Reposting this as it has a surprising amount of information on old board dynamics, talk on Virtual Attrition in all it's forms; some backstory on Stuart with Herman Kahn, Suphi Backstory...
...plus we're finally close to the first combat use of lasers soon [tm]
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Username: Hoahao
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 398
Date: 11/6/02 1:34
arty obsolet!!
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2 ... 407807.stm
"The shovel is brother to the gun." C. SandburgThe US army has, for the first time, shot down an artillery shell in flight using a high-powered laser weapon.
Tactical high energy lasers have the capacity to change the face of the battlefield
US Army Lt Gen Joseph Cosumano
The laser tracked and locked on to the shell, before firing a stream of concentrated light energy photons and destroying it. The US Army's Space and Missile Defence Command said that "seconds later, at a point well short of its intended destination, the projectile was destroyed". The Mobile Tactical High Energy Laser (MTHEL) is being developed by the TRW Corporation for use by the US military and the Israeli Defence Ministry. Two years ago, it successfully shot down a Katyusha rocket, but in Monday's test it managed to destroy a shell moving at a higher speed. The test took place at the White Sands missile range in New Mexico. Potent weapon A laser is an intense beam of light, carefully corralled so that the beam does not diverge and weaken. In the MTHEL, the energy is supplied by a controlled chemical reaction. [] The laser gun uses radar to track targets
The laser is a potentially potent weapon as the beam travels literally at the speed of light and can cross great distances with minimal loss of intensity. Such a beam could knock out targets at distances ranging from tens of kilometres to, in theory, thousands of kilometres. "This shoot-down shifts the paradigm for defensive capabilities," Lieutenant General Joseph Cosumano, head of the missile defence command, told Reuters news agency. "We have shown that even an artillery projectile hurtling through the air at supersonic speed is no match for a laser." Israeli interest The laser was built as a joint project between the US and Israel. [] The Katyusha missiles are Soviet-designed
The Israeli Government is interested in the system because Katyusha rockets are used by militant Islamic groups in attacks on Israel. The system stems in part from a commitment former US President Bill Clinton made in April 1996 to then Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres to aid Israel in developing a security system against rockets. Lasers were behind the space-based missile defence shield idea, labelled "Star Wars", first suggested by US President Ronald Reagan in 1983. The Pentagon has been working on a variety of other laser weapon technologies that could be used to shoot down ballistic missiles in flight, although deployment of such weapons is at least a decade away.
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 82
Date: 11/28/02 1:12
Re: arty obsolet!!
No, i don't think so.
Shooting down one shell is pretty neat, but it doesn't help one too much when a typical FFE has thirty shells coming in a matter of a few seconds.
Maybe in the future could we get the tech to shoot down a good % of an FFE, but not for quite some time, IMHO.
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: Seer Stuart
Nickname: The Prince of Darkness
Posts: 858
Date: 11/28/02 3:32
Re: arty obsolet!!
The catch is residence time vs flight time.
Residence time is the time it takes for the laser to do enough damage to the shell to destroy its aerodynamic integrity.
The laser doesn't blow the shell up by the way; what it does is create a pit in the shell that disturbs the airflow to the point where aerodynamic forces tear the shell apart.
The flight time is the time between the shell becoming engagable by the laser (ie coming within range or over the horizon) and the time the shell impacts on target).
OK so lets look at the situation.
If the flight time of the shell is t
The residence time of the laser is r
The acquisition time of the fire control system is a
The time taken for the laser to shift between targets is s
The "flight time" of the laser beam is c
and
the number of shells engagable by the laser is X
then
X = t/(r+a+s+c)
However, for the ranges in question c is effectively = 0
a is irrelevent since it will be less than r and the fire control will be engaging one target while the laser is processing the predecessor. The time taken for the laser to shift betwen targets is also effectively = 0
therefore X = t/r
The current residence time is between 3 and 5 seconds. However, the new solid state laser will cut that to 0.5 seconds or less.
Now crank some figures for various artillery combinations in and you'll get how many shells a single artillery defense laser can shoot down.
However, a
NOTE: it was cut off in my copy [Shep]
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Username: Anthony G
Nickname: Regular
Posts: 43
Date: 11/28/02 8:00
Re: arty obsolet!!
I'm often called a pessimist however events usually prove me to be an optimist.
Using your variables
t = time of possible engagement (I will assume if you see it you can hit it; this is not TOF because you cannot ordinarily see the round the moment it is fired or immediately prior to impact unless you are in the air and range/aspect/scan parameters are met)
a = sensor acquisition time (we'll call it 3-5 sec)
r = residence time (your 3-5 sec going down to 0.5 sec)
s = shift time (should be fairly short, 1-2 sec down to zero for electronically aimed lasers)
Time available for engagement would be Time Available = t-a
Time required to destroy one target and shift to the next Time Engagement = s + r
So to compute the # of engagements you would have Number of Engagements = Time Available / Time Engagement
or
N = (t a)/ (s + r)
Feeding in known/presumed numbers the pessimist might say:
n(optimistic) = (t 5) [sec] / (2 + 5) [sec/engagement]
The optimist would say
n(pessimistic) = (t 3) [sec] / (0 + .5) [sec/engagement]
Now we need some sort of engagement data.
The pessimist (and he is not the most pessimistic person on the block by any means) says for an engagement by 105mm m101 arty out to a range of ~8500m at charge 7 with QE slightly less than 400 mils (max ord slightly over 1000m) if you presume that terrain/siting considerations limit ability to see the bullets to altitudes above 250m you would have roughly 15 sec (this is t) in which to acquire and engage a round.
so here your engagements are bracketed with:
n(pessimistic) = ~1.4 or ~1 engagement (15 5)/(2 + 5)
n(optimistic) = ~15 engagements (15 3)/(0 + .5)
If OTOH the optimist says I can site my radar/weapon systems to spot your rounds at ~100m then you are looking at a visibility time of roughly 25 sec.
n(pessimistic) = ~2.8 or ~3 engagements (25 3)/(2 + 5)
n(optimistic) = ~44 engagements (25 3)/(0 + .5)
As you can see there is a HUGE range of potential effectiveness from not very all the way to devastating.
anyway I hope this was illuminating to someone
There's no need to fear! Underdog is here!
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Username: Scott Brim
Nickname: Technocrat
Posts: 130
Date: 11/28/02 19:05
Long term implications.
Let's assume that twenty years from now (or whenever it comes to pass) cost effective mobile laser defenses are in service for those nations or paramiltary organizations that can afford them, and that these lasers have significantly reduced the threat of both strategic and tactical offensive action by aircraft -- manned or unmanned -- against these particular nations or paramilitary groups.
All types of aircraft are affected: air superiority and strike fighters (manned and unmanned), transports, helicopters, V-22's; in other words, any kind of airpower asset you need to make OMFTS and similar strategies successful as Sea Power military doctrines in the 21st Century.
In addition, let's suppose these defenses have significantly complicated the employment of rockets, missiles, and artillery projectiles as tools for prosecuting an offensive ground war operation of any type, let alone one which has OMFTS and vertical envelopment as its primary operational doctrine for establishing and then expanding an initial lodgement within enemy held territory.
Is it possible to envision that under these circumstances, the traditional roles of aircraft, artillery, armor, and ground troops might be reversed?
In other words, ground troops and their portable weapons -- combined with armor and with truly massive volumes of artillery -- might pave the way for missiles and for aircraft by fighting their way through the defender's ground forces in order to attack and to destroy the defender's laser units, thereby allowing both missiles and aircraft a sufficient measure of survivability to enter into the battlespace.
In this kind of scenario, is it possible to think in terms of an "aircraft survivability envelope" which advances with the ground forces, and which expands as these forces pass through and defeat the defender's ground units?
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Username: Anthony G
Nickname: Regular
Posts: 44
Date: 11/28/02 19:26
You have to consider ...
... this laser thing as a system.
It has a method of target acquisition; so you might spoof it, hide from it or disable it in some way.
It has to track you long enough to generate a firing solution; here lies another place to interfere.
It seems to me that methods of hardening vs lasers haven't been explored. Remember that we have some fantastic materials scientists out there. I have to believe that a form of armor exists or is out on the horizon that could degrade the performance of lasers. Such armor could simply be a material that does not absorb the energy of particular wavelengths of lasers well.
There's no need to fear! Underdog is here!
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Username: Scott Brim
Nickname: Technocrat
Posts: 131
Date: 11/28/02 20:22
Re: You have to consider ...
I have to believe that a form of armor exists or is out on the horizon that could degrade the performance of lasers.
The question is, can such an armor be manufactured with such an appropriate set of strength and weight characteristics so as to find its way onto devices which fly through the sky as their primary means of reaching (or approaching) the target?
Is it really true that this armor doesn't have to actually deflect or defeat the laser beam outright, it just has to affect the laser's overall on-target performance to an extent such that a larger and realistically bounded volume of incoming ordnance has a chance of defeating it?
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Username: Seer Stuart
Nickname: The Prince of Darkness
Posts: 860
Date: 11/29/02 2:20
Re: arty obsolet!!
The sensor acquisition time should apply apply to the first shot; if we use a dual-channel fire control system, one channel is tracking the shell being engaged while the second channel is acquiring and tracking the next target. As soon as the laser has finished with the first shell, it switche sto the ready-made fire control solution from the second channel while the first channel sets up the third shot.
A;so. you're using an M-101 with 8,500 meters; thats short range (within modern mortar range). If we take modern artillery, say a 155 L45 or L52 we're looking at a gun with a range of between 30 and 45 kilometers. In some cases (the late unlamented Crusader, the Finnish 155 L52 and the Thai 155 L55 we're looking at ranges of up to 52.5 kilometers.
Also, the virtue of an artillery defense is that it doesn't have to shoot down all the inbound rounds; it just has to stop the first few getting through until counter-battery forces the firing guns to displace. Of course, the guns could have their own anti-artillery laser batteries protecting them.
Even taking the pessimistic figure of around 3 rounds destroyed per laser per salvo, this means that a battery of six anti-artillery lasers could take down 18 rounds per salvo. Which means that they could neutralize, for a short time at least, an artillery battalion. Which may not be much ut it could buy enough time to get a critical unit out from under.
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 85
Date: 11/30/02 0:36
Re: arty obsolet!!
Certainly interesting figures, though i doubt even the 'pessimistic' system would be deployed for at least 15 years, minimum(optomisticly speaking).
I think that were it9the laser defense) to reach that level of effectiveness, you would end up seeing a massive proliferation of artillery to overcome it.
Instead of making artillery vanish, it(artillery) would be fielded in ever increasing numbers, with more advanced high ROF platforms to saturate any defenses that were developed.
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: Bruce Morrow
Nickname: Regular
Posts: 33
Date: 11/30/02 3:42
spreadsheets and implications
For those who want to play with numbers here is some information.
For a thread that I made on reviewing and analyzing a burst/pulse type of laser system characteristics, it can be found at this link:
http://pub92.ezboard.com/fmilitaryandpo ... D=11.topic
Note that it is only interested with relatively short pulse(s) duration effects.
For a thread that I made on alterations for the spreadsheet to analyze continuous beam laser characteristics, the web link is:
http://pub92.ezboard.com/fmilitaryandpo ... D=18.topic
Others can further modify the numbers for the alterations to the spreadsheet for different assumptions and characteristics.
Basically, it suggests that continuous beams are used for situations where you are more interested in imposing a heat load on the target which can cause melting as well as defeating attempts to make the surface reflective. However for laser systems that rely on deep penetration effects and more immediate effect, then short duration pulses on the order of a microsecond should be used.
As far as implications for the bigger picture, it may be different from what most believe. Lasers would still be primarily line-of-sight weapons with ranges from 10 kilometers to somewhere around 300 kilometers depending on the fire control systems, power and focussing characteristics. In addition they have certain damaging effects that are peculiar to themselves.
I would suggest that most aircraft that have to face laser systems in the battlefield would be restrict their speeds to somewhere in the sub-sonic range (to prevent the surface from undergoing catastrophic buckling from the air flows while melting), use obstacles to block line-of-sight (such as mountains, buildings or other enemy forces), have a thick layer of composite armor, include a powerful rapid-fire solid slug cannon for destroying enemy laser systems, and its own anti-missile laser. This may mean that future aircraft might trace their design concepts to the A-10 Wart hog, since it has much of those characteristics with the exception of not having an anti-missile laser. It is also maneuverable enough that it could take out artillery systems.
It should also be noted that there will still be a need for other aircraft for such jobs as: information gathering and processing, logistics of moving equipment around, and probably huge laser arrays for taking out the really large missiles. There will also be various specialized UAVs.
As for ground forces, one should not discount the possibility that they will simply incorporate laser systems as simply one more mobile unit for that Future Combat System. Such a larger system could essentially act like a mini-embodiment of the Land-Air Doctrine where they all engage in fire and maneuver to keep moving and flanking the enemy forces for both indirect and direct fire weapons. This could be somewhat off-putting for an enemy force that is pre-occupied with using artillery and anti-missile lasers when suddenly a bunch of mini-tank robots suddenly appear on their sides with orders to neutralize them. This could be a way to test on a small scale what refinements the strategy needs to make it more effective. It would put budget pressures to keep potential enemies from putting all their "eggs" into just artillery and anti-missile lasers, while at the same time making the Future Combat System more flexible in what sorts of threats it could handle.
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Username: Scott Brim
Nickname: Technocrat
Posts: 132
Date: 11/30/02 15:33
A-10 replacement
Does anyone know if a serious program for development of an A-10 replacement is now under consideration, for either a manned or an unmanned aircraft?
Or is it simply too early to make a serious commitment to developing an A-10 replacement, given the kinds technological forces which are breaking loose these days which could significantly affect its performance and cost requirements.
IIRC, the A-10 is scheduled to be in service until 2028 or thereabouts.
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Username: Tony Evans
Nickname: Citizen
Posts: 563
Date: 11/30/02 22:05
Re: arty obsolet!!
Why would anybody with any brains opt for saturation when cruise missiles flying at NOE can be used to attack the defensive lasers, which of course can be pinpointed by firing just a few rounds of artillery?
It is not enough that God is on our side. We must likewise be on God's.
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Username: Seer Stuart
Nickname: The Prince of Darkness
Posts: 864
Date: 11/30/02 22:28
Re: arty obsolet!!
Why would anybody with any brains opt for saturation when cruise missiles flying at NOE can be used to attack the defensive lasers, which of course can be pinpointed by firing just a few rounds of artillery?
A good point. The point is though that defensive lasers bring about a new level of complexity to the planning of artillery strikes. At the moment, its relatively a simple three-stage process.
1) Localize the target
2) Shoot at it
3) Run like hell before the counter-battery fire arrives.
Once the artillery fire is on its way, there's precious little anybody can do about it. Those shells are going to arrive; the art is to prevent any more being fired.
Now introduce laser defenses. Of course they can be countered but we now have to think out a reasonable tactical plan to get the artillery fire through. It begins to look like the sort of planning needed for an airstrike. We would need a "wild weasel" barrage to get the defensive lasers to reveal their positions by firing, a "defense suppression" to take out the defensive lasers and an "escort artillery" force to take down enemy artillery that opens up on ours when they start firing at the lasers. Finally we would need the "strike package" to get through and hit the targets.
Suddenly the commitment of assets needed to get the artillery strike through has just got a whole load bigger and more complex.
Cruise missiles flying NOE? Thats more problematical. If we look at the command loop involved it gets tricky. The Wild weasel artillery fire gets the defensive lasers to reveal their position all right. However, that's got to be relayed to the battery of cruise missile launchers who'll dial in their missiles and fire them. The cruise missiles then have to get to their target and hit it. If its still there - the solid-state lasers will be mobile. Present drawing have them on a Humvee but I doubt that; I suspect an 8x8 will be more like it. I don't think it would be impossible for the lasers to get the shoot-move-shoot cycle inside the reaction time of the missile batteries.
Ding - penny just dropped. At AUSA, one of the companies was showing a long-endurance loitering munition that would hover over the battlefield to drop on targets of opportunity. I bet an anti-artillery laser system is one of the target sets the designers have in mind.
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Username: Tony Evans
Nickname: Citizen
Posts: 564
Date: 11/30/02 23:28
Re: arty obsolet!!
That's why I always laugh at people that pooh-poohed TacTom and other persistent cruise missile technologies on the gorunds that targets of opportunity don't pop up within predictable windows of time. Of course they do, if they are defensive fire production centers and you attack their clients at a predictable time.
Hellfire armed Predators--aside from rather serendipitous applications discovered in Afghanistan--also make much more sense in this context. The argument agains RPVs has always been that they can get shot down. Well, setting aside for the moment that getting a drone shot down within definable temporal and spacial coordinates tells you something in itself, if you saturate the battelfield with enough dual purpose (surveillance/attack) RPVs, or enough of each type, you put the enemy in a classical combined arms bind. They either go stealthy and forego defensive fires until the last possible moment--probably too late--or they lose their defensive fire agencies trying to take out surveillance RPVs.
The same problem applies to all defensive fire agencies, regardless of their nature. Lasers are in some way more vulnerable to this than standard AAA. A conventional AA gun only has to produce enough energy to get the effective portion of the weapon system--the shell--to fly a relatively low energy ballistic trajectory to the near vicinity of the target. The laser, on the other hand, generates every bit of effective energy it will utilize, plus more to account for attenuation and beam spread, at the firing point. While the heat signature of the "muzzle" will be tremendous, if you keep the thing reasonably mobile, you put it in close proximity to a highly energetic power source. The heat bloom from cooling such a power supply ought to be easily detectable as well.
It is not enough that God is on our side. We must likewise be on God's.
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Username: Urgit
Nickname: Linuxphile
Posts: 298
Date: 12/1/02 13:12
Re: arty obsolet!!
How would you be able to detect the position of a AAL ( Anti-Artillery Laser, sorry I'm an IT bod remember =)?
Obviously you can detect it's presence when your shell's go off course / explode prematurely, but is it actually possible to detect the laser's actual position?
Also, wouldnt any munitions hanging around on a parachute be a fairly easy target for modern radar ( and hence laser systems ) to spot?
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Username: Scott Brim
Nickname: Technocrat
Posts: 133
Date: 12/1/02 15:35
Hypersonic projectiles/missles as counterbattery?
Could we surmise that hypersonic scramjet projectiles/missiles might play a role some day in dealing with anti-artillery laser systems (AALs to use Urgit's acronym) by reducing the time the defender has available to acquire and engage the incoming rounds, thereby adding more complication to the defender's various means of survivability against counterbattery action?
The presumption here is that current hypersonic research eventually results in a some kind of useful weapons system that can see field deployment in fifteen or twenty years, and that hypersonic devices can be constructed affordably and in sufficient quantity. (And also that there is a reason to build these systems, which there may or may not be.)
As now conceived, hypersonic scramjet missles are seen as strike weapons. But is it possible that hypersonic devices could be made small enough so as to allow their use in 155mm artillery systems, providing for an organic hypersonic AAL counterbattery weapon at the battalion level?
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 90
Date: 12/2/02 16:41
Re: arty obsolet!!
Why would you want to saturate with artillery?
They(the enemy) may very well saturate the laser defenses with artillery because A) The side with the anti-arty laser has probably also got a laser D for cruise missiles(which is probably more mature since they are a higher priority i would think) or, B) Because they might need that arty to hold a critical geographical or political position in the face of a massed enemy attack. An attack which is certain to not wait for a 500kt TACTOM to traverse several hundred miles(or even 50) to take out the OPFOR anti-arty laser defense so that your force's normal allotment of guns can do helpful things like fire counterbattery or provide direct fire support or FASCAM missions.
It is also highly likely that the force in question won't even have a system like the TACTOM.
Remember, we are talking about the Iran's, N.Korea's, and Argentina's of the world here, not the US or UK.
We will be the one's with these toys- not them.
Also, let's face it, for the next thirty years very few nations will have any laser based systems at all, and if the US/NATO does have anti-arty laser D, they(Threat nation's) will need to counter it in some way. Since they will have no laser based counter available, they may very well go the Russian route of massive numbers.
It doesn't seem that unreasonable to me that this is how it could all unfold.
Besides, arty is a lot cheaper to buy enmasse than mobile anti-arty laser platforms will be i would think, which is another factor to wiegh.
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: David Newton
Nickname: The English Adminstrator
Posts: 1658
Date: 12/2/02 18:22
Re: arty obsolet!!
Why do you assume that laser based defence systems are not going to become widespread over the next few years? Lasers are a mature technology, which has been around for about 50 years. The problem is not the lasers, the problem is power generation, and getting the power generators small enough. Don't just assume that the US and its allies have the lead on everything. I seem to remember Stuart saying that somewhere like Brazil has been actively seeking laser based defence systems recently.
Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with mustard.
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Username: Supatra
Nickname: Infantry - Let us Prey
Posts: 864
Date: 12/2/02 18:39
How many people here have been shelled?
For those who have not know what is worst thing about artillery fire? Is that we can do nothing about it. Must just lie flat on ground wait for it to stop. Perhaps stop because gunners find better target perhaps stop before counter battery fire take enemy guns out perhaps stop because shell land on top of you. Can be any of three but all those under fire can do is wait. Is demoralizing. If lasers can give some measure of protection can give unit under artillery fire some way to protect itself some way of stopping shells coming then is worth having.
Be polite. Be professional. But, have a plan to kill everyone you meet.
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Username: David Newton
Nickname: The English Adminstrator
Posts: 1662
Date: 12/2/02 19:31
Re: How many people here have been shelled?
I've been shelled, albeit with something rather less than lethal than high explosive.
There was one time when I was in university hall of residence accomodation, and we were having a ball that evening. Therefore everyone had black tie gear on. The hall next door, with which there was something of a rivalry had a party later that evening, and so the people in the hall had been temporarily turfed out so that party preparations could be made. That meant that they were eating their evening meals just across the turning circle from the hall I was in. Part of their evening meal was yogurts. Some of the people with yogurts took to sending them on a ballistic trajectory into my hall's quad, over a three storey building no less. The people who were hit in that bombardment were not particularly happy, since stains are a pain to get out of tuxedos and ball dresses.
The defence in that case was hall staff heading across and putting a stop to the bombardment, but it was frustrating not being able to do anything about it whilst the yogurts rained down.
Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with mustard.
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 97
Date: 12/2/02 23:47
Re: arty obsolet!!
Please do not think that i am opposed to the laser D, cause i am not, but i sincerely doubt that any potential aggressors are likely to have this technology anytime soon.
Could i be wrong? Absolutely, but that is my honest feeling on the matter.
Look at how many nations can't even field decent AWACs platforms, let alone lasers.
I am merely pointing out that if i have to overwhelm the other guy with sheer numbers, that it is a lot better than just 'losing' my ability to hit them with arty cause they shoot it all down.
Cause that would really suck....
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: David Newton
Nickname: The English Adminstrator
Posts: 1667
Date: 12/3/02 1:17
Re: arty obsolet!!
An AWACS platform is a very much more complicated piece of kit than a laser defence weapon. The problem with the AWACS aircraft is systems integration. Taking all of the incoming data, and assembling it into a picture of what is going on over the battlefield is a very complicated process. A laser defence system is simply another tactical asset. Deciding how to use the new systems, and developing doctrine for integrating laser systems into the artillery is likely to be a thorny problem for the same reason that AWACS aircraft are.
The problem with a lot of lesser military powers is not so much the systems they have, but the C4I that controls those systems. That is where America, and to a lesser extent Britain have such a military advantage over just about everybody else. Their C4I systems are so developed that they can control the battlefield at a faster pace than virtually anyone else. It worked for the Germans in 1939-1941 with Blitzkrieg, and it worked in Desert Storm. Getting inside the enemy's decision cycle is critical to winning modern wars.
With these artillery defence systems, their presence will add another layer of complexity to the battlefield. As Suphi and Stuart indicate, it will not just be a matter of defending ground troops from artillery attack, it will be our old friend virtual attrition. That is the principle air defence networks work on, and adding it to the mix where artillery is concerned will be very valuable for the western militaries.
Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with mustard.
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Username: Bruce Morrow
Nickname: Regular
Posts: 35
Date: 12/3/02 3:29
Cooling information
I have made a very brief article on basic cooling numbers for others to use when analyzing claims of cooling requirements for high energy systems like laser and what they would need to be. It is located at:
http://pub92.ezboard.com/fmilitaryandpo ... D=19.topic
It is sufficiently generic and simple that it can give rough idea of the requirements for the cooling material/interface requirement for any heat load. It is actually a lot more complicated than that, but it is simply intended to allow anyone with a simple calculator to do a "reality check" for when the question of heat loads is raised.
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Username: Seer Stuart
Nickname: The Prince of Darkness
Posts: 868
Date: 12/3/02 4:26
Re: arty obsolet!!
I am merely pointing out that if I have to overwhelm the other guy with sheer numbers, that it is a lot better than just 'losing' my ability to hit them with arty cause they shoot it all down.
And now, once again we run head-on into an old friend of ours. Virtual attrition. Yes, it would be possible to mass artillery at a single point and overwhelm the defenses at that point. There's a problem. Well actually two.
The first and obvious is that artillery is a finite asset and an expensive one to boot. If its massed at one point, then the rest of the battle area has to be stripped to do it. That means obtaining superiority at one point will only be obtained by accepting inferiority across the board elsewhere. That's a recipe for disaster at any time and, against highly mobile Western (and particularly the US) armies its tactical suicide. Also, the massed artillery is rendered very vulnerable to US firepower which specializes in removing entire grid squares. Thats conventional firepower, not nuclear. Since the rest of the battlefield is being stripped of artillery to mass at one point, the laser defense systems at that point are effectively protecting even those units that are not under their screen.
The not-so-obvious point is that artillery is a voracious consumer of supplies. In fact, its not too much of an overstatement that Army logistics is keeping artillery moving and firing and everything else is a detail. If the guns are massed at one point, the logistics to support them must also be massed to support them at that point. Since logistics take longer to set up than just moving guns into position, that logistic re-orientation points to where the guns are going to be. The implications of that are intriguing.
As an old colleague of mine, Don Brennan, used to say (with respect to BMD) virtual attrition is a bitch. Its not the direct effect of the defenses that kills you, its the implications of what the defense might do.
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 98
Date: 12/3/02 5:43
Re: arty obsolet!!
So SEER, with all due respect, do you just expect the other side to say "Oh well, we can't afford/buy/build laser's, but there's no point in buying more artillery cause we will run into virtual attrition?"
I am curious as to what other's think that Red forces will do to overcome this technology.
Moving on, there are also distinct exceptions to your observations of the employment of forces, such as those cases where US/Blue forces are tied to a terrain oriented defensive mission and their superior mobility is nullified. Or also when light infantry(ie limited mobility) Blue forces are involved.
There are definitely certain times when a large imbalance of local firepower(local superiority) is extremely useful.
You may have 10 divisions, and i may only have 5, but if i can hit a portion of your front defended by 1 division with three of my own- thus achieving local superiority- before you can attack me, it will be hard to tell that my forces are outnumbered 2:1 in-theater where the fighting is happening.
For all practical intents and purposes i will hold a 3:1 numbers advantadge in the limited area of the FEBA i am attacking into.
If i get a breakthrough, and push one of my divisions deep into your rear threatening your LOC, capital, or other politicly sensitive objective, i will win(well- probably
) despite the 2:1 overall theater advantadge you held initially.In such circumstances it is quite normal to mass very high concentrations of artillery, logistics, ADA etc to support the attack. In fact, i would say it is crucial.
Now, while i agree that it is extremely unlikely that an enemy force is likely to pull off the build up/massing required for an attack like the one outlined above against US forces and maintain OPSEC, it is possible(We did exactly this during ODS with the mass exudus West for the VII corps left hook).
This is an excellent debate though, and i appreciate the opposing views.
You guys are actually swaying me, but the other side and how they react also needs to be considered IMHO.
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: David Newton
Nickname: The English Adminstrator
Posts: 1668
Date: 12/3/02 17:18
Re: arty obsolet!!
First, you are using the wrong reply link. Please use the one just underneath the time and date stamp of the post. That one replies to an individual message, and not the entire thread. It makes following the discussion a lot easier.
Second, it's not just a case of saying, "Oh well, we can't afford/buy/build laser's, but there's no point in buying more artillery cause we will run into virtual attrition?" There are real, tactical, strategic and practical problems that virtual attrition causes. I don't think that you have quite got the concept of virtual attrition yet. As I said, it is the principle that air defence systems are built on, so it is probably best to explain it in terms of that because that is an actual situation, rather than a hypothetical situation from five or ten years' time.
OK, so some nation has the ability to put x number of planes over a target at a certain time. For the moment, it doesn't matter what types those planes are, just that the logistics of the situation enable x planes to be put in the air. There are certain force multipliers, and certain force constrainers that operate in war zones, and have an impact on both the number of planes that can be operated overall, and their effectiveness. One of those force multipliers is an AWACS aircraft. Such aircraft allow much better situational awareness of the battlefield. Another is tankers, which allow aircraft to remain aloft longer, either extending their time on station, or extending the possible striking range of a force.
Now we move on to force constrainers. The number of aircraft x that the power can put over the target is fixed, but not all those aircraft can be strike aircraft, due to the fact that striking the target is not the only mission that needs to be accomplished. This leads to the modern concept of the strike package. One very obvious, and very old (in aviation terms) job that needs doing is CAP, ie keeping enemy fighter and interceptor aircraft from shooting down the strike aircraft. That takes one chunk out of the available aircraft x. Another is taken out by Wild Weasel aircraft. Those are aircraft which deal with air defence networks, by taking out SAM sites for example. Still a third is taken out by electronic warfare aircraft, which jam enemy radars and communications. So, that is three support aircraft over the target that are needed to complete a mission, at a minimum. Other support missions could become necessary in the future, such as recon assets to follow mobile targets and other similar targets of opportunity.
Countering that tendancy for virtual attrition, ie reduction of the number of strike aircraft over the target due to the need for support and defence aircraft is the advance in technology. That is where things like laser guided bombs, and lately JDAMs come in. They allow less bombs to be used in destroying a target. It used to be that a target was allocated a number of aircraft to destroy it. That was certainly true up to Vietnam, and was to an extent true in Desert Storm. It has now reached the point, even with tactical aircraft, where it is possible to talk about targets per aircraft.
All of this means that planning an airstrike is a complicated business. The introduction of laser based defence systems into the artillery business means that a lot more of that complexity comes into that area. As others have indicated, the basic idea of artillery at the moment is that it arrives at a point, sets up, shoots, and then gets out of there before counter battery radar allows counter battery fire to arrive. There is a defence mechanism against the guns, but none that is effective against the shells. The laser systems add a defence against the shells themselves. It goes from a situation where once a battery has fired, assuming that the targetting is accurate, and that there is a very low dud rate, the shells will hit the target and explode, to a situation where there is no guarantee that will happen. The additional layer in the defence means that either more artillery pieces have to be used in a particular shoot, depriving other areas of the front of artillery, or a countermeasure for the laser fire needs to be deployed. Given the nature of laser fire, and the nature of artillery shells, that countermeasure would almost certainly have to be active. Therefore, having a countermeasure implies having an extra system on the ground, which the logisitics support system of the army has to support.
With the need for more artillery, cost can come into the equation, so a country may not be able to afford to buy more artillery, running into the situation that the quote that you put at the start of your post postulates. As you indicate, cost can also come in with the systems themselves. We are not just dealing with one new system here, we are dealing with two. If the enemy has a laser defence system, then the enemy is also likely to have a countermeasure system. That means that in a ideal situation, the power concerned needs to have both as well.
The really tricky situation comes at the planning staff and C4I level again. The laser defence system has introduced several extra variables into planning an attack. Calling in artillery becomes a lot more like an airstrike. Thinking about it, that may well be one of the reasons behind the cancellation of Crusader. If laser based defence systems are going to add additional complications to artillery, and aircraft can do a pretty good job of putting ordnance on target today, why bother with a massively complicated and expensive artillery system?
Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with mustard.
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 99
Date: 12/3/02 18:35
Re: arty obsolet!!
I see. Comprehensive IADS = virtual attrition.
B-2 = no virtual attrition(no strike package, just the Spirit- we've all seen that chart i'm sure).
I am pretty familiar with the variables at play as you have laid them out- just didn't realize there was a term for it. Still, i am not so sure how effective 'virtual attrition' really has been.
Certainly the things you point out add a lot of complexity to the planning and prosecution of air operations, but IADS have not fared very well in times of war. It seems as if trying to protect the IADS itself becomes a real liability to the defender as well.
Wonder what the term is for that?
Still interested to hear what others think that threat forces will do to counter Anti-arty laser D(assuming similar systems are unavailable to them).
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: David Newton
Nickname: The English Adminstrator
Posts: 1672
Date: 12/3/02 19:41
Re: arty obsolet!!
It has been very effective. The very fact that unescorted strike aircraft can't go into a hot zone means that virtual attrition has been effective.
You also say that IADS have not been very effective in wartime, but I would point out that IADS have not really been tested in an equal environment. It took 2,600 aircraft to dismantle the Iraqi IADS in 1991. The Yugoslav IADS was never really dismantled, partially due to stupidly restrictive ROE, but partially due to the fact that there weren't enough aircraft involved in the war to really put a dent in it. There were never much more than 1,000 aircraft involved over Kosovo, and so the IADS remained reasonably intact. It is also the case that an IADS is a very complicated beast, again a nightmare of systems integration. From what I have heard, the British IADS is not very good, so even first rate powers can cockup in this area.
In short, a truely effective IADS has not really been tested by a truely effective airforce. I mean by that that the airforce and IADS are on about equal terms. Without the USAF and USN, it would have been impossible to crack the Iraqi IADS in 1991.
Regarding the B2, even that needs a strike package to accompany it. Over Kosovo for example, EA6B Prowlers were on hand for radar jamming when B2s flew missions.
BTW, you're still using the wrong reply link!
Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with mustard.
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 100
Date: 12/3/02 21:02
Re: arty obsolet!!
OK, i used the reply link you specified, but it all comes up on the same thread when i view it regardless.
But i will try to remember to use the one you specified to make things easier for ya.
I would argue that the N.Vietnamese IADS was effectively totally destroyed in a matter of days by the US during Linebacker II(The NVA didnt have any SAMs left to shoot back with by the mid-point of Linebacker II).
Also, what of the Nazi IADS in WWII?
Certainly by late 44 it was totally overwhelmed and inneffective wasn't it?(not a 'modern' IADS, but an IADS nonetheless).
Also, how effective was the Iraqi IADS when it could not even impose a 1% attrition rate on coalition aircraft, even on the first night of the war?
Also, one does not really need to 'destroy' an enemies IADS if one can supress it do they?
Isn't that the major difference between the USAF and USN SEAD doctrine?
To me, the best IADS is good modern fighters with well trained pilots and AWACs support.
If you control the sky and see everything going on, you don't even need SAMs or AAA really do you?
Probably why the US Army has always had lousy battlefield Anti-Air capability and never really placed very much emphasis on it. We have the USAF for that.
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: David Newton
Nickname: The English Adminstrator
Posts: 1673
Date: 12/3/02 21:39
Re: arty obsolet!!
You have cited the last time when I would say competent airforces (USAAF and RAF) came up against a competent IADS (German). Look at how much effort the USAAF and RAF had to devote to knock out the Luftwaffe and German air defences. Look at how much effort the Luftwaffe devoted in 1940, and didn't knock out the British defences.
The North Vietnamese IADS was packing the latest equipment, but not every SAM site could be manned by Soviet troops, and those that weren't did not have those who could best take advantage of things. I am also not sure about the C4I that the Vietnamese had, that might not have been up to scratch.
The Iraqi IADS did catch out quite a few pilots. Aside from one possible F/A18 A2A kill by a Mig 25, every aircraft lost to enemy action during Desert Storm was knocked down by AAA or SAMs. 37 fixed wing aircraft were lost to enemy action during that war. That means that about 1.5% of total aircraft deployed were destroyed. That isn't an unsustainable rate of losses, but it is a significant number of the aircraft involved.
From a practical point of view, destroying an IADS is the same as supressing it, indeed SEAD is effectively destroying an enemy air defence network. A radar at the business end of a HARM or ALARM missile is destroyed, and a SAM site or AAA site knocked out with a bomb is also destroyed. Even spoofing a SAM site can be viewed as physical destruction of the IADS if a SAM is launched and misses its target for whatever reason, since that has reduced the supply of SAMS that the IADS has available.
On the reply link, it depends what view you have the board set to. You almost certainly have the board set to showing all the posts in a thread as one list. There is an alternative view that shows the thread as a tree structure. Switch to that and you will see what I mean about following discussions more easily, since each subthread has its own branch of the tree.
Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with mustard.
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Username: Seer Stuart
Nickname: The Prince of Darkness
Posts: 869
Date: 12/3/02 23:19
Re: arty obsolet!!
So SEER, with all due respect, do you just expect the other side to say "Oh well, we can't afford/buy/build laser's, but there's no point in buying more artillery cause we will run into virtual attrition?"
This is a logical fallacy called a false dilemma. You're setting up two alternatives as being mututally exclusive - that is saturating laser defenses works or abandon artillery completely. This is a fallacy because that isn't the choice offered. The choice isn't between using saturation tactics and abandoning artillery. Its between saturation and other means of penetrating the defense. Tony's low-level cruise missiles are one, ultra-high speed artillery projectiles are another. There may well be more. However, virtual attrition effectively destroys saturation as a viable means of penetration.
There are definitely certain times when a large imbalance of local firepower(local superiority) is extremely useful. You may have 10 divisions, and i may only have 5, but if i can hit a portion of your front defended by 1 division with three of my own- thus achieving local superiority- before you can attack me, it will be hard to tell that my forces are outnumbered 2:1 in-theater where the fighting is happening.For all practical intents and purposes i will hold a 3:1 numbers advantadge in the limited area of the FEBA i am attacking into. If i get a breakthrough, and push one of my divisions deep into your rear threatening your LOC, capital, or other politicly sensitive objective, i will win(well- probably ) despite the 2:1 overall theater advantadge you held initially.
And if if was as donkey we'd all get a ride. You don't expect me to take that seriously do you? Its perfectly possible to create an imaginary chain of events that will support any argument (for example, I could destroy your army by using my secret force of aliens from Roswell who landed in Area 51 by mistake). However, its necessary to have an eye on what is realistic and practical. Try a stupid stunt like that narrow front advance against a modern mobile army and the "massed" force will be wiped out in hours. The uncommitted force on the flanks (with total artillery superiority) smashes in the flanks of your narrow thrust advance, encircles it and wipes out everything in it. Its even dubious whether the massed force will do any good. It needs its massed artillery to get a few round sthrough to the targets and while its doing that, the defending force rips apart the massed attacks with its own unopposed artillery fire. In today's world, massed forces are just so many more targets lined up to die.
Edited by: Seer Stuart at: 12/4/02 2:04:17 am
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Username: Seer Stuart
Nickname: The Prince of Darkness
Posts: 870
Date: 12/3/02 23:56
Re: arty obsolet!!
I would argue that the N.Vietnamese IADS was effectively totally destroyed in a matter of days by the US during Linebacker II(The NVA didnt have any SAMs left to shoot back with by the mid-point of Linebacker II).
You still don't get it do you.
The purpose of a defense system is to defend things not to defend itself.
It doesn't matter if it gets destroyed itself as long as it achieves the intended result which is to increase the amount of effort the attacker needs to destroy the things being defended.
According to "Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment" edited by Cargill Hall and published by the US Air Force Histories and Museums Program, it took 41 support aircraft to get each B-52 relatively safely over Hanoi - and the loss rate was climbing fast as the Vietnamese got the measure of the B-52 tactics. That menas that 41 aircraft that could have been attacking something else were supporting B-52s instead.
Thats twice as bad as Rolling Thunder where each aircraft delivering bombs required 24 support aircraft. That means that the North Vietnamese air defense system had forced 24 out of 25 aircraft to waste their efforts on defense suppression so that one aircraft could get to bomb the target. Thats a virtual attrition rate of 96 percent for Rolling Thunder. Its 98 percent for Linebacker - and in neither case did the bombers get close to achieving their objective.
The North Vietnamese won the air war over Vietnam. The USAF got its ass kicked. Get used to it. The USAF has.
Another example and my favorite.
In the 1950s the British nuclear deterrent was a force of V-bombers thatw ere assigned 200 city targets throughout the western USSR. At that time the Soviet Air Defenses couldn't stop them. That changed and by the mid-1960s, the improving Soviet air defenses made the deep penetration V-bombers highly suspect. So the RN shifted to Polaris. 16 missiles at sea, three warhead per missile. That gave a maximum of 48 targets. Only the Soviets started installing missile defenses that made Polaris suspect. The British response was Chevaline that reduced the Polaris load to two warheads per missile and, to make sure they could get through the defenses, the whole 32 were aimed at one target, Moscow. In short, the Soviet defenseshad reduced the targets at risk from 200 to 1.
Put another way, they had reduced the threat from the British by 99.5 percent without ever firing a shot. Thats virtual attrition.
Also, how effective was the Iraqi IADS when it could not even impose a 1% attrition rate on coalition aircraft, even on the first night of the war?
Extremely effective. Close to 100 percent. According to case studies, the Coalition flew 2,400 sorties of which 9 were aimed at non-air defense system targets. In other words, the Kari system neutralized 99.625 percent of the deployed allied air power - and it would have done the same if it had never fired a shot to defend itself. 2,391 sorties that hit it would otherwise have hit the targets it was protecting instead. Thats virtual attrition.
It doesn't matter how many aircraft actually get shot down. Every aircraft that's tasked with defense suppression instead of attacking real targets is virtual attrition. every aircraft that misses its target because it jinks to avoid AA is virtual attrition. Every aircraft that sacrifices one of its four hardpoints to carry an ECM pod has just suffered 25 percent virtual attrition.
The key is that the defense system isn't the target, the things its protecting are the targets. Every strike, every shell, every missile that gets diverted from the real target to the defense system is a victory for the defense. Enough of those victories and the defense wins. Just like the Soviet defenses defeated the British without ever firing a shot. Just like the NVA defeated the USAF (only the USAF had the courage to admit it and try to learn from the experience). The other key is to remember that the purpose of a defense system isn't to shoot down aircraft, its to prevent their weapons hitting the targets. How they do that doesn't matter.
Classic case. Best way of defeating a Wild Weasel? Buy cheap junky Chinese radars and leave them on. The Wild Weasel fires his two HARMS blowing up useless radars and has to go home for more. He's lost. Without him around you can turn on your good radars and blast the bombers as they make their runs. Sound implausible? December 20th 1972 the Vietnamese did just that - suckered the Weasels into shooting up dummies and left the B-52s uncovered. That night, six out of 99 B-52s went down, 27 more were seriously damaged (three only just made it back to U-Tapao). Thats real attrition that was made possible by the virtual attrition of the Wild Weasel force.
To quote Don again. Virtual attrition is a bitch.
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Username: Tony Evans
Nickname: Citizen
Posts: 571
Date: 12/4/02 3:36
Re: How many people here have been shelled?
Uhhh...that's not quite the same thing as 122mm airburst HE. Of course, very little else is--and most of that is worse.
It is not enough that God is on our side. We must likewise be on God's.
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 101
Date: 12/4/02 5:32
Re: arty obsolet!!
Interesting that you would call that scenario fantasy SEER.
Because using a massed mobile combined arms force to achieve local superiority and smash through an enemie's line to plunge deep into it's rear is quite well known as the doctrine of Blitzkrieg.
Fantasy huh?
Who said such an attack won't fold your flank and roll along your line?
Why would you assume a central frontal assault?
Why also would you assume that your enemy is fixed to a certain geographic line and can't reorient his own forces to deal with your counterattack?
Further, what makes you so sure all your ten divisions are even deployed on the front?
I said 10 to 5 in theater. 'Theater' is usually a pretty big area bro.
There are no shortage of examples in history of massed local superiority being succesfully employed against a numericly superior opponent.
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 102
Date: 12/4/02 5:48
Re: arty obsolet!!
SEER....
"You still don't get it do you. The purpose of a defense system is to defend things not to defend itself. "
No, i believe it is you who isn't looking at the whole picture.
Because the purpose of an airforce is to threaten things.
If your forces need to deploy 100,000 troops just to stop my airforce, then by my air force's very presence i am taking away 100,000 front line troops and forcing them to defend all over against airpower instead of being a part of the land battle- where wars are decided.
The air force makes you defend yourself in depth all across your rear, and strips soldiers from the decisive land battle.
Virtual attrition works both ways see....And the air force's virtual effect on the ground war is far greater than that of the IADS on the airforce IMHO.
You also state that 99.whatever % of sorties were flown against IADS, yet that figure contradicts the thousands of CAS, Anti-artillery and antiarmor sorties all throughout the KTO both before and after the commencement of the ground war. A-10's flew one of the highest sortie rates and did very little weaseling.
And for all the money spent, all the 'virtual attrition', the Iraqi IADS was 'virtually' unable to protect Iraqi ground forces effectively anyway.
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: Nightwatch2
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 73
Date: 12/4/02 14:42
99% Iraqi effectiveness???????
Seer Stuart,
Your analysis is a bit off.
We flew an awful lot of sorties against non-IADS targets in Desert Storm. Are you referring only to the effort since Desert Fox?
If so your percentages are correct, but skewed by the objectives of the No-Fly Zone enforcement under which these strikes are being carried out. In other words, the objective of these almost daily strikes over the last four years has been to ensure the safety of our air patrols, not destroy general infrastructure.
So the current state of affairs of the Iraqi IADS is far short of the 99% effectiveness since they have not prevented a single sortie over the last 4 years from accomplishing its assigned mission.
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Username: Supatra
Nickname: Infantry - Let us Prey
Posts: 872
Date: 12/4/02 14:48
Re: arty obsolet!!
That night, six out of 99 B-52s went down, 27 more were seriously damaged (three only just made it back to U-Tapao).
Hey that is famous night at U-Tapao. One B52 came in with very bad damage. No brakes all the engines on one side out so could not use reverse thrust to stop. Went all the way down the runway with emergency vehicles chasing it off end of runway into village called Ban Mabtapud. In end stopped in main street all local people ran out to help crew if bomber catch fire. This not happen bomber is towed away think was scrapped. Many years later Stu self some friends go down to see Ban Mabtapud where big oil refinery is being built. Are talking to engineers building plant. They say when clearing village they find wreckage from bomber that night. But mixed in with wreckage they find bits of Mig21
Be polite. Be professional. But, have a plan to kill everyone you meet.
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Username: Supatra
Nickname: Infantry - Let us Prey
Posts: 873
Date: 12/4/02 15:00
Re: arty obsolet!!
Is also perhaps most common mistake cadets make at staff college. Is thing all instructors wait for with great pleasure. Cadet sit down with principle of war concentration of force in mind and set up force for one big thrust. And gets destroyed with ease. This tactic work well perhaps in early days of second world war when mobile forces face armies that are not mobile. But today to attack on narrow front without flank support is suicide.Because using a massed mobile combined arms force to achieve local superiority and smash through an enemie's line to plunge deep into it's rear is quite well known as the doctrine of Blitzkrieg. Fantasy huh?
Please excuse but you did.Who said such an attack won't fold your flank and roll along your line?
Please excuse again but you said that.Why also would you assume that your enemy is fixed to a certain geographic line and can't reorient his own forces to deal with your counterattack?
In truth Stu is right here. What he try to describe is way modern armies fight. Way we teach this is to say armies are like pile of very dry sand. If is blow in one place give way in front flow around flanks and rear. If you amass all your artillery in one spot for breakthrough then you sacrifice rest of front and this will destroy you. Know what you have in mind is old idea of schwerpunkt. See my Army is trained using German textbooks from 1930s even today. But schwerpunkt was obsolete idea even by middle of World War II. After 1943 to advance on narrow front was good way to make disaster. This was great measure of Eisenhower as general that he had strength to resist demands for narrow front attack kept advance on broad front.
Be polite. Be professional. But, have a plan to kill everyone you meet.
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Username: Supatra
Nickname: Infantry - Let us Prey
Posts: 874
Date: 12/4/02 15:12
Re: 99% Iraqi effectiveness???????
Khun Nightwatch think Stu is playing games here. M21sniper specify only first night of operation Desert Storm. This is when allied force attack air defense system only na? Only missions not aimed at Iraqi ADS were two F117 and seven cruise missile aimed at other things. Believe me we do big study on this for our RTADS work much same way as Iraq ADS. But are important differences. Biggest one is our people are not afraid to make decision first ask permission later. Another is, perhaps if want to talk more on that should email me provately we do not mind americans knowing how system works you build it after all but is not for general public. Also tell you good story about Stu and RTADS.
Problem we have in ours is no missiles. Air Force have some point defense ones we have thousands of shoulder fired missiles from China Type PL9B. But no long range ones. Would like Patriot but cannot afford this. Russians offer us S400 in exchange for rice and meat and fish so this is way we may go.
Be polite. Be professional. But, have a plan to kill everyone you meet.
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Username: gan123
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 120
Date: 12/4/02 16:55
Re: arty obsolet!!
In reading your comments the battle of Kursk came to my mind. Would this be an example of where the Germans got their butts kicked attempting a narrow front attack? The battle of the bulge also comes to mind. Is this also an example?
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Username: Stens
Nickname: He's a Knockout
Posts: 85
Date: 12/4/02 17:36
Re: arty obsolet!!
Hey, Greg. I'm working across the street today, so I'll communicate like this.
Operation Luttich, the German attack at Mortain, would be another example. This attack featured massed forces, with the opposition aware of their deployment, attacking on a narrow front.
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Username: Supatra
Nickname: Infantry - Let us Prey
Posts: 876
Date: 12/4/02 17:53
Re: arty obsolet!!
Hey you two know eachother this is so?
Requirement for success of a narrow front attack is for those who attack to have high level of mobility and large amount of logistic lift. Also defender must have low level of mobility few little logistic lift and few reserves for deployment. These are conditions hard to meet these days.
Problem with narrow front attacks is always same. As attack moves forward distance from supply base to front line of troops gets greater. For enemy same distance gets smaller. But attacking force must funnel supply through narrow bottleneck. This cause serious heartache to logistics officers. Look at Market garden for extreme example of how this can all go wrong. Now to think on this if defender strike at flanks of this attack he has very short distance to go before enemy advance is cut off completely. So odds favor defender not attacker. This happen in ours in Battle of Mon Mak Moon. Vietnamese army cross border with two divisions in narrow front. We have very weak cordon in front mostly Tahan Pran village militia and battlegroup units scratched from rear echelon troops. Have just one infantry regiment holding line. But we have very mobile force Second Cavalry Division moving up. This strikes at southern flank of Vietnamese attack caves in flank and sends Vietnamese running. Even though they outnumber us all the way to the end they are still outmanoeuvered for they think of attack on narrow front.
Sa again this idea of pile all assets into one big attack is mistake all amateurs make.
But real point here is different has become lost in static. Point was to defeat laser anti-artillery defense by massing all guns at one point to saturate defense. This is very bad move because to do so means must strip artillery from other areas of front so rest of front is very weak. This mean defending units on rest of front will not be hurt by artillery so have almost free hand. Please to remember nearly all killing is done by artillery these days. So if attacker have all his artillery at one point in effort to defeat lasers and none in others he will lose for sure.
Be polite. Be professional. But, have a plan to kill everyone you meet.
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 103
Date: 12/4/02 21:27
Re: arty obsolet!!
Supatra.....
OK, that is EXACTLY what i said.There are definitely certain times when a large imbalance of local firepower(local superiority) is extremely useful. You may have 10 divisions, and i may only have 5, but if i can hit a portion of your front defended by 1 division with three of my own- thus achieving local superiority- before you can attack me, it will be hard to tell that my forces are outnumbered 2:1 in-theater where the fighting is happening.For all practical intents and purposes i will hold a 3:1 numbers advantadge in the limited area of the FEBA i am attacking into. If i get a breakthrough, and push one of my divisions deep into your rear threatening your LOC, capital, or other politicly sensitive objective, i will win(well- probably ) despite the 2:1 overall theater advantadge you held initially.
Now tell me where it says that my forces are tied to a geographic line or that i would attack in the center, and not on the flank, as you claim i did.
Oh, i didn't? How bout that....
Do i really need to point out that even as recently as ODS this exact technique of local superiority driven into a narrow front was carried out by US VII corps on the right flank of Iraqi forces(the initial thrust)- WHICH HELD A NUMERICAL THEATER ADVANTADGE- with devastating success?
So was the initial Nazi assault into France a concentrated attack along a narrow front, as was The battle of the Bulge- which was stopped only becuase some US Airborne troops were too stubborn to surrender at Bastogne(and the ridiculous idea of relying on captured allied POL).
Or that Operation Overlord was a concentrated attack into a narrow portion of the Atlantic wall taking advantadge of massive local superiority?
You do NOT always get surrounded and cut-off, because deception, enemy alignment, OPSEC and the recon game have a lot to do with whether or not the enemy even realizes that is your main thrust, or bacuase he may be confused with a diversionary attack(Such as US 1st Cavalry's diversionary attack up the Wadi) or other subterfuge(Like Garbo of WWII fame or Patton's phantom army).
Amatuer indeed.....
Further, if you paid attention, i said laser D could very well cause a proliferation of artillery- meaning all line units had a higher number of guns across the board.
Which would mean that you needed even more laser D to counter my artillery- and unit for unit the artillery will be MUCH cheaper to procure, train personnel on, and maintain.
Most threat nations absolutely DO NOT have the capability to field hypersonic cruise missiles accurate enough to strike at laser Defenses(as if a laser that can hit a mach 3 shell can't hit an aircraft or cruise missile anyway), and will therefore most likely just field more artillery- because it is the simplest way to go. Most effective way to go? No.... But it is the simplest.
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 104
Date: 12/4/02 21:33
Re: arty obsolet!!
Supatra- "Requirement for success of a narrow front attack is for those who attack to have high level of mobility and large amount of logistic lift. Also defender must have low level of mobility few little logistic lift and few reserves for deployment. These are conditions hard to meet these days."
Yeah, or confuse the enemy into thinking i am attacking elsewhere, or not at all, or deny him his recon assets to prevent him from making an educated guess at all.
Or i could parylize his C4I(a favorite technique of the US) to prevent him from making the neccesary adjustments to counter my attack to begin with because he can't issue orders.
There is also no rule that dictates that i have to launch an attack until his forces are immobilized after weeks of concentrated aerial bombardment against his logistics base.
The concept of achieving local superiority along a narrow front is anything but dead.
Jesus, have any of you been to NTC? Ever?
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 105
Date: 12/4/02 21:38
Re: arty obsolet!!
Further, i would point out that natural geographic barriers(Like mountains, river's, coast lines, swamps, etc) can be used to protect one or both of my flanks in a massed attack into a narrow front.
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: Tony Evans
Nickname: Citizen
Posts: 576
Date: 12/4/02 22:07
Re: arty obsolet!!
Slow down, son.
Superiority at the point of attack can only converted into victory if an overall advantage exists. The Germans attack in 1940 succeeded not because of numerical superiority at the point of attack--that had been achieved on WW1 battlefields too numerous to count--but because they possessed an overall operational mobility advantage. And most of that was doctrinal. When that doctrinal advantage went away--IOW, wehn the Allies learned how to counter blitzkrieg tactics--the Germans couldn't do a thing to help themselves. That is why the Mortain and Ardennes offensives failed. No matter how valiant there actual conduct of the defenders was (and it was heroic--all glory and honor to them), the critical ridges at Mortain and Bastogne in Belgium would not have even been garrisoned if there wasn't an improved Allied doctrine that required a stand to be made in those places.
Overlord was a concentrated attack because that was the only way to punch a hole in the Atlantic Wall. Once a breakout had been made, a broad front policy was immediately adopted for the express purpose that it put the maximum number of German units at risk for the maximum amount of time--a consumation devoutly to be sought given the Allies material superiority. Not only was this a conscious approach on the part of the Allies. The Germans knew--and acted on this knowledge--that a war of movement could be countered by not hoding doggedly to a penetrated front, but by falling back to a new one that could be held.
Also, Overlord is a good example of why your argument about deception ops is not only amateurish, but naively so. The deception operations associated with Overlord were the most extensive and successful in history. Once battle was joined, they kept the German high command from recognizing the schwerpunkt for 48 hours at most. A lot of sturm und drang has been engaged in over the exact value of that 48 hours, but it seems pretty clear, given the subsequent 6 weeks, that the initial battle in Normandy was only marginally more successful and marginally less sanguine than if the Germans had known exactly where every company of the landing force was scheduled to land.
The movements of XVIII and VII Corps during Desert Storm were not narrow penetrations at all, but flanking sweeps that essentially established an extended front that the Iraqis were not prepared to defend and ultimately could not. Earlier proposals of an up the middle penetration operation were rejected on precisely the grounds that the Colonel suggested. As for the success of deception operations in this campaign, evidence that has long been in the public domain indicates that the Iraqis knew within 6 hours of the initial ground attacks what was going on. They certainly began withdrawing from Kuwait and repositioning the RGFC as a screen within the first 24. Had they been only slightly better operationally, and not totally outclassed by strictly tactical and technological factors, they would probably have succeeded in withdrawing behind the Euphrates almost intact.
It is not enough that God is on our side. We must likewise be on God's.
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Username: David Newton
Nickname: The English Adminstrator
Posts: 1677
Date: 12/4/02 22:39
Re: arty obsolet!!
It should also be pointed out, that with Overlord, the concept of attacking on a broad front was not just limited to after the breakout. Maritime power was used to attack another place in France as well, Provence, during August's Dragoon. Had a breakout not been achieved in Normandy by then, the prospect of facing another army group coming up from southern France would have caused a whole load of problems for the German command. As it was, 6th army group was simply a mop up brigade in most of France, as the German formations had either been shredded or were running away to avoid getting cut off.
Maritime power has always been about spreading the enemy thin because he doesn't know where a blow will fall. You will also notice that the intial army group attacks in Overlord were all coordinated. It wasn't just 2nd army that attacked, and then 1st army that attacked, both attacked at once.
Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with mustard.
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Username: Seer Stuart
Nickname: The Prince of Darkness
Posts: 875
Date: 12/4/02 23:54
Re: arty obsolet!!
The concept of achieving local superiority along a narrow front is anything but dead. Jesus, have any of you been to NTC? Ever?
To save you any additional embarrassment you should be aware that:
1) Suphi is a Sandhurst-trained staff Colonel
2) When the Colonel was a Captain she commanded a leg infantry platoon that assaulted and defeated a mechanized infantry company
3) She has fought five infantry actions to my knowledge, three as a platoon commander, two as company commander. She won all five. There may be more I don't know about
4) Suphi plans and executes company, battalion and regimental level military operations for a living; you don't. That makes her a professional, you are an amateur.
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Username: Hoahao
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 440
Date: 12/5/02 0:06
Re: arty obsolet!!
Ahhh newcomers!! They provide endless entertanement!!
"The shovel is brother to the gun." C. Sandburg
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Username: Edward Dunai
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 186
Date: 12/5/02 0:17
Re: arty obsolet!!
I hate to (at least marginally) disagree with Stuart and Suphi on one point... Monty immediately engaged in a broadfront advance with Ike's support, Patton's 3rd Army most definately did not (I cannot think of any other term for his advance through France than Blitzkrieg, relying on air support to secure his flanks and moving as fast as possible along a narrow axis to threaten and take vital points)
He was stopped not because the fuel or the transport wasn't available or because of enemy action, but because A) Eisenhower had one of his idiot moments and went with Monty's slogging tactics (which failed... over and over and over again...) and B) Eisenhower had so little control over his own staff (or do none of you recall that at the same time Patton was screaming for fuel and ammo that Ike's quartermaster general was using nearly the entire motor pool in Europe to move his HQ, in appropriate luxury, to Paris as fast as possible so as to secure the best lodging for himself and his staff...) that the most successful attacks were not properly supported.
What I think M21A1 is saying is that tube artillery is cheaper by far than any conceivable anti-arty laser system, ergo if you 'virtually attrite' my extre 10 battalians of field guns, once I 'really attrite' your 10 laser defense systems I suddenly have absolutely massive artillery concentration with which to hammer you into the ground wherever I choose. Virtual attrition is nice on paper, but if the assets still exist when the conditions that 'virtually' attrited them cease to exist, then you are in a world of pain. If I can buy a battalian set of tube artillery to counter your anti-artillery laser, and each anti-artillery laser can only counter one battalian at a time, you will run out of funds for lasers before I run out of funds for artillery (and besides, your laser does nothing but counter my artillery, once that counter is gone, all those lovely tubes are available for sending outgoing mail to your address)
Virtual Attrition, IMHO, equals Virtual Victory for Virtual Warfare...
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Username: Seer Stuart
Nickname: The Prince of Darkness
Posts: 876
Date: 12/5/02 0:18
Re: arty obsolet!!
Virtual attrition works both ways
At last you're beginning to get it. This discussion isn't about air defense systems and whether they work or not or narrow fronts vs broad fronts or anything else of that ilk. Your arguments using them are based on the limited base fallacy. You're taking a small segment of a big question and using that small segment to extrapolate a wholly misleading answer. What we've been trying to point out to you is that a course of action cannot be considered in isolation; the indirect costs of that action have to be considered as well as the direct costs. In military terms indirect costs are termed virtual attrition; things lost from a primary purpose because they've had to be diverted to a secondary purpose.
So its not just necessray to count how many aircraft can be shot down or whatever else, the impact of the decisions elsewhere also have to be considered. Very often, in fact invariably, they are much greater than the direct costs.
And the air force's virtual effect on the ground war is far greater than that of the IADS on the airforce IMHO.
Who cares? Thats not the point. This is an example of the Red Herring fallacy; your statement is simply irrelevent to the point under discussion.
You also state that 99.whatever % of sorties were flown against IADS, yet that figure contradicts the thousands of CAS, Anti-artillery and antiarmor sorties all throughout the KTO both before and after the commencement of the ground war. A-10's flew one of the highest sortie rates and did very little weaseling.
More with the Red Herring Fallacies. You specifically stated "on the first night". What happened on other days and nights was irrelevent. The figures I gave you came straight from the official USAF history of the Desert Storm air offense.
And for all the money spent, all the 'virtual attrition', the Iraqi IADS was 'virtually' unable to protect Iraqi ground forces effectively anyway.
More with the Red Herrings. It did the first night; not one bomb or missile landed on the Iraqi Army. Incidently, its worth pointing out that air defenses have forces attacking aircraft to fly over 15,000 feet - an act that has both real and virtual consequences.
The key point to all this is that its essential to consider the consequences of actions, not just the actions themselves. Not just first-level consequences but second - third- and fourth-level consequences. When somebody proposed a course of action a mentor of mine Herman Kahn (pbuh) had a nasty of habit of asking "and that means what?" to each development in the proposal. When somebody couldn't answer they got a stony "Then find out and come back"
So lets take your artillery line. The consequence of massing all the available artillery at one point is that the rest of the army is denuded of artillery support - that has consequences of its own. If more artillery is procured, then the money has to come from other parts of the budget. That has consequences. The added artillery requires extra logistics support. That has consequences. The extra guns and support need more people to run them. That has consequences. the reduced budget elsewhere means other parts of the army have to be weakened. That has consequences. Or it has to come from other services. That has major consequences. Or it has to come from daining the civilian economy - and that can have terminal consequences.
Virtual attrition is just a part of those consequences. Shouting about how your massed force will take the capital, the world and then the universe won't change that. If you want to be anything more than an amateur, you have to be able to work out what the second-, third- and fourth level consequences of a given course of action are likely to be.
Now work out what the consequences of your proposal are and come back. And no more fallacies. Think logically.
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Username: Seer Stuart
Nickname: The Prince of Darkness
Posts: 877
Date: 12/5/02 0:28
Re: arty obsolet!!
What I think M21A1 is saying is that tube artillery is cheaper by far than any conceivable anti-arty laser system, ergo if you 'virtually attrite' my extre 10 battalians of field guns, once I 'really attrite' your 10 laser defense systems I suddenly have absolutely massive artillery concentration with which to hammer you into the ground wherever I choose. Virtual attrition is nice on paper, but if the assets still exist when the conditions that 'virtually' attrited them cease to exist, then you are in a world of pain. If I can buy a battalian set of tube artillery to counter your anti-artillery laser, and each anti-artillery laser can only counter one battalian at a time, you will run out of funds for lasers before I run out of funds for artillery (and besides, your laser does nothing but counter my artillery, once that counter is gone, all those lovely tubes are available for sending outgoing mail to your address)
The point is that the lasers are not a substitute for artillery, they are additional to it (and may not be that costly by the way. The new solid-state lasers may be relatively cheap and they run on straight diesel fuel). so the situation is that while the attacker's massed guns are trying to get shells through the laser screen, the defenders guns are blowing the attacker's guns apart with counter-battery fire. If the attacker ceases fire to displace his guns, the defender starts winning. Incidently thats another form of virtual attrition; in addition to the guns lost directly by being hit with counter-battery, more guns are virtually attrited because they are moving not firing.
This is why the engagement rate is so crucial. If (say) a battery of six defensive lasers is full-time occupied in suppressing the fire from an artillery battery (3-round rate), the situation isn't very favorable. However if that battery can eliminate the fire from 15 artillery battalions (44 round rate) then we'd better find another way of doing things.
Another way of looking at that is what balance we have to strike between artillery and artillery defense procurement. Thats a very complex question in which indirect costs and virtual attrition figure very heavily.
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Username: Seer Stuart
Nickname: The Prince of Darkness
Posts: 878
Date: 12/5/02 0:35
Re: arty obsolet!!
Yes indeed, they do. It has a strange fascination about it. I shall always remember my first words to Suphi and her reply.
"That took balls."
"Never had any"
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Username: Seer Stuart
Nickname: The Prince of Darkness
Posts: 879
Date: 12/5/02 0:45
Re: arty obsolete!!
Maritime power has always been about spreading the enemy thin because he doesn't know where a blow will fall.
Thats absolutely right. Have you read Norman Friedman's "Seapower as strategy"? he goes into this point very carefully. In addition to pointing out that all the forces defending points that could be attacked but are not (and thus sit around doing nothing), are subjects of virtual attrition, he coins another phrase "virtual reinforcement".
It means that an enemy planning an attack not only has to allow for what forces are immediately on scene but what forces can be lifted in by seapower (now, of course, what can be lifted in by airpower as well).
Of course, the attacker doesn't know what proportion of that force will be lifted in and has to allow for the fact that all of it could be. That also has interesting implications. In one case, for example, it put very strict time limits on the Boers in South Africa because of the rate at which the British could lift in troops from India and Australia as well as the home islands.
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Username: fltcpt
Nickname: Capitalist
Posts: 1285
Date: 12/5/02 0:54
Re: arty obsolet!!
and may not be that costly by the way. The new solid-state lasers may be relatively cheap
One of the companies that I am associated with does work in the laser technologies field. I can attest to the fact that the prices of solid state lasers and their components are significantly better than it was just a decade ago along with being much improved. As the lasers continue to mature their costs in both manufacturing and end user costs have significantly dropped. In some cases certain devices today are less than 1/4 the price it was for a similiar unit with the same output a decade ago, and considerably more reliable.
It is very likely that the fire control systems and the power supplies are much more expensive than the laser unit itself.
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Username: David Newton
Nickname: The English Adminstrator
Posts: 1680
Date: 12/5/02 0:57
Re: arty obsolet!!
Edward, look at what was going on during Patton's advance with the other Allied formations. Patton's army was not the only Allied formation around. There was also Hodges' first army, Dempsey's second army and Crerar's first army as well. All of those formations were attacking as well when Patton advanced. He might have advanced the fastest, but there were first three other Allied armies backing him up, and the once Patch's 7th army had landed in France, there were four.
Eventually, before the advance ground to a halt in autumn 1944, there were three Allied army groups all attacking on broad front, with 1 British, 1 Canadian, 1 French and 4 US armies as their component parts. I would hardly call an advance by all of those formations an attack on a narrow front!
Patton was stopped by logistics. Clearing the Schledt earlier would have lead to a distinct easing of the logistics problem, but it would not have been a universal panacea to that problem. The mistake in not clearing the Schledt earlier was partially that of Montgomery, for not realising the strategic need, partially that of Eisenhower, for not providing greater strategic direction, and partially that of the naval commander for not pushing harder to get real priority action beyond just assigning 1st Canadian army to the situation.
Virtual attrition is really the tactical and strategic problems caused by introducing the new planning variables into the situation with artillery. Laser based systems will be able to tie up real amounts of artillery. That means that whilst those artillery tubes are dealing with the laser based defence systems, they are not available for another mission. That means that some other part of the front is deprived of fire support to deal with the laser based defence system, allowing exploitation of that gap.
Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with mustard.
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Username: David Newton
Nickname: The English Adminstrator
Posts: 1681
Date: 12/5/02 1:08
Re: arty obsolete!!
That point about martime power and its use in wartime strategy is SW Roskill talking. I have been working my way through his official history of the RN in WWII, and I have reached Volume III Part II, and read most of that.
The amount he stresses maritime power and how to use it will, and what the mistakes in its use were means that those volumes serve as a very good primer for semimodern useage of maritime power.
I may well read that Friedman book at some point in the future, but for the moment I have a great many books to go through before that, including things like Morison's 15 volume effort on the USN and a number of books about the land and air wars from 1939-1945.
Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with mustard.
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 107
Date: 12/5/02 4:39
Re: arty obsolet!!
Mr Evans......
"Slow down, son."
If yer gonna call me son then i want to borrow the car dad...
"Superiority at the point of attack can only converted into victory if an overall advantage exists."
Well i would agree that that is a basic tenet of war.
Advantadges come in many shapes and forms however.
"The Germans attack in 1940 succeeded not because of numerical superiority at the point of attack--that had been achieved on WW1 battlefields too numerous to count--but because they possessed an overall operational mobility advantage."
Yes, AND a superior numerical advantadge at the point of attack.
We can get into doctrine all we want but local superiority is a a very desirable thing to achieve, and is absolutely neccesary for blasting a hole in the other guys lines unless you have a massive technological or training edge or total air supremacy and a ton of TACAIR.
"And most of that was doctrinal. When that doctrinal advantage went away--IOW, wehn the Allies learned how to counter blitzkrieg tactics--the Germans couldn't do a thing to help themselves. That is why the Mortain and Ardennes offensives failed. No matter how valiant there actual conduct of the defenders was (and it was heroic--all glory and honor to them), the critical ridges at Mortain and Bastogne in Belgium would not have even been garrisoned if there wasn't an improved Allied doctrine that required a stand to be made in those places."
Troops were rushed into Bastogne right up until the attack precisely because it was NOT properly garrisoned to defend against the Nazi penetration.
There are a million reasons the 2d Ardennes offensive failed(Not the least of which is the fact that the plan was ridiculously optomistic), about the only thing they did succesfully was to achieve initial local superiority and OPSEC, and breach the allied lines properly.
If Bastogne had fallen quickly though, it would have taken a lot longer to undo the mess made by the initial breech.
Those troopers saved us a lot of time, blood and effort by holding onto that place.
"Overlord was a concentrated attack because that was the only way to punch a hole in the Atlantic Wall. Once a breakout had been made, a broad front policy was immediately adopted for the express purpose that it put the maximum number of German units at risk for the maximum amount of time--a consumation devoutly to be sought given the Allies material superiority. Not only was this a conscious approach on the part of the Allies. The Germans knew--and acted on this knowledge--that a war of movement could be countered by not hoding doggedly to a penetrated front, but by falling back to a new one that could be held."
I concur it was an attack on a narrow front out of neccesity.
We needed a very significant local superiority to hold and expand the beachheads.
BTW, just how many of those fall back positions did the Nazi's succesfully hold?
"Also, Overlord is a good example of why your argument about deception ops is not only amateurish, but naively so. The deception operations associated with Overlord were the most extensive and successful in history. Once battle was joined, they kept the German high command from recognizing the schwerpunkt for 48 hours at most. A lot of sturm und drang has been engaged in over the exact value of that 48 hours, but it seems pretty clear, given the subsequent 6 weeks, that the initial battle in Normandy was only marginally more successful and marginally less sanguine than if the Germans had known exactly where every company of the landing force was scheduled to land."
You are absolutely out of your mind. Had Hitler released his Panzer divisions immediately, or worse still, had he had them massed in the vicinity of Normandy to begin with, the Allied landings would have been crushed utterly. I have only heard and or read statements by about 100 different military historians who said the deception campaign for Overlord was absolutely ESSENTIAL to the success of the operation, And i agree fully.
My God man, and you call ME naive and amatuerish?
Laugh out loud.
"The movements of XVIII and VII Corps during Desert Storm were not narrow penetrations at all, but flanking sweeps that essentially established an extended front that the Iraqis were not prepared to defend and ultimately could not."
They ABSOLUTELY were narrow penetrations through the berms, and then VII and XVIII swept up the right flank and fanned out some. When VII corps turned East, they did so in a tight 4 division fist that achieved MASSIVE local superiority for their assault into the Iraqi rear and subsequent attacks into the Iraqi RGFC Divisions.
Franks commander's were alloted less about half the frontage that a US division is normally deployed on.
This is all greatly detailed in the book "Into the Storm" co-written by Gen Fred Franks, US ODS VII Corps commander and Tom Clancy.
He stresses time and again that he "Wanted to hit the enemy in a tightly packed four division fist to generate unstoppable momentum all through the attack."
I suggest you read it- you are way of base.
"Earlier proposals of an up the middle penetration operation were rejected on precisely the grounds that the Colonel suggested. As for the success of deception operations in this campaign, evidence that has long been in the public domain indicates that the Iraqis knew within 6 hours of the initial ground attacks what was going on. They certainly began withdrawing from Kuwait and repositioning the RGFC as a screen within the first 24. Had they been only slightly better operationally, and not totally outclassed by strictly tactical and technological factors, they would probably have succeeded in withdrawing behind the Euphrates almost intact."
But they were not more succesful becuase coalition forces worked very hard to win the reconaissance battle and deny the Iraqi's the ability to determine US intent.
The fact that the US moved two entire Corps of mechanized forces sight unseen over 100 miles West and kept them secret until the attack began(or within 6 hours as you state) is a testament to the need for OPSEC and deception, and the effect it has.
The screening forces deployed by the Iraqi's were smashed, and the main reason most of the Iraqi RGFC forces escaped is because the ground war was halted before the corridor was sealed- or so says Franks(Schwarzkopf disputes this by saying that Franks did not realize that he was in an exploitation attack, and held his forces under too tight a rein.)
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 108
Date: 12/5/02 4:44
Re: arty obsolet!!
"It should also be pointed out, that with Overlord, the concept of attacking on a broad front was not just limited to after the breakout. Maritime power was used to attack another place in France as well, Provence, during August's Dragoon. Had a breakout not been achieved in Normandy by then, the prospect of facing another army group coming up from southern France would have caused a whole load of problems for the German command. As it was, 6th army group was simply a mop up brigade in most of France, as the German formations had either been shredded or were running away to avoid getting cut off."
A perfect example of a diversionary attack and a useful contribution to the deception campaign that Normandy was not the main attack.
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: Edward Dunai
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 187
Date: 12/5/02 4:54
Re: arty obsolet!!
Look at the maps, however, and you see a different story, Patton was WAY the hell in front of Hodges et al, and attacking across the narrow front, 1st, 2nd and 4th Army were mostly mopping up behind him and securing lateral objective across the broad front, not making penetrations on their own, meanwhile the Brits were bogged down under Monty, who refused to attack until every i was dotted and t crossed, and then waited another few days to be sure, then found excuses to delay the attack some more, then blamed the Americans when his forces failed...
The 'broad front' part of the US forces was more the handguard to Patton's rapier, he was thrusting into the vitals of the enemy, and the rest rolled up what was already in disarray and confusion, and if Ike had done his job and kept the Quartmaster Corps from frittering away assets to set up a new headquarters for itself in luxury and instead supplied 3rd Army, we might have seen Patton crossing into Germany far earlier than historical.
Quite a few of the generals of WWII are overrated, in my opinion, Bradley and Montgomery were by turns far too bold and far too cautious, and had nigh unto incompetent staffs, yet they 'cared' for their soldiers and built a reputation as 'soldiers generals', just like McClellan did in the Civil War. Hodges was a solid field commander and heavily underrated by the 'common wisdom' (he was far better than Bradley, that's for certain). As long as the fighting was mobile Patton was incredible, the few times he got bogged down is when he made his blunders, but for all his 'gambles' he never once was burned, in many ways Patton was the last great Cavalry general in the tradition of a Grierson or a Stuart, let him loose and he rode the chaos of the battlefield and created more. He attacked across narrow fronts, moved as fast as he could, bounced off opposition to strike elsewhere, felt for seams in enemy lines and exploited them... and by doing so he created the opportunities that the more 'steady' commanders like Hodges could exploit. Would Patton alone have been as successful? Not likely, you need the steady grinding as well as the deep strike, both the broad AND the narrow front attack, betting the farm on one or the other is an invitation for disaster. I *agree* with Suphi and Stuart (and you I think) that simple concentration of all forces on one point and CHARGE is a recipe for disaster against a mobile enemy, but the proper blend of broad pressure and deep strike is lethal to any foe.
Eisenhower was uneven, he allowed far too much dissension in his Staff, didn't control things the way he should have, coddled Monty for FAR too long and was far more a political general than a military commander, but at the same token he managed to keep the Allies singing from, more or less, the same hymnal and generally fighting the Germans more than each other. As a 'coalition' General he was superb, but he wasn't one of the 'geniuses of war' that his fans paint him.
Back on topic, I wonder how long it will be before these anti-artillery/anti-missile/anti-aircraft lasers are mounted on AFV's in CIWS style turrets...
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 109
Date: 12/5/02 4:55
Re: arty obsolet!!
That's all fine and dandy, but if She isn't aware that local superiority is a highly desirabe and often neccesary tactical situation then i can't help her.To save you any additional embarrassment you should be aware that:
1) Suphi is a Sandhurst-trained staff Colonel
2) When the Colonel was a Captain she commanded a leg infantry platoon that assaulted and defeated a mechanized infantry company
3) She has fought five infantry actions to my knowledge, three as a platoon commander, two as company commander. She won all five. There may be more I don't know about
4) Suphi plans and executes company, battalion and regimental level military operations for a living; you don't. That makes her a professional, you are an amateur.
In any case, she obviously misunderstood what i said originally, which is exactly why i requoted my original statement.
She said that i said i would attack into the center of a 10 division front with the remainder of my forces fixed to a geographic line, which i did not.
That would be kinda stupid.
Oh, and should i have someone else come in here and spout off my qualifications for you SEER to prove to you that i am not an amatuer?
Such children sometimes.....
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 110
Date: 12/5/02 5:23
Re: arty obsolet!!
Look, what i am saying in regard to this virtual attrition is that it works both ways.
Sure, your IADS complicates my strike planning, and it complicates my arty missions, etc, etc.
But what i am saying is that the whole thing more than equals out by the fact that all the people you have to commit to your IADS and ADS are themselves attrited from being decisively used in the war.
Your IADS and ADS unlike my artillery and my air force does not deliver steel on the battlefield, it does not overtly affect the ground war.
IADS is something that an airforce forces an enemy to build, stripping ressources from other areas.
Even with your IADS though, i can still effect the land war with my air force, but your IADS cannot.
Same with the artillery. My artillery will actually blow stuff up, so will my planes.
While i do agree that the IADS attrits the Airforce(are you surprised?), i just think that the Air force attrits the enemy army more.
In other words, more guys defending against air attack means less guys to shoot at my tanks.
And as someone else pointed out, when i finally do disrupt your IADS/ADS to a certain level all my arty and TACAIR will be that much more effective.
That is why i earleir stated that i believed that the best possible 'IADS' was a force of modern fighters with excellent pilots and AWACs.
Because once the enemy air threat is gone, they will still be effective offensive weapons.
OTOH, even if an IADS wipes out the other side's airforce, then all your IADS forces can do is stare into empty skies.
They have been effectively removed from the battle.
Finally, as far as the personal attacks by certain members here, if they make you(whoever you may be) feel better or more secure in your position, then go for it.
But you are wasting your time if you think they will intimidate me into silence.
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 111
Date: 12/5/02 7:04
Re: arty obsolet!!
"I *agree* with Suphi and Stuart (and you I think) that simple concentration of all forces on one point and CHARGE is a recipe for disaster against a mobile enemy, but the proper blend of broad pressure and deep strike is lethal to any foe."
Yes, i agree with that 100%.
The tactical situation will depend which and where.
Certainly trying to mass forces for a decisive thrust when you cannot protect your flanks would be lunacy.
However, if you have sufficient forces for flank security or a natural geographic obstacle protecting your flank(s), or your enemy is lacking in mobility, or has lousy/confused leadership, etc, etc, it gives you the ability to mass your forces(or rather a good % of them) for a decisive attack into an underdefended portion of the FEBA or your enemie's flank(s).
Once you get solidly into your enemies logistics train and LOC it is very difficult for him to reorient his defenses because he is dealing with all kinds of mayhem in his rear.
Lots of commanders, and yes US commanders, lose it thoroughly when they have enemy forces in strength in their rear.
That's one of the many lesson's NTC teaches them, how to deal with strong enemy forces in their rear without panicking.
It shouldn't shock anyone to know that the first time the NTC OPFOR is marauding around a unit's rear out in the Mojave that things get all screwed up and then some.
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: DocMartyn
Nickname: Cranium Cracker
Posts: 622
Date: 12/5/02 12:45
Hill Updates 'Warthogs' for the War on Terror
www.sltrib.com/12022002/utah/7507.htm
PS Stuart w.r.t. Virtual attrition, I tried to make this argument on the Bvs.B board, that convoys are Virtual attrition, in that they slowed transport. Is there an nice analysis of the implications of convoys in the mass transport of goods?Hill Updates 'Warthogs' for the War on Terror
Monday, December 2, 2002
BY DAWN HOUSE
THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE
HILL AIR FORCE BASE -- Its official name was "Thunderbolt II," but friends of the venerable A-10 dubbed the aircraft "Warthog" after the wild pig that sports curled tusks and unsightly facial hairs.
The 1970s, heavily armored Warthog is the only jet-age aircraft designed specifically to support troops fighting on the ground. But by 1990, the A-10s were slated to be pulled out of service and carted off to the Maintenance and Regeneration Center in Arizona, better known as the boneyard.
The Hogs, however, proved themselves in the 1991 Persian Gulf War with their simple, survivable twin-engines and firepower that could be used against ground targets, including armored vehicles and tanks. In the new age of terrorism, Hogs have been deployed to trouble spots all over the world, including Bosnia and Afghanistan.
"It's very maneuverable and has a great ability to loiter over the battlefield for extended periods and put constant fire on the battlefield with its seven-barrel, 30 mm Venture cannon and an array of other weapons," said Maj. Dave Clayton of Hill Air Force Base. "It's also very rugged. The A-10 can sustain a lot of damage and still accomplish its mission."
When Air Force brass decided to keep the 350-plane fleet in service for the next 25 years, the bulk of the upgrade work fell to Hill's Air Logistics Center on the Ogden side of the base. Fairchild Corp., based in Dulles, Va., began building Warthogs in 1975. The last one came off the assembly line in 1982.
At Hill, Warthogs are given new paint jobs (called plastic media blasts), new advanced avionics upgrades that include Global Positioning Systems, and rebuilt, stronger wings (a process dubbed Hog-Up) that will double the life span of the aircraft from 8,000 to 16,000 hours.
Warthog pilot Jeremy Horn, who test flies rebuilt planes at Hill, said although the aircraft look exactly like they did more than 25 years ago, old-time pilots wouldn't recognize them from the cockpit.
Appropriately, Hangar 1, where the work is being done, has been dubbed Hog Heaven.
"I don't know how that nickname came about," said maintenance worker Diane DeLaVega. "It kind of just happened."
Horn has heard all the jokes about Hogs, including the one about them being the only planes that can be hit from behind by a bird. Maximum speed for a Hog is about 420 mph.
"These planes can do just about anything," said Horn, "except fly fast."
Horn likens the better-known, sleek F-16 Falcons to race cars, and adds that, "When I go hunting, I'd rather go out in the wilds in a Bronco. If you want something done in the combat world, you'd want a Hog there."
Warthogs can survive direct hits from armor-piercing and high-explosive projectiles up to 23 mm, said Hill spokesman Garrett Grochowski. Self-sealing fuel tanks are protected by internal and external foam and redundant flight-control systems are backed up by manual controls, permitting pilots to fly or land when hydraulic power is lost.
In addition, the single-seat cockpit forward of the Warthog's wings and its large bubble canopy give pilots all-around vision, which, conceded Grochowski, "makes it kind of ugly."
Said A-10 production chief Rick Merrill: "Their firepower can cut through a tank like a hot knife through butter, and that makes them beautiful."
Hogs bring additional advantages, said Merrill. They can operate from bases with limited facilities near battle areas, and repair is relatively easy because many of the aircraft's parts are interchangeable left and right, including the engines, vertical stabilizers and main landing gear.
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona is also making some upgrades for the U.S. fleet. Korean Airlines in Kimhae, South Korea, is refurbishing Warthogs stationed at Osan Air Base in South Korea and Sabca Industries in Germany is doing Hog maintenance work in Europe.
Hogs are expected to be in service until 2028.
Lawyer: "All your responses must be oral, OK? What school did you go to?"
Witness: "Oral."
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Username: Scott Brim
Nickname: Technocrat
Posts: 136
Date: 12/5/02 13:48
Re: Hill Updates 'Warthogs' for the War on Terror
Back in the early 1980's, Senator Alfonse D'Amato was roundly criticized in the press for pork barrel politics in pressuring Congress to fund "extra" A-10s that the US Air Force "didn't want or need." And he did manage to keep the production line open for a few extra years.
IIRC, about half of the original A-10 fleet has now been retired but still survives out in the Arizona desert. I wonder if the retired A-10s could be successfully remanufactured if there was a need to do so. Or maybe some of them could be reused as experimental unmanned CAS platforms.
If that works out, maybe we'll just have to bring Senator D'Amato back out of retirement so that he can vote for another round of "pork barrel" Warthogs.
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Username: David Newton
Nickname: The English Adminstrator
Posts: 1683
Date: 12/5/02 14:00
Re: arty obsolet!!
A concerted attack against the landings themselves on D Day would have proved to be a horrible disaster for the Allies. However, if Hitler had released the reserve armoured divisions, two things would have happened that would have meant that the amount of harm that they would have been able to do would have been a lot smaller than initially appears to be the case. The first thing would have been that Bomber Command, 2nd Tactical Airforce, 8th Airforce and 9th Airforce would have descended on them like a swarm of locusts. If they survived that, then once they got to the landing area, naval artillery would have cut them to pieces. Look what happened at Anzio for an example of the latter.
Calling the attacks by XVIII and VII corps during Desert Storm attacks on a narrow front is definetly wrong. US forces attacked at all points from the coast of Kuwait to several hundred miles inland within a day. The breaches through the berms themselves were physically small, but once beyond that, the divisions fanned out. There was a large concentration of force, indeed VII corps alone had enough armoured and mechanised divisions to be an army level command (five divisons in total) probably making it the most potent concentration of firepower ever assembled under the command of a corps. However, that attack was made along the entire front in theatre that had significant enemy forces and more. The whole point of the VII and XVIII corps attacks was that they swung around beyond where the enemy had a significant number of forces, and then executed a massive flanking attack.
Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with mustard.
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Username: David Newton
Nickname: The English Adminstrator
Posts: 1684
Date: 12/5/02 14:05
Re: arty obsolet!!
The reason that you were told about Suphi's qualifications is so that when she talks about infantry actions and army staff work, you know that she does that for a living. So far as your qualifications about this are concerned, I don't think it would do anyone any harm to know them. We would then know where you are coming from when you talk about this sort of thing. Personally speaking, I can't claim to be anything more than an amateur with an interest in military history and doctrine.
Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with mustard.
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Username: Nightwatch2
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 74
Date: 12/5/02 15:01
Re: 99% Iraqi effectiveness???????
Kuhn Colonel
I had not picked up on the point that he was referring to only the first night. In that event, he is quite correct on one hand BUT not so overall. We do not plan an air event, we plan campaigns.
His points though on virtual attrition are all quite valid. We expend an enormous level of effort to deal with the IADS that otherwise could have been used to reduce infrastructure to rubble.
I would be very interested in your details on the RTADS. I'll ask STU to forward your email over a separate channel.
Warm regards.
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Username: Supatra
Nickname: Infantry - Let us Prey
Posts: 881
Date: 12/5/02 15:38
To save misunderstandings
Stu is kind to help with warning but must make few things more clear.
Sandhurst-trained staff Colonel
Staff Colonel is correct. Am on staff of First Army. But did not attend full staff course at Sandhurst. What went on was Foreign Staff Officers Course this is foreign relations thing to help allies understand how English army thinks. Instead did staff course at our equivalent of Sandhurst.
She has fought five infantry actions to my knowledge
You count Thammaset University as one of these Stu? For myself do not was just extreme riot control. But still total five for was action at Maesot you miss. But these are not important ones. For me most satisfying are patrols we run. Khun Soren Khun Dick Khun Tony will tell you is nothing so satisfying for professional as good well done patrol.
my first words to Suphi and her reply. "That took balls." "Never had any"
Big grin remember most of that. For am asking myself why is farang here hiding behind paving stone with butt stuck in air? Remember you say something do not remember making reply. That part of brain was for certain on autopilot. For those who do not know this we meet again two years later. Then was Comptroller of Queen Sirrikit Oilfield owned by Army Stu and his were doing preliminary studies on new air defense system for us. They come up to see the oilfield so we have party to welcome them. Have been friends ever since.
Be polite. Be professional. But, have a plan to kill everyone you meet.
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 112
Date: 12/5/02 20:36
Re: arty obsolet!!
"A concerted attack against the landings themselves on D Day would have proved to be a horrible disaster for the Allies. However, if Hitler had released the reserve armoured divisions, two things would have happened that would have meant that the amount of harm that they were able to do would have been a lot smaller than initially appears to be the case. The first thing would have been that Bomber Command, 2nd Tactical Airforce, 8th Airforce and 9th Airforce would have descended on them like a swarm of locusts. If they survived that, then once they got to the landing area, naval artillery would have cut them to pieces. Look what happened at Anzio for an example of the latter."
When i say commit the Panzer divisions, even more than the tanks themselves, i am thinking of the Mechanized infantry and especially those division's organic artillery.
I would agree that massed Nazi armor formations would have been heavily attrited had they tried to intervene directly, but having the tanks dispersed in cover/concealment behind Normandy as a rapid reserve to prevent a breakout, with their infantry and arty alone commited to the Sea wall would have been quite a horrible mess for the allies.
Would have made Omaha look like a cake walk if all the beaches were defended by all that extra artillery and mechanized dismount infantry.
"Calling the attacks by XVIII and VII corps during Desert Storm attacks on a narrow front is definetly wrong. US forces attacked at all points from the coast of Kuwait to several hundred miles inland within a day."
IIRC, there was a very large gap between 1st Marines/US Army Tiger Brigade/Arab forces in the East and US VII/XVIII Corps in the west.
UK 1st Armored(Part of VII Corps) was the first unit to swing east(therefore the southern most unit.
1st Cavalry conducted a diversionary attack north into the Wadi to confuse Iraqi forces as to the actual axis of attack and UK 1st Armor attacked East first to fix the Iraqi defenders along what was the front(1st Armor's right flank was secured by a geographic barrier- the berm) to keep them from trying any flanking attacks into VII corps right flanks, or a penetration/spoiling attack into Saudi Arabia.
"The breaches through the berms themselves were physically small, but once beyond that, the divisions fanned out."
US 1st Marines so far as i know stayed tightly concentrated with USA Tiger as the spearhead of the Eastern attack North into Kuwait city. Their right flank was protected by the Gulf, and their left flank was so far as i remember exposed.
Arab forces following behind did fan out and remove pockets of bypassed resistance before reconcentrating and passing lines with US forces to be the first into Kuwait city.
So as far as i have read, US 1st Marines/USA Tiger provided their own flank security on the left, and were not covered by any other coalition ground forces.
Of course by this point coalition air power had severely limited the mobility of the Iraqi units that could have threatened that left flank, and remained under continuous air attack right until the end of the war.
"There was a large concentration of force, indeed VII corps alone had enough armoured and mechanised divisions to be an army level command (five divisons in total) probably making it the most potent concentration of firepower ever assembled under the command of a corps. However, that attack was made along the entire front in theatre that had significant enemy forces and more. The whole point of the VII and XVIII corps attacks was that they swung around beyond where the enemy had a significant number of forces, and then executed a massive flanking attack."
Yes, however, XVIII and VII corps were very tightly concentrated, far moreso than is standard practice, with each divisional front of the two corps about half what is normal.
Yes it did cover the entire western Iraqi flank in the KTO, however, massive local superiority was still achieved by reducing the frontage of each division by around half.
Franks makes several comments in his book that his commanders worked extremely hard to maintain unit cohesiveness and prevent blue on blue incidents along each division's flank despite the very close proximity of VII corps divisions as they raced East.
He also says that he called 3d Army CO Gen Yoesock on several occasions asking him to reorient XVIII corps farther North to give his divisions more manuever room because his own units were so densely packed North to South.
When the swing East was initiated, Franks ordered US 1st cavalry to join the line, giving him 3 full divisions and 2 ACR's online North to South, and he kept them massed in that fashion until the war was ended after 100 hours of ground battle.
At first UK 1st Armor was the covering force for VII corps right flank, but as VII corps struck deep into the enemy flanks it outraced UK 1st and as a result it's right flank was exposed.
On the left flank, US XVIII corps had fallen behind in some absolutely horrible terrain and had thus exposed VII corps left flank.
Franks also makes several comments on his concern for his flanks(Particularly his left flank facing Iraq) the farther he drove East, as he was gaining territory much faster than both US XVIII and UK 1st Armor.
This may in some way explain why he 'kept his units in tight rein' to paraphrase Gen Schwarzkopf, and did not go into exploitation mode much sooner.
In any case, the left hook did achieve a massive level of local superiority by restricting the divisional frontage of all the US VII corps divisions by half, thus allwing 2 divisions to occupy the same space as one, effectively doubling the firepower of VII corps.(Giving 4 bdes up, 2 back in the same frontal area as a normal division would deploy 2up, 1 back).
So while it was a broad attack along the Iraqi right flank, it was still also a narrow concentrated attack because of the numbers of forces involved packed into such a small axis of attack, and as VII corps ourraced UK 1st and US VXIII, it became a deep penetration along a narrow area of the Iraqi right flank.
Even still, Schwarzkopf wanted a much deeper exploitation penetration by VII corps to seal the escape routes which would have meant that VII corps flanks were totally exposed.
That's why Franks says he halted VII Corps advance to pass US 1st Cavalry through his lines and bring all his units online together, North to South, so that he could generate an overwhelming force on a very narrow front to maintain enough momentum to carry his attack all the way East to conclusion, and allow XVIII corps to his NW and UK 1st Armor to his SW to catch up and give him some measure of flank security.
The way Franks puts it, Schwarzkopf was most displeased with that decision.
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 113
Date: 12/5/02 21:32
Re: arty obsolet!!
"The reason that you were told about Suphi's qualifications is so that when she talks about infantry actions and army staf work, you know that she does that for a living. So far as your qualifications about this are concerned, I don't think it would do anyone any harm to know them. We would then know where you are coming from when you talk about this sort of thing."
I would have thought that you being a regular poster at Warships1 that you would have already had a pretty good idea of my background, but for the 'benefit' of those here i will lay it out.....(In case anyone actually cares)
I served from the late eighties to 90 as an 11B, secondary MOS 11C, attended USAJOTC, USAAWC, and USASS where i earned the additional MOS designator B4.
I served my whole enlistment(Aside from TDY's) in 4/31 Inf, Mech(FORSCOM)- mainly in HHC Scout Plt, where we were primarily tasked with a training mission to aid USAFAC(primarilly the FO's) and to act as OPFOR for Fort Sill personell(which we did quite a lot).
4/31 Inf is now a part of the 10th Mountain(as of 96?), btw.
Just FYI(Forgive me a little unit pride please)- the 31st is the only US unit to ever see combat on Russian soil(Where the 31st earned the unit motto 'Polar Bears') during the Bulshevik revolution, and were the unwilling participants of the Bataan Deathmarch in WWII. The 31st also fought in Korea, Vietnam, and recently Afghanistan(as part of the 10th Mountain).
I was also lucky enough to have cycled NTC three times.(first time as an 11B, 2d and 3d cycles as an 11BvB4).
As an aside, US OPFOR at NTC is every bit as good as their reputation.
I was chopped to SOUTHCOM for Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama in Dec 89'.
I ETS'd shortly after my Southern vacation as a Corporal, E-4P.
For the last 6 1/2 years i have been a self employed vehicle recovery agent in Philly(Great hours, lots of time for message boards and other endeavours
), and i have commited some of my time as a technical editor/contributer to the military technology site g2mil(For those familiar with g2mil, the EdInChief's rants are his and his alone).In matters regarding IADS, Air forces, Navies, etc. i would call myself an interested outsider(Same as amatuer?).
I am however lucky enough to have lots of friends in all the branches that give me the inside scoop(Unclassified of course), and have given me a hell of an education on things like OMFTS, CAS(got a lot of buds in the A-10 community), ACM, SEAD(one of my best buds was a -16CJ pilot during the war in the Balkans) and fleet AAW(i'm lucky enough to be cordial with a grumpy old Tico SWO, lol).
Well, there you have it.
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 114
Date: 12/5/02 21:33
Re: 99% Iraqi effectiveness???????
"I had not picked up on the point that he was referring to only the first night. In that event, he is quite correct on one hand BUT not so overall. We do not plan an air event, we plan campaigns."
Apparently, neither had i.....
My appologies to SEER.
"US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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Username: Tony Evans
Nickname: Citizen
Posts: 579
Date: 12/6/02 0:38
Re: arty obsolet!!
On precisely which alien planet would the Germans have committed their mobile forces to static front line defense prior to the battle even starting? When they did commit their panzer divisions to the frontl ines it was flying in the face of their doctrine and against their better judgment--so much so that the inevitable collapse of the normandy containment got a lot of people sacked, even though they probably didn't have any real choice.
Look at it this way: the Germans were convinced that the landing was coming in the Pas de Calais. Did they line the beach with panzergrenadiers and sew the coastal hinterland with panzerartillerie? No, of course not. They committed a few more divisions to that sector and shaded their panser reserve forces in that direction. The sum total of the effect of the deception plan was to keep those reserves uncommitted for the first couple of days of the offensive and to keep infantry divisions defending in the Calais sector from reinforcing Normandy longer than they might otherwise have.
Ther is absolutely zero evidence from WW2 operations that a properly planned and executed amphibious operation could ever be stopped at the waterline. The only variables that the defenders seem to have been able to effect was the depth of initial lodgement and cost extracted from the attacker before he accomplished his mission.
Your history of operations in Desert Storm has a humidity of approximately 100%.
1st and 2nd MarDivs attacked abreast in the vicinity of the "elbow" of Kuwait, with the 1st to the south of the 2nd. Each division executed several parallel breaches, passing approximately 5-15% of its combat power through each breach. (2nd MarDiv had more breaches than 1st MarDiv, due to an uneven allocation of engineering assets.) In addition, 1st MarDiv infiltrated two 2-battalion task forces on the evening of G-2/G-1 in order to cover its flanks on G-Day. The Tiger Brigade did act a 2nd MarDiv's "operational maneuver group", but 6th and 8th Marines did not follow in trace, unengaged. They fought their own battles covering the flanks of the Tigers. In the 1st MarDiv sector, Task Forces Ripper and Papa Bear attacked abreast from the outlets of the breach lanes all the way to Kuwait International Airport. While the Egyptians and Syrians were less than enthusiastic in their advances on the left flank of 1st MEF, the Saudis and Kuwaitis did a creditable job of advancing up the coast road from Khafji to Kuwait City, generally managing to stay even with the right flank of 1st marDiv, though there was a gap of several kilometers between them for most of the operation.
As for your "deep penetration" attack of VII Corps, I would like to caution you against using Clancy--or even Franks as told to Clancy--as a serious source. It wasn't just Schwartzkopf who was upset with Franks, it was his subordinates as well. And they were upset because Franks was doing precisely the opposite of what you claim he was. He wasn't penetrating deep into anything. He was massively coordinating the operations so that all divisions stayed on-line and so that he didn't outrun his flank support. He concentrated his combat power not because he was some kind of reincarnation of Rommel, boldly going where no American general has gone before. he did it because he wanted to be sure that he could outgun the enemy at the point of contact and maintain the (relatively slow) momentum of his whole force, as a monolithic entity. All of the battles that were fought on G+2 and G+3 were fought in the way they were because Franks was a firepower devotee. If he had been half the maneuverist you claim he was, he wouldn't have thrown his corps at Medina Ridge, or into the Valley of the Boogers, he would have let his battalions loose to find ways around and truly penetrate the Iraqi rear. That's why Schwartzkopf and everybody else were so mad at him--the RGFC didn't get away because 3rd Army ran out of political time, but because VII Corps wouldn't jump knee deep into the Iraqis' sh!t and rip their guts out when they had the chance.
It is not enough that God is on our side. We must likewise be on God's.
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 120
Date: 12/6/02 9:04
Re: arty obsolet!!
Tony, in case you hadn't noticed, i went into far less detail about the Marines Eastern attack because i am simply not as familiar with it.
You may very well be right in that regard.
As far as Normandy, we will have to agree to disagree. I am far from alone in my position, and you are obviously quite set in yours. I respect your opinion because of your previous position but i respectfully disagree.
(If you want to discuss the point farther, i will, but take it easy Marine, the battle has already been fought <!--EZCODE EMOTICON START
--><img alt=";)" src="http://www.ezboard.com/intl/aenglish/im ... <!--EZCODE EMOTICON END--> )
Now for specific points...
"As for your "deep penetration" attack of VII Corps, I would like to caution you against using Clancy--or even Franks as told to Clancy--as a serious source."
Whether or not you, i or anyone else agrees with his decision making process, he is obviously a very serious source of information because he was the on site commander.
But before you go marrying me to the guy you need to realize that just because i used his execution as an example that i am not in love with him. But he was the CO of US VII Corps, and therefore his part in things was very relevant to the discussion, and still is.
"It wasn't just Schwartzkopf who was upset with Franks, it was his subordinates as well. And they were upset because Franks was doing precisely the opposite of what you claim he was. He wasn't penetrating deep into anything. He was massively coordinating the operations so that all divisions stayed on-line and so that he didn't outrun his flank support."
There were times in the operation where he had definitely outran his flank support. In order for me to come up with distances would require me to reread a few chapters(or at least find the +1 and +2 day maps).
I am certain that as you state he could have penetrated deeper faster, but he would have done so at the risk of his flanks(though in all honesty i think that risk was minimal due to the state of Iraqi opposition at that point).
Certainly that was what Schwarzkopf wanted, and i would not be surprised at all if every single TC in all of VII Corps wanted to be cut lose to race balls out for the Gulf.
Right or wrong it seems(as he stated in his book) that Franks had as his #1 priority a minimum of US casualties, and again right or wrong, thought his approach was best.
"He concentrated his combat power not because he was some kind of reincarnation of Rommel, boldly going where no American general has gone before. he did it because he wanted to be sure that he could outgun the enemy at the point of contact and maintain the (relatively slow) momentum of his whole force, as a monolithic entity."
I never said he was Julius Ceasar reincarnated, i only laid out what he did, and what his explanation was for it.
But as you point out, he was rightly concerned with achieving local superiority and maintaining mass, and he did both. What he did not do was advance fast enough.
After reading his book he definitely struck me as a conservative commander.
I think we can both agree that in his place Patton would have been sunning on the beaches of the Gulf in LESS than 100 hours.
"All of the battles that were fought on G+2 and G+3 were fought in the way they were because Franks was a firepower devotee. If he had been half the maneuverist you claim he was, he wouldn't have thrown his corps at Medina Ridge, or into the Valley of the Boogers, he would have let his battalions loose to find ways around and truly penetrate the Iraqi rear. That's why Schwartzkopf and everybody else were so mad at him--the RGFC didn't get away because 3rd Army ran out of political time, but because VII Corps wouldn't jump knee deep into the Iraqis' sh!t and rip their guts out when they had the chance."
Again, i did not endorse his tempo of operations, i merely stated what he did as he explained it, and why he said he did it. Doesn't mean i love the man.
I do however find it interesting that you ALSO(because i do too) think that he should have raced VII Corps ahead much faster. Not with abandon, but with agressive determination.
In so doing he would have applied massive local superiority across a narrow portion of the Iraqi right flank to generate a nearly unstoppable momentum deep into the Iraqi rear severing all LOC and wreaking general mayhem.
In so doing he would have exposed his flanks, but it was exactly the point that i made to begin with that local superiority could be used to force a narrow breach allowing a force to strike deep into the enemie's rear despite a numerical inferiority in the theater as a whole that got everyone calling me an amatuer, telling me my forces would get encircled and smashed.
All of this discussion stemmed from that.
As a final point out of fairness in his book Franks says VII Corps mission was force oriented, and not terrain oriented.
In other words it was his mission to destroy the Iraqi forces arrayed in front of him(Specificly the RGFC Divisions), not to capture a geographic area deep in their rear, so it does somewhat explain why he was not trying to race as deep into their rear as possible.
If he had moved faster and allowed his individual divisions more freedom of action, he wouldnt have failed as he did, but as you stated he didnt have the guts or imagination for it (LOL, i just changed balls to guts in honor of Supatra
)."US Snipers-Providing surgical strikes since 1776"
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