The Cards Reshuffled

[Simon Darkshade]

Or several steps, in this case.

Not all of The Twelve are going to be overt/known associates or operatives. Blakeney going over Frogside to rescue the Dauphin and win the favour of the Prince Regent is going to happen parallel to some other actions.

There are a few hints as to what might or might not be going on, as well as 'Browning' not necessarily being entirely honest in his description of what was going on in 2077; rather, he was telling the story that would be more understood or accepted by 1790s Englishmen.

Even the year 2077 has some resonance to it.

[Simon Darkshade]

The Cards Reshuffled 2

Mr. Thomas Steele alighted from his carriage, grateful to stretch his legs after the journey. Across the snow spotted fields and lawn lay an ornate house in the Gothic style some three stories tall, topped with a higher tower and surrounded by various outbuildings. Compared to some of the other estates he had passed by on his way here, the snow overnight had apparently been less heavy, and the nearby line of trees comprising the nearest part of the estate's wood seemed surprisingly green; there seemed to be some extremely large deer. On the side of one of the outbuildings, he could see some sort of curious iron contraption consisting of a central pillar and a spider web like structure of limbs and wires atop it.

From where he stood, the nearest fields also seemed to carrying some sort of hardy winter crop, whilst others looked to be fallow. The barns looked to be rather larger than those to which he was accustomed, but given the hour of the morning in January, the livestock were naturally inside them, save for a small waddling bird about two and a half feet tall being shooed back inside by a worker.

"Dashed dodos. They don't really know what's good for them. Mr. Steele, I presume?"

Steele turned around to see a tall figure with light flaxen hair dressed in much the same sensible coat and clothing as himself.

"Mr. Browning, I take it?"

"Indeed. Welcome to Bletchley Park. We had been expected you about now, so I took the liberty of coming outside to receive you."

"How did you know to expect me now?"

"One of our men came in from the outfields where he had been on watch. A bit too chilly to stand on ceremony otherwise, what! Shall we go on inside?"

Steele followed Browning inside, through a long and lavishly appointed entrance hall into a particularly well-lit drawing room, with the apparent source of illumination coming from some sort of rather bright oil lamp inside the ornate globe. The walls were lined with bookshelves, apparently part of why he had been dispatched.

"Please, have a seat, Mr. Steele. This is but a very small part of our collection here, which comes to just over a quarter of a million physical books and manuscripts." Browning smiled curiously. "The books are the lesser part of what we have accumulated and have to offer, even as my librarian, a Professor Nikolas Lloyd, is want to disagree with me. Would you care for some tea?"

"Thank you, Mr. Browning. A restorative cup before we get down to business would be most welcome."

"Rather." Browning got up and pressed a button on the wall, setting off a faint jingling of bells.

"We have a hundred and two rooms here in the main house, with various functions and purposes, ranging from workrooms, libraries, studies, schoolrooms and the map rooms. As mentioned in my introductory letter to the Prime Minister, we have something of a more advanced collection of maps than those currently being prepared by the survey of the Board of Ordnance."

"How much more advanced, Mr. Browning?"

"50 inches to the mile, covering the whole of the British Isles in the main series. Once we begin full cooperation with His Majesty's Government, that can be extended to further mapping of current cities for development purposes. We have various maps of the Continent, and locations beyond, that will be of some use, but proper surveying of the land as it currently lies will take time. We have a great number of nautical charts and maps as well that will hopefully be of some assistance and utility to the Admiralty."

"Maps and books. A most useful combination."

"Indeed, Mr. Steele. They represent knowledge and information that other states, both current enemies and potential future rivals, do not possess and indeed in many cases are completely unaware of. Knowledge, after all is power. Of one sort."

The tea arrived on a tray carried by one of the house servants, who withdrew after pouring.

"A particularly delectable variety, Mr. Browning. Is it still obtained from China?"

"Not anymore. Whilst a large part of the world's tea was grown there, an equally significant fraction came from Ceylon and India. We do have some rather special varieties of tea seeds out in the potting shed, so that the days of the Manchu monopoly on tea could very well be numbered."

"That would be advantageous for our trade, and that of the East India Company."

"Indeed. We have a bit more than tea, though. In the shed, which I would show you were the weather a tad more civilised, we have a large store of seeds of quite advanced strains of wheat, barley, oats, maize, peas, beans and rice, along with a range of fruits and vegetables from our own orchards, gardens, orangery and the conservatory. We further have a large number of seed potato cultivars of equal advanced nature."

"Advanced in what fashion?"

"In the case of the various grains, they consistently produce a considerably higher yield than your own of this era, and are particularly hardy to boot. For wheat, my farming expert Mr. MacDonald informs me that there is a yield of close to 75 bushels per acre, compared to 20 to 25 from enclosed fields at present. The potatoes are all from blight resistant varieties, with yields of between 700 and 750 bushels per acre. There are additional means, apparently, of further increasing the yield of these crops, such as fertilisers, but the development of those could likely take some time. In any event, these seeds provide...well, they provide the seeds for a genuine revolution in British agriculture, over time, in terms of providing considerably larger harvests. The various farm animals present also offer something of an advantage, and we have breeding populations of dairy and beef cattle, pigs, sheep and chickens. Truth be told, though, I am sure you did not come all this way just for new wheat and beef, Mr. Steele."

"Indeed, Mr. Browning. Quite a lot more was mentioned in the notes that you left with the Prime Minister, to which I have been made privy."

"Then follow me, my good fellow, and allow me to illuminate you."

Thereupon, Mr. Browning lead Mr. Steele upstairs to a large and airy infirmary, which consisted of a lying-in room with a number of beds, a room for consultation, examinations and all manner of operations, and, more significantly, a large storage room lined with cabinets and a number of bookshelves.

"Here we can see our medical library, with the most reliable and accurate texts on anatomy, surgery and everything in between. Over here," Browning opened a cabinet to display some needle-like instruments "we have a supply of what are called 'syringes' and all the stuff for injections of various medicines into the human body, as Wren and Pascal experimented with last century. These are standardised thermometers for taking the temperature of an afflicted person, whilst these wooden sticks are 'tongue depressors', for holding down the tongue whilst a doctor examines a patient's mouth. These instruments, which I will not even attempt to pronounce, accurately measure the pressure of a man's blood, as Curate Stephen Hales measured some sixty years ago, and these are 'stethoscopes', for listening to a heartbeat or other internal sounds."

"And what are those? They look like ladies gloves!"

"They are gloves to be worn by a surgeon or doctor whilst performing an operation or other procedure upon a patient. My medical advisor, Doctor Maturin, has impressed upon me to impress upon your good self, and everyone else that I get to talk to about the matter, that a simple matter of doctors washing their hands and having clean instruments. He will give a talk on the matter after luncheon or this evening, depending on how quickly we progress with other matters. Before we finish here, there are a number of boxes over here which will not mean much for the moment, but after Dr. Maturin has had an opportunity to speak with yourself, and with a quite marvelous physician named Edward Jenner, they will make more sense.

For now, these boxes here contain vials that will ensure that a man who imbibes their contents will be immune to yellow fever; these three ones contain pills that provide the same protection against malaria, cholera and typhus. This final stack contains pills which will fight very successfully against infections and germs, whilst these here" Browning held up a box of pills "provide relief from gout. Please pass these along to Mr. Pitt, at your discretion."

"You can imagine, Mr. Browning, that some men might not regard taking some unknown substance from a man purported to be from the future with any remarkable degree of alacrity. Without casting aspersions upon your motives or intent, these could well be poisonous."

"A wise precaution. If I may take this one measure to allay any concerns as to their properties and any harm?" Browning took out one of the pills and swallowed it. "In the absence of any unexpected death on my behalf, might we continue?"

They walked across to the other side of the landing, where they briefly paused at a workroom containing a number of sewing machines, typewriters and various hand-tools, with the room having a notable scent of camphor to it, coming from the small amounts left in the various drawers to ensure that the tools would not rust, and paused at the doorway of an adjoining chamber.

"Behind this curtain lies a number of machines which it would be really rather difficult to explain at this point; like many of the ideas and advances that my associates and I will be talking to you about this afternoon and evening, this will take a number of further steps in order to make sense. For now, suffice it say that these are, in a way, adding machines for calculating numbers and sums; I wouldn't really want to burden you with much more babbage - sorry, I meant baggage - than that."

"So I am not permitted to look behind the curtain?"

"Far from it, Mr. Steele. We are here to provide advice and assistance to His Majesty's Government, not orders. It simply won't have a great deal of significance to you, at least at this point."

Steele carefully pulled the curtain aside and looked into the room, possessed by no small amount of trepidation as to its mystical contents. What he saw was around a dozen square glass boxes sitting on desks, with some rectangular shaped objects in front of them and some other things looking for all the world like halved eggs on strings next to the rectangles. It all looked rather underwhelming and silly, and he was quite sure that whatever it was wouldn't catch on.

After that, they headed down two flights of stairs into the cellar level, where Browning unlocked several doors with both keys and some strange device with numbers on it in order to enter the Bletchley Armoury. Here then was more of what the Paymaster-General of His Majesty's Forces was imagining when his friend the Prime Minister had spoken to him about this very special and very secret visit - weapons, and lots of them.

"I've had these arranged in an approximately sequential order of development for your benefit, Mr. Steele. These here are the Pattern 1842 percussion musket and these are the Pattern 1853 .577" Enfield rifled-musket; the former is effectively the current Land Pattern musket with a percussion action, whilst the latter are rifled and have an effective range of 300 yards and a maximum of 1250 yards. Over here next to them is the Sharps rifle, the Hall rifle and the Spencer repeating rifle, all of which are to provide your gunsmiths with some interesting food for thought."

"What are these guns in this rack? There must be fifty of them!"

"60, in fact. They are the Martini-Henry breech-loading single action rifle, and they represent the next generation beyond the rifled-muskets, as it were. Lining that wall, we have the Short Model Lee Enfield Mark 4 rifles, and beneath them the FN-49 automatic rifle and the L1A1 Self-Loading Rifle. There is over a century's worth of the gunsmith's art in those rows, and hopefully the basis for a better rifle for the British Army, in God's good time. Finally, next to them, we have the Adams, Beaumont-Adams, Colt and Webley revolvers, and a number of Browning automatic pistols. For the time being, most of these are beyond the reach of gunsmiths across the rest of Britain to manufacture, although that will eventually change as the knowledge and information we have to offer can be disseminated."

"I can understand that, and most of the rifles and 'revolvers' are not so outlandishly different to our muskets and pistols as to be unimaginable. But what, Mr. Browning, are those contraptions in the corner? They are too small for cannon."

Browning allowed himself a scintilla of an iota of a brief smile.

"Those are what will be quite effective in changing the course of many a battle, and indeed of war itself. There is the Maxim machine gun, the Vickers machine gun and the L7 general purpose machine gun. All of that will remain but empty words until the morrow, when the demonstration can be arranged."

From the armoury, they headed down a final flight of stairs, through three locked doors and finally one sliding door that only opened when Browning did some strange process with his thumb and his eye. When it opened, it revealed a very large cellar, with one large and one small stone chest on either side of the room, and a number of stacks of something covered in hessian sacking.

"Follow me, Mr. Steele. I do believe that this will be of interest."

Browning walked over to the nearest stack and pulled aside the hessian, revealing a stack of gold bars assembled in a pyramid.

"There are 80 of them, each weighing 400 ounces. Based on current values, that is approximately £133,000 worth of gold."

"My God."

"Every day. It is January 6th now, so what you are currently seeing is just under eight hundred thousand pounds worth of gold alone, not counting the diamonds on the other side. Knowledge is power, Mr. Steele, knowledge is indeed power, but money can frequently help."

[jemhouston]

Money is the grease that world needs.

[Simon Darkshade]

Quite. Too much grease, and you get a grease fire.

Here, for me, the big issue is working out how to channel the amount of gold into various purposes without leaving a blaring trail. One solution has to do with an aspect of Steele’s job.

[Belushi TD]

I would think that one would be able to jigger the accounts of gold mines under UK control to indicate a lot more being produced than actually was the case.

Given the accounting practices at the time, would it be possible to just turn it into gold Sovereigns and use it to pay off the crown debts "off the books" as it were? Rather than have the crown rack up a whole pile of debt, however it was financed at the time, just have people drive round with bags of coins and pay people? Or was it all done through banks?

Money laundering was still legal at the time, correct? Deposit the gold, take out a loan for less than the value of the gold, use the loan to pay the crown's debts, and default on the loan. Bank seizes the gold for failure to pay the loan, and everyone's happy.

For any small debts owed by the crown, just send a guy around with the bill and an official looking uniform and a bag of coins. Present the bill to the owner of the company, hand him a stack of sovereigns and have the guy write "Paid in full" on the bill, and go about your business.

Just don't do it all at once so the opposition (and any members of government who can't be trusted with the secret) get suspicious.

Another idea - Set up a philanthropic corporation whose aim is to reduce the cost of munitions or ships or cannon or whatever to the people of the UK. They do this by paying a chunk of whatever the company charges the crown for their particular product.

Another idea - Have a team of forensic accountants go through the graft and waste of HM Dockyards and hammer those responsible for the theft. This doesn't even cost you any of your horde of gold, or at least not much, just enough to pay the accountants.

Belushi TD

[Simon Darkshade]

At this point, the total national debt was £242.9 million in 1793, with an annual interest bill of £9.2 million and £7.3 million on defence. Total GDP was £207 million. By 1800, the debt was £441 million, which won’t be happening here.

Revenue in 1793 was £18.1 million, coming from £13.6 million from excise, £3 million from property taxes and £1.2 million from other taxes.

Thus, the big problem as I see it isn’t ’laundering’ the income, but inflation blowing up should all of the gold enter the system. The key then would be to trickle it in, whilst being able to fund an expanded war effort, invest in the right places and play a bit of a complex shell game with exactly who holds the debt.

One method that will be used is linked to the role of the P-G, where he could sell old stores. A slightly anachronistic power at this point, but one of a number of different ways that will be used. As there will be knowledge of gold mines revealed, that presents one additional path for cooking the books.

[Simon Darkshade]

In Part 3, in addition to the denouement of the estate tour, there will be a luncheon (showcasing a few different receipts/recipes that will eventually percolate out as part of the culinary/cultural part of the story), followed by a series of ‘briefings’ on

- Military and Naval Development
- Potential Strategy for the War with France
- Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
- Imperial Development
- Economics and Trade
- Science and Technology
- Transport and Infrastructure
- Medicine and Food
- Home Affairs, Politics, Ireland and Associated Issues
- The Immediate Way Ahead

Following on from this, beyond Part 3, there will be some further developmental parts as political questions are wrestled with; the rescue of the Dauphin by Percy Blakeney; some sort of action against Napoleon to take him off the board in free range terms; and then some of the first changes in action, such as the Glorious First of June, training Sharpe’s Rifles, naval construction and the various processes of beginning to ‘reshuffle the deck’.

A ‘meta aim’ is to balance the pace of change and development with the force of inertia and reaction. Hopefully, this can be done whilst providing an opportunity for some ‘specialist chapters’ from the subsidiary members of The Twelve and big picture steering from Browning.

For every calendar year, I’ll endeavour to provide some sense of statistics to map changes; and after the initial entries which set the scene, some sense of foreign/external to The Secret PoVs. I also aim to incorporate a range of text types, such as newspapers, diaries, letters, future articles and more; some bits and pieces of intertextual references, such as in-universe versions of certain works of fiction and music/songs; and weaving in historical and ‘fictional’ characters. About the one thing I’m not good on is making any pictures, maps and the like.

[Simon Darkshade]

A few military notes related to some discussion in the next part:

- Building up the British Army towards an expeditionary force of 150,000 that can be deployed to France, through landings in several points and then converging, is part of the goal to be worked towards. That will entail production of the new rifled muskets and other equipment, but first and foremost, full control of the seas through the removal of the threat of the French and Spanish navies
- The French Revolutionary Armies total around 1.5 million on all fronts, on paper, but without Bonaparte, they will still struggle to concentrate more than 75,000 to 85,000 at maximum in any one battle
- Achieving some measure of success in the Flanders Campaign will be difficult overall, but through avoiding historical unforced errors, utilising knowledge of French events and movements, and concentrating Austrian, Dutch and British forces in key battles could draw things out beyond 1793
- Some landing operations against the French using French emigres could encounter more localised success with the aid of more significant British contingents armed with new weapons, both small arms and artillery, in order to pull forces away from other fronts and build up expertise in amphibious descents
- In terms of timing, some sort of naval engagement should be engineered between 1802 and 1805, and the invasion follow in ~ 1807. This will give sufficient time to build up the fleet for Nelson's victory, and recruit, train and equip the armies that Wellington, Moore, Abercromby and the Duke of York will command on the Continent
- Diplomatically, keeping Prussia in the First Coalition and adding Russia at the right moment would be a combined masterstroke; doing so whilst strategically bumping Spain into the 'enemy column' in order to get large parts of its holdings and her fleet is more than a masterstroke, but a real Xanatos Gambit
- Manipulating the French Revolutionaries into eating themselves a little bit more won't go astray, which is part of the planning behind the rescue of the Dauphin
- In North America, if and when it comes to some sort of war with the infant USA, there will be no sense in fighting fair, in numbers, technology or knowledge
- To begin with, no Louisiana Purchase will be on the cards, and Florida will be one of the Spanish bits and pieces snapped up in any war
- What other Spanish bits? Argentina/River Plate + Chile, California, Texas, 'Louisiana', Trinidad, the Mariana Islands, Florida, Panama, Spanish Guinea, the Canaries, Minorca, the Falklands and Porto Rico. Cuba is a stretch goal, and the Philippines a very distant stretch goal.
Some of those are going to be very straightforward, such as the Marianas, Falklands, Guinea and Porto Rico; others, such as the South American expedition and the Californian expedition, will be more interesting logistical challenges, but worthwhile; a successful descent upon the Canaries and Minorca are not too outlandish; and Louisiana and Texas will come as part of any peace settlement. The 'stretch goals' are unlikely permanent gains insofar as *this* war is concerned, as they can be used as bargaining chips in order to get areas that are more attractive.
- Overall, Argentina/the Rio de la Plata provides the basis for a future settler colony on a par with Australia, Canada and South Africa; various islands and 'bits and pieces' add to and secure the global basing network, and give territory for a Trans-American Canal in Panama to boot; and California and Texas provide the basis for allied/puppet states, and possibly, possibly future Dominions of sorts.
- Argentina's population at this point is under 500,000 Spaniards and creoles, or about double the population of (francophone) Quebec - larger, but not a long term problem when the 'demographic hose' of increased British migration is factored in, increased by greater food production and medical advances, as a long term 'diluting agent', if that makes sense; similar to ideas for the relative dilution of the Dutch/Afrikaner fraction of the white population in South Africa
- The process of dismantling the Spanish Empire in South America was historically kicked off by the failed British invasion of the Plate in 1806/7, so there isn't any dramatic difference a decade earlier
- The USA of the time can be 'divided' into New England, the Middle Atlantic (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware), the South, and the Frontier (Tennessee, Kentucky and the Northwest Territory). The phrase 'divida et impera' does come to mind in a certain sense
- Timing such a conflict for when Britain is on the pathway to peace in Europe or at peace would be an artful step
- Small scale engagements in 1776-1783 and 1812-1815 allowed enough variables to come to play to allow for American victories, whereas the application of overwhelming force in the example of General Howe in New York was more successful
- Being able to deploy two 30,000 strong field armies operating from Canada into New England and onto the Chesapeake, along with two 20,000 strong field forces to Charleston and New Orleans operating from the West Indies and Florida and 25,000 men to New York from Britain would put the cat among the pigeons a bit
- This type of capacity would be expensive and take time to build, but with the cumulative weight of advantages (such as medicines allowing staging out of the West Indies) would help. There would need to be a fundamental shift as to the understanding of the size of the British Army (and armies in general)
- Unlike many foreign states, the USA is at this point more in the realm of 'extremely estranged family', with quite literally only a small part of the populace having been born in the nascent independent entity. There is common language, broadly similar religion, broadly common culture, the same common law and a multitude of other links

[jemhouston]

We are in for interesting times.

How are you feeling?

[Simon Darkshade]

Interesting enough, in due course.

I'm feeling well enough, if lacking in sleep due to the dog, and a little bit vexed on some Dark Earth orbat stuff [I'm tossing up whether to introduce a new type of division to allow for the last of the USARNG divisions mobilised for Vietnam, a la Korea in @, to be returned to state control and demobbed, and how to fiddle numbers so that the DE version of the Minimum Risk Force here https://www.tboverse.com/viewtopic.php?p=12951#p12951 can be worked. The number in mind is naturally more than the 66 figure of our world, but also more than the 50 Regular and 40 ARNG total; I'm leaning towards 96. The madness is strong.].

[Simon Darkshade]

The Cards Reshuffled 3

“Every day?”

“Indeed, Mr. Steele.”

“In these chests?”

“Yes.”

“May I look within them?”

“I’m afraid not, sir. My instructions regarding them is that we are not to look behind the curtain during the night or day, save for the hour of dawn. The same goes for the other, smaller chest, which is filled daily with a pouch containing a quarter of a pound of diamonds.”

“Does this miracle last from now until doomsday?”

“In both cases, no. The smaller chest will apparently be functional until September 15, 1807, whilst the larger chest with the gold will cease to function completely on May 29th, 1821, or some five and ten thousand days, respectively. In the event of the curtain being disturbed, this period of largesse would be very unfortunately and very finally curtailed.

“But how does this work?”

“The whys, whatfors and hows are somewhat beyond my scope to explain at this time,” said Browning smoothly, reminding himself that it was all supposed to be worth it, “but suffice it to say that the bullion is not being purloined or stolen.

As to the exactitudes of its workings, there are a number of machines within this house that I could explain, in a fashion, so that you or another could understand them, or the wonders of nature, or the workings of the moon and stars. But would that be the best use of our time and opportunity, considering that England is at war, and opportunity slips by every hour, like the sands in yon hourglass?

Perhaps in due time, once we have spoken of much more and explained the long series of ideas and methods, we will be in a position to fully explain how this process works. For now, like the means of our travel to 1794, explaining it would take away weeks and months that would be spent more productively. Will that suffice for now?”

He looked pointedly at Steele, fingering the ring in his pocket until the man nodded somewhat dubiously, then gradually with a tad more enthusiasm. As strange as the situation was - and a man from another age with a gold producing cellar was pretty dashed high on the hierarchy of strangeness in any chap’s book - at the bottom line, a boon was a boon.

“Good. The impact of this is marked and, dare I say it, profound. This source of funds can potentially pay for the current war and, God willing, victory therein, and when pave the way for the future in a number of ways. Used wisely, this stream of income presents a unique opportunity to have a choice of several different paths. I must, though, impress upon you and the Prime Minister the importance of utilising this boon in a distinctly circumspect fashion - there is sufficient gold here that, should it be publicly known, the value of gold and the pound could shift in a distinctly unfavourable direction. That is where your office comes into our calculations, as it were.”

“In what fashion? The days of the Paymaster receiving funds in specie are past, Mr. Browning.”

“They are indeed, sir; were they not, our task would be a modicum easier. However, your current position can be used as the first link in a series of steps using accounts and delegated authority to distribute internal funds. In the circumstances of war, it will work for the time being.”

“A sleight of hand subterfuge involving the balance sheets and accounting tricks won’t last forever.”

“Nothing lasts forever, Mr. Steele. What we would propose is something a little more sophisticated, but it will take time and stages to develop and play out. Firstly, the instruments and bonds of the national debt, which has so vexed Mr. Pitt, can be acquired and effectively repaid, over the course of a number of years. Secondly, new deposits of gold can be ‘discovered’ in a gradual fashion, to cover for the presence of actual bullion for such payments that require coin. After that point, there will be capacity to channel income and earnings through a number of businesses that ‘march on paper’ into the taxation and excise system. In a way, sir, it is akin to the workings of a laundry, if you will, with gold bullion taking the place of linen.”

“We shall see the exact details and substance of your plan, but you’ll forgive me for being somewhat reticent to accept a plan without going through it in full.”

“But of course, sir. I can have one of my fellows, Mr. E. Blackadder, write a report on the proposal. You’ll meet him and the others in my group at dinner, which is being prepared for your satiety as we speak.”

“A capital notion; I am gladdened that the habits of these fashionable types from the city and their late dining habits never caught on for the future."

Browning thought it better to not disabuse Mr. Steele of that particular erroneous notion until the appropriate juncture in the fullness of time.

"So, do you have any other curious magic boxes hidden down in your cellar? That of Pandora?" asked Steele on their way back up.

"Nothing so egregiously gauche, sir, just five of the best automated metallic super 3D printers that could be found in our day and age."

"What the devil is a Souper Threedee Printer?"

"Merely a moderately useful tool, in the grand scheme of things. Ah, here we are - dinner!"

Their dinner, taken in the bright and well appointed dining room, was presented in the French style so as not to entirely discombobulate their esteemed guest, but with the addition of a number of dishes that could provide a brief and tantalising culinary glimpse of some of the foods and preparations that the cooks of Bletchley Park, apparently Masters Heston Oliver and Gordon Floyd and a Mistress Delia Lawson, could offer. There was some sort of delectable baked lobster dish garnished with an arrangement of prawns in a piquant pink sauce; crumbed lamb cutlets arranged like a map of Britain and Ireland; crispy fried chicken presented in a golden bucket painted in some sort of garish red and white design; grilled beefsteaks and venison chops with herbed butter; roast pheasant with bread sauce and tiny soldiers sculpted from stuffing; a bowl of what seemed to be assorted fruits but was actually finely ground spiced meats; a monstrous roast rib of beef that must have weighed over twenty five pounds; a savoury cheese, tomato, ham and bacon tart sprinkled with anchovies and luxuriant pineapple; some marvelous concoction of smoked pork ribs and extremely tender sliced beef adorned with a toothsome concoction apparently known as Halford's sauce; a ragout of minced veal in a strangely picquant and spicy sauce served with some sort of egg noodles and a poached salmon the size of a small child, who lay there with a rather morose look on its face and cucumber scales replacing his natural armour. Accompanying the main provender were several rather novel salads, a clever dish of fried potato sticks, a large tray of roasted vegetables, and an array of cakes, ices and puddings, all laid out in the manner of a fashionable London table.

For the life of him, Steele could not recognise a great many of the dishes, but all seemed exquisitely tasty and immaculately presented; the food of the future did seem to hold some utility, at the very least. He thought he could recognise a number of seasonings, but several were quite alien to his palate, whilst the array of foods not normally in season pointed to a most well prepared and impressive household. After this welcome prandial interlude, the dishes and cloth were cleared away by the swift servants and Mr. Browning rose again from his seat at the head of the table.

"And now, Mr. Steele, we have a series of what we would call 'briefings', both on account of their thankfully limited duration and the summation of their contents. This is to provide some overall information as to a number of significant issues of immediate import, so that consideration of processes of change can be at the very least considered with a measure of alacrity; the more fulsome reports on each issue are contained in yon volumes for the illumination of Mr. Pitt.

In the first instance, due to the degree of import given the state of the war, we have that of military and naval development. As our military man is currently travelling - to what end shall be revealed at the conclusion of these proceedings - I shall deliver the section on the Army, whilst Mister (as he is for the moment) Horatio Hornblower shall do so for the Royal Navy.

The Army currently has an appointed strength of 27,000 regulars and would swell, in our history, to almost quarter of a million by 1812. It was ultimately victorious over the French in 1815 at an obscure Belgian village near Brussels, having harried them all the way through the Iberian peninsula over half a dozen years of fighting. Prior to that, its performance in Europe left much to be desired, whilst there was a substantial death toll to the ravages of disease in the Caribbean and defeats by ragtag colonial militias in North and South America. With changes in strategy, armament, training, medicine, tactics and direction, much of the negatives can be avoided or changed altogether, which will add to Britain's power and prestige at the inevitable international congress that will come at the end of the fighting.

Victory is far off, and has a hundred fathers, whilst defeat is seemingly something of a lonely and wretched orphan. The chief enemy on land is and will be France. The current situation sees them advancing in the Low Countries, holding along the Rhine, preparing for offensives in the Pyrenees, and have just won at Toulon against efforts lead by Britain. Should nothing be done differently, they will achieve a striking victory in the Netherlands; then use that as a boost to thei morale and efforts along the Rhine, forcing Prussia into peace; then turn their focus against Austria in Italy. Their total nominal strength at present is around 670,000 men in total, considerably outweighing any opposition, although their actual deployable manpower is rather over half of that number; the maximum that they will reach will be up to 800,000 men. France has the strategic advantage of what can be characterised as a ‘central position’, whereby they can focus on their disorganised and uncoordinated enemies of this Coalition in turn. They are not possessed of any revolutionary weapons or technology, nor are their troops extraordinarily well trained; in many cases, far from it. The quality of the French soldier on an individual level is not so different from the rest of Europe. The difference in their performance in our time came down primarily to leadership.

The first and most threatening manifestation of that comes in the form of Napoleon Bonaparte, the recent victor at Toulon. He is extraordinarily able and bought about French victory in Italy over the next two years, then went on to seize power and change the world. Bonaparte is a wolf, and too dangerous to be allowed to roam free. Should it be approved, then we would suggest going ahead with action to permanently remove Bonaparte from future calculations, with extreme prejudice.”

Browning paused to glance at the empty seat where Sharpe would have been sitting.

“Such action would quite likely shorten the probability of the war extending for as long as in our history, but the French threat is not limited to a single ogre. They also had quite the array of very talented generals across her armies at this point, from the North to the Rhine to the Vendée. Currently, the leadership of Revolutionary France lies in the hands of Robespierre and his Jacobin gang. Their bloodthirsty and paranoid tendencies can be used to our end, by creating false suspicion towards some of their known successful commanders. Should Prime Minister Pitt approve of the proposed action to free the Dauphin, forged letters and other information incriminating a range of their commanders could be arranged. Manipulating the enemy to strike against themselves is one simple step in the journey towards victory.

In the Low Countries, they will deploy over 126,000 men of the Army of the North in the field aiming to envelop the flanks of the Allied position; on the left, they will attack through Ypres and Ghent to Brussels, whilst on the right, they will thrust at Namur and Lieges in an effort to cut Austria’s lines of communication and supply through Luxembourg. Preventing their success here would continue to pull their strategic focus to the north, buying time.”

“Buying time? Are you suggesting that there is no scope for victory at this juncture?”

“Not quite, but no easy victory at the least. It is likely that it will take a cascade of blows to break the morale and strength of Revolutionary France, and Britain can deliver a large part of that with the right sized and newly equipped army under the right generals in the right place at the right time. To be specific, a British army equipped with the most straightforward rifles that we exhibited earlier will, with the right leadership and intelligence, provide such a volume of fire as to inflict extremely heavy losses on the French at perhaps two to three times the range of their Charleville muskets. This would be further augmented by sufficient new artillery with a range of upwards of 1800 yards, or over double that of France‘s current or anticipated field artillery. With the combination of these weapons, sufficient casualties would be inflicted to bring about a very clear battlefield victory. That is the result that we would recommend to work towards, but it will take between six and nine years to achieve, as outlined on Page 3 of the report before you.”

Steele read the information presented in a novel table-like structure, the apparent work of someone or something called 'PowerPoint'. 'Provision of tooling and plans for tooling, parents, diagrams and further information with a goal, after between two and three years, of producing between fifteen and twenty thousand of these rifles and two hundred new 12 pounder ‘gun-howitzers’ per year and timetables for fielding them in new and current units.' Ambitious, but not beyond the capacity of Britain, at least now… He nodded at Browning to continue.

“The overall strategy that we would propose then is one of trying to maintain the front in the Netherlands for as long as possible, as part of a general approach to try and keep French forces stretched out on as many fronts as possible - Holland, the Rhine, the Alps, Italy, Spain and the Vendée. Should that be viable, then when the time is right, a new British Army can descend upon a particular area, having drawn away French reserves so that there is sufficient time for them to establish themselves before moving to engage the enemy and destroy him.

This would entail maintaining our joint effort in Holland as long as possible; supporting Austria and Prussia on the Rhine with financial subsidies, intelligence and even nominal British forces as necessary; helping the Austrians to hold indefinitely in the Italian borderlands of Piedmont; and engaging diplomatically with Sweden and Russia to join in the general alliance against the bloody tyranny of Robespierre. The final action would free up quite substantive Prussian and Austrian forces as can be seen on the map on the next page.

There are a host of other factors involved with this ‘grand plan’, both technical ones regarding new guns, and strategic ones, regarding the maintenance of Austrian and Prussian forces in the field, and the position of Russia, but one of the key ones in turn will be the utilisation of the sea and the Royal Navy, which Mr. Hornblower will expand upon. Once this is in hand, then the prospects for offensive action against France on the Continent and indeed around the world will follow.

The strength of the British Army will need to continue to grow over ninefold to a strength of at least 250,000 and up to 300,000 regulars in approximately 120 regiments of foot, 40 cavalry regiments and at least 40,000 in the artillery and engineers. Of those, 50,000 men would be deployed to the East Indies, 10,000 to the Mediterranean, 25,000 to Ireland, 10,000 to the West Indies, 5000 to North America and 25,000 men maintained on the home establishment. This would allow for a minimum of five highly trained and lavishly equipped “corps d’armee” of 25,000 men, four of which would be grouped together in a field army for the eventual invasion of France. These regular British formations would be augmented by Hanoverian and other German contingents; exiled expatriate units opposed to France; the West Indian regiments; and a new unit of foreign recruits organised in a ‘legion’ of foot, horse and guns.

Further defence of the British Isles would be the duty of the embodied Militia, a new Volunteer Corps, and such units of a new Army Reserve as can be formed over time. Organisation of those forces into second and third line contingents will take time and most likely political will, as well as money. It can be anticipated at this time that the prospect of any French invasion threat, which presented a real concern for many in what I will term ‘our former past, can be hugely minimised above and beyond of the chief defence provided by the Navy.

Whilst the question of what campaigns to fight and what to avoid is a privilege of those who hold the highest offices, on the basis of our history and the information available, I would recommend in the strongest possible terms that any large scale precipitous commitment of British Army forces to the West Indies not be initiated without full and substantive planning, and the provision of certain of our preventative medicines to counteract the worst predations of tropical diseases.

Should the weapons we propose be built in sufficient numbers - both here and by Britain’s craftsmen and industry - troops trained in them and the right commanders appointed to lead them, then we assess the likelihood of success of a ‘British Expeditionary Force’ in the field against the armies of Revolutionary France as being in the region of ninety-five in one hundred.”

“A mere 95? Why not 100?”

“Nothing is truly ever guaranteed in what can be termed ‘political terms’, Mr. Steele, even when it effectively is in a practical sense; there is also the issue of freak weather, acts of God and other such thoroughly unlikely variations. With those caveats aside, it is more likely that any battle against the French will make Culloden look like a dashed close run thing. And now, it is the turn of Mr. Hornblower.”

“Thank you, Mr. Browning. Unlike the Army, the Royal Navy did not take part in the final battle which ended the long struggle with France in 1815, but it had already ensured that Britain would win the war, following the most famous triumph in the nation's naval history against the French and Spanish at Trafalgar in 1805."

"The Spanish? Why did those dastardly dons switch sides?"

"That is a very broad question best posed when Mr. Aubrey speaks on foreign affairs following myself; I have been reliably informed by my esteemed friend Mr. Browning that nobody expects some sort of Spanish exposition, at least not at this point. Our chief concern with them will be their armada and the elimination thereof. If I may continue?"

"Very well."

"The grand strategy adopted by Britain in our time was to blockade France and the Continent, and to take action against such fleets that could potentially join forces with the French to present a threat to Britain herself. Control of the seas rendered control of the world's trade, and set up Britain's dominance over the coming century that followed victory. To that end, the same path is one that bears recommendation and indeed acceleration. That can be provided through a number of different means.

In the first instance, we have construction. Historically, Britain built 9 first rates, 5 second rates, 94 third rates and 16 fourth rate ships of the line during the wars with France, with a large part of them coming after 1810, when the war at sea had already been essentially decided, and 153 frigates. As of the beginning of 1794, the Royal Navy had 5 first rates, 23 second rates, 113 third rates (of which 70 are 74s or larger and 43 are 64s), 15 of the older fourth rates and 12 of the fifth rate 44s, along with 94 frigates (and another dozen to launch in this coming year).
We have prepared an ambitious proposed 15 year construction programme for 24 first rates, 32 second rates, 120 third rates and 240 frigates as such:

1794: 2 first rates, 3 second rates, 8 third rates, 12 18pdr frigates
1795: 2 first rates, 3 second rates, 8 third rates, 12 18pdr frigates
1796: 2 first rates, 3 second rates, 8 third rates, 12 18pdr frigates, 6 24pdr frigates
1797: 2 first rates, 3 second rates, 8 third rates, 12 18pdr frigates, 6 24pdr frigates
1798: 2 first rate, 2 second rates, 8 third rates, 12 18pdr frigates, 6 24pdr frigates
1799: 2 first rates, 2 second rates, 8 third rates, 12 18pdr frigates, 6 24pdr frigates
1800: 2 first rates, 2 second rates, 8 third rates, 12 18pdr frigates, 6 24pdr frigates
1801: 2 first rates, 2 second rates, 8 third rates, 12 18pdr frigates, 6 24pdr frigates
1802: 2 first rates, 2 second rates, 8 third rates, 12 18pdr frigates, 4 24pdr frigates
1803: 1 first rate, 2 second rates, 8 third rates, 12 18pdr frigates, 4 24pdr frigates
1804: 1 first rate, 2 second rates, 8 third rates, 12 18pdr frigates, 4 24pdr frigates
1805: 1 first rate, 2 second rates, 8 third rates, 12 18pdr frigates, 4 24pdr frigates
1806: 1 first rate, 2 second rates, 8 third rates, 12 18pdr frigates
1807: 1 first rate, 1 second rate, 8 third rates, 12 18pdr frigates
1808: 1 first rate, 1 second rate, 8 third rates, 12 18pdr frigates

The latter portions of the proposal are of course entirely dependent upon how long any war or series of war will last, and the placement of larger numbers of more significant ships in the earlier years is designed to provide necessary numbers when they will be of most utility. The greatest British admiral of the war oft complained of a 'want of frigates', so there is a deliberate effort to provide for them as soon as possible, particularly to counter any movements of the Spanish fleet to the cause of the French. The additional expense for construction could very likely be facilitated by the resources provided here at Bletchley. In addition to being quantitatively greater, we would also suggest a range of qualitative improvements to the design and armament of various ships, as outlined for your perusal in the accompanying appendix to today's report.

The second instance is through much greater success in a particular naval battle that will occur in this coming year in the month of June. The Navy, under the brilliant leadership of Lord Howe, fought with the French some four hundred nautical miles west of Ushant, capturing six enemy ships of the line and sinking one, but, through a lack of coordination to the attack and other factors, failing to truly press home the advantage and rout the Frogs, as well as capturing their highly needed grain convoy from the Americas. Should the Prime Minister approve, then we can suggest a number of means to allow for the augmentation and coordination of Admiral Howe's force, allowing for a far more decisive engagement with the French and the capture of the convoy or large part of it; these would include adjusting the orders issued to Admiral Montagu, reinforcing Lord Howe's fleet with certain ships from the Channel and Mediterranean as appropriate, deployment of scouting frigates along the route of the French convoy and the utilisation of observation from the air through the employment of a balloon that would make the Montgolfier brothers rather envious. Victory here will in turn constrain the ability of the French to offer threat in the Channel and Atlantic, removing the possibility of a French expedition to Ireland, as they tried in our time in 1796 and 1797; allowing for the reinforcement of the Mediterranean Fleet and further offensive actions in that theatre; a more efficient blockade of France; a diminished need for particular steps which may cause some issues with the Americans, which Mr. Aubrey will expand upon; and greatly increased prestige and influence upon the actions of the other powers of Europe.

The third means is through technology. There are a number of areas where Britain can exploit the benefit of the knowledge we deliver, ranging from the eventual reduction in current expense of coppering through the use of special paint that prevent the fouling of ship's bottoms, to advances in compasses and chronometers. However, the major areas of interest lie in propulsion and guns. In the former case, the future of ships lies in the steam engine, which will revolutionise tactics and strategy for navies and remove complete reliance on the vagaries of the wind. There are two inventors who the Admiralty should engage post haste - a Scotsman named William Symington and an American named Robert Fulton, both of whom are currently in Britain and engaging in experimentation and construction; with the right information and assistance from our Professor Elemental over here, they will be able to provide for a not inconsiderable increase in the development of experimental marine steam engines, and thence other developments which build upon it. In the latter area of naval guns, there is potential for the controlled development of the next 'generation' of weapons, including the 68 pounder smoothbore cannon and also large 'shell guns' firing an explosive round that will devastate wooden navies."

"What other types of navies will there be?"

"Iron, sir. That will be something for many, many years in the future, as Mr. Richardson, our 'smith', as it were, can expound upon. For now, we can begin the processes of encouraging the development of science and technology with particular applications to the needs of the Royal Navy. Now, the final means that can bring about a swifter and even greater victory at sea for Britain and her Empire is command. The Navy was blessed with many extremely able and daring commanders, but none moreso than a young captain who is now preparing for action in the offensive against Corsica - Horatio Nelson. In our time and place, he would go on from Corsica to Genoa, battles off Cape St. Vincent, Cadiz, Tenerife, the Nile, Malta and thence to Copenhagen and to everlasting legend and immortal memory at Trafalgar in 1805, where he gave his life in the victory. He should be encouraged, guided and nudged in the right directions, and helped to develop his considerable abilities; should it be approved, there are those among us who would attain commission in His Majesty's Britannic Navy and aid, assist and even protect from his more brash manifestations of personal valour, in an appropriately supporting fashion. The right commanders at the right place at the right times will render even better results, which will further open up more avenues for progress. Identifying the right commanders will also pave the way towards preventing the rather unfortunate mutinies at Spithead and the Nore in 1797 through provision of better treatment, pay and victualling. Heading off this occurrence before it comes to the pass, or to pass, sorry, will act to prevent the spread of French inspired revolution into Britain and Ireland, to some small extent, and further to allow for the fleet to constantly improve itself towards readiness for new actions and efforts.

The French have 7 first rates, 10 second rates, 49 third rates and 50 frigates, with a further 2, 5, 8 and 8 of each type under construction. This presents a challenge, but not an insurmountable one. If their numbers can be reduced through the battle in June, that will be a boon; additionally, we do have a proposal for utilisation of a type of very effective 'hellburner' fireship against the French Mediterranean Fleet at Toulon, which will additionally attrit their overall fleet and capacity to strategically threaten our operations and commerce. Preventing their acquisition of the Dutch fleet will be an important further step towards constraining their offensive and defensive naval capacity, which occurred in freezing conditions in January 1795 through a daring raid by French cavalry; this can possibly be accomplished through a combination of diplomacy and financial persuasion, and might have some positive impact against the potential formation of another vexsome League of Armed Neutrality.

Finally, Spain has 11 first rates, 5 second rates, 43 third and fourth rates and approximately 40 frigates, divided between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic and the hinge of fate between them that is Gibraltar. Should the Dons join with the Frogs, as is likely, then the naval balance is transformed; should their ability to do so be neutralised and outbalanced through concentration of forces, decisive action, new construction and the advantage of technology, then there need never be such a threat that amounts to Trafalgar. Whilst the victory there was glorious, the most glorious and least costly victories are those which never need to be fought. The Spanish have what would later be termed very much as a 'fleet in being', as compared to one that we can anticipate to be regularly and significantly increased in strength; therein lies the solution to the Spanish threat in our view. By cutting figurative limbs off the French in June and at Toulon, we cut their potential threat, and then allow the Mediterranean Fleet, reinforced by ships from the Channel and Atlantic, to fall upon the Spaniards at Cadiz like a wolf on the fold.

Then, with their means of reinforcement removed, we can act to constrain and bottle up the French so that we can invade, even as the Navy acts to support a series of smaller invasions around the world against strategic French and Spanish colonies and holdings, defeating them in detail as we sweep their bases and sources of wealth from the ocean sea. By denying France naval mobility on a grand strategic level, we hold them in place and prevent damage to our own interests and their protection of their own, in what can be termed a naval manifestation of a 'colossal cracks' operational technique - we apply firepower and technology as well as traditional blood and guts to win each battle that we face and eventually, the victory at sea."

[Belushi TD]

YAY!!!! Its back.

And filled with delicious puns!!!

Well done, Sir!


Belushi TD

[Simon Darkshade]

Thank you kindly. There is a fair bit of meat in this briefing chapter, and in the next two to come, but then we get into the Scarlet Pimpernel rescuing the Dauphin and Richard Sharpe making sure that Napoleon is Blownapart.

An absence of Boney doesn’t necessarily preclude the French from a mistake in Egypt, but that will be interesting to try and engineer.

There is a fair bit of action to plan and plot out, as befits the greatest war to date, but it will fundamentally be a shorter and cheaper one. My current head canon is for victory at sea by 1802ish, and on land by 1805 or 1806. The fun/interesting/difficult/time consuming part is working out how to combine that with taking the best bits around the world currently owned by Spain and the Dutch.

[Simon Darkshade]

Some general musing:
- Without Boney and a French victory in Italy, it will be difficult to see them try for Egypt, but not impossible
- Following up a bigger victory at the Glorious First of June with a further blow to French numbers in the Atlantic would be of great utility
- Their forces in the Med can be tied down, at least until the Spanish enter
- Attacking their fleet in Brest with a kind of 'fireship' equipped with fuel air explosive and other goodies could inflict substantive attrition
- Historically, the French took 18 ships of the line from the Med to join 15 Spanish for Trafalgar, after losing 11 SoL at the Nile
- Of those, new construction, captures and acquisitions were 13/18 - Scipion, Formidable, Duguay-Trouin, Heros, Bucentaure, Neptune, Intrepido*, Pluton, Aigle, Argonaute, Swiftsure*, Achille and Berwick
- Trying to coordinate fireship attacks on Toulon and Brest will likely be too difficult, but greater construction and coordination can allow for a larger RN Mediterranean Fleet to watch Toulon
- Broad plans at this point would then see a loss of ~ 12 French SoL at the Glorious First of June, 6+ at Cape St. Vincent and at least 6 in any 'cheating' attack on Brest. There is something to be said for luring/letting the French Mediterranean Fleet out, eventually, and even getting them all the way over to Egypt to knock them about...
- A new first rate will take 4 years, a second rate ~3 years and a third rate 2 years to build. That will result in a decent boost from new construction, in addition to the currently authorised 3 x Neptune class 2nd rates, Mars and Centaur; by 1798, the RN could have up to 26 new 3rd rates, 9 second rates and 2 first rates, or the equivalent of an entire new fleet
- Nelson should still have something of an interesting career. Corsica will happen before any change can occur, then further action against the remains of the French Mediterranean Fleet at Toulon, then a much more successful Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Cadiz and Malta in short order. There will likely be some sort of action against whatever remains of the French Atlantic Fleet, then 'expansion operations' into South America and the West Indies. There may not be exactly the same Nile and probably not a Trafalgar (against both Spain and France) with the same stakes unless something really messes up, but there might be something thematically similar to Copenhagen, depending on how long the war goes for
- After that point, there is then scope for command of the fleet in any tussle with the Americans that might occur, followed by some special missions in the Orient to force open China and Japan rather earlier, and then some sort of command in the Mediterranean defeating the Barbary Pirates once and for all, before finally leading a fleet against the Turks in support of Greek independence. That should cover things through ~ 1820, whereupon a tenure as First Naval Lord and Lord High Admiral would follow, then perhaps a retirement into 'politics' in the Lords. In any event, I'm going to try to plot out at least half a dozen major naval battles

For Europe, one potential set of postwar circumstances could maybe see:
- Prussia not gaining territories in Western Germany
- Austria remaining fairly strong, but not gaining Northern Italy
- A Polish partition, but with a legitimate King and his descendants in exile
- Sweden not losing Finland
- Naples becoming Two Sicilies
- Possibly some sort of loose Italian confederation
- A continuining HRE, if only in name
- In general, a divided Germany of many small and medium states
- A very big question of what happens to the Austrian Netherlands
- France possibly losing some of her eastern territories such as Alsace Lorraine as a quasi-independent entity/buffer state...resurrecting a relocated Burgundy would be 'interesting'
- A different Switzerland
- A restored Kingdom of France without occupation
- Britain snapping up Malta, the Balearic Isles and the Ionian Islands
- The Ottomans will be teetering all ready
- Danish control over Norway can't really be carried on for much longer
- Definitely some sort of Concert of Europe system, with the British more directly engaged
- Politically, a lot of the nationalist impulses unleashed by Boney won't quite be born in the same way, but their emergence is still very likely

[Simon Darkshade]

The next draft. The only things left to add to this now are bits on China and the Far East and South America, before a section on Imperial Development and colonisation, plus some Aubreyisms



“Thank you. And now, Mr. Aubrey will present on foreign affairs.”

“The French. Our traditional enemy and our current foe, revolutionaries and disturbers of the peace. The vast majority of England’s current foreign policy is based around defeating France, who time and again have been our main enemy. Why? Why have they been our main enemy going back to the Middle Ages?

To begin with, proximity verging on propinquity; the doings of a neighbour are of more import than some far off land of which we know little. This begat, in part, the long term claims of our kings to the throne of France, which continues to this day. But this circumstance has changed over time, and particularly the last 150 years, as France became more powerful and sought to dominate the Continent. That is a state of affairs that directly challenges the essential interests, power and survival of Britain - we cannot permit a single power to control the Continent. The way ahead is fairly straightforward- fund and support our coalition of allies in Europe, take France’s colonies away from her and break her trade. As Mr. Browning eloquently outlined, preventing French success in Flanders and Italy will prevent their nefarious little heads popping up elsewhere in Europe to attempt to further extend their borders and kingless empire, like moles popping up from one hole to another all across Christendom.

After victory, in our former, time, England and France never fought another war, although there were temporary crises in relations that lead to war scares in the late 1850s and 1890s, with the former coming from an assassination attempt on the then French ruler purpotedly supported by radicals on our side of the Channel, and the latter from a standoff over colonial ambitions in deepest Africa along the Nile. Apart from those, we fought a number of wars together as allies, and relative French power declined until the second half of the twentieth century. This would suggest that, once cut down to size and shorn of their current foul revolutionary tendencies, there is a possibility that the era where France was our greatest enemy might be coming to an end. However, by virtue of their geographic position, population, economy and military, they will always present something of an non friendly rival in the absence of a broader threat that might bring us together, which may or may not occur. Historically, that came variously in the form of Russia and a German Empire unified by Prussia, at least until such time as a new Franco-German entity rose up on the Continent; that potential is so far off into the future as to be an unlikely curiosity. This current war can then be characterised as arguably France's last hurrah - her last viable challenge for mastery of the Continent and the world. When we are victorious, France will represent less of a real and wild tiger and more of one rendered on paper by a particularly lurid and cruel artist - viciously arrayed and frightening to scatterbrained children and addlepated old ladies, but no longer a genuine threat.

Once France is beaten - and it will be thrashed thoroughly, of that I have no doubt - our challenge shifts to prevent another state from attempting that same end. Thus, our policy arguably should be informed, at least in a small part, by trying to win the peace just as much as we aim to win the war. In our time, Britain stood aloof from the machinations of the Continent as a matter of course and dedicated policy over many decades, achieving what a later minister described as a kind of ‘splendid isolation’; the only issues were that it was hardly splendid in the end result or process, nor truly isolated. It can be argued that a better outcome could see the great powers of Europe be balanced off against each other to create a more stable Continent and world. At the very least, the men making the decisions should be informed, in some way and in an appropriate fashion, as to what certain paths could possibly lead towards, as well as obvious foibles to avoid. To that end, let us examine who and what we are dealing with. The foremost powers of Europe aside from France are Austria, Prussia, Russia and Spain. Each have their own interests, ambitions and goals, some more distant than others.

Of these, the most tenuous in that ranking is Spain. She has a considerable empire across the world, and a not inconsiderable fleet, but ultimately has feet of clay, lacking the leadership, wealth, cohesion and hard military power to compel other states to her will. In our time, and likely here as well, she treacherously made peace and alliance with France; this did not save her from French deprivations, though, and the subsequent war which ravaged her heartland destroyed Spain as a world power of the first rank for all time. Whilst we are currently allied, and would be again in that different future past of ours, there is nothing that Spain can really offer to Britain that we cannot provide for ourselves. They are not wealthy, nor modern, nor possessed of any particularly rich natural resources in the Iberian Peninsula proper, and their ability to successfully prosecute a long modern war is substantially behind that of the foremost powers of Europe.

As Mr. Hornblower touched upon with regard to naval affairs, the Spanish fleet offers the most direct potential threat of combining with the French in the likely event of an unholy alliance between Madrid and Paris by dint of sheer numbers and their positioning. The size of their fleet and its potentially unfriendly alignment does make Spain stand out as a potentially uncontrolled factor in the successful prosecution of the war; if it were eliminated, then this danger would be removed. The sheer size, concentration and defences of the Spanish fleet militate against any preemptive action, and any such step would be severely counterproductive in view of our relations with other powers. As such, they are a threat to be honoured and prepared for, with a view to their swift neutralisation. Their army does not present any major threat to British interests outside of the defence of Gibraltar, and there may be some strategic value in reconsidering the current borders there and giving thought to expansion in due course.

Further, there is much that Spain currently holds that would be advantageous to possess. Those in Madrid and Paris currently view the most valuable colonies in the world as the various sugar islands in the West Indies; whilst they have no small value at present, this will not be lasting in any sense. Of far more value in the long run are the likes of the Canadas, South America, New Holland, the Cape and even the United States - land with great potential for settlement, expansion and development. Whilst others might still be stuck in the past of sugar and spice and everything nice, the world is changing to one of gold, wheat and new colonial nations with unparalleled potential. There are still islands of considerable import and strategic value of various kinds that we would do well to acquire. From Spain then, we should seek to take Minorca, Trinidad, Porto Rico, Texas, Louisiana, Florida, Panama, the Argentine, the Falklands, Chile, the Californias and the Marianas, and seek to hold them. If we take the Philippines, Cuba, Hispaniola or other areas of New Spain, then we can use them as tools of negotiation at the conclusion of any war. The former group either have strategic locations (in the case of the islands), vast strategic potential or vast strategic resources. Minorca gives us a key base in the Western Mediterranean to augment Gibraltar and serve as a link in what will become a chain of bases cementing our control of the middle seas; Trinidad holds a key position close to South America and has substantive natural resources of a strategic nature; Porto Rico controls the strategic geography of the broader West Indies; Texas and the Californias are treasure houses of natural resources and potentially rich farm and grazing land, while Louisiana spans much of North America; Florida further cements control of the Caribbean and cuts off American expansion; Panama is the best placed location for a canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; the Argentine and Chile contain vast natural resources and vast farmland such that can become one of the veritable breadbaskets of the world, whilst the Falklands offer control of future oil deposits; and the Marianas are among several strategically placed island chains in the Pacific that would cement future British control.

We would not advise acting to start a war with Spain, but when it comes, quite soon, to have the plans to shatter their empire, claim what we know to be the choicest parts for our future benefit, neutralise the threat of their fleet and in doing those two things, force a peace upon them. Beyond the current war, we have no particular enmity with Spain, but would be better suited by a general collapse of their colonial empire in the Americas so that we can supplant them, variously directly and indirectly; a removal of their current fleet, for purposes of diminishing the possible threat to England's shores and interests; and something of an introspective period of internal focus, whereafter they can again try to find their place in a changed Europe. It is possible that this process can occur without the destruction wrought upon Spain in our former time, where the armies of France ravaged her land and peoples such that they did not recover for more than a century.

Next, we have Austria. She has a relatively powerful army and extensive holdings on paper, but her central issue is that she is not a distinct national entity as the other powers, but rather a collated empire of many different nations. There is no 'Austrian' nationality or blood, at least at this time, but rather a number of kingdoms all under the rule of Francis. There is strong potential probability, verging on likelihood, that eventually this will spill over into some form of revolt in the coming two or three generations; the broader ideas and spirits unleashed by the revolutions in France and elsewhere are not something so easily exorcised and banished back to the netherworld, in the long run. For that central reason, Vienna ranks as arguably the third of the non-French powers of the Continent, at least in terms of her potential stability. Should they manage to tame that beast, and it was possible for quite some decades in our time, then they can serve as a stabilising force in Central and Eastern Europe, and one that does not generally clash with British interests in any direct fashion.

One caveat to this is the matter of Italy. Historically, Austria gained substantial lands in Northern Italy as a consequence of the eventual peace with France, and the earlier dissolution of Venice as an independent entity. These were relatively rich, in some areas, but proved to be too restive to be kept in the long term, becoming a factor in wars with France on the behest of Sardinia, which lead the unification of Italy into a nation state. This matter of the Duchy of Milan and the lands of Venice is something for His Majesty's Government then to consider, with possibly a view towards a different outcome. Should Austria not expend her blood and treasure for lands that she cannot really hold, she may potentially be better positioned with regards to her relations with Russia and Prussia; depending on the actions of Turkey, there may be scope for some 'trade offs' in that direction.

In second position is Prussia. They have the smallest population of any of the Great Powers, with well under 10 millions at present. Through her possession of Silesia, she has access to decent supplies of coal and iron, which will be significant as time, economy and science develop in Europe as here, but this would not be enough to enable her to truly change the balance of power on the Continent. That would come should they gain control of that part of the western Germanies around the Rhine and Ruhr rivers, which have substantive population, great resources and turn Prussia from an eastern entity into one that holds the heartland of Europe in her grip, fatally imperiling Hannover and Hesse. With control of the more powerful north of the Germanies, a Prussian-lead effort to unify with the south is bound to happen, as it did for us, following some sort of successful war prosecuted against Austria. In the long term, a unified German state is a much greater potential threat than even that which France offers at the moment, as the new means and measures of war and raw power change in the coming century.

In and of herself at the moment, Prussia is no particular threat to Britain or her interests. The forthcoming partition of Poland, which is too far advanced in development to be altered even for Britain tempered with the aid we offer, will provide quite a bit of meat for Prussia, Austria and Russia to chew and digest. Any righteous indignation at the injustice being rendered to the Poles can be tempered by that prospect, along with a number of potential precautionary actions that Mr. Browning will touch upon in his conclusion to this afternoon of talking. Prussia is, to a large extent, an army with a state attached, and an able one at that, but even nowhas lost something of the repute built up by the performance of Frederick the Great. Should they not have the same opportunities to experience a litany of defeats and then a string of victories, the Prussian Army that develops may be slightly different in a number of respects. If they remain an Eastern Germanic state in territory and power base, then they will be progressively eclipsed by waxing British power, wealth and population, to the extent that the relationship will ultimately be a distinctly unequal one. This is a state of affairs which would not fundamentally challenge British interests in a direct fashion, and would contribute towards something of a stable balance of power in Europe.

Finally, we have Russia. They have the largest 'home population' of any of the Great Powers, which allowed them to maintain a standing army of between one and one and a half millions for most of the next century. They played a significant part in the defeat of the historic French threat under Bonaparte, and would subsequently intervene in Europe on a number of times to support regimes friendly to their values. Those were based around reaction, autocracy and absolutism, all in their particular Russian character, and with a side helping of mysticism and maintenance of medieval practices such as serfdom. Their policies under the Tsars to come was of expansion, centralisation and repression, with the first particularly aimed at the Ottomans, the Persians and the various states of Central Asia; this would culminate in a direct rivalry with the British Empire known as 'The Great Game', which sought to threaten India itself. In this, Russia is the only European great power that has the means and opportunity to directly threaten the vital interests of Britain and our position as the preeminent world power. However, Russia has a number of weaknesses - firstly, she is extremely backward and undeveloped, and will remain so for almost another century; secondly, this has the effect of stretching her capabilities out over vast territories and multiple fronts; and thirdly, her historical leadership was lacking in ability for a good six decades to come.

Beyond the immediate future, Russia presents the greatest potential threat to Britain through her dominance of the Eurasian continental landmass and her position athwart the crucial territory of the heartland of the world's power and resources. In the main part, they are largely protected from our major weapon, the seapower of the Royal Navy, by the frozen north and the mountains and deserts of their south, with only the Baltic and Black Seas providing avenues for an approach; at the same time, they are positioned so that they can descend upon Eastern and Central Europe with massed armies and encounter a reasonable degree of success, at least until the advent of different weapons which will fundamentally change the battlefield. Should they be allowed to expand and develop their interior on their own terms, it is inevitable that there will be some degree of clash with British interests. Whilst France is the current and most pressing enemy, in the longer term, the greatest foe will be Russia; if we can successfully oppose them and prevent their rise as a hostile competitor, then Britain's position will be much more secure across the world.

As well as the great powers, we have the collective entities of Germany and Italy; and the peripheral states of Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, the Dutch Republic and Ottoman Turkey. It would arguably be in Britain's long term interests to prevent, or at least stymie, the rise of unified German and Italian states, given their central positions in Europe and the Mediterranean respectively and given the simple arithmetic of statecraft - a multitude of smaller independent entities possessed of their own interests are less likely to oppose our position or leadership on anywhere near an equal level. The unification of Germany was a contentious process, born as it was out of the establishment of a German Confederation at the end of the French wars in 1815, and being slowly driven by Prussia after she established her clear dominance as the leading Teutonic power with a crushing victory over Austria. Maintaining a number of German states - Bavaria, Baden and Wurttemberg, Hesse, Saxony, Mecklenburg, Prussia, a conglomeration of the Ernestine duchies in Thuringia, Westphalia, Nassau, the Palatinate, Holstein and Oldenburg, to name on potential combination, in addition to her free cities and smaller entities - would not be utterly beyond the scope of concentrated and consistent diplomacy, should it be seen as an attractive objective. Even with Prussia being the first among equals, there is sufficient counterweight to prevent her total domination of the internal affairs of the Germanies. Maintaining the existence of the Holy Roman Empire, should it survive the current conflict, is not entirely necessary, but also would not be significantly harmful to broader British interests. As for Italy, a unified entity will eventually begin to look across the seas and borders with envious and expansive eyes, and in time, build a fleet that could locally oppose British interests; compared to that situation, a loose grouping of Venice, Genoa, Lombardy, Piedmont-Sardinia, Tuscany, the Papal States, Parma, Bologna, Naples and Sicily would be far more disparate, divided and inwardly focused. In both cases of Germany and Italy, it is more likely that divided and loose confederations would be more open to British trade after the advent of peace.

Sweden is a shadow of her former power, but is possessed of a decent position in the heart of Scandinavia and the Baltic, and has extensive natural resources. She presents no discernable threat or competition with Britain or her interests and indeed, so long as she possesses Finland (which historically was conquered by the Russians in an ill-fated side conflict of the broader French wars in 1809), Sweden acts to constrain part of the westward projection and opportunity of Russia. Cultivating and supporting her may render some useful results in time, although it would really take a miracle for Sweden to re-ascend to the ranks of Great Powers. Denmark, covering as she does not only the land of that name, but also Norway, Iceland, Greenland and various smaller islands and colonies, is something of a different proposition in some respects, by virtue of her disparate possessions and the factor of her fleet, which may become potentially threatening in the event of French successes in the Low Countries and Germany. However, there is little that sets her against Britain in the long term, and not a huge amount that would be absolutely necessary to take from her in the unlikely event of conflict. Portugal is our oldest ally, and presents no threat to our interests at this time. Historically, there were some disagreements over colonial borders in Africa and elsewhere, but those particular issues need not arise in a circumstance where our own exploration and expansion can occur on a rather accelerated and forearmed basis. Their holdings in Brazil became independent in our history due to the invasion and occupation of the mother country, but even without this calamity, continued indefinite Portuguese rule in its current form is probably beyond the scope of Lisbon to support, financially, militarily or politically; it may be that we can assist Portugal in achieving an amicable and gradual independence or indeed even some form of limited union, at least for a generation.

Lastly in Western Europe, we have the Dutch. Currently, they are our nominal allies, but their stability and capacity to withstand both French invasion and internal revolt is distinctly limited, with a strong desire across many groups to facilitate a revolution similar to that of France against the old, established order. Historically, this occurred next year, with Prince William fleeing to Britain and encouraging Dutch colonies to cooperate with British occupation, whilst the French captured the Dutch fleet whilst it was iced in to harbour with a daring cavalry raid, of all things. It is likely, even with some degree of success in the Low Countries, that there will be some form of revolution there in due course, necessitating occupation of her colonies to protect our trade and interests. In the long term, it was seen as necessary to keep the Cape Colony and Ceylon, whilst the East Indies and Dutch West Indies were returned; here, a broadly similar approach can be recommended for the immediate future, with the caveat that particular postwar claims and borders in the area of the East Indies can be resolved in a manner more favourable for British interests. Prevailing upon the Dutch to sell their residual interests in India and West Africa to Britain was eventually successful, and with the right offer at the right time, should be similarly acceptable here. Should the opportunity present itself to take the East Indies in the event of some crisis or conflict, then Sumatra and Borneo should be prioritised over Java, Celebes and the smaller spice islands of the Moluccas, whatever their current perceptions of relative value.

Straddling both Europe and Asia, we have the somewhat sickly and declining entity of the Ottoman Empire. They are possessed of some degree of power through population and armies, but are not comparable to the major powers in the latter respect. The Sultan can project power and control over Anatolia, Rumelia and the near reaches of the Levant, whilst his nominal rulership of Egypt would soon evaporate historically some ten years from now through the catalyst of a French invasion and subsequent rise of a restive former vassal, one Mohammed Ali Pasha. Within a generation, Greece would finally rise in revolt, aided by the powers of Europe, and despite Turkey attempting to bloodily and cruelly suppress her efforts at self-liberation, would break free, whilst the Serbs, Bulgars and Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia would wrestle out from beneath the Turkish yoke over the next sixty years after that. This gradual disintegration was the cause of much instability and much opportunity for Russian interference and intervention, and the subsequent unrest within the Balkans would be one of the causes of the most terrible war that the world had yet seen at the beginning of the 20th century. Eventually, after a slow and painful demise and far too much unnecessary bloodshed of various descriptions, the Ottoman Empire finally expired whilst being defeated by our own armies over many years, and Turkey was reduced to an Anatolian rump. We had acted to maintain and support Turkey for a significant portion of the next century, due to our staunch opposition to Russian expansionism and ambitions for control of the Straits and Constantinople. After such long efforts, and even one war, we ended up having to be the means of their final execution.

It would be difficult to see any sort of Turkish renaissance of power occurring at this point, but it may also be necessary to act variously to support and oppose the Sultan's policies at different points. Our chief interest will shift from the immediate issue of the Straits to the broader prize of the Eastern Mediterranean, and specifically to the strategic Isthmus of Suez. There was built a great sea level canal in the 1860s in our time, which allowed for the swift passage of ships and commerce to India, China and the Antipodes, and greatly enriched the Empire. That is the major prize of the region, which will eventually necessitate, in some fashion or another, control of Egypt on one side and the immediate hinterland in the Holy Land on the other. Further, the currently sparsely populated and desolate lands of Arabia and Mesopotamia contain beneath their soil unparalleled riches in the form of rock oil and other minerals and gases of future significance. It would be advantageous to put Britain in a position where she may control and harvest their bounties when their time comes. For now, no direct action need be taken against Turkey, as we have more direct and important matters to deal with, but in time, there may well be scope for informed consideration of various potential options that can be explored regarding our policy towards them, and how various outcomes can be achieved.

In general in Europe, beyond the immediate exigency of victory over the deprivations and threat of Revolutionary France, we have various options and opportunities where we can act to maintain the balance of power and Britain's position; and where we can act more strategically and subtly to encourage other states to develop in a more orderly and open fashion, balancing liberality and constitutional reason, progress and stability, reform and the value of tradition. In the process of that, we can not only prevent a number of dreadful wars and conflicts that would drag us into their bloody maelstrom and cost us dear in British lives and British treasure, but make for a better, more advanced and peaceful world open to our trade and commerce. By working to our interests and positions, we can also act to encourage the others, as Voltaire might put it. This would be part of our grand strategy to not only win the war, but to win the peace through a dedicated approach that integrates all the instruments of our national power - military, naval, scientific, industrial, economic, financial, diplomatic, cultural and political - into our short, medium and long term planning. Such an opportunity is not available to any of our rivals, and presents a grand advantage in and of itself.

Beyond Europe, there is one significant state that presents a challenge to Britain on a number of different levels, yet at this time is still a relative babe in swaddling clothes in terms of her age, size and capabilities."

"The United States."

"Precisely. We share a common language, religion, large parts of culture and tradition, but our recent history of conflict - aye, of defeat, and defeat to our own estranged colonists, to our children in a certain way of thinking - makes the gulf between us at times wider than the Atlantic itself. In our time and place, 1794 would see the cusp of a treaty between our countries that resolved some outstanding differences (although largely in America's favour) and put paid to the threat of war for the time being. The United States would be greatly enlarged through the sale of Louisiana to them by France, who had acquired the territory from Spain. The impact of the ongoing wars with France would stimulate tensions between us, though, rising through missteps and mistaken actions, decisions and policies by both sides that culminated in the Americans declaring war on Britain and invading Canada in 1812."

"What happened as a result of that?"

"Something of a mixture, Mr. Steele. We maintained a blockade, and landed forces which successfully routed theirs on land, and burned down their new capital city in revenge for their actions on Canadian soil. We rebuffed their invasion of Canada, but our counteractions on land and on the Great Lakes in the north were turned back, whilst a smaller British army was severely defeated at New Orleans before the news of a negotiated agreement to end the war had reached North America. The end result? Largely status quo ante bellum."

"Something of a success, then."

"By some measures, sir, by some. Within a generation, though, the Americans were further expanding, and going to war with Mexico, the independent successor of Spanish holdings on the continent, and, after that decisive victory, reaching the shores of the Pacific itself. With control of the resources of a continent, they grew more and more every year, apart from a few minor internal squabbles of no real note and some bloody campaigns against the benighted Indians, so that within the lifetime of a man born this morning, they would be larger than Britain in population, wealth and industry. Like a son outgrowing his father, they eclipsed Britain and even the Empire in every measure, and eventually began projecting their power and interests out into the wider world. These differed from those of Britain, and progressively lead to the decline of the Empire itself, until such time as England was treated as a mere satrap of America. This presaged the eventual decline and fall of the very nation herself, even as the fortunes of the Greeks waned with the fall of Rome. Canada herself, that most loyal and eldest of Britain's dominions, was eventually taken and absorbed in the quest to secure new resources and oppose America's enemies in China and Russia."

Browning blinked quickly. That particular pain of but five years ago in their old world still stuck in his craw.

"It is very difficult to predict and anticipate distant future developments with a fulsome degree of accuracy, but in almost every scenario where the United States rises in an untrammeled fashion to the status of a great power, we have concluded that it is more likely than not that the relative power and position of Britain declines as a result. If we do nothing, and simply allow the vagaries of history to take their course, then very little is likely to change, and little of that for the better. There is an incipient danger in doing nothing with regard to the United States, or of simply adopting a policy of coexistence, and an accompanying danger of trying to over-correct the course of England's future, or of doing too much. Currently, America has a population of under 3 millions and an economy that is around a quarter of Britain's size as a measure of national wealth, along with no navy to speak of and a tiny army. They have many strengths, such as the innovative spirit and approach of their populace, potentially large reserves to call upon in the event of war and a considerable shipping capacity that can manifest itself as a privateering threat; they also have weaknesses of key materials (including the capacity for protracted production of powder at this time), finance and sheer mass. Let me be clear - we are not calling for or recommending direct war with America, but simply for preparation and for reappraisal of the overall situation and the future strategic approach of the British Empire with regards to them, based on the information that we can supply."

"That may be a bit too difficult to work at this time, Mr. Aubrey. The issue of American independence has been fought and lost by us, and relaunching that particular bugbear whilst we are in a fight to the death with France is not an approach that will attract particular favour at this time, or indeed subsequently, I wager."

"Your wager and estimation may well be correct, sir, but I would suggest that some further study of the written materials which will be proffered, and the accompanying pictures, may influence your position, and possibly that of the Prime Minister, in some small fashion. I will admit that our view of America is different to yours, due to the small matter of near three centuries of intervening history, but the disparity between their current state and what they might become is marked. Even small steps in different directions are likely to change the course of relations and strategic considerations, such as the matter of Louisiana. If the United States of America is allowed to grow across the North American continent in an untrammeled fashion, then they will naturally rise to such strength and position as to be one of the foremost powers of the world, and eventually rival and then eclipse Britain. For the moment, the best course of action is to continue to pursue this treaty as matters stand, but also to begin to think about the future, and possible choices that might be made, or need to be made. The Americans will pursue their own interests, and whilst those may well be seemingly in parallel alignment to our own at this time, that won't always be so."

"You've done what you described as an error - falling between doing not enough and doing too much, Mr. Aubrey. You've said enough about what America might do in some circumstances, but not what we should do to counter that, should we wish it."

"As this is an introduction, Mr. Steele, I would think it a little precipitous to immediately recommend policy before the issue can be studied in full, but to put it in simple terms: be prepared. It is possible, and perhaps even likely, that America and Britain will come to blows, over some clash of interests or another, at some point within the next 20 to 25 years; with diplomacy, and the right touch, this could be avoided, should that be the approach that His Majesty's Government choose to take. If war does come, then it would be advisable for Britain to be victorious, and decisively so, and then, just like with France, set out to win the peace. This does not mean a reconquest of the American colonies as the only option, for such a conflict would be long, bloody and to no clear end or advantage, but rather to win whatever occurs in such a fashion as it changes the very trajectory of states and their destiny in a particular manner. The American states at this point are not necessarily as United as they might become in some futures, nor is the future in general written. May I paint you an analogy, sir?"

"By all means." Steele found himself warming to Aubrey's words for some reason, as if the longer he spoke made for a greater weight of persuasiveness. Curious.

"Consider a pair of schoolboys, playing in the fields. They get into an argument and a tussle, as boys are want to do. One considers that he is quite more stronger and capable than the other, and draws himself up as if to strike a blow; then the other rapscallion punches him swiftly and hard on the nose, sending him sprawling to the ground. His pride has taken an injury, but nothing in his body is broken by the short, sharp shock. The other fellow then extends a hand and raises him up from the ground, brushing him off. The boys then become fast friends, the past tumble and punches forgotten swiftly enough, but the one who knocked the other to the ground is the more dominant of the pair."

"Something of a drawn out example, but the point is easy to understand. What if the boy who is knocked to the ground doesn't take it in such an amicable fashion?"

"Frankly, a potentially much worse situation. As said, the ideal situation is to win without having to fight. Every year that goes by with Britain getting stronger also means another year where America grows a bit older, and hopefully more circumspect. General Washington may be somewhat magnanimous at this time, but some of those who might succeed him potentially hold somewhat more strident views on a number of issues. If we have achieved victory over France within 15 years, sir, then it is unlikely that the same type of conflict will occur. As in so many things in Europe, that victory is the key to further success."

[Simon Darkshade]

The Cards Reshuffled 4

“Thank you. And now, Mr. Aubrey will present on foreign affairs.”

“The French. Our traditional enemy and our current foe, revolutionaries and disturbers of the peace. The vast majority of England’s current foreign policy is based around defeating France, who time and again have been our main enemy. Why? Why have they been our main enemy going back to the Middle Ages?

To begin with, proximity verging on propinquity; the doings of a neighbour are of more import than some far off land of which we know little. This begat, in part, the long term claims of our kings to the throne of France, which continues to this day. But this circumstance has changed over time, and particularly the last 150 years, as France became more powerful and sought to dominate the Continent. That is a state of affairs that directly challenges the essential interests, power and survival of Britain - we cannot permit a single power to control the Continent. The way ahead is fairly straightforward- fund and support our coalition of allies in Europe, take France’s colonies away from her and break her trade. As Mr. Browning eloquently outlined, preventing French success in Flanders and Italy will prevent their nefarious little heads popping up elsewhere in Europe to attempt to further extend their borders and kingless empire, like moles popping up from one hole to another all across Christendom.

After victory, in our former, time, England and France never fought another war, although there were temporary crises in relations that lead to war scares in the late 1850s and 1890s, with the former coming from an assassination attempt on the then French ruler purpotedly supported by radicals on our side of the Channel, and the latter from a standoff over colonial ambitions in deepest Africa along the Nile. Apart from those, we fought a number of wars together as allies, and relative French power declined until the second half of the twentieth century. This would suggest that, once cut down to size and shorn of their current foul revolutionary tendencies, there is a possibility that the era where France was our greatest enemy might be coming to an end. However, by virtue of their geographic position, population, economy and military, they will always present something of an non friendly rival in the absence of a broader threat that might bring us together, which may or may not occur. Historically, that came variously in the form of Russia and a German Empire unified by Prussia, at least until such time as a new Franco-German entity rose up on the Continent; that potential is so far off into the future as to be an unlikely curiosity. This current war can then be characterised as arguably France's last hurrah - her last viable challenge for mastery of the Continent and the world. When we are victorious, France will represent less of a real and wild tiger and more of one rendered on paper by a particularly lurid and cruel artist - viciously arrayed and frightening to scatterbrained children and addlepated old ladies, but no longer a genuine threat.

Once France is beaten - and it will be thrashed thoroughly, of that I have no doubt - our challenge shifts to prevent another state from attempting that same end. Thus, our policy arguably should be informed, at least in a small part, by trying to win the peace just as much as we aim to win the war. In our time, Britain stood aloof from the machinations of the Continent as a matter of course and dedicated policy over many decades, achieving what a later minister described as a kind of ‘splendid isolation’; the only issues were that it was hardly splendid in the end result or process, nor truly isolated. It can be argued that a better outcome could see the great powers of Europe be balanced off against each other to create a more stable Continent and world. At the very least, the men making the decisions should be informed, in some way and in an appropriate fashion, as to what certain paths could possibly lead towards, as well as obvious foibles to avoid. To that end, let us examine who and what we are dealing with, in Europe, the rest of the wider world and our own Empire, current and future.

The foremost powers of Europe aside from France are Austria, Prussia, Russia and Spain. Each have their own interests, ambitions and goals, some more distant than others. Of these, the most tenuous in that ranking is Spain. She has a considerable empire across the world, and a not inconsiderable fleet, but ultimately has feet of clay, lacking the leadership, wealth, cohesion and hard military power to compel other states to her will. In our time, and likely here as well, she treacherously made peace and alliance with France; this did not save her from French deprivations, though, and the subsequent war which ravaged her heartland destroyed Spain as a world power of the first rank for all time. Whilst we are currently allied, and would be again in that different future past of ours, there is nothing that Spain can really offer to Britain that we cannot provide for ourselves. They are not wealthy, nor modern, nor possessed of any particularly rich natural resources in the Iberian Peninsula proper, and their ability to successfully prosecute a long modern war is substantially behind that of the foremost powers of Europe.

As Mr. Hornblower touched upon with regard to naval affairs, the Spanish fleet offers the most direct potential threat of combining with the French in the likely event of an unholy alliance between Madrid and Paris by dint of sheer numbers and their positioning. The size of their fleet and its potentially unfriendly alignment does make Spain stand out as a potentially uncontrolled factor in the successful prosecution of the war; if it were eliminated, then this danger would be removed. The sheer size, concentration and defences of the Spanish fleet militate against any preemptive action, and any such step would be severely counterproductive in view of our relations with other powers. As such, they are a threat to be honoured and prepared for, with a view to their swift neutralisation. Their army does not present any major threat to British interests outside of the defence of Gibraltar, and there may be some strategic value in reconsidering the current borders there and giving thought to expansion in due course.

Further, there is much that Spain currently holds that would be advantageous to possess. Those in Madrid and Paris currently view the most valuable colonies in the world as the various sugar islands in the West Indies; whilst they have no small value at present, this will not be lasting in any sense. Of far more value in the long run are the likes of the Canadas, South America, New Holland, the Cape and even the United States - land with great potential for settlement, expansion and development. Whilst others might still be stuck in the past of sugar and spice and everything nice, the world is changing to one of gold, wheat and new colonial nations with unparalleled potential. There are still islands of considerable import and strategic value of various kinds that we would do well to acquire. From Spain then, we should seek to take Minorca, Trinidad, Porto Rico, Texas, Louisiana, Florida, Panama, the Argentine, the Falklands, Chile, the Californias and the Marianas, and seek to hold them. If we take the Philippines, Cuba, Hispaniola or other areas of New Spain, then we can use them as tools of negotiation at the conclusion of any war. The former group either have strategic locations (in the case of the islands), vast strategic potential or vast strategic resources. Minorca gives us a key base in the Western Mediterranean to augment Gibraltar and serve as a link in what will become a chain of bases cementing our control of the middle seas; Trinidad holds a key position close to South America and has substantive natural resources of a strategic nature; Porto Rico controls the strategic geography of the broader West Indies; Texas and the Californias are treasure houses of natural resources and potentially rich farm and grazing land, while Louisiana spans much of North America; Florida further cements control of the Caribbean and cuts off American expansion; Panama is the best placed location for a canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; the Argentine and Chile contain vast natural resources and vast farmland such that can become one of the veritable breadbaskets of the world, whilst the Falklands offer control of future oil deposits; and the Marianas are among several strategically placed island chains in the Pacific that would cement future British control.

We would not advise acting to start a war with Spain, but when it comes, quite soon, to have the plans to shatter their empire, claim what we know to be the choicest parts for our future benefit, neutralise the threat of their fleet and in doing those two things, force a peace upon them. Beyond the current war, we have no particular enmity with Spain, but would be better suited by a general collapse of their colonial empire in the Americas so that we can supplant them, variously directly and indirectly; a removal of their current fleet, for purposes of diminishing the possible threat to England's shores and interests; and something of an introspective period of internal focus, whereafter they can again try to find their place in a changed Europe. It is possible that this process can occur without the destruction wrought upon Spain in our former time, where the armies of France ravaged her land and peoples such that they did not recover for more than a century.

Next, we have Austria. She has a relatively powerful army and extensive holdings on paper, but her central issue is that she is not a distinct national entity as the other powers, but rather a collated empire of many different nations. There is no 'Austrian' nationality or blood, at least at this time, but rather a number of kingdoms all under the rule of Francis. There is strong potential probability, verging on likelihood, that eventually this will spill over into some form of revolt in the coming two or three generations; the broader ideas and spirits unleashed by the revolutions in France and elsewhere are not something so easily exorcised and banished back to the netherworld, in the long run. For that central reason, Vienna ranks as arguably the third of the non-French powers of the Continent, at least in terms of her potential stability. Should they manage to tame that beast, and it was possible for quite some decades in our time, then they can serve as a stabilising force in Central and Eastern Europe, and one that does not generally clash with British interests in any direct fashion.

One caveat to this is the matter of Italy. Historically, Austria gained substantial lands in Northern Italy as a consequence of the eventual peace with France, and the earlier dissolution of Venice as an independent entity. These were relatively rich, in some areas, but proved to be too restive to be kept in the long term, becoming a factor in wars with France on the behest of Sardinia, which lead the unification of Italy into a nation state. This matter of the Duchy of Milan and the lands of Venice is something for His Majesty's Government then to consider, with possibly a view towards a different outcome. Should Austria not expend her blood and treasure for lands that she cannot really hold, she may potentially be better positioned with regards to her relations with Russia and Prussia; depending on the actions of Turkey, there may be scope for some 'trade offs' in that direction.

In second position is Prussia. They have the smallest population of any of the Great Powers, with well under 10 millions at present. Through her possession of Silesia, she has access to decent supplies of coal and iron, which will be significant as time, economy and science develop in Europe as here, but this would not be enough to enable her to truly change the balance of power on the Continent. That would come should they gain control of that part of the western Germanies around the Rhine and Ruhr rivers, which have substantive population, great resources and turn Prussia from an eastern entity into one that holds the heartland of Europe in her grip, fatally imperiling Hannover and Hesse. With control of the more powerful north of the Germanies, a Prussian-lead effort to unify with the south is bound to happen, as it did for us, following some sort of successful war prosecuted against Austria. In the long term, a unified German state is a much greater potential threat than even that which France offers at the moment, as the new means and measures of war and raw power change in the coming century.

In and of herself at the moment, Prussia is no particular threat to Britain or her interests. The forthcoming partition of Poland, which is too far advanced in development to be altered even for Britain tempered with the aid we offer, will provide quite a bit of meat for Prussia, Austria and Russia to chew and digest. Any righteous indignation at the injustice being rendered to the Poles can be tempered by that prospect, along with a number of potential precautionary actions that Mr. Browning will touch upon in his conclusion to this afternoon of talking. Prussia is, to a large extent, an army with a state attached, and an able one at that, but even nowhas lost something of the repute built up by the performance of Frederick the Great. Should they not have the same opportunities to experience a litany of defeats and then a string of victories, the Prussian Army that develops may be slightly different in a number of respects. If they remain an Eastern Germanic state in territory and power base, then they will be progressively eclipsed by waxing British power, wealth and population, to the extent that the relationship will ultimately be a distinctly unequal one. This is a state of affairs which would not fundamentally challenge British interests in a direct fashion, and would contribute towards something of a stable balance of power in Europe.

Finally, we have Russia. They have the largest 'home population' of any of the Great Powers, which allowed them to maintain a standing army of between one and one and a half millions for most of the next century. They played a significant part in the defeat of the historic French threat under Bonaparte, and would subsequently intervene in Europe on a number of times to support regimes friendly to their values. Those were based around reaction, autocracy and absolutism, all in their particular Russian character, and with a side helping of mysticism and maintenance of medieval practices such as serfdom. Their policies under the Tsars to come was of expansion, centralisation and repression, with the first particularly aimed at the Ottomans, the Persians and the various states of Central Asia; this would culminate in a direct rivalry with the British Empire known as 'The Great Game', which sought to threaten India itself. In this, Russia is the only European great power that has the means and opportunity to directly threaten the vital interests of Britain and our position as the preeminent world power. However, Russia has a number of weaknesses - firstly, she is extremely backward and undeveloped, and will remain so for almost another century; secondly, this has the effect of stretching her capabilities out over vast territories and multiple fronts; and thirdly, her historical leadership was lacking in ability for a good six decades to come.

Beyond the immediate future, Russia presents the greatest potential threat to Britain through her dominance of the Eurasian continental landmass and her position athwart the crucial territory of the heartland of the world's power and resources. In the main part, they are largely protected from our major weapon, the seapower of the Royal Navy, by the frozen north and the mountains and deserts of their south, with only the Baltic and Black Seas providing avenues for an approach; at the same time, they are positioned so that they can descend upon Eastern and Central Europe with massed armies and encounter a reasonable degree of success, at least until the advent of different weapons which will fundamentally change the battlefield. Should they be allowed to expand and develop their interior on their own terms, it is inevitable that there will be some degree of clash with British interests. Whilst France is the current and most pressing enemy, in the longer term, the greatest foe will be Russia; if we can successfully oppose them and prevent their rise as a hostile competitor, then Britain's position will be much more secure across the world. A blow like that to the head of their problem, will be worth two birds in the bush.

As well as the great powers, we have the collective entities of Germany and Italy; and the peripheral states of Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, the Dutch Republic and Ottoman Turkey. It would arguably be in Britain's long term interests to prevent, or at least stymie, the rise of unified German and Italian states, given their central positions in Europe and the Mediterranean respectively and given the simple arithmetic of statecraft - a multitude of smaller independent entities possessed of their own interests are less likely to oppose our position or leadership on anywhere near an equal level. The unification of Germany was a contentious process, born as it was out of the establishment of a German Confederation at the end of the French wars in 1815, and being slowly driven by Prussia after she established her clear dominance as the leading Teutonic power with a crushing victory over Austria. Maintaining a number of German states - Bavaria, Baden and Wurttemberg, Hesse, Saxony, Mecklenburg, Prussia, a conglomeration of the Ernestine duchies in Thuringia, Westphalia, Nassau, the Palatinate, Holstein and Oldenburg, to name on potential combination, in addition to her free cities and smaller entities - would not be utterly beyond the scope of concentrated and consistent diplomacy, should it be seen as an attractive objective. Even with Prussia being the first among equals, there is sufficient counterweight to prevent her total domination of the internal affairs of the Germanies. Maintaining the existence of the Holy Roman Empire, should it survive the current conflict, is not entirely necessary, but also would not be significantly harmful to broader British interests. As for Italy, a unified entity will eventually begin to look across the seas and borders with envious and expansive eyes, and in time, build a fleet that could locally oppose British interests; compared to that situation, a loose grouping of Venice, Genoa, Lombardy, Piedmont-Sardinia, Tuscany, the Papal States, Parma, Bologna, Naples and Sicily would be far more disparate, divided and inwardly focused. In both cases of Germany and Italy, it is more likely that divided and loose confederations would be more open to British trade after the advent of peace.

Sweden is a shadow of her former power, but is possessed of a decent position in the heart of Scandinavia and the Baltic, and has extensive natural resources. She presents no discernable threat or competition with Britain or her interests and indeed, so long as she possesses Finland (which historically was conquered by the Russians in an ill-fated side conflict of the broader French wars in 1809), Sweden acts to constrain part of the westward projection and opportunity of Russia. Cultivating and supporting her may render some useful results in time, although it would really take a miracle for Sweden to re-ascend to the ranks of Great Powers. Denmark, covering as she does not only the land of that name, but also Norway, Iceland, Greenland and various smaller islands and colonies, is something of a different proposition in some respects, by virtue of her disparate possessions and the factor of her fleet, which may become potentially threatening in the event of French successes in the Low Countries and Germany. However, there is little that sets her against Britain in the long term, and not a huge amount that would be absolutely necessary to take from her in the unlikely event of conflict. Portugal is our oldest ally, and presents no threat to our interests at this time. Historically, there were some disagreements over colonial borders in Africa and elsewhere, but those particular issues need not arise in a circumstance where our own exploration and expansion can occur on a rather accelerated and forearmed basis. Their holdings in Brazil became independent in our history due to the invasion and occupation of the mother country, but even without this calamity, continued indefinite Portuguese rule in its current form is probably beyond the scope of Lisbon to support, financially, militarily or politically; it may be that we can assist Portugal in achieving an amicable and gradual independence or indeed even some form of limited union, at least for a generation.

Lastly in Western Europe, we have the Dutch. Currently, they are our nominal allies, but their stability and capacity to withstand both French invasion and internal revolt is distinctly limited, with a strong desire across many groups to facilitate a revolution similar to that of France against the old, established order. Historically, this occurred next year, with Prince William fleeing to Britain and encouraging Dutch colonies to cooperate with British occupation, whilst the French captured the Dutch fleet whilst it was iced in to harbour with a daring cavalry raid, of all things. It is likely, even with some degree of success in the Low Countries, that there will be some form of revolution there in due course, necessitating occupation of her colonies to protect our trade and interests. In the long term, it was seen as necessary to keep the Cape Colony and Ceylon, whilst the East Indies and Dutch West Indies were returned; here, a broadly similar approach can be recommended for the immediate future, with the caveat that particular postwar claims and borders in the area of the East Indies can be resolved in a manner more favourable for British interests. Prevailing upon the Dutch to sell their residual interests in India and West Africa to Britain was eventually successful, and with the right offer at the right time, should be similarly acceptable here. Should the opportunity present itself to take the East Indies in the event of some crisis or conflict, then Sumatra and Borneo should be prioritised over Java, Celebes and the smaller spice islands of the Moluccas, whatever their current perceptions of relative value.

Straddling both Europe and Asia, we have the somewhat sickly and declining entity of the Ottoman Empire. They are possessed of some degree of power through population and armies, but are not comparable to the major powers in the latter respect. The Sultan can project power and control over Anatolia, Rumelia and the near reaches of the Levant, whilst his nominal rulership of Egypt would soon evaporate historically some ten years from now through the catalyst of a French invasion and subsequent rise of a restive former vassal, one Mohammed Ali Pasha. Within a generation, Greece would finally rise in revolt, aided by the powers of Europe, and despite Turkey attempting to bloodily and cruelly suppress her efforts at self-liberation, would break free, whilst the Serbs, Bulgars and Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia would wrestle out from beneath the Turkish yoke over the next sixty years after that. This gradual disintegration was the cause of much instability and much opportunity for Russian interference and intervention, and the subsequent unrest within the Balkans would be one of the causes of the most terrible war that the world had yet seen at the beginning of the 20th century. Eventually, after a slow and painful demise and far too much unnecessary bloodshed of various descriptions, the Ottoman Empire finally expired whilst being defeated by our own armies over many years, and Turkey was reduced to an Anatolian rump. We had acted to maintain and support Turkey for a significant portion of the next century, due to our staunch opposition to Russian expansionism and ambitions for control of the Straits and Constantinople. After such long efforts, and even one war, we ended up having to be the means of their final execution.

It would be difficult to see any sort of Turkish renaissance of power occurring at this point, but it may also be necessary to act variously to support and oppose the Sultan's policies at different points. Our chief interest will shift from the immediate issue of the Straits to the broader prize of the Eastern Mediterranean, and specifically to the strategic Isthmus of Suez. There was built a great sea level canal in the 1860s in our time, which allowed for the swift passage of ships and commerce to India, China and the Antipodes, and greatly enriched the Empire. That is the major prize of the region, which will eventually necessitate, in some fashion or another, control of Egypt on one side and the immediate hinterland in the Holy Land on the other. Further, the currently sparsely populated and desolate lands of Arabia and Mesopotamia contain beneath their soil unparalleled riches in the form of rock oil and other minerals and gases of future significance. It would be advantageous to put Britain in a position where she may control and harvest their bounties when their time comes. For now, no direct action need be taken against Turkey, as we have more direct and important matters to deal with, but in time, there may well be scope for informed consideration of various potential options that can be explored regarding our policy towards them, and how various outcomes can be achieved.

In general in Europe, beyond the immediate exigency of victory over the deprivations and threat of Revolutionary France, we have various options and opportunities where we can act to maintain the balance of power and Britain's position; and where we can act more strategically and subtly to encourage other states to develop in a more orderly and open fashion, balancing liberality and constitutional reason, progress and stability, reform and the value of tradition. In the process of that, we can not only prevent a number of dreadful wars and conflicts that would drag us into their bloody maelstrom and cost us dear in British lives and British treasure, but make for a better, more advanced and peaceful world open to our trade and commerce. By working to our interests and positions, we can also act to encourage the others, as Voltaire might put it. This would be part of our grand strategy to not only win the war, but to win the peace through a dedicated approach that integrates all the instruments of our national power - military, naval, scientific, industrial, economic, financial, diplomatic, cultural and political - into our short, medium and long term planning. Such an opportunity is not available to any of our rivals, and presents a grand advantage in and of itself.

Beyond Europe, there is one significant state that presents a challenge to Britain on a number of different levels, yet at this time is still a relative babe in swaddling clothes in terms of her age, size and capabilities."

"The United States."

"Precisely. We share a common language, religion, large parts of culture and tradition, but our recent history of conflict - aye, of defeat, and defeat to our own estranged colonists, to our children in a certain way of thinking - makes the gulf between us at times wider than the Atlantic itself. In our time and place, 1794 would see the cusp of a treaty between our countries that resolved some outstanding differences (although largely in America's favour) and put paid to the threat of war for the time being. The United States would be greatly enlarged through the sale of Louisiana to them by France, who had acquired the territory from Spain. The impact of the ongoing wars with France would stimulate tensions between us, though, rising through missteps and mistaken actions, decisions and policies by both sides that culminated in the Americans declaring war on Britain and invading Canada in 1812."

"What happened as a result of that?"

"Something of a mixture, Mr. Steele. We maintained a blockade, and landed forces which successfully routed theirs on land, and burned down their new capital city in revenge for their actions on Canadian soil. We rebuffed their invasion of Canada, but our counteractions on land and on the Great Lakes in the north were turned back, whilst a smaller British army was severely defeated at New Orleans before the news of a negotiated agreement to end the war had reached North America. The end result? Largely status quo ante bellum."

"Something of a success, then."

"By some measures, sir, by some. Within a generation, though, the Americans were further expanding, and going to war with Mexico, the independent successor of Spanish holdings on the continent, and, after that decisive victory, reaching the shores of the Pacific itself. With control of the resources of a continent, they grew more and more every year, apart from a few minor internal squabbles of no real note and some bloody campaigns against the benighted Indians, so that within the lifetime of a man born this morning, they would be larger than Britain in population, wealth and industry. Like a son outgrowing his father, they eclipsed Britain and even the Empire in every measure, and eventually began projecting their power and interests out into the wider world. These differed from those of Britain, and progressively lead to the decline of the Empire itself, until such time as England was treated as a mere satrap of America. This presaged the eventual decline and fall of the very nation herself, even as the fortunes of the Greeks waned with the fall of Rome. Canada herself, that most loyal and eldest of Britain's dominions, was eventually taken and absorbed in the quest to secure new resources and oppose America's enemies in China and Russia."

Browning blinked quickly. That particular pain of but five years ago in their old world still stuck in his craw.

"It is very difficult to predict and anticipate distant future developments with a fulsome degree of accuracy, but in almost every scenario where the United States rises in an untrammeled fashion to the status of a great power, we have concluded that it is more likely than not that the relative power and position of Britain declines as a result. If we do nothing, and simply allow the vagaries of history to take their course, then very little is likely to change, and little of that for the better. There is an incipient danger in doing nothing with regard to the United States, or of simply adopting a policy of coexistence, and an accompanying danger of trying to over-correct the course of England's future, or of doing too much. Currently, America has a population of under 3 millions and an economy that is around a quarter of Britain's size as a measure of national wealth, along with no navy to speak of and a tiny army. They have many strengths, such as the innovative spirit and approach of their populace, potentially large reserves to call upon in the event of war and a considerable shipping capacity that can manifest itself as a privateering threat; they also have weaknesses of key materials (including the capacity for protracted production of powder at this time), finance and sheer mass. Let me be clear - we are not calling for or recommending direct war with America, but simply for preparation and for reappraisal of the overall situation and the future strategic approach of the British Empire with regards to them, based on the information that we can supply."

"That may be a bit too difficult to work at this time, Mr. Aubrey. The issue of American independence has been fought and lost by us, and relaunching that particular bugbear whilst we are in a fight to the death with France is not an approach that will attract particular favour at this time, or indeed subsequently, I wager."

"Your wager and estimation may well be correct, sir, but I would suggest that some further study of the written materials which will be proffered, and the accompanying pictures, may influence your position, and possibly that of the Prime Minister, in some small fashion. I will admit that our view of America is different to yours, due to the small matter of near three centuries of intervening history, but the disparity between their current state and what they might become is marked. Even small steps in different directions are likely to change the course of relations and strategic considerations, such as the matter of Louisiana. If the United States of America is allowed to grow across the North American continent in an untrammeled fashion, then they will naturally rise to such strength and position as to be one of the foremost powers of the world, and eventually rival and then eclipse Britain. For the moment, the best course of action is to continue to pursue this treaty as matters stand, but also to begin to think about the future, and possible choices that might be made, or need to be made. The Americans will pursue their own interests, and whilst those may well be seemingly in parallel alignment to our own at this time, that won't always be so."

"You've done what you described as an error - falling between doing not enough and doing too much, Mr. Aubrey. You've said enough about what America might do in some circumstances, but not what we should do to counter that, should we wish it."

"As this is an introduction, Mr. Steele, I would think it a little precipitous to immediately recommend policy before the issue can be studied in full, but to put it in simple terms: be prepared. It is possible, and perhaps even likely, that America and Britain will come to blows, over some clash of interests or another, at some point within the next 20 to 25 years; with diplomacy, and the right touch, this could be avoided, should that be the approach that His Majesty's Government choose to take. If war does come, then it would be advisable for Britain to be victorious, and decisively so, and then, just like with France, set out to win the peace. This does not mean a reconquest of the American colonies as the only option, for such a conflict would be long, bloody and to no clear end or advantage, but rather to win whatever occurs in such a fashion as it changes the very trajectory of states and their destiny in a particular manner. The American states at this point are not necessarily as United as they might become in some futures, nor is the future in general written. May I paint you an analogy, sir?"

"By all means." Steele found himself warming to Aubrey's words for some reason, as if the longer he spoke made for a greater weight of persuasiveness. Curious.

"Consider a pair of schoolboys, playing in the fields. They get into an argument and a tussle, as boys are want to do. One considers that he is quite more stronger and capable than the other, and draws himself up as if to strike a blow; then the other rapscallion punches him swiftly and hard on the nose, sending him sprawling to the ground. His pride has taken an injury, but nothing in his body is broken by the short, sharp shock. The other fellow then extends a hand and raises him up from the ground, brushing him off. The boys then become fast friends, the past tumble and punches forgotten swiftly enough, but the one who knocked the other to the ground is the more dominant of the pair."

"Something of a drawn out example, but the point is easy to understand. What if the boy who is knocked to the ground doesn't take it in such an amicable fashion?"

"Frankly, a potentially much worse situation. As said, the ideal situation is to win without having to fight. Every year that goes by with Britain getting stronger also means another year where America grows a bit older, and hopefully more circumspect. General Washington may be somewhat magnanimous at this time, but some of those who might succeed him potentially hold somewhat more strident views on a number of issues. If we have achieved victory over France within 15 years, sir, then it is unlikely that the same type of conflict will occur. As in so many things in Europe, that victory is the key to further success. Beyond the shores of Europe, there are only a few further states of significance at this time - those in the Near East and the handful of closed empires in the Far East. Their numbers may be added to by developments which are likely to occur particularly to the Spanish Empire in the Americas, and by the emergence of Abyssinia from isolation into the modern world, but there is a differentiation between these states and the various native ruled entities in Africa and beyond.

Foremost, there is the matter of the Orient. China remains closed to our trade outside of the limitations of Canton System, in contrast to the privileges enjoyed by the Portuguese, Spanish and even the Russians, and their Emperor refused the reasonable requests of the embassy of Lord Macartney. This inequity cannot stand in the long run, and forcing China to open to British trade and accept us as equal states is a consistent aim for British policy. Historically, this was accomplished through the import of opium, which proved to be a trigger to a pair of wars where China was decisively defeated. However, mere emulation of this path runs into a number of obstacles. Firstly, it lead to profound instability and mounting problems across China and the broader Far East, precipitating wars and crises that were not in alignment with British interests or our long term success. Secondly, it came at an immense moral cost, in that the trade in opium was very much viewed by future generations and indeed many contemporaries during the 1800s as a wicked one exploiting the worst of human misery. It is possible that a different approach may be available to be considered here, on account of the confluence of a number of factors. The tea monopoly currently enjoyed by China can be broken through the agency of some of the seeds here at Bletchley, which can be cultivated in India with considerable success, whilst Farmer MacDonald can expand upon the utility of his blue mulberries and improved strains of silkworms suited to English and Irish conditions, and our own porcelain industry can produce better china than China; this can offer a way to avoid the very development of any future trading deficit with China before it occurs. We can also bring our increased power and science to bear to achieve the aim of opening China to our general trade through a profound demonstration of our strength and capabilities on land and at sea; this would permit the development of demand for our manufactures, textiles and other goods within China that would eventually dwarf the value of opium. For example, our historical trade to China totaled around 40,000 chests of opium in 1839, at approximately £120 apiece for a gross value of £4.8 millions; more advanced and valuable goods can easily render a value ten times that, without any of the associated reputational or moral damage, or negative impact upon British trade with China. The potentially different course of action remains one to be perhaps at least considered; if we are to be John Bull in a china shop, then we should at least grasp ourselves by the horns of the problem.

The other Oriental hermit kingdoms of Japan and Korea are both sealed off in their own isolation, and are not necessarily possessed of any great wealth in resources, but if an expedition to open China is to be countenanced, naturally after the successful conclusion of the current war with France, then it would make sense to 'get three for the price of one', and open their reasonably expansive markets to British commerce and Christian civilisation on our terms. Perhaps the chief advantages of such an action beyond trade are that it would position ourselves distinctly advantageously for expansion of influence in the Northern Asian area as opposed to Russia, whose control and influence over the far reaches of their Siberian and North American holdings is rather less firm than their heartland; and that it can allow English influence time to develop and ensure that those Oriental states do not fall under the spell, commercial or otherwise, of other states. To the south, there is Siam, which has made something of a habit of dallying with the French, and it may become necessary to consider some alteration to their status to secure important trade routes and the wider defences of India.

In the Near East, we have Persia and the various petty sheikhdoms perched around the edges of Araby. Currently, Persia is belaboured by a civil war which will conclude in a few short years with a new dynasty, the Qajars, triumphant. They would proceed to sign a treaty with Britain guaranteeing that they would oppose any French ambitions in the area, but this did not fully resolve their territorial ambitions towards Afghanistan, leading to a war between us some decades later. Importantly, Persia has considerable wealth in oil beneath their soil, which would make some agreement that secures that for Britain, as was done historically later down the line, an attractive proposition. Being able to exert not just influence but control over some aspects of Persia's development may prevent the emergence of some troubling tendencies and problems which emerged briefly in the 20th century. Across the Gulf from them, the various small princedoms along the Pirate Coast were gradually bought under British protection and control from the early 1800s, and such steps are recommended here to fully secure trade routes to India. This will also allow our agents and friendly tribes the ability to act against certain groups in the interior of Arabia who may offer some long term threats to British security and power in the region.

Finally, we have those territories which are either now under our rule, or should be in due course. Foremost is India, as it is her wealth, resources and manpower which would separate us from a number of other would-be colonial rivals, with the caveat that we could well spend an entire day talking about strategy, ideas and tactics for India and not even scratch the surface of what could be done. Indeed, should these initial presentations result in a more lasting relationship with His Majesty's Government, the matter of India will be quite a central one. Securing our position on the subcontinent is not simply as easy as pursuing paths which worked in our own former past, as many of those sowed the bitter seeds of future strife and decline. The immediate objective will be fighting and winning the final war against Mysore very shortly, and supporting the wars against the Marathas which should come in the next few decades, which will sound the final knell for their empire and in turn cement our controlling position in India. From there, it is likely that the borders of India will further expand into the territory now occupied by the Rajputs, Scinde and the Sikh Confederacy, bringing it into contact with the Afghan Empire; in the event of conflict with the latter, our main recommendation is for methodical logistic preparation and overwhelming force. To the east, India will likely expand into the territory now occupied by Burma and Nepal, in due course. The more important issue for India, beyond expansion, is likely to be working towards her internal good order, stability, efficient governance and developmental progress; our history does point towards the East India Company becoming progressively less suited to the role of governance as the scope and extent of that role grew greater, but that is more likely to be an issue examined in greater depth once the current French wars have been concluded. After all, we shouldn't kill our geese before their eggs are gilded."

Steele looked at Aubrey quizzically, even as the bluff fellow seemed rather chuffed with that last quip. The man was either mad or both.

Canada and New South Wales have the potential to be extremely valuable, powerful and successful colonies, with the latter growing to cover the entirety of the Australian continent. The resources of New Holland and British North America are but part of their overall value, as each may eventually be able to support populations well over twice that of Britain today. As settler colonies, they will add another element to the power and extent of Britain's empire, particularly as those of Spain proceed to foresake her. In the case of New South Wales, there are further opportunities to be found across the sea in the islands of New Zealand, which are sparsely populated and verdantly fertile. Adding to Canada and Australia with further colonies in Southern Africa and the Argentine, and in other locations in North America, as touched upon earlier, will not only create further British 'child countries' around the world, but give significant control of a very large part of the world's supply of particular goods. Securing further lands in Africa will most likely have to weight for the more expansive development of certain medicines and weapons systems, but taking advantage of our foreknowledge and opportunities will enable Britain to almost entirely dominate that continent.

With the right choice of actions, policies and positions, Britain can not only expedite a more fulsome and favourable defeat of France, but remove much of the basis for a number of future problems in Europe and the wider world, as well as position ourselves in the utmost best place possible for dominance of that wider world through trade and influence. The greater challenges that face Britain in the longer term lie in Russia and the United States, even as France fades and a Prussian-unified Germany can potentially be prevented from emerging, and in order to properly face those challenges, increasing and strengthening our position in a number of areas will be advantageous. In this process, what we offer in particular is something that few other nations have ever been able to conjure - information and perspective to make a truly long term policy possible, yet it would be a profound mistake to try and address the problems of tomorrow's tomorrow when those of today still lap at our door. It is not to say that any choices will be easy or without cost - you can't remake an egg, no matter what ghastly work you make of an omelette - but they will be worthwhile. Whatever we choose to do with our armies, or our fleets, or with the statecraft of our learned diplomats, it will ultimately come down to the dealings and capacity of a single word, which will be the substance of Mr. Blackadder's talk.

Economy."

[Belushi TD]

Is there supposed to be an additional word or two here?

Steele looked at Aubrey quizzically, even as the bluff fellow seemed rather chuffed with that last quip. The man was either mad or both.

Very interesting update. Lots of early planning going on. Is one of the things that's on the table removing the prohibition on establishing factories and such in India so they are no longer forced to rely upon imported stuff?

Or was that only a thing for the American colonies?

Belushi TD

[Simon Darkshade]

On the first query, it is a deliberate choice from an old comedy sketch: https://english.stackexchange.com/quest ... ad-or-both

At this point, there wasn't any formal prohibition on Indian manufacturing per se, but rather some regional approaches that later grew into something more troublesome. With the advantages delivered here, there won't be too much of an issue in establishing commercial dominance without the need for many of the workarounds adopted historically.

I'll add a bit more later.

[jemhouston]

A very heavy chapter.

[Simon Darkshade]

There will be a few more heavy chapters to come, with a lot of stuff to lay out on the table. Everything will ultimately be the choice of the 1794 powers that be, so that there will be the capacity for them to make mistakes in a variety of directions.

It is further necessary to get a lot of the expository briefing out of the way so that a dozen balls can start rolling, and then I can get into the action sequences, battles, character development, politics, changes and a lot more.

In contrast to some earlier works by a bloke no longer here, the ‘loading of the deck’ for Britain is going to be partly balanced, at least in dramatic terms, by much more ambitious KPIs, and not just having a labourious re-run of a historical war despite advantages, or some of the equally silly narrative choices taken. To those who much is given, much is demanded.

Further, what is being pursued is not just historical acceleration down a known path, but historical hand brake turns off road into the bush on Robert Frost’s proverbial path not taken. That takes the form of hamstringing some potential competitors, such as Prussia, and preparing to monster some others, such as America.