Has the Navy written itself out of the Strategic Role?

[MKSheppard]

So; it's interesting to read this nearly 20 years later, especially after the last 5 years or so have seen the following big name ticket programs be formally unveiled:

NGI (Next Generation Interceptor to replace existing NMD GBI interceptors)
GBSD (Sentinel ICBM)
SSBN(X) (Columbia-Class)
NGB (B-21 Raider)
NGAD (F-47)
NGAD-N (USN F/A-XX) whenever that drops.

I know a lot of stuff now that I didn't know back then, thanks to decades of FOIA efforts by the National Security Archive in Washington DC -- the 1970s are now about 50 years away; so the first detailed SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA documents from the early era of MIRVs are being released via FOIA in the 2020s.

It's a shame, because with what I know now, there would have been some very interesting discussions possible regarding attack sequencing, timing, etc.

Another thing to point out some 20 years later:

1.) Slow drones like Reaper are being downed routinely by non-nation state actors (Houthis)

2.) Said non nation state actors (houthis) are firing long range missiles and drones on radar only / guess plots against shipping and against land targets in Israel.

3.) ABM is now a necessity at all levels of command (tactical, theater and strategic) due to targets at all these levels being struck or threatened by ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and even IRBMs) in the last four years.

4.) With the coming of Starlink (soon to be Starshield); a significant amount of drones can now be securely controlled all the way to impact with a very small active phased array antenna on the dorsal surface of the drone.

The final posts now have a much more grim tone to them since 2020...

Has the Navy written itself out of the Strategic Role?

---- Output from Has the navy written itself out of the Strategic Role 1.htm ----

Back in December 2007, this was scrivened:

Right now, things are looking all nice and dandy for the USN; they have the Ohios, etc, and they've assimilated their long-time rivals in SAC

(IMAGE OF STRATEGIC COMMAND SHIELD)

If I recall somewhat famously, LeMay had a model of a early Polaris SSBN on his desk with the SAC stripe down it.

But what happens when everyone and their cousin has ABM?

Then the Ohios are worthless; and well, the F/A/E/K/C-18 Sewer Horror I don't think has the range and speed needed for deep nuclear strike. Plus; the Ford Class CVNs no longer are optimized for the nuclear strike role like the Nimitzes were.

And if the Ohios are worthless, what reason does the Air Force have to stay in this "joint" Strategic Command when one side no longer can pull it's load?

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SLBMs will be the last missile-based strategic force to be eliminated by ABM defenses; the ability of an SSBN to hide and to launch strikes from unusual and unexpected places will preserve the value of its missiles a bit beyond the time their land-based equivalents are eliminated.

Where strategic striking forces will go from there is a very good question and there's a lot of serious study being done on that right now - one early impact was the USAF's sudden urgency behind their new bomber program. The navy are starting to look at replacements for the Ohios but they're hitting an awkward question - why? - citing exactly the issues you are quoting.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

The current generation of ABM are far from 100% effective. If an Ohio class SSBN launches 24 missiles, each equipped with multiple warheads (10 for the sake of argument) then you have 240 incoming nukes from a single SSBN. Now multiply that by 5 submarines and you have well over 1,000 incoming nuclear warheads. If your ABM system is 90% effective (a pretty optimistic figure) then you still get hit with 100+ nuclear warheads. That's still plenty to deter me from engaging in a nuclear war with the U.S.

If your ABM system is mid-course and 90% effective, then you'll have 2 missiles left at the end. If the point defences work at 90% effectiveness, you'll have 2 warheads left. You don't get to pick which 2 of the 240 you launch actually hit the targets.

Effectively, you're out of the missile launching business at ~30% ABM efficiency. The targetting issues associated with anything above that become prohibitive.

Kevin
The beatings will continue until morale improves.

Quote:
The navy are starting to look at replacements for the Ohios but they're hitting an awkward question - why? - citing exactly the issues you are quoting.

That leaves the UK in a very bad place. No Ohio replacement means their Vanguard replacement program may have issues, and they don't appear to have a Plan 'B'.

KM
The beatings will continue until morale improves.

The current generation of ABM are far from 100% effective. If an Ohio class SSBN launches 24 missiles, each equipped with multiple warheads (10 for the sake of argument) then you have 240 incoming nukes from a single SSBN. Now multiply that by 5 submarines and you have well over 1,000 incoming nuclear warheads. If your ABM system is 90% effective (a pretty optimistic figure) then you still get hit with 100+ nuclear warheads. That's still plenty to deter me from engaging in a nuclear war with the U.S.

Not so. There are 24 missiles per submarine. Assuming five missiles per sub, that's 120 missiles. The outer ring defenses work on shoot-shoot-look-shoot-shoot. Meaning that given expected levels of accuracy, there is a 97 percent chance of one missile living long enough to release its warheads.

So statistically we have 9 warheads inbound to the inner defense ring which also works on shoot-shoot-look-shoot-shoot. Statistically there is a 7 percent chance that one of the warheads will survive to initiate over its target.

The reliability of ballistic missiles is popularly quoted at 60 percent. I cannot conform or deny that.

So your attack plan will result in a 4.8 percent chance of a single warhead getting through.

That's just assuming a simple, two-layered missile-based defense system. Just like the one being developed by the Indians.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

There's always cooperation with the French...

I doubt there will be any replacement for the Vanguards, whether or not the US builds new SSBNs. When they're retired, the British nuclear capability will retire with them.

I think there are alot of assumptions here.

Not only is anti-ballistic missile defense being assumed widely effective, but countermeasures on an ICBM are being ignored.

Those are 2 not so easy assumptions to make IMO.

http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/
Information Dissemination - My Blog

ABM systems have been widely effective since the 1960's, and the CM issue was solved almost as far back.

Why would those be invalid assumptions?

Kevin
The beatings will continue until morale improves.

An important point. Even the 1970s era Poseidon missiles had ABM countermeasures built in. (I was a Poseidon missile fire control technician in the early 1980s.) I expect that 1990s era Trident II missiles have better ABM countermeasures. I expect that modern nuke re-entry vehicles will start using stealth technology, and may be doing so already.

You had better be pretty confident in your ABM system before thinking that you can survive an American nuclear attack. Consider that the first targets struck will be the ABM sites, and these strikes will use cruise missiles or other such weapons that the ABM system is not designed to defeat. Then the SLBMs and/or ICBMs enter via the hole in your defense system.

Even the 1970s era Poseidon missiles had ABM countermeasures built in. (I was a Poseidon missile fire control technician in the early 1980s.) I expect that 1990s era Trident II missiles have better ABM countermeasures. I expect that modern nuke re-entry vehicles will start using stealth technology, and may be doing so already.

The countermeasures don't work. They never did. The problems of target discrimination in their presence was solved back in the 1960s. Ever since then, the designers have been coming up with improved countermeasures and the missileers have been defeating them. In fact, the gap between penetration/countermeasures technology and target discrimination technology has been widening for the last twenty years. Target discrimination is primarily a matter oc computer processing power and Moore's Law has done more to destroy anti-ABM countermeasures than any other single factor.

As for stealth, its pointless. With something coming in that fast, there's no way it can be concealed or hidden.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

I can't see any way stealth would work on something that comes in at BM re-entry speeds. Even if the coating/shape worked, you'd get enough signal back that any signal reduction benefits would be mooted PDQ.

In terms of stealth vs range, the actual benefit of any RCS reduction (ie stealth) is reduced to the fourth power. ie if you want to decrease the acquisition/tracking range by half, you need to reduce the RCS by 16 times or down to 6.25%. Good luck with that.

Kevin
The beatings will continue until morale improves.

Quote:
The countermeasures don't work. They never did. The problems of target discrimination in their presence was solved back in the 1960s. Ever since then, the designers have been coming up with improved countermeasures and the missileers have been defeating them. In fact, the gap between penetration/countermeasures technology and target discrimination technology has been widening for the last twenty years. Target discrimination is primarily a matter oc computer processing power and Moore's Law has done more to destroy anti-ABM countermeasures than any other single factor.

I guess I had come to understand differently, last I had heard a combination of jammers, decoys, tethered objects, and even flares combined with terminal-phase energy management maneuvers for reentry vehicles that changes projected trajectories adds a much a huge degree of difficulty in intercept.

I'm talking D-5, not C-4. I could certainly be wrong, just going off what I have read about in the past.

I agree stealth wouldn't be effective, stealth is achieved through electronical means in ABM as far as I know.

last I had heard a combination of jammers
Jammers don't work from re-entry vehicles.

decoys
Are completely ineffective. Also, the probelms of properly separating decoys from RVs has never been satisfactorily solved.

tethered objects
Likewise (plus they have inordinate problems all of their own)

and even flares
Useless.

combined with terminal-phase energy management maneuvers for reentry vehicles that changes projected trajectories

Manouvering is to improve terminal accuracy, not evade interception. The ballistic arc of an inbound is such that no effective evasion manoeuvers are possible

adds a much a huge degree of difficulty in intercept.
No. They don;t. As techniques they are effective only in the minds of ABM opponents. In reality, they've all bene discredited since the 1960s - and, as I said, the gap between them and the discrimination technology is widening all the time. At the moment, missile defense has an enormous advantage over ballistic missile offense and that gap is getting greater every year.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

I think the really problemmatic assumption is that the defense system is widespread. For a long time to come, because of their expense, ABM systems will be aligned to protect the most likely threat axes. The addition of SLBMs adds a lot of additional logistical burden to the syatem, by multiplying the number of possible threat axes.

For example, the Indian ABM system will be primarily aligned to defend against threats from the north. We're not expecting a missile strike from Brasil.

In our situation, the assumption is probaly not bad. In the case of, say, India, how good is that assumption?

- Dennis

Victory at all costs,
victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be;
for without victory there is no survival.
-Sir Winston Churchill

Then you just design long-range cruise missiles, and have them hug the terrain to the target.

--<br>A pro-artificial turf, pro-designated hitter baseball fan.

Okay... so now, you get to work on SEABM - Suppression of Enemy Anti-Ballistic Missiles.

Stealthy cruise missiles from subs or aircraft would be the most likely option.

Or you get a fast low-flying aircraft to deliver hard-target killers to kill the missiles or the launch control centers for ABMs.

Edit: Think the B-1, the FB-111, or even the plain old F-111 in this role.

--<br>A pro-artificial turf, pro-designated hitter baseball fan.

A bomber is going to have to fight its way through conventional air defenses to hit the ABM target set. Why bother doing that when you can fight your way through conventional air defenses and hit more important target sets?

About 40 years ago the physicists determined that several small nukes are more destructive then 1 large nuke, provided that the nukes are laid in a specific pattern over the target(s). The re-entry vehicle maneuvers to place the individual warheads in the proper pattern.

For an ABM system to be effective you need to destroy the re-entry vehicle before it starts releasing warheads. Otherwise you end up with a bunch of relatively small and physically tough targets.

For an ABM system to be effective you need to destroy the re-entry vehicle before it starts releasing warheads. Otherwise you end up with a bunch of relatively small and physically tough targets.

Rather easy to do.

Read the Seer's essay here (http://p076.ezboard.com/fhistorypolitic ... =122.topic)

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The navy are starting to look at replacements for the Ohios but they're hitting an awkward question - why? - citing exactly the issues you are quoting.

The only real way to preserve their strategic striking role would be to build a very big, very large, very fast strike aircraft, something similar to the A-5 Vigilante.

And I don't think the necessary infrastructure is in place for that; or whether any such program can be deployed to the fleet fast enough; even if we eliminated any possible stealth requirement.

More to the point; to get any such A-5 Vigilante clone in service just as the Ohios are being rendered obsolete; you would have to start design work 15 years ahead; IE, just about in the next couple of years -- and that's going to be VERY problematic; you are going to have to try to explain to a bunch of stupid Congresscritters that Ballistic Missiles are obsolete; WILL be obsolete and we need this strike aircraft to maintain our strategic deterrent....

The Congressmen will of course bring up all the old canards like decoys, jammers, flares, MIRVs etc.

I honestly don't think funding for any real BIG genuine manned strike aircraft program is going to become available from the congressmen until we actually stage a full up missile massacre; where we launch an Ohio's full complement of missiles at our ABM shield; and they all get shot down.

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---- Output from Has the navy written itself out of the Strategic Role 2.htm ----
Back in December 2007, this was scrivened:

I think the really problemmatic assumption is that the defense system is widespread. For a long time to come, because of their expense, ABM systems will be aligned to protect the most likely threat axes. The addition of SLBMs adds a lot of additional logistical burden to the system, by multiplying the number of possible threat axes.

This is a reasonable assumption; there are only a limited number of trajectories that go from launch fields to targets so its well possible to stack the ABM defense along that arc, the incoming ICBMs all run through a self-defined bottlenecked kill-zone (that's why the idea of swamping the defense runs into problems). SLBMs have a much greater range of trajectories to target which is why I said they'll outlast ICBMs. However, we can make the ABM defense mobile as well - hence the use of AEGIS ships, airborne laser, and (recently) an F-16 equipped with modified AMRAAMs. Other options as well.

The problem is that designing an SSBN takes quite a long time. If we're going to replace the Ohios from 2035 onwards we're going to have to decide what we'll replace them with, well, now. So, we have to look at the threat scenario for 2035-2085 and decide whether the SSBN as we know it today, is really going to be viable.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

Then you just design long-range cruise missiles, and have them hug the terrain to the target.

Except they're almost as endangered a species as the ICBM. Flying low these days is not a good idea.

Okay... so now, you get to work on SEABM - Suppression of Enemy Anti-Ballistic Missiles. Stealthy cruise missiles from subs or aircraft would be the most likely option. Or you get a fast low-flying aircraft to deliver hard-target killers to kill the missiles or the launch control centers for ABMs. Think the B-1, the FB-111, or even the plain old F-111 in this role.

Fast, low-flying is death for the aircraft. That's an 80's way of thinking. The aircraft you suggest will die doing it.

Anyway, if one is going to all that effort to penetrate the defenses, why bother blowing up the ABMs. Why not just hit the strategic targets directly.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

About 40 years ago the physicists determined that several small nukes are more destructive then 1 large nuke, provided that the nukes are laid in a specific pattern over the target(s).

I'm very well aware of that. One of the things I used to do was plan the specific patterns.

The re-entry vehicle maneuvers to place the individual warheads in the proper pattern.

That's not how it works. The re-entry vehicles are contained within a bus. That bus then manoeuvers to discharge the re-entry vehicles that come down along a specified ballistic arc. The bus manoeuvers, fires a warhead, manoeuvers again, fires another etc. That's why a given MIRV bus an only engage targets within a limited footprint.

For an ABM system to be effective you need to destroy the re-entry vehicle before it starts releasing warheads

No, we actually have to take out the MIRV bus before it starts to discharge its re-entry vehicles. That's a done deal, we have the performance needed to do that in the 1960s. In fact, one of the reasons behind the ABM Treaty was that both the US and USSR wanted to use MIRV and MIRVs are not viable in the face of ABM defenses.

Otherwise you end up with a bunch of relatively small and physically tough targets.

Any that survive are handled by the inner-layer defense,. That's one of the things we've been demonstrating recently.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

The only real way to preserve their strategic striking role would be to build a very big, very large, very fast strike aircraft, something similar to the A-5 Vigilante. And I don't think the necessary infrastructure is in place for that; or whether any such program can be deployed to the fleet fast enough; even if we eliminated any possible stealth requirement.

More to the point; to get any such A-5 Vigilante clone in service just as the Ohios are being rendered obsolete; you would have to start design work 15 years ahead; IE, just about in the next couple of years -- and that's going to be VERY problematic; you are going to have to try to explain to a bunch of stupid Congresscritters that Ballistic Missiles are obsolete; WILL be obsolete and we need this strike aircraft to maintain our strategic deterrent.

Reluctantly I agree with you. The good news is that the need to think very carefully about how we go around doing this is sinking in. Some of the ideas that are coming up are quite interesting; for example scramjet-propelled drones that make their runs at around Mach 12 and 200,000 feet plus. (The 200,000 feet is a nominal figure; above that we're looking at suborbital). Stealth is the big debating point; one school is saying we have to have it and more so. The other is that its a technology dead-end that can (and is) being closed by developments in radar technology.

Low-altitude is pretty much off the table. Airspace below 15,000 feet is just too darned dangerous. That's why the Aussies are retiring their F-111s, it was a good bird for its day but that day is long, long gone.

I honestly don't think funding for any real BIG genuine manned strike aircraft program is going to become available from the congressmen until we actually stage a full up missile massacre; where we launch an Ohio's full complement of missiles at our ABM shield; and they all get shot down.

Or until somebody else does it. There are twelve nations actively developing ABM systems while we speak and another dozen who want to buy such systems from those developing them. It doesn't have to be us who does a test like that, the Chinese could for example. And very well might. That raises the fear that if the anti-ABM people get there way in the US, come 2035 we could put a new SSBN into service with Super-Trident and the Chinese do a test that shows the whole system is negated - and we've just wasted 20 years of time and billions of dollars building a weapon that's about as relevent as a smooth-bore musket.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

Some of the ideas that are coming up are quite interesting; for example scramjet-propelled drones that make their runs at around Mach 12 and 200,000 feet plus. (The 200,000 feet is a nominal figure; above that we're looking at suborbital).

I'd question the entire validity of the drone idea for strategic deterrence.

Unmanned drone-like vehicles make good anti-defense missiles, because the best way to get to a missile site before it fires is to travel in a straight line right to it, and M12+ and 200k feet sounds wicked, especially once the drone goes into a terminal dive (parts of the drone would be melting, and flying off, but who cares, it's a one way trip); and hit the enemy site with it.

Assuming 2,000 kg weight (twice as big as SRAM), and hitting the ground at 4,023 m/sec; we get 16,187 megajoules; that'd make one hell of a crater.

But relying on it for everything? Bad idea. The drone would only be able to do canned evasive manuvers; and how would we control it? We have a hard enough time controlling Predator UAVs over Iraq at about what, 200 MPH, much less a Drone coming in at 9,000 MPH.

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There isn't a system in the world that can hit a maneuvering target at Mach 3 and 80 000 ft. What would you use to hit something at Mach 12 and 200 000 ft?

Kevin
The beatings will continue until morale improves.

Very good points all of them. Again. we have two communities here, one being the drone community who basically believe humans are obsolescent and the antidrones who believe that remote piloting technology will always bee a little behind the capability needed.

Of course, we could always develop a drone that is totally autonomous but then it might come to unfortunate conclusions about the human race.

I suppose in some ways we're at the same point of balance now (in the strategic sense) that armies were at (in the tactical sense) in 1914. Defensive technology has run so far ahead of offensive technology that we really need a major breakthrough to switch things around. In 1916, that was the tank; we really need to come up with an analagous way of neutralizing the defenses. What that will be I don't really know; I suspect we're looking at an early version of the technology but haven't realized it yet.

The problem is that every candidate technology I can think of is more effective for the defense than the offense. For example, a space battle-station with lasers that can shoot down the interceptor missiles sounds good, but the same battle station would be very effective at shooting down ICBMs/SLBMs.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

There isn't a system in the world that can hit a maneuvering target at Mach 3 and 80 000 ft. What would you use to hit something at Mach 12 and 200 000 ft?

Probably a space-based laser or something along that ilk. We're really heading out onto the wild and woolly technology frontier now. The problem with the M12/200,000 approach is that its going to take a lot of technology to get us there and its questionable if we can do it. Also, defense tech is way ahead of offense tech and by the time we get there, the defense may already be a jump or two ahead.

When you come down here, my guess is you'll be working on this stuff. Almost everybody in our line of business is.

But Mark's original point stands; Navies have written themselves out the strategic game, not right away, but three decades down the line they have.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

Stealth is the big debating point; one school is saying we have to have it and more so. The other is that its a technology dead-end that can (and is) being closed by developments in radar technology.

I'd agree that some stealth is very useful; take some care to reduce the RCS and IR signatures of the aircraft (like the B-70's paint job, it would have radiated away the heat of the airframe on certain wavelengths outside teh range of known Soviet IR detectors) so that it's a bit harder to find the aircraft (a couple of seconds may make all the difference) but as a primary deciding factor? Then we get the F-117 and B-2; which are slow targets.

That raises the fear that if the anti-ABM people get there way in the US, come 2035 we could put a new SSBN into service with Super-Trident and the Chinese do a test that shows the whole system is negated - and we've just wasted 20 years of time and billions of dollars building a weapon that's about as relevent as a smooth-bore musket.

I'm not so sure that our ABM system will go the way of the old Mickelson complex -- it was only in operation for what a day or two before Congress voted to kill it, while GBI has been in operation for a couple of years at least -- and Congress has made no attempt to kill it.

I don't think the anti-ABM crowd has that kind of influence any more.

By the way, I'm wondering about the size disparity between SPARTAN/GBI (both were/are about 29,000 to 30,000 lbs full up); and the Soviet GORGON ABM - (72,000 lbs full up).

Even the latest Russian long range ABM; the 51T6 (ABM-4) still retains the massive size and weight of the GORGON, even after 40~ years of development in more energetic propellants; etc.

Could it be that the Soviets and later Russians have long since lied about the effective range of their Exo-Atmospheric interceptors; as a way of "cheating" their way through the ABM treaty? E.g. if we only get two sites; lets make the ABM missile so big that it can cover most of the Soviet Union with extremely long range?

That explanation makes far more sense than "incompetent Russians need a missile more than twice as big as the American ABMs to cover the same area".

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Well, we ditched the ABM treaty so lets ditch SALT and go for nuke cruise. Whats interesting is that the Ballistic missle seems obsolecent but is still useful for second/third rate powers to bully neighbors without an ABM system. What if at some point the Chinese decide to make a real SAC type force armed with hyper speed and low speed cruise type missles. Witch is harder to develop, a strategic bomber or a ballistic missle. Remember, "their" strategic bomber does not have to necessarilly be designed like ours. Maybe Putin will sell some TU-95's to Iran...

If the place wasnt a threat, we shouldnt be there. If it is a threat, it shouldnt be there. Thats what weve got our bombers for.

The problem with the M12/200,000 approach is that its going to take a lot of technology to get us there and its questionable if we can do it.
Probably a stupid question, but how far from M12/200,000ft is a current missile bus at the top of it's trajectory? If it's in the right ballpark in energy terms could you conceptually fit something like pop out wings and a sustainer motor to the bus and use that as your manouvering attack vehicle.

Reason I'm thinking along those lines is the problem the UK has got - submarine basing is about the only way we can have any reasonable guarantee that our deterrent would survive a first strike. Oh, and to get to those sorts of heights/speeds generally takes a fairly impressive firework - and that's something we already have so why not make use of it?

An interesting file here (second entry)

http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?t=76422
forum.keypublishing.co.uk...hp?t=76422 - LINK

Quote:
Very good points all of them. Again. we have two communities here, one being the drone community who basically believe humans are obsolescent and the antidrones who believe that remote piloting technology will always bee a little behind the capability needed.

I'm leaning against the UAVs. The loss rates of the Predator raise questions about how sustainable they are in a high-threat environment - or when people are determined to kill UAVs.

Quote:
I suppose in some ways we're at the same point of balance now (in the strategic sense) that armies were at (in the tactical sense) in 1914. Defensive technology has run so far ahead of offensive technology that we really need a major breakthrough to switch things around. In 1916, that was the tank; we really need to come up with an analagous way of neutralizing the defenses. What that will be I don't really know; I suspect we're looking at an early version of the technology but haven't realized it yet.

SEABM is the mission - and that is how to think of it. In essence, at some point, the door needs to be kicked in. Part of the answer is steath technology (to hide where the attack will come from).

At this point, ABM systems would have to become part of a target set. ABM systems become a center of gravity - and denuding a country's ABM system could become a means to force capitulation.

Quote:
The problem is that every candidate technology I can think of is more effective for the defense than the offense. For example, a space battle-station with lasers that can shoot down the interceptor missiles sounds good, but the same battle station would be very effective at shooting down ICBMs/SLBMs.

Then perhaps the solution is not to think of new technology, but instead to treat ABMs as a new target, and use existing technology to take them down. It's a strategic version of the Wild Weasels.

--<br>A pro-artificial turf, pro-designated hitter baseball fan.

Quote:
That leaves the UK in a very bad place. No Ohio replacement means their Vanguard replacement program may have issues, and they don't appear to have a Plan 'B'.

In what way precisely?

In what way precisely?

The british retired their WE177s, and that means they've lost all the institutional knowledge needed for anything but SLBMs.

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I'm leaning against the UAVs. The loss rates of the Predator raise questions about how sustainable they are in a high-threat environment - or when people are determined to kill UAVs.

I agree - unless we're operating in an environment where supporting a human pilot is prohibitive. To put that in context, I am greatly in favor of keeping people in the loop.

SEABM is the mission - and that is how to think of it. In essence, at some point, the door needs to be kicked in. Part of the answer is steath technology (to hide where the attack will come from).

Except stealth is a technological dead-end whose use is rapidly being circumscribed (or circumcised depending on how far the process is going). Stealth doesn't make things invisible, it simply makes them harder to see. Signals processing power is growing so fast we are increasing our ability to look much faster than the stealth technologists can increase their ability to hide.

At this point, ABM systems would have to become part of a target set. ABM systems become a center of gravity - and denuding a country's ABM system could become a means to force capitulation.

I'll say this again,. Taking down an ABM system by means of "otehr" attacks is going top require a massive effort and complete penetration of hostile air space. Since we have to completely penetrate hostile are space to take down an ABM system, why not simply use that penetration to finish off the strategic targets anyway and just ignore the ABM system.

All of which misses the point that air defense systems are also pretty capable; we don't have the technology that can defeat them any more and, first because of the "fly low" mind-bug and now because of "stealth". We're trapped in an aircraft design environment that's within the intercept parameters of current-standard SAMs.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

Quote:
All of which misses the point that air defense systems are also pretty capable; we don't have the technology that can defeat them any more and, first because of the "fly low" mind-bug and now because of "stealth". We're trapped in an aircraft design environment that's within the intercept parameters of current-standard SAMs.

The upcoming F-35 deployment not withstanding, without the development of some radical new approach to managing US air power, does this not mean that in the long term, the US Navy is also out of the power projection ballgame?

Having just finished Norman Friedman's article in this month's Proceedings concerning the lastest version of the Maritime Strategy, I have to wonder just how long the Navy's effectiveness as a combined sea-control force / power-projection force might last if Navy aircraft are eventually rendered largely obsolete by the relentless advance of defensive technology.

There's also no delivery method for the devices they can build.

We're back to "really high and really fast". The UK has never done that, and would have to start up from scratch, right now. The money that could be used for that is being put into the Vanguard replacement instead.

Kevin
The beatings will continue until morale improves.

The money that could be used for that is being put into the Vanguard replacement instead.
Are we actually spending any money on the Vanguard replacement yet? I'm aware that Aldermaston are getting a fair bit of investment, but AFAIK all the money being spent on submarines right now is going on the Astute class.

Quote:
I'm aware that Aldermaston are getting a fair bit of investment, but AFAIK all the money being spent on submarines right now is going on the Astute class.

Bingo. The main justification for the Astute class is keeping the industrial infrastructure required for the SSBN's alive.

Kevin
The beatings will continue until morale improves.

---- Output from Has the navy written itself out of the Strategic Role 3.htm ----
Back in December 2007, this was scrivened:

drunknsumbrnr

My understanding is the UK cannot affordably persue a major SLEP of the Vanguards, so the replacements will have to be produced rather ahead of any USN effort.

At the moment the planning last I heard was based on the existing missile Trident.

If ABM becomes commonplace against such a system what is the timescale for that?

If the US decides not to pursue another SSBN class, the RN is going to be holding onto the Tridents long after their useful-by date.

I think you'll see major ABM proliferation within 10 years. It's really not that hard to set up, especially if someone else is proving the system out first.

Kevin
The beatings will continue until morale improves.

Right now and since the abandonment of the SSK side of things the UK has only nuclear powered submarines.

Considering the ranges the RN is called on to operate at, SSN's are still the way to go for a host of tasks.

In terms of politics it might well be that Astute is mixed in argument with a SSBN.

Abandoning nuclear powered subarmines right now, means abandoning submarines.

I think you'll see major ABM proliferation within 10 years. It's really not that hard to set up, especially if someone else is proving the system out first.

I agree. the Indian plan is to start building their missile defense screen with the first ABM sites to be operational in 2010. I'd say that within the period 2010 - 2020 we're going to see most of the dozen countries who are now actively pursuing missile defense bringing their systems on line (whether the U.S. remains one of those countries remains to be seen. If the Democrats get their way, I suspect that in 2020, the U.S. will be one of the few major countries without a capable missile defense system. The next decade (2020-2030) will see a dozen more or so countries establishing their missile defenses. That will mean pretty much everybody of consequence will some form of missile defense. Put another way, countries that don't have an effective missile defense system by 2030 won't be of any consequence.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

A host of tasks? Like what?

If the USN wasn't in the picture, the RN's 7 Astute's would be the crown jewels of the fleet.

With the USN's capabilities, I can't see any compelling strategic interest for the RN in SSN's, aside from keeping the industrial capability alive to support the SSBN's.

Please keep in mind that those SSN's are costing you most of your escort fleet, as well as any chance to switch your strategic deterrent before it goes into a dead end.

Kevin
The beatings will continue until morale improves.

whether the U.S. remains one of those countries remains to be seen. If the Democrats get their way, I suspect that in 2020, the U.S. will be one of the few major countries without a capable missile defense system.

Then we will cease to exist in the form we are now.

I would prefer to burn the Constitution rather than force the US into a systematic vulnerability. I pray the people have more sense, but if they don't, then they may not matter, either.

- Dennis
--
Victory at all costs,
victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be;
for without victory there is no survival.
-Sir Winston Churchill

we task our boats

Sure you do. However, the CVF's can do most of what the SSN's can do short of a full-out World War III. If you were in WW III, the USN will have sunk most of the enemy navy(ies) before the RN can make it's presence felt with only 7 boats.

Kevin
The beatings will continue until morale improves.

I'm sure they can, but not necessarily the ones we want to sink.

What is the actual effectiveness of these current ABM systems against:-

Existing exoatmospheric RV's as used on the likes of Trident, which are ballistic.

Powered, Manouvering RV's

What is the actual effectiveness of these current ABM systems against:- Existing exoatmospheric RV's as used on the likes of Trident, which are ballistic.

Kill rates demonstrated in the high 90 percents (using a single interceptor per missile). Using shoot-shoot-look-shoot-shoot, PK is as close to 100 percent as its possible to get.

Powered, Manouvering RV's. No significantly different. The degree of manoeuver isn't enough to complicate the intercept gemotery that much. Also, the type of RV your discussing here is so heavy and complex that an ICBM can only throw one per launch vehicle as opposed to an RV that can hold up to 14. Therefore the defense has eliminated 13 out of 14 attacking warheads without firing a shot - equivalent to a 92.8 percent kill rate before opening fire.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

Are the remaining targets important enough to throw away world power status?

Kevin

The beatings will continue until morale improves.

By the way, to put things into context, the following countries are working on or developing ABM systems

United States
Russia
China
Israel
France
Germany
India
Japan
South Korea
Taiwan

The following countrues have bought into, or are negotiating to buy into, other people's ABM systems

Great Britain
Netherlands
Spain
Italy
Japan
South Korea
Taiwan
Australia
India
Pakistan
Singapore
Iran
Saudi Arabia
Syria

There are probably several I've missed on both lists. Note that some countries appear on both lists, that's because they are both buying into other people's programs and developing their own. What's interesting is how far down the international food chain the lists go

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

It is interesting to note that those advocating an unmanned solution are looking to decrease the response time for ABM intercept.

Given that is one advantage of the SSBN, that it can launch from a shorter range to target thus already reducing flight time, I find it odd the claim is the SSBN is becoming obsolete to technologies not in existence attempting to meet the same metrics SSBNs already offer today.

Even in ABM intercept, we forget two major aspects of a nuclear strike. Simutanious Electronic Warfare against ABM systems which may include EMP and directed attacks against hardened networks, and that intercepts still require human reactions. We are nowhere near seeing wide axis autonomous defensive systems providing instant intercept, there is still a human factor involved.

With that 'devils advocate' view said, this is an interesting topic offering a lot to think about. Good stuff Mark and Seer.

How remarkable, a system as near as perfect as possible.

And this will proliforate.

Having been proven of course, having been shown its possible, it is now logicaly within the reach of many states, rather like nuclear weapons themselves one might think.

So now it is only a matter of time and with it the restraint on major war we've witnessed during our lives.

How ironic, that this will be used to further cut the defence budget, at the very time it should logicaly be increased.

War seems inevitable.

Damn it, for the 12,312th time, EMP does not work. It is a boogeyman trotted out by the ignorant and stupid.

This post shall not be carried in aircraft on combat missions or when there is a reasonable chance of its falling into the hands of an unfriendly nation, unless specifically authorized by the "Moderator."

It is interesting to note that those advocating an unmanned solution are looking to decrease the response time for ABM intercept.
Of course, its the only option they have.

Given that is one advantage of the SSBN, that it can launch from a shorter range to target thus already reducing flight time

The variety of launch points also makes the calculation of ballistic arcs harder. However, that's why AEGIS is evolving into an anti-missile system.

I find it odd the claim is the SSBN is becoming obsolete to technologies not in existence attempting to meet the same metrics SSBNs already offer today.
But the technologies in question not only exist today but have been available for 50 years or more. The first missile-missile intercepts were carried out ion the late 1950s. The technology was not deployed for political, not technical reasons. It is those established technologies that are now being deployed worldwide, look at the list of countries building ABM systems, that theraten the SLBM.

Even in ABM intercept, we forget two major aspects of a nuclear strike.
We're nor forgetting anything

Simultaneous Electronic Warfare against ABM systems which may include EMP

EMP is a non-problem. Military systems are already hardened against it and have been for decades. To give you some idea, hardening an electronic system against EMP costs around 5 - 10 percent of the total cost of the system. The larger and more complex the system, the less protecting it against EMP costs as a percentage of the total cost of that system.

and directed attacks against hardened networks

The problem is to strike against the ABM system means one has to penerate the defensive screen first. In fact, taking down the ABM screen pretty much requires that one establish air dominance (not just air superiority) over hostile territory. If one has to establish air dominance over hostile territory, why not simply use that dominance to deliver nuclear warheads and bypass the ABM system completely? Using air dominance to destroy the ABM system, then withdrawing and firing missiles at the disarmed country is utterly illogical.

and that intercepts still require human reactions.

Which is a good thing, not a bad thing. We've got humans in the loop, unlike ballistic misssiles that do not.

We are nowhere near seeing wide axis autonomous defensive systems
Oh yes we are, they're commonplace. Even relatively unimportant countries have them.

providing instant intercept
We don't need instant intercept, all we need is to be able to shoot the missiles down. Where did the need for instant intercept come from? However, once ABL and its siblings enters service, we will have as near to instant intercept with its lasers as physics allows.

there is still a human factor involved.
Which is a good thing.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

How remarkable, a system as near as perfect as possible.

Not remarkable at all, just good design using established technologies to best advantage. Remember, we've been developing this for 40 years or more.

And this will proliforate. Having been proven of course, having been shown its possible, it is now logicaly within the reach of many states, rather like nuclear weapons themselves one might think.

Which is a very good thing. A good defensive system is an excellent thing.

So now it is only a matter of time and with it the restraint on major war we've witnessed during our lives.
This is a non-seqiter. What ABM does is make a full-scale nuclear war less likely by removing the inevitablility that currently accompanies a mass missile launch.

How ironic, that this will be used to further cut the defence budget, at the very time it should logicaly be increased.
Another non-seqiter.

War seems inevitable.
Which makes the construction of ABM even more urgent.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

Quote:
This is a non-seqiter. What ABM does is make a full-scale nuclear war less likely by removing the inevitablility that currently accompanies a mass missile launch.

In the short term perhaps, but those states with large numbers of forces have less restraint on them, knowing that their territory in depth cannot be so struck.

Quote:
Another non-seqiter.

The argument that ABM invalidates the ICBM/SLBM deterrent will be used to cut, not to spend.
This is how it has gone on several occaisions before, a minister is sent off to think things through and comes up with a radical plan. Said plan has two sides, cuts in existing things, increases in new things.

The cuts will be implimented to a fanfair of "this is the future", the spending side will never happen to anything like that envisioned and never over the timescale envisioned.

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Which makes the construction of ABM even more urgent.

In the short term yes.
But what will now provide that deterrence bar large forces?

Quote:
In the short term perhaps, but those states with large numbers of forces have less restraint on them, knowing that their territory in depth cannot be so struck.

If that were valid, the US would have bombed the USSR back in the 1950's. The USSR couldn't have done much back at that time.

Kevin
The beatings will continue until morale improves.

---- Output from Has the navy written itself out of the Strategic Role 4.htm ----
Back in December 2007, this was scrivened:

QUOTE "If that were valid, the US would have bombed the USSR back in the 1950's. The USSR couldn't have done much back at that time."

It has always been my understanding that the US did not have enough kilotonnage to take out the USSR until the development of the H-bomb in the mid-1950s. So the US only had a limited window of opportunity between building enough H-bombs and the Soviet ICBMs came online.

Stu has a better handle on bombs necessary I'm sure, but I believe not much would be needed. Sov industrial practice was to centrally organize everything in big packages. Targeting Sov power plants only, with merely 15 kiloton devices, would probably bring things to a quick stop.

If the place wasnt a threat, we shouldnt be there. If it is a threat, it shouldnt be there. Thats what weve got our bombers for.

In the short term perhaps, but those states with large numbers of forces have less restraint on them, knowing that their territory in depth cannot be so struck.

That's a very hypothetical statement and flies in the face of previous experience. For example, the US had an almost total nuclear dominance over the USSR between the late 1940s and the early 1960s. We could hit them, they couldn't hit us. They couldn't stop us hitting them, we could stop them hitting us. Even the Russians admit that now. So, if your logic is correct, why didn't we take the Russians out in the 1950s? By your argument, we would have grabbed the opportunity. Why didn't China take out India in the late 1960s? Or India take out Pakistan? In each case there, one side had a monopoly of nuclear power and could strike without retaliation.

Furthermore, if we postulate that there is a power out there that is just itching to nuke the United States and will grab the first opportunity to do so, doesn't that make the construction of an ABM system even more important?

It has always been my understanding that the US did not have enough kilotonnage to take out the USSR until the development of the H-bomb in the mid-1950s. So the US only had a limited window of opportunity between building enough H-bombs and the Soviet ICBMs came online.

That's not actually so; from about 1950 onwards we have enough nuclear devices to eliminate the USSR as a functioning society. The nuclear strike described in The Big One is roughly what would have hit Russia from about 1950-51 onwards. Now, it wouldn't have been the total, utter destruction that we would have inflicted ten years later, the USSR would still have been around (knee-capped but still around) and probably still able to put up some sort of resistance; that's when we would have had to go back, taking targets out as devices became available. Buit as a functioning society it would have been dead. The earliest Russian ICBMs weren't a factor, we could have got bombers over them before they could have fired them. It was 64-65 befroe that changed.

So, the point remains; on a best estimate we could have done the USSR to a nice crispy turn any time between 1950 and 1965 without serious risk to ourselves; on a worst estimate, the window of opportunity was 1956 - 1964. Either way, thats a number of years, so following Zen9's argument, why didn't we?

By the way, had the grand strategy of the 1950s been followed, having established total offensive superiority in the 1950s, we would have concentrated on building a defensive system in the 1960s that would have grown in strength and power as Soviet offensive capabilities improved, effectively eliminating the latter. The Soviets would ahve been forced to build both offensive and defensive systems and that would have broken their economy. Cold War could have been over in the early 1970s.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

Well why did'nt you?

To be frankly honest I'm not sure.

It could be however, that action was not taken due to concerns about what it would do to Europe.

Having saved it from the Nazi's, and stopping the Red Army from rolling over the Rhine, having invested a lot of money to rebuild western Europe, it might well have seemed an awful waste of effort if it was to be destroyed in the process of WWIII.

It could also be that internal issues within the US might have held you back, or that your eyes where on more than Russia.

It might be that war is unpopular, and cold war which seems like peace is popular in comparison. Especialy as its all so 'far away' from you.

Fighting another war far away in foreign lands might not have been that attractive to the electorate, who certainly would know what war was like.

It might be that it took time to turn away from the idea Russia was someone to do deals with as in '45. Certainly Churchill's "Iron curtain" speach went down like a lead balloon.

So do tell, you had the knife, and had the opportunity, so why did'nt you drive it home?

That said you make a good argument for what could've happend and its quite possible you missed an opportunity to break the USSR in the early 70's.

As for my point, well I'm not thinking of this in terms of a US perspective, if BMD is the future of defence, then it is something my country must have for its own preservation.

Well why did'nt you?

Not important. The point is that neither we nor any other country in a nuclear monopoly situation (ie one where they can smite their enemies but said enemies cannot smite back) has used that position. Therefore, the argument that ABM will result in them doing so fails.

Having proposed that argument, the burden is on you to support it in the face of established historical precedent.

As for my point, well I'm not thinking of this in terms of a US perspective, if BMD is the future of defence, then it is something my country must have for its own preservation.

That's for you and your government to decide. However, ABM is an established fact of life now. You have the option not to be vulnerable to ballistic missiles, do you want to be?

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

Stuart, assuming a receptive Congress and White House, how difficult or desirable would it be to deploy an updated version of GPALS?

Fighter pilots make movies, Bomber crews make history.

"The point is that neither we nor any other country in a nuclear monopoly situation (ie one where they can smite their enemies but said enemies cannot smite back) has used that position."

Stuart, maybe I'm missing something here, more than likely given the combination of your greater understanding of such things with my annual X-mas eve dinner with my brother and sister and their families. The Japanese had no capability to respond either conventionally or with nuclear devices.

Bear in mind that in my opinion the route the US took was the right one.

Jonathan

You mean in August 1945?

We were already in a long bitter shooting war. We had committed to invading Japan. The decision was made essentially to save American lives. It also saved tens of millions of Japanese lives. They still owe us a thank-you note.

We have a reluctance, for better or wose, to starting wars. Or at least we think we ought to. That is a great restraint on behaviour. If you think you are the good guys, you tend to try to live up to your own standards.

- Dennis
--
Victory at all costs,
victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be;
for without victory there is no survival.
-Sir Winston Churchill

Quote:
The point is that neither we nor any other country in a nuclear monopoly situation (ie one where they can smite their enemies but said enemies cannot smite back) has used that position. Therefore, the argument that ABM will result in them doing so fails.

In terms of nuclear weapons, only the use on Japan exists.

However I'm not so sure that a state with an advantage in arms has not used such when it see's an opportunity to do so.

When one feels powerful, one is emboldend to use such power.
When one see's a weakness in another, one it tempted to exploit it.

As for the other, I have already answered that, and will argue the case for whatever is needed to that end, if ABM is that thing then so be it.

Stuart, assuming a receptive Congress and White House, how difficult or desirable would it be to deploy an updated version of GPALS?

Desirable? Very

Difficult? That's a variable question. In some ways we're well on the way to deploying a limited version of GPALS now. We've got a multi-layer defense system being built and we cane xpand it almost at will (just because we use expensive silo basing for the existing batteries doesn't mean we always have to. If we wanted a really cheap, fast expansion, we could use simple rail launchers and use existing radars for fire control, then harden up the system later. Some of the more futuristic components would be ahrd and expensive to achieve but that's no reason not to try

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

The Japanese had no capability to respond either conventionally or with nuclear devices.

They did when the war started - look at Shanghai or the other Chinese towns that were bombed. The reason the Thais folded in December 1941 was because the Japanese threatened to firebomb Bangkok and burn the city to the ground - and Bangkok was a wooden city then. So, in conventional terms, the Japanese had already set the bar by their own actions.

In 1945, everybody involved regarded nuclear weapons as just being very powerful conventional bombs, ones that enabled a single bomber to do the work of five hundred or a thousand. To be fair, at the time, that wasn't so wrong. A B-29 with a Mark 3 inflicted about as much damage (human and material) as 500 armed with conventional incendiaries. So it wasn't a matter of suddenly using something, it was simply continuing a course of action that can be traced back to the intial actions of the ultimate recipients.

In a way, what the Japanese threatened to do to Bangkok lead inexorably to what the B-29s did to Tokyo.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

In terms of nuclear weapons, only the use on Japan exists.

And, as we've seen, tahte xample isn't applicable since it was simpy an extension of an existing bombing campaign and strategy simply using a more efficient weapon.

However I'm not so sure that a state with an advantage in arms has not used such when it see's an opportunity to do so. When one feels powerful, one is emboldend to use such power. When one see's a weakness in another, one it tempted to exploit it.

Red herring. We're talking specifically about nuclear weapoins and ABM defenses and the evidence from prior example is 100 eprcent against your thesis. Conventional weapons are not the same as nuclear ones.

As for the other, I have already answered that, and will argue the case for whatever is needed to that end, if ABM is that thing then so be it.

I look forward to hearing your pro-ABM arguments from now on then.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

Quote:
And, as we've seen, tahte xample isn't applicable since it was simpy an extension of an existing bombing campaign and strategy simply using a more efficient weapon.

Indeed, there is no arguement there.

Quote:
Red herring. We're talking specifically about nuclear weapoins and ABM defenses and the evidence from prior example is 100 eprcent against your thesis. Conventional weapons are not the same as nuclear ones.

I'm not entirely convinced of that.

Quote:
I look forward to hearing your pro-ABM arguments from now on then.

You may look forward to whatever you wish. I however said 'if' as in "if ABM is that thing then so be it".

Theres something wrong with this whole argument, which I can't quite put my finger on yet. Some strand of the whole fabric seems missing or warped. Since I cannot see what that is, I cannot dismiss it nor take it as read one way or the other.
Clearly you and others belive this is the way things are going.
I shall certainly look into the matter.

By the way, merry christmass.

Seems the alternative to nukes is to develop a super bug with a vaccine. Or without if you want to go the doomsday routine. And cheap too... super cheap.

Until it mutates on you, and your vaccine isn't worth the serum it was made from.

Natural viruses are frightening enough - they don't need some idiot tinkering with them to make them deadlier or more communicable!

You can rest assurred that there are "idiots" tinkering even as we speak!!

If the place wasnt a threat, we shouldnt be there. If it is a threat, it shouldnt be there. Thats what weve got our bombers for.

I know. It's one of the things epidemiologists get maudlin about when we drink.