USMC - VMGR-252), so I have an appreciation for both. USAF will tell you they can go anywhere in the world with their Caseys (As long as nobody takes them out).
Logistics, logistics, logistics. That is what rules the battle zone.
Mark
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Username: Theodore
Nickname: Keeper of the Secret Handshake
Number of Posts: 4922
Date of Post: (08/27/07 13:46:11)
Welcome aboard.
I had thought about the fuel problem, but I don't know how operationally signficant those extra 20 minutes would have been. It would depend on the circumstances.
On the order of launch - it varied depending on a number of factors. The range of the aircraft in question was one of them, but the same type of aircraft could have a very different range depending on how it was loaded. There is also the question of takeoff run - a fighter could launch in a much shorter distance than a loaded torpedo bomber. The size of the strike (hence available flight deck space), the weather, and the weight of individual aircraft could all play a part in how the strike was spotted.
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Username: M Stockwell
Nickname: Regular
Number of Posts: 31
Date of Post: (08/27/07 20:41:10)
Thanks for the welcome. I have been reading these boards for about 8 weeks while preparing to move, moving, unloading and unpacking. (Welcome to South Louisiana in August - 95 degree plus temps and high humidity
).The last time I participated in boards was the old Warship boards back when Dick Landgraff was still willing to participate. I invented the USS New England to satisfy everyones requirements for a battleship.
Subsequently I realized the New England wouldn't fit in any harbor on earth.
Oh well.
As far as launch order, this really depends on the era and type of A/C involved. In the biplane days (late 20's, most of the 30's) the fighters were spotted forward due to their shorl takeoff runs, with the torpedo bombers last due to long takeoff runs. This, however, led to very short range strikes if the fighters were to go the distance.
Carrier ops were/are a continuously evolving operation. In my time in KC-130F's, I was involved in refueling numerous carrier aircraft during exercises, including KA-3 tankers.
In regards to ordnace loads, in WWII, SBDs when scouting normally carried a 500 Lb bomb. When loaded for an anti-shipping strike against warships (Carriers!!!), they carried a 1000 lb bomb. If the target was a battleship, the load was a 1600 lb armor piercing bomb. Obviously, the heavier the bomb load, the less fuel they could launch with.
Actually, this is not obvious and is greatly misunderstood as a result.
To illustrate, an A6E Intruder could get off the ground with 30 500 lb bombs (5 double triple ejector racks each loaded with 6 500 lb bombs), but hardly any fuel. Once off the ground (or catapaulted off the ship or expeditionary airfield) the A6E had to climb to about 18000 ft (Angels 180) to rendezous with the tanker. It could then take on a full fuel load. It could fly with a max bomb load and a max fuel load, it just could not take off with both.
So, before the advent of operational aerial refueling, you balanced range against ordnance load.
The reason I use the phrase "operational aeiral refueling" is because the first aerial refueling that I am aware of took place in January 1929. I think? that operational refueling did not begin until the 1950's. Probably with the USAF.
Sorry to be long winded, but if you have the knowledge and resources, share them with people you like.
)Mark
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Username: Sea Skimmer
Nickname: Interstellar Warlord
Number of Posts: 1947
Date of Post: (08/27/07 21:31:32)
Aerial refueling first took place in 1921; however the method used was literally a man climbing from one plane to another in mid air with a can of gas on his back! Obviously, this could only work with biplanes going 60-80mph, and men of a type that are now rare in the world.
I believe 1929 marked the first systematic use of the refueling, by then upgraded to a hose system, to vastly extend an aircrafts range. A new world endurance record was set with 150 hours, and within two years the record was raise to more then 600 hours, with both fuel and motor oil being transferred, along with supplies for the air crew.
The first operational tanker aircraft, the KB-29, began fueling planes in 1948. About 250 were converted from existing B-29s. It was soon replaced by the purpose built KC-97 in 1950 and air refueling became a truly practical and routine part of air operations.
Sorry to be long winded, but if you have the knowledge and resources, share them with people you like.
)I wouldn't worry about that one! People here love long winded but informative posts.
Personally I'm long winded, and an expert on nothing, but I feel like I usually communicate some kind of useful information with every paragraph, so its all good.
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Username: Seer Stuart
Nickname: The Prince of Darkness
Number of Posts: 7088
Date of Post: (08/28/07 04:35:04)
The first operational tanker aircraft, the KB-29, began fueling planes in 1948. About 250 were converted from existing B-29s. It was soon replaced by the purpose built KC-97 in 1950 and air refueling became a truly practical and routine part of air operations.
The British actually used aerial refuelling on a routine basis first; their transatlantic flying boat service used the technique described; the aircraft would take off with full cargo but a light fuel load and then meet up with a tanker to top off their tanks. They started that in 1939 and I understand that a number of commercial flights were made before the outbreak of war shut the whole thing down.
The KB-29Ms didn't last that long, they were OK as tankers but they used the hose refuelling that had a transfer rate too low for use with bombers. The KB-29Ms were replaced by KB-29Ps that used the flying boom technique, they entered service in 1950. There were 92 KB-29Ms and 116 KB-29Ps. They were all phased out of service by 1957
They were replaced by KB-50s that started entering service in 1956. 134 B-50s were modified to KB-50 standard. 112 of these were converted to KB-50J standard that had an underwing jet on each wing to boost performance. Those entered service in 1958 but they were a great disappointment; the B-50 airframe was already old and tired and it was hard to keep the KB-50Js operational. Ina ddition, there were 24 KB-50Ks that were converted from TB-50 trainers. All KB-50s were assigned to TAC.
I remember seeing KB-50 tankers operating over the UK around 1960. The type lingered on until at least 1964 with some KB-50s operating over Vietnam (the only B-50s to see action). Some KB-50s came under hostile fire during Vietnam and there are unsubstantiated reports that a couple of them may have been shot down.
Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others
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Username: PMN1
Nickname: Old Friend
Number of Posts: 671
Date of Post: (08/28/07 06:17:49)
The British actually used aerial refuelling on a routine basis first; their transatlantic flying boat service used the technique described; the aircraft would take off with full cargo but a light fuel load and then meet up with a tanker to top off their tanks. They started that in 1939 and I understand that a number of commercial flights were made before the outbreak of war shut the whole thing down
Which makes it a bit surprising it doesn't seem to have been suggested for use in the Battle of the Atlantic - how good a tanker would a Stirling make?
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Username: Seer Stuart
Nickname: The Prince of Darkness
Number of Posts: 7088
Date of Post: (08/28/07 07:13:01)
Which makes it a bit surprising it doesn't seem to have been suggested for use in the Battle of the Atlantic - how good a tanker would a Stirling make?
In 1945, the RAF proposed sending a bomber force (the Tiger Force) to take part in the bombing of Japan prior to the invasion. The force was equipped with Lancasters which didn't have the range needed so an aerial refuelling capability was built into the Tiger Force structure. I believe up to 50 Lancasters converted into tankers was proposed. It never happened of course.
Why the British didn't use aerial refuelling in the Battle of the Atlantic is a good question. One explanation might be that there weren't enough large aircraft to make it worthwhile and another might be that the training standards of war-trained airmen weren't high enough.
Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others
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Username: PMN1
Nickname: Old Friend
Number of Posts: 671
Date of Post: (08/28/07 11:43:32)
The numbers of aircraft to be assigned to Tiger Force seems to change every time I read - the biggest quantity i've read was 20 squadrons of bombers and 20 squadrons of tankers.
I've put the why no AAR during WW2 up elsewhere and other replies have been, how do the receiver and tanker aircraft find each other, my reply was, well they know where the convoys are so.....
The best explanation i've heard is that by the time there were enough large aircraft to think about diverting some to tanker duties, CVE's had closed the gap.
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Username: Theodore
Nickname: Keeper of the Secret Handshake
Number of Posts: 4922
Date of Post: (08/28/07 12:11:58)
With the aircraft of the day, crew endurance might have been a bigger problem than fuel endurance.
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Username: MBecker01
Nickname: Old Friend
Number of Posts: 793
Date of Post: (08/28/07 12:24:11)
Why the British didn't use aerial refuelling in the Battle of the Atlantic is a good question.
Was it needed in the first place? Liberators closed the "black hole" without aerial refuelling and it seems the Lancaster had a smilar range.
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Username: Sea Skimmer
Nickname: Interstellar Warlord
Number of Posts: 1947
Date of Post: (08/28/07 12:43:18)
But painfully few of either aircraft were assigned to coastal command. IIRC at the end of 1941 the British had just six LB-30 Liberators on the job. Air refueling could have vastly extended the area that twin engine planes could cover.
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Username: PMN1
Nickname: Old Friend
Number of Posts: 671
Date of Post: (08/28/07 13:10:15)
is mentioned on this site
http://www.unrealaircraft.com/forever/ww2.php
The aircraft all seemed to have used a hose and grapple method rather than the what would be obvious to us probe and drogue method.
There is also this
http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Pu ... ueling.pdf
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Username: M Stockwell
Nickname: Regular
Number of Posts: 31
Date of Post: (08/28/07 17:09:06)
I finally found some useful info on the aerial refueling of the Short Empire boats on the trans-atlantic mail flights. Four boats (Short S.30 Mk III Atlantic models were built with most of the "Flight Refuelling" equipment. One or more of the S.23 Atlantic models (The original Empire boats) were also refitted.
Two boats, G-AFCU "Cabot" and G-AFCV "Caribou" were fully equipped. Cabot did the proving flights. Both used inflight refuelling operationally from March 1939 until the war started. The tankers were three Handley Page Harrows, 1 stationed at Shannon, Ireland, and the other 2 at Newfouldland. There were at least 8 round trips down with aerial refuelling. These were mail flights only, no passengers.
Seer Stuart's thought about crew quality was almost certainly a major factor in wartime thinking. The quality of the Imperial Airways/British Overseas Airways Company (BOAC) and Pan American flying boat crews were legendary. They were widely regarded as the best in the world.
Still, given all the range issues during WWII, it is surprising that no experimental use with military A/C was tried.
The 1929 date I previously cited was US Army Air Corps flight of the "Question Mark". A Fokker C-2, it was refueled 43 times by 2 Fokker C-1s, staying aloft for 150 hours before engine trouble forced it to land. I found the 1921 reference, and also a 1918 flight, in which the pilot snagged fuel cans with a grappling hook and hauled them aboard. (USN I think)
However, the 1939 inflight refuelling of the Empire boats in transatlantic mail service seems to qualify as the first true operational use, military or civilian.
The Boeing Model 314 and 314A's use by PanAm in transatlantic service were much larger and had enormout fuel capacity (3,500 US gallons and 4,700 US gallons), so they could make their stages without refuelling.
To say the least, I learned a lot about the early history of aerial refuelling today through this board. I wish I had known this back in the early '70's. I would have appreciated what we were doing a lot more.
Mark.
(Haven't found a good quote to match the better ones on this board yet)
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Username: Larry
Nickname: Official USAF Sycophant
Number of Posts: 2174
Date of Post: (08/29/07 10:40:48)
Welcome to the board, it looks like you're well on your way to becoming another highly valued member. One note, however. You are replying out of thread because you are hitting the wrong reply button. Do not use "Add Reply" at the bottom of the page if you want to reply directly to someone. Use the reply just below the header information on the post (header = author's name, title of post, etc).
I wish I had a gun just like the A-10, I'd be happy as a baby in a playpen I'd mow 'em down like a weedeater, with that thirty millimeter! I wish I had a gun just like the A-10.
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Username: M Stockwell
Nickname: Regular
Number of Posts: 31
Date of Post: (08/31/07 19:37:44)
Thanks Larry.
I put enough brain cells together to figure out what i was doing wrong just before you pointed it out. It is somewhat confusing the way the threads are presented if you are logged on as opposed to when you are not logged on.
I think a combination of the 2 formats would be best.
Mark
PS: A-10s forever. One hell of an airplane, with really great pilots and ground crews.
