The Sherman Thread

[MKSheppard]

Following the Great Yuku-poo distengration of the EZBoards, I started to save "interesting" threads to my hard drive; where they've remained for twenty plus years, across multiple computers; I moved them from PC to PC etc.

Until now, they've been locked into the old screwed up Yuku HTML format; requiring much manpower to convert into a php BB compatible format to restore.

I spent a few hours with various AIs (Grok, Chat GPT) bodging together a python script that reads my old saved thread pages and transliterates them into something I can post up here...:

The original SHERMAN THREAD was posted way back, under the unimpressive title:

re: sherman tank

---- Output from Sherman 1.htm ----

Back in July 2003, this was scrivened:

What was wet storage, in the context of the sherman ?

Declan

Cry Havoc and let slip the Hampsters of war.

I believe that refers to the ammunition being stored inside of water filled jackets to protect it from fire. However Sherman's where often overloaded with ammo, which was simply stacked exposed inside the turret, causing many to explode when hit.

"As your attorney, I advise you to not listen to reason" Non Sequitur

Thanks skimmer

I have been following a debate on straight dope regarding the sherm ,and that was one of the modifications mentioned to get it more survivable.

Declan


Cry Havoc and let slip the Hampsters of war.

Wet stowage placed the ammunition in compartments within a box filled with ethylene glycol (antifreeze). The theory was as skimmer explains - the the antifreeze would smother a fire before it detonated the ammo. My understanding is that it was not terribly successful and that the real cause for the decrease in Sherman combustion was that crews stopped stuffing their tanks with 150 or 160% of their combat loads (resulting in main gun rounds strewn around the fighting compartment waiting to ignite), which had been common in Normandy due to concerns about lack of resupply.

SPQA

Also the ready rack in the Sherman was mounted around the turret basket and was not wet stowage, so a german round entering the vehicle stood a good chance of setting off the ready rounds and not touching the stowed ammo.

The real question is why did the War Department go with large numbers of Sherman tanks when the Pershing was available and a much better system and certainly more survivable ? I know that doctrine at the time called for tanks not to engage other tanks but in reality this just wasnt the practice. The Pershing in large numbers during Normandy and after would have saved many lives.

It might save tank crews, but the Sherman's spent the vast majority of their time supporting infantry. So how many extra infantry are going to die because we built thousands fewer Sherman's in favor of retooling for larger more expensive tanks? The Pershing was also more difficult to transport to and around the battlefield.

The supply boys asked the Army if they wanted twice as many Shermans or half as many "better" tanks. The shipping would only carry so many Shermans or half as many "better" tanks.

The Army said that they wanted the Shermans rather than half as many better tanks. This decision was made a couple of years before D-Day. Changing their mind was not a real good option.

I would very likely have gone for the "better" tanks. Seems like I prefer to win the armoured battles and let the infantry support role catch as catch can. If we lost the armoured battles, we would be facing our tanks against their 'tanks plus infantry' supported attacks.

We gave our infantry divisions a tank battalion of 56 tanks,
gave our Allies thousands of Shermans and had two heavy tank divisions with well over 200 tanks each.

By taking half as many better tanks, I reduce(two companies of better tanks instead of four companies of Shermans) the tank bn for every infantry division. The Allies get fewer tanks, however, they will be much better tank killing machines. In addition, their larger gun will be a superior infantry support weapon. A larger HE round is valuable in an infantry support role.

My armoured divisions have the same number of "better" tanks and I tend to win the armoured battles without losing vast numbers of Shermans. I will have fewer replacement tanks, however, I will not be losing nearly as many tanks. The enemy will also be losing more of their tanks to my "better" tank killing machines.

The Russians seemed to think that most Allied armour was good only for secondary roles. They normally used Russian tanks in the main battles.

One Russian Armoured Corps did use Shermans and the British heavy support tanks did also find use due to their heavy armour(even with their weak gun!)

The British 17 pounder mangaged to fit inside a Sherman turret and was a much better anti tank weapon. England offered to give us 300 guns plus ammo per month and we turned them down. I would have taken them up on their offer and asked for the plans so that I could make more guns to increase the 300 guns per month figure. If I cannot have better tanks, I would surely like to upgrade my Sherman.

I peeked at an article that chose the P-47 as the best fighter aircraft of WWII. It could do more roles better than other aircraft. A Jack of all trades...

I would have chosen another aircraft and won the fighter battle. If you win the fighter battle, you may bomb the enemy with your remaining planes. If you lose the fighter battle, you are trying to bomb them with them holding the air because they won the fighter battles.

German air support was a tad thin from D-Day forward because they had lost control of the skies. Me 262s with bomb racks anyone? Anyone besides Hitler of course?

As far as infantry support weapons, you would have saved a lot of tankers and infantry lives by going toe to toe with the Germans armour and winning without losing a battlefield full of Shermans because they could not match the anti tank guns of the enemy.

I hardly feel that two companies of a "better" tank would have left our infantry divisions with any feelings of inferior weapons. The better tank would also be a better infantry support weapon because their main gun would fire both a larger AP and "HE" round.

There was a serious problem with our tank crews. They had been told that their tanks were as good or better than the Germans and they found out the "real" truth the hard way.

Ike asked what happened with the 76MM upgraded gun, it was supposed to be a world beater and only slightly upgraded the Sherman anti armour value. Another claim and another failure to live up to the real world.

We beat the Germans with a combination of combat power. Tens of thousands of Shermans won the war with a lot of other help. They also suffered very heavy losses because they were inferior tank killing machines.

The Sherman was also known as the Ronson. A brand of lighter that lit up every time. It rarely failed to live up to that title.

Perhaps the best support for a "better" tank is given in the two latest Gulf wars. Apparently no Abrams crewman has died inside his vehicle. The Iraqi tank crews cannot share this claim. They lost tanks in the thousands during both wars along with thousands upon thousands of tank crews.

Regards,
Robert

Quote:

I would very likely have gone for the "better" tanks. Seems like I prefer to win the armoured battles and let the infantry support role catch as catch can. If we lost the armoured battles, we would be facing our tanks against their 'tanks plus infantry' supported attacks.

Except the infantry fought massively more then Panzers where encountered. The US Army thought that the ideal mix of tank guns would be three 105mm howitzers, a weapon with little AP capacity, for every one 90mm gun. I think that alone is telling about what the tanks where busy doing. Beating that lone Tiger ten minutes faster was less important then saving the infantry three hours flanking a bunker that two 75mm shells could wipe out.

Quote:
The Russians seemed to think that most Allied armour was good only for secondary roles. They normally used Russian tanks in the main battles.

One Russian Armoured Corps did use Shermans and the British heavy support tanks did also find use due to their heavy armour(even with their weak gun!)

Actually three Russian tank armies where completely equipped with Sherman's, one of which actually converted from T-34/85's.


"As your attorney, I advise you to not listen to reason" Non Sequitur

Quote:
the Pershing was available and a much better system and certainly more survivable ?

It was not abvailabel. The US had serious trouble getting a heavy tank to work at all until the M-26 was finally ready in November 1944. The transmissions available were not then up to the task of handling a vehicle fifty percent heavier than any tank the US had tried before. Not only were they, therefore, not available overseas until 1945 , they were still at least as mechanically unreliable as the Panther. Remember that the Shermans in Normandy represent about two years of production and build up. Unless you have a tank ready to go in 1943, the vast majority of your tanks will still be Shermans.

If you did replace Shermans with Pershings on the production lines, this would have meant that for the benefit of ten percent of the action (less actually as the Sherman was a good match for the assault guns and Mark IV's faced about half the time they fought tanks), you would deprive the infantry of tank support as much as half the time as fewer tanks can then be transported and those fewer tanks would be less available due to breakdowns. You would also have to live with the increased POL requirements of a M-26 force, not an inconsiderable problem considernig the ability to supply the front with fuel in 1944. This would markedly slow down the Allied rate of advance and increase total Allied infantry casualties as a result.

What would have been a good idea would have been to put 90 mm guns on at least some M-4's in 1943. Unfortunately, the West's best intel until June 1944 was that their combo of 75 mm gun tanks, a few 17 pounder and 76 mm tanks, and M-10 TD's would be sufficient. Tigers were believedrare and the very few Panthers they had seen at Anzio in February were apparently easily destroyed.

During the North African campaign, the British came across, and knocked out, Tiger I's. We knew all about the 88 mm gun and knew it was a tank killer. However, such is the lead time that the heavies never arrived till the end of the war the Patton and the (superior) Centurion.<!--EZCODE EMOTICON START :\ --><img alt=":\" src="http://www.ezboard.com/images/emoticons ... <!--EZCODE EMOTICON END-->

Quote:
I would very likely have gone for the "better" tanks. Seems like I prefer to win the armoured battles and let the infantry support role catch as catch can. If we lost the armoured battles, we would be facing our tanks against their 'tanks plus infantry' supported attacks.

We did win the armor battles, FTMP. We didn't do it particularly with tanks, but preferred to go asymetrically, fighting tanks with aircraft.

Our doctrine of using the tank as an anti armour vehicle has flipped since the war, but given the doctrine of the time, the M-4 with the 75mm was about the best compromise we had.

Quantity has a quality all its own.





- Dennis
--
Victory at all costs,
victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be;
for without victory there is no survival.
-Sir Winston Churchill

Actually our doctrine regarding the use of the Sherman was to avoid head to head armor encounters and that the Sherman was primarily for supporting the infantry while the Jacksons and Hellcats were the primary anti-tank fighting force with the help of the air force.

As for the Pershing, There might have been a few available after December 1944, but not many....and this held out through Korea where we started there with many Sherm and few Pershings in country.

The first Tigers that the British encountered both were destroyed by 6 pounder anti tank guns. Interestingly the first time they where ever used, a four tank Tiger platoon was completely wiped out by a single 76mm Russian anti tank gun as well.

Not the greatest introduction into combat ever.


"As your attorney, I advise you to not listen to reason" Non Sequitur

The Army might have chosen to have a mix of three 105mm howitzers to every 90mm gun but I seem to recall them having Shermans with a short 3 inch or slightly better 76mm. What division size unit had three 105mm howitzer to every 90mm gunfor its TOE? Not one.

It was the supply people saying that you may have twice as many Shermans or half as many better tanks that caused the Shermans to show up on the battlefield.

The infantry did not mind waiting a couple of hours for artillery, tanks, air or anything else to bust a couple of bunkers. Having your Shermans make repeated direct hits on the armour of Panthers or Tigers lowered morale and caused great lost of life. Even upgrading to the 17 pounder would have make the tank battles much cheaper in lives and tanks lost.

My books list no Russian Tank Armies completely equipped with Shermans. The Russians lost about 15,000-20,000 tanks per year during the war. How could the very limited number of Shermans that we sent them keep up with the lost rates after equipping three tank Armies? Many of the Allied tanks sent to Russia were light tanks. The numbers just do not match up.

Could you please list the Russian Tank Armies so equipped as I would love to see when/how they discarded Russian equipment for three Tank Armies. Time period and numbers of these tank armies 'fully equipped' with Shermans?

The Sherman was very reliable and so could be counted on to move large distances, however, the Russians lost tanks so fast that the numbers that they lost would numb the mind.

Apparently they had a fair number of Shermans and used them to equip a single tank Corps. This plus assorted regiment or brigade sized units here and there would have used up all of our Shermans sent to Russia.

The U.S. sent 1,683 light tanks and 5,488 medium tanks to Russia during the war. Britain and Canada sent an additional 5,218 tanks. Since the medium tank figures includes Grants/Lees, the number of Shermans was only a large fraction of the total.

Since the total British and U.S. aid only amounted to 16% of Russian tank production, filling out three of their six(they had five Tank Armies for most of the war and raised a sixth fairly late in the war) Three Tank Armies completely equipped with Shermans just does not add up.

Perhaps three tank armies had some 'sub-units' equipped with Shermans, however, the limited numbers of Shermans could not fill out three tank Armies. The aid to Russia was spread out over the entire war and much of it was sent very late in the war.

The apparent reason that the Shermans equipped a single Russian Tank Corps was for logistical reasons. Send the spare parts/replacement Shermans to that Corps. It was the supply people mixing in with the fighting men.

Regards,
Robert

16 Sept. 1942 Leningrad

First attack "all vehicles returned undamaged."
Second attack in swampy, wooded country...three Tigers gun were damaged... one tank lost "burned out"

"No shot had penetrated the armor."

Report of German officer involved in the first two Tiger combats in Russian. Thomas L. Jentz, Germany's Tiger Tanks.

A single 76mm gun did not wipe out the Tigers in their first combat in Russia.

Regards,
Robert

I was not claiming to use Pershing or Patton tanks. The Russians had problems with the animals(Tigers and Panthers tanks) and rushed a new tank destroyer design into production.

They took about a month to design same and tested the 107mm anti aircraft gun against a captured Panther tank to see if the armor could be penetrated. It went in the front and exited the rear armor so the test was judged a success.

The Russians choose the 107mm anti aircraft gun because they had plenty of guns and millions of rounds of ammo already available.

The Army had heavy tank projects in the works. Scale one down to deliver a better tank to the troops.

Regards,
Robert

Quote:
The infantry did not mind waiting a couple of hours for artillery, tanks, air or anything else to bust a couple of bunkers. Having your Shermans make repeated direct hits on the armour of Panthers or Tigers lowered morale and caused great lost of life. Even upgrading to the 17 pounder would have make the tank battles much cheaper in lives and tanks lost.

Please excuse but YES WE BLOODY DO When are pinned down with butt in the mud we want support and want it now. Not in two hours or one hour or ten minutes but now. If we must wait for two hours then do not bother to send support for will be nobody left alive to support. To be pinned down by bunker fire is only the start. Once we cannot move defenders will bring down artillery and mortar fire on us until there is nothing left. Why you think infantry units have mortars?

Also point of Sherman was there were enough so were around when needed. American infantry battalion commander ask for Sherman tank support he gets it. German infantry battalion ask for Panther tank support his commander roll on floor laughing then give him urine test. This is key thing. Sherman was there when needed. Panther was not.

And for infantry support critical thing is HE round not AP. Then can use HE fire to suppress bunkers while we get moving to penetrate defense. Do not think there was 17 pounder HE round.

Sherman was best tank of WW2. Were 52,000 of them.

Build a man a fire you warm him for a night
Set a man on fire you warm him for all his life

Quote:
They took about a month to design same and tested the 107mm anti aircraft gun against a captured Panther tank to see if the armor could be penetrated. It went in the front and exited the rear armor so the test was judged a success. The Russians choose the 107mm anti aircraft gun because they had plenty of guns and millions of rounds of ammo already available.

Please excuse but do not know of any Russian 107 millimeter anti-aircraft gun. There is Russian 102 millimeter naval gun and Russian 107 millimeter recoilless gun but is no 107 millimeter AA gun. Please to provide details of this gun?

Quote:
The Army had heavy tank projects in the works. Scale one down to deliver a better tank to the troops.

Grin. And will get it around 1947. This is not so easy as it sound.

Build a man a fire you warm him for a night
Set a man on fire you warm him for all his life

Quote:
The Army had heavy tank projects in the works. Scale one down to deliver a better tank to the troops.

You mean scale a forty-five ton 90 mm gun tank down to, say, thirty-two tons with a 76 mm gun? They did that. The M-4A3E8 combined many detail improvements from the heavy tank programs.

The problem was that they needed 90 mm gun tanks in large quantities, but didn't realize it until it was for too late to do more than they did historically. If you fnd out you need them at the begimnning of June, you won't have them designed, tested, produced in useful numbers, sent overseas, and then retrain the crews by the end of the month. That's why the Pershing didn't get there until January.

BTW, they had a 90 mm gun tank destroyer just entering production in the US when France was invaded, the M-36. By the time they saw action, the worst tank killing battles were long over.

There was in fact an HE round for the 17 pounder - it just wasn't very good. The lowly 75mm M3 that armed the baseline Sherman fired a very useful HE round, which is one of the reasons it was kept throughout the war. Rich Anderson posted a really interesting study by the 6th Armored Division on tanknet a few years ago. In the part dated in September, 1944, the division requested that it's radial engined M4A1s be replaced with Ford engined M4A3s (roughly 100 more horsepower), but it had no complaint whatsoever about the gun.

SPQA

---- Output from Sherman 2.htm ----
Back in July 2003, this was scrivened:

Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two by Steven J. Zaloga and James Grandeen, p. 165, "Prototypes of the KV-14 on a modified KV-1S chassis, were designed in a record 25 days, and on 7 February, barely a month after the capture of the Tiger, perfunctory trials were completed. On 14 February 1943 the GKO accepted the KV-14 for production as the SU-152. The first heavy mechanized gun regiments were formed in May 1943..."
25 days to design and the first unit was rushed into combat at Kursk in 1943. Not "around" 1947 on later...

The U.S. built an bunch of atomic bombs, 42,000 Shermans, and most anything that "we" decided was needed.

We "grin" and put a man on the moon if we decide to do something.

Will check on Russian 107mm gun details.
Regards,
Robert

Where exactly is the infantry going if they are "pinned down with our butt in the mud?" If you do not have tank support you had better win without tanks!

I agree that the infantry and everyone else wants support and they want it "five minutes ago." Sometimes you have to make do without tank support.

Infantry divisions in the U.S. Army managed to fight from 6 June 1944 until the end of the war. The Big Red One Infantry Division probably suffered a couple of hundred percent losses, however, they managed to fight and win WWII. Sometimes they fought with tank support and sometimes they fought without tank support.

If your infantry cannot survive two hours, they might consult the American combat in Asia and Europe during WWII. Many fights took place without a Sherman to win them. The infantry, artillery, engineers, air support, etc. simply did the best they could. The American landings at Normandy were largely infantry fighting without tank support. We still won.

Both British and American Airborne divisions dropped into combat and held their ground or took it to the enemy "without" tank support.

Mortars are to lay smoke or harass the enemy until the artillery support, tank support or air support can be called into action.

Perhaps some smoke rounds from the mortars would enable your infantry to retreat or attack by laying down a smoke screen?

The American Rangers took an 80 meter high cliff at Normandy by climbing the cliffs and attacking the Germans(without American tank support) dug in at the top.

The enemy does not use artillery fire to attack you while you are advancing on their positions?

The American army tries to gain artillery superiority so that it may dominate the battlefield. We likely had the best artilllery arm in WWII and we used it to great effect.

I guess that an airborne division could request tank support, however, I do not see how the tanks could help an airborne division that had dropped behind enemy lines. They would likely have to wait more than "two hours" before the tanks came up to support them. The 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions managed to last a lot longer than "two hours" without tank support and even managed to fight the Germans and take and hold a considerable number of positions.

Tanks cannot always manage to move up and support the infantry. One of the U.S. Army Historical series describes the fighting in poor tank country where the infantry had to go in alone and still managed to fight for more than "two hours. Narrow trails and rain managed to eliminate/delay tank support so the poor bloody infantry had to take the fight to the enemy "without" tank support.

When an American division moved forward and ran into German Panthers or Tigers, they had a choice of attacking with Shermans or not. They atacked if needed and sometimes lost a whole lot of tanks and tank crews because the Sherman was not a good anti tank machine vs Panthers or Tigers.

We did make a lot of Shermans. My books say 42,000 not 52,000 perhaps you are counting a post war production figure?

A do not know, however, my guess is that the 17 pounder (which was an anti aircraft gun) would come with HE. I would certainly ask for regular anti aircraft rounds and fire them from my 17 pounder anti aircraft gun.

The British did build tank guns without HE rounds. I think that their 40mm came in a AP round. It was a mistake of the British government, not the gun that fired the shells.

The Germans were fighting most of the world and they were outnumbered. We beat them with almost overwhelming numbers of aircraft, tanks, guns, men etc. etc. That being said, the U.S. was outnumbered in the Gulf Wars and still won with inferior numbers, however, "better" combat vehicles.

The 42,000 Shermans were a part of the war winning combination of forces that won WWII. They were decent tanks in 1942 and poor tanks by 1943-1945.

The tank had evolved from WWI with the Germans having four basic series Mark I-IV tanks before we entered WWII. The U.S. knew about these tanks and they were silly to not believe that further advances in guns and armor would be made.

We entered the war with light tanks, came up with the Grant and moved up to the Sherman by 1942. Both the Grant and Sherman were major upgrades of tanks and the U.S. certainly should have made some "better" tanks to fight the newer German models. The Russians fought Tiger tanks outside of Leningrad in 1942 and the U.S. had already fought them in the African fighting.

The Russian T-34 and KV-1 tanks in 1945 were superior tanks to the German armored forces, however, they were largely destroyed in 1941. The Russian barely managed to hold on until the winter of 1941 and later broke the back of the German Army.

The Russians produced tens of thousands of T-34 and KV tanks, however, that still does not make them "better" tanks because of their larger numbers. They were "better" tanks because of their better guns and armor.

The Sherman was produced in large numbers(42,000) and still was an inferior tank from 1943 forwards.

At the very least, accept the British offer of 300 17 pounder guns(plus ammo) per month and we could fill out all of our armored divisions with 17 pounder gun armed tanks in about one years time.

I suspect that the Americans declined the British offer because we felt "American" weapons were at least as good. In this case, they were wrong.

Regards,
Robert

Perhaps the Russains did not have a 107mm anti aircraft gun, however, Stumbling Colossus, by David M. Glantz, p. 207, "A subsequent status report on 20 July noted, "Army units are still experiencing shortages of food and ammunition, especially for regimental and divisional(107mm) antiaircraft guns.

It might be a misprint, however, I have found that Mr. Glantz's research appears to be very detailed.

Perhaps you "know" about post WWII weapons. The 107mm divisional antiaircraft weapon would likely be a fairly heavy weapon and would perhaps been replaced by more mobile weapons in the Russian inventory of WWII.

I seem to remember seeing the 107mm in other volumes. I assume that this citation complies with your request.

I tend to collect books on tanks and battle histories. Anti aircraft weapons are not my strong point. I have not seen the specs on this weapon,however, I believe that it is listed in other volumes as well as Stumbling Colossus.

Regards,
Robert

Building a better tank is not a worthy ends in itself.

Other people have catalouged the oppertunity cost of trying to do so, far fewer tanks including far fewer with the infantry.

To make your case you have to demonstrate that the btter tanks would have significantly shortened the war in Europe and reduced the casualties overall, despite the worse position of the infantry and the undoubted logistical and production limitations.

Where exactly is the infantry going if they are "pinned down with our butt in the mud?" If you do not have tank support you had better win without tanks!

While you can certainly do that, it is a lot cheaper (in terms of lives) to have the support on hand.

I agree that the infantry and everyone else wants support and they want it "five minutes ago." Sometimes you have to make do without tank support.

Yes, but in WW2, US infantry, both Army and Marine, had armor support available more often than not. And that was due to the mass availablity of the Sherman.

Infantry divisions in the U.S. Army managed to fight from 6 June 1944 until the end of the war. The Big Red One Infantry Division probably suffered a couple of hundred percent losses, however, they managed to fight and win WWII. Sometimes they fought with tank support and sometimes they fought without tank support.

IIRC, 1st ID had three tank battalions attached to it at several points. Oddly enough, that is also the tank strength of a 1943 pattern armored division.

If your infantry cannot survive two hours, they might consult the American combat in Asia and Europe during WWII. Many fights took place without a Sherman to win them. The infantry, artillery, engineers, air support, etc. simply did the best they could. The American landings at Normandy were largely infantry fighting without tank support. We still won.

That's really not accurate. Shermans were around for almost any major battle you can name. Oh, there are some exceptions, but they are exceptions.

Both British and American Airborne divisions dropped into combat and held their ground or took it to the enemy "without" tank support.

Yeah - and they were specialized units that were also pulled out of combat frequently to absorb and train replacements, something the average infantry division in the ETO did not get to do. The less trained, less cohesive line units needed all the support they could get. And by virtue of decent planning, there just happened to be large numbers of Shermans around to do the job.

Mortars are to lay smoke or harass the enemy until the artillery support, tank support or air support can be called into action.

Okay...so? How does this relate to your point that the Sherman was inadequete? Mortars certainly aren't going to move up under fire and take enemy strongpoints under direct cannon and machine gun fire the way Shermans are.

Perhaps some smoke rounds from the mortars would enable your infantry to retreat or attack by laying down a smoke screen?

Or perhaps not. Smoke is definitely the infantryman's friend, don't get me wrong, but it is no substitute for the mobile, protected firepower of a tank.

The American Rangers took an 80 meter high cliff at Normandy by climbing the cliffs and attacking the Germans(without American tank support) dug in at the top.

And took such grievous losses in the process that the battalion was disbanded soon after. Nice example.

The enemy does not use artillery fire to attack you while you are advancing on their positions?

They probably do. Which is why it is nice to be under armor where shell fragments make noise and scare you instead of shredding you. Which brings us back to the Sherman...

The American army tries to gain artillery superiority so that it may dominate the battlefield. We likely had the best artilllery arm in WWII and we used it to great effect.

True, but irrelevant. The artillery may have been the big killer on the battlefield, but it still is not going to close with the enemy, while a tank will.

I guess that an airborne division could request tank support, however, I do not see how the tanks could help an airborne division that had dropped behind enemy lines. They would likely have to wait more than "two hours" before the tanks came up to support them. The 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions managed to last a lot longer than "two hours" without tank support and even managed to fight the Germans and take and hold a considerable number of positions.

And were pulled out of the line to absord and train replacements as soon as the situation permitted. BTW, ask the British 1st Airborne Division what happens when paratroopers take on armor. Ever hear of Arnhem?

Tanks cannot always manage to move up and support the infantry. One of the U.S. Army Historical series describes the fighting in poor tank country where the infantry had to go in alone and still managed to fight for more than "two hours. Narrow trails and rain managed to eliminate/delay tank support so the poor bloody infantry had to take the fight to the enemy "without" tank support.

And suffered significantly higher casualties in the process. Tank support equals fewer friendly casualties and more enemy casualties. If the situation doesn't permit it, the situation doesn't permit it. If it is possible, using tanks is the right thing to do.

When an American division moved forward and ran into German Panthers or Tigers, they had a choice of attacking with Shermans or not. They atacked if needed and sometimes lost a whole lot of tanks and tank crews because the Sherman was not a good anti tank machine vs Panthers or Tigers.

Yeah. One of the risks of the job. And oddly enough, US tank crews had about an 80% survival rate from knocked out tanks - meaning four of the five crewmen were likely to survive. And even then, you're ignoring the fact that there were about 5,000 Panthers built during the whole of the war, and most went to fight the Soviets. Or that there were about 1,500 Tiger Is built during the whole of the war, and most went to fight the Soviets. Or that there about 450 King Tigers built during the whole of the war, and most went to fight the Soviets. The German heavy tanks were not available in large enough numbers to have any impact on the outcome of the war in the west. BTW, the Sherman was quite capable of dealing with the Pz IV, any variant of the sturmgeshutz and all of the light (not based on Panther/Tiger hull) panzerjagers. Those vehicles were available in number, and the Sherman was good enough to deal with them.

We did make a lot of Shermans. My books say 42,000 not 52,000 perhaps you are counting a post war production figure?

I think that, much like the T-34, there are many, many numbers floating around. Why don't we leave it at, "the US built a butt-load of them?"

A do not know, however, my guess is that the 17 pounder (which was an anti aircraft gun) would come with HE. I would certainly ask for regular anti aircraft rounds and fire them from my 17 pounder anti aircraft gun.

It did come with a (poor) HE round, but it certainly was not an AA gun. The 17 pounder was a purpose built anti-tank gun. It was also a bit overpowered, causing it to overheat quickly as well as leaving it with a low rate of fire.

The British did build tank guns without HE rounds. I think that their 40mm came in a AP round. It was a mistake of the British government, not the gun that fired the shells.

Both the 2- and 6- pounders fired only AP rounds. "Fault" doesn't really play any part of this. Neither of those guns fired HE rounds and the 75mm M3 did. Which was better than the HE round fired by the 17 pounder or the British 95mm howitzer - and the US 76mm M1, for that matter.

The Germans were fighting most of the world and they were outnumbered. We beat them with almost overwhelming numbers of aircraft, tanks, guns, men etc. etc. That being said, the U.S. was outnumbered in the Gulf Wars and still won with inferior numbers, however, "better" combat vehicles.

Totally irrelevant. During both Gulf Wars, the US enetered with a well-equipped peacetime army. During WW2, we had to build the whole thing from scratch, using the most expeditious means available.

The 42,000 Shermans were a part of the war winning combination of forces that won WWII. They were decent tanks in 1942 and poor tanks by 1943-1945.

Not true. They were still good tanks in 1953 in Korea.

The tank had evolved from WWI with the Germans having four basic series Mark I-IV tanks before we entered WWII. The U.S. knew about these tanks and they were silly to not believe that further advances in guns and armor would be made.

Coulda, woulda, shoulda. The fact is that the when WW2 started, the Polish Army was stronger than the US Army. Given that, given the fact that there was no domestic tank industry, given the fact that all hardware had to compete for production priorities, the Sherman was brilliant.

We entered the war with light tanks, came up with the Grant and moved up to the Sherman by 1942. Both the Grant and Sherman were major upgrades of tanks and the U.S. certainly should have made some "better" tanks to fight the newer German models. The Russians fought Tiger tanks outside of Leningrad in 1942 and the U.S. had already fought them in the African fighting.

That might say something about putting a 90mm gun in the Sherman, but it doesn't say anything about the tank itself.

The Russian T-34 and KV-1 tanks in 1945 were superior tanks to the German armored forces, however, they were largely destroyed in 1941. The Russian barely managed to hold on until the winter of 1941 and later broke the back of the German Army.

Wait, so you're saying that the German Army beat the Soviets using inferior tanks!

The Russians produced tens of thousands of T-34 and KV tanks, however, that still does not make them "better" tanks because of their larger numbers. They were "better" tanks because of their better guns and armor.

I would harly call the Soviet 76mm an outstanding gun. And even the 85mm had penetration on par with the German 75mm/48.

The Sherman was produced in large numbers(42,000) and still was an inferior tank from 1943 forwards.

You keep saying that, but you have not proven your assertion.

At the very least, accept the British offer of 300 17 pounder guns(plus ammo) per month and we could fill out all of our armored divisions with 17 pounder gun armed tanks in about one years time.

Very, VERY bad idea. That means we're stuck with British output and that we can't make up shortfalls ourselves. The 17 pounder was no better at armor penetration than the US 90mm, so if you really want an upgunned Sherman, look at that. At least you'd actually get a better HE shell than the 75mm if you used the 9omm.

I suspect that the Americans declined the British offer because we felt "American" weapons were at least as good. In this case, they were wrong.

No - it was declined because the US Army's Ordnance officers came to same conclusion about supply that I just did. Well, that and the troops in the field weren't asking for a replacement for the 75mm Sherman (and were in fact singing its praises) until the Normandy campaign and in some cases, even beyond. You also need to keep in mind that the troops in mid 1944 were fighting with equipment ordered in mid
1942.

SPQA

Are you thinking of the 100mm that armed the SU-100? The only weapon of any sort I can think of that is 107mm is the 4.2" mortar.

SPQA

There appears to be several types of 107MM guns in Russian hands around/during the time of WWII.

Red Army Handbook 1939-1945 Steven J Zaloga and Leland S. Ness, p. 199 They want to produce a new 107MM anti tank gun to face possible heavier German armor. The 107MM anti tank gun turned out to be much to heavy and expensive.

p. 211 says "The Russian Army retained the Russian Schneider 107mm corps gun Model M1910, modernized with a longer tube as the Model M1910/30 after 1931. It was to be replaced by the 107mm M-60 corps gun Model 1940 but this expensive weapon was not produced in significant numbers prior to 1941 and production ended abruptly when its factory was evauated in the autumn of 1941.

p. 213 A picture of a 122mm field gun that ends with, "It replaced the older Tzarist 107mm field guns."

Page 211 bottom table of artillery lists, M-60 Model 1940 107MM gun Weight 3,957 pounds rate of fire 3-4(rpm) Range 17.5(km) Projectile weight(kg) 17.

Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two by Steven J. Zaloga and James Grandsen, p. 85 lists the "the Grotte design, called TG-5 or T-42,... armed with a 107mm gun...
it was doubful whether the prototype was completed.

page 121 shows two pictures of KV tanks armed with "a 107mm gun" and a "longer 107mm gun" "Immediately before the outbreak of the war, the Kotin team designed a heavily modified version of the KV-1, the KV-3 Obiekt 220 which was to be armed with a 107mm gun. This would have replaced the undergunned KV-1 if the war had not broken out.

page 120 lists the "new ZiS-6 107mm gun which was not finished when the war started. As a result, the Obiekt 220 was not completed until late in 1941, and Kulik's bungling needlessly delayed the production of excellent and desperately needed tank and anti-tank guns.

I assume that these are not all misprints. The 107mm existed in Russian hands before and during WWII.

Regards,
Robert

I listed many points in support of my view. I fail to see where you have "proven your case." I expressed my view and you expressed yours, why should a new set of rules "only" apply to my views, while yours remain free from the same requirements?

I did mention that the U.S. Army in the Gulf Wars managed guite nicely with a "better" tank. It has a wonderful smooth bore very high velocity weapon for taking out enemy tanks. It is certainly not a real good infantry support weapon such as the Sherman was "better" for having a low velocity short barreled gun. The Abrams also has a very limited ammo supply, something that infantry support vehicles(the Sherman carried many more rounds of ammo) should have.

The Abrams is a "better" tank killing machine that may also fire HE. It follows the "newer" Army pattern of building "better" tanks and having them kill enemy tanks. I believe that the record still stands that no Abrams crewman has been killed inside that tank in two Gulf wars. At the very least, you are a lot safer in an Abrams than driving a Sherman towards a German Panther or Tiger.

If the Army wanted to follow the "idea of the Sherman" they would not have built the Abrams. The Army learned some lessons from history and deployed a war winning weapon that saved lives. Both wars were won with little loss of life on our side because the tanks could destroy the enemy tanks almost at will. Wars won by "better" weapons in a time frame measure in hours or days rather than years seems "better" to me. You may disagree, however, I feel that the "rules" should apply to both sides in expressing their viewpoint. If I am to "prove" my case, why should you not have to prove yours?

One of my suggestions was to "at least" accept the British offer of 300 guns(17 pounders) plus ammo each month and have at least a fair number of "beter" tanks. Slightly more than one years supply of 300 guns per month would let us outfit most(all)the armored divisions of the European fighting with much "better" tank killing machines.

I would accept the "savings" of building a war winning weapon that saved lives and ended the war much faster.We were building some 2,000 Shermans per month, if the war ended sooner the new tanks would not be needed/built.

The Abrams tank is not cheap. Quality rarely is cheap. It does tend to win battles and wars. Both battles and wars are not cheap.

Use the Lancaster equations and see if the war will not be won faster and cheaper. If your ships are twice as good and equal in numbers, you tend to wind with the "square" of the combat value. With Weapons three times as good, you tend to inflict damage at nine times the rate of the "inferior" enemy weapons.

I have been a war gamer for over four decades and know that to fight without being able to hurt the enemy because of an inferior weapon or armor is most likely to lose battles, lives and wars.

Sure numbers are neat, however, check what semi-modern weapons do to attacks by human waves of spear carrying natives. Mountains of dead before a thin red line. There are exceptions, however, usually someone forgot to post a guard or send out scouts.

Perhaps a WWI infantry attack against machine guns will supply the value of huge numbers against a "better" infantry killing machine gun. Numbers may win in the end(they often do) but at what cost?

It just might be cheaper to build half as many "better" tanks as twice as many Shermans. I would be very surprised if it were not cheaper in both dollars and lives. I find it hard to believe that the WWI era dollars produce Shermans for less than the money spent in "upgrading" a Sherman to a 17 pounder gun.

I am curious how the defenders of the WWII Army doctrine of "tanks do not fight tanks" and planes kill tanks etc. etc. would fight the Battle of the Bulge from 16 December 1944 until 23 December 1944 when the skies prevented many/most aircraft from flying.

The 7th Armored Division was told to hold St. Vith and did a bang up job for several very valuable days. Would their job have been done better with "better" tank killing machines? I think so. They paid in lives lost and blood splilled for using Shermans. They did the best they could with what they had, but it cost more not less.

I do not see how you have "proven" your case that the war would not go better with "better" tank killing machines available. If we shortened the fighting in Normandy the savings in lives would have been awesome. The British wore down the German armor by sticking their heads into the German "meat grinder." With a "better" tank killing machine the fighting would have been shorter and much less costly.

The Germans lost at Normandy because their losses were not nearly being replaced. Panzer Lehr only had about 3,000 men left when the Cobra breakout "started," their D-Day total was some five times that many men. When the German lines had the men and machines, they held us to small gains near Normany. When the fighting had cost them men and material that could not be replaced, we broke out.

The Germans had a saying "boot them, don't splatter them." Concentrate your tanks into a "mailed" fist and break the enemy lines. Wars fought by wearing down your enemy are a high cost way of war. If your 'better" weapons can force the issue, the battle may be won faster and at much less cost.

As far as production problems, we still built the largest navy in the world after canceling a considerable portion in 1943. We built some 300,000 aircraft and that total could have been doubled if we had not build so many four engined B-17, B-24 and B-29.

We could produce just about anything that we wanted. We were the only country to build and use an atomic bomb. After WWII we put a man on the moon. If the orders came down from on high, we could be very likely to build whatever was ordered. The problems with building a "better" tank would most likely be swept aside by the arsenal of Democracy if someone high up "gave the order."

At worse, accept the 300 guns per month that the British offered and have a much better tank killing machine. If there is some problem with HE put together an assortment of tanks. 50-50 or 60/40 maybe. I think the British used 1 in 4 or 2 in 5 ratio for their Fireflys(Shermans armed with 17 pounders)

If you forsee supply problems, please note that American artillery used the mainly the 105 and 155 weapons, however, an fairly wide assortment of other types was also included without fatal damage to winning the war.

Assuming that we did produce half as many tanks(more ships built to carry tanks anyone?) why do you think that half as many tanks(only slightly larger) cost more to build or that they consume more than twice as much POL per tank? If a shorter war results the savings are greatly improved in favor of building the "better" tank killing machine. My Gulf War notes should apply here as well as to WWII.

If my viewpoint is correct and the war is shortened, the cost in POL etc. would be much less. If you fuel only half as many tanks for a shorter time period the savings should be considerable.

I am not suggesting building half as many tanks, that is a worse case version of "what if." I like tanks and tend to build a "lot" of them in my wargaming. I addressed your "idea" that the supply would be cut in half to provide a "worst case" war winning variant.

The "supply" people said that they could "ship" half as many bigger tanks than Shermans and the War Department decided to take twice as many Shermans "shipped" to Europe. That was the only limitation that I wrote about. I disagree with their decision.

The supply people could ship only half the tanks "with the resources" projected/expected. What if we built additional tank transport capable ships with the savings from "only" building half as many slightly larger tanks. Two shermans have much more tonnage between them than a single 40+ ton tank for building costs.

My "what if" version shows only fraction smaller loss in numbers built. Perhaps build 30,000 "better" tanks in place of 42,000 Shermans. You save almost a million tons of tank "parts/pieces" and might decide to supply addition tank capable shipping. We did cancel a lot of ships from the 1943 Naval building program. Maybe build additional ships that can carry more tanks?

Assuming that we "only" build half as many tanks and the war ends quicker. We do not need to have nearly as many replacement tanks as the Shermans needed. Red Army Tank Commanders The Armored Guards, Richard N. Armstrong, p. 459 "In the course of offensive operations, tank armies lost an average of 90% of their tanks and self propelled assault guns...irrecoverable losses in continous operations averaged 30% of initial stregth...In some operations, each tank and self-propelled assault gun was evacuated, restored and placed back into the fight 2-3 times."

The Russian fighting resulted in about 100% losses each year so they produced another 20,000 or so tanks/assault guns each year. If the war was one year shorter, you saved building about 20,000 AFV and in addition saved the heavy losses in AFV crews.

I suspect that the numbers would be very much higher, however, take one "what if." To make my case, how about just one less family gets the notice that a son, husband or father was "KILLED IN ACTION."

Regards,
Robert

Robert, a quiet and polite word of warning. Dirk and Suphi are professional, active service infantry, Dirk is an NCO, Suphi is a senior officer. I don't know much about Dirk's career but Suphi's fought between five and nine (depending on who one talks to) platoon, company and battalion-level infantry actions and won all of them - and brought most of her people back while doing so. What you're hearing isn't learning from books, its hard-won practical experience.

Your comparison with the Abrams doesn't hold water. Today, the battle tank is primarily a tank killing machine because the infantry support role has been devolved to other systems. The armored personnel carrier today fills some of these functions and there is a plethora of man-portable support weapons that do the rest. The RPG-7 is a good example - obsolete as a tank-killer, it has been re-invented as a general infantry support weapon. In another sense, anti-tank missiles today do much of the bunker and strongpoint killing task. There was film of that happening during the recent unpleasantness in Iraq. In fact, the US Army did "follow the idea of the Sherman" its just they didn't continue to do it the same way.

You are badly misreading the Lanchester equations. In fact, their lesson is that quantity is much more important than quality. this is because combat power is arithmetically related to unit quality but exponentially related to unit quantity. The Lanchester equations suggest that if each side has a combat power of four and one doubles its quality while the other doubles its quantity; the quality-doubler goes up by 4 x 2 = 8 while the quantity doubler goes up by 4 x 4 = 16 so the net result is that the quantity doubler now has a serious advantage. However, the Lanchester equations are now pretty well discredited as too simplistic so it doesn't really matter.

I have been a war gamer for over four decades and know that to fight without being able to hurt the enemy because of an inferior weapon or armor is most likely to lose battles, lives and wars.
Unfortunately, that is totally meaningless. Sorry. One of the companies I used to work for set up "wargames" using computer equipment that cost millions of dollars. The general conclusion was that they are a total waste of time. What wargames are useful for is examining performance under stress, not for determining answers to tactical questions. I've seen a lot of such games over the years, ranging from amateur productions to highly professional military ones. None of them gave any realistic answers to what happens on a battlefield. Usually, all they do is reflect the personal preferences of the people (more usually person) who wrote the rules. its noticable that in most non-military wargames the rules used heavily favor the Germans in WW2 scenarios and the French in Napoleonic ones. Why is an interesting psychological question.

(Added in Edit after some reflection) It also occurs to me that wargaming-based opinions may be badly distorted another way. Every Second World War game I've seen has bene primarily a tank game with infantry thrown in as an afterthough. (Interestingly, most WW2 wargamers will tell you that "they see themselves primarily as infantry commanders" but in reality, their attention is devoted only to the tanks). This comes out strongly in game mechanisms. Tank shoots at tank. There is one dieroll to see if it hits, another to see where it hits, a third to see if it penetrates and a fourth to determine the damage. There is voluminous data on tank types and sub-types with ever more detailed data on performance, guns and armor. Artillery shoots at infantry and its one dieroll and "oh, take two clips off". Infantry are basically infantry with virtually no distinction.

Add in another factor, carefully concealed. Most wargames use force scaling - a tank on the table represents a larger "real" number. Only that relationship isn't constant. If the rules are examined really closely, a model on the table may represent three German tanks, or five American or up to 15 Russian. If the rules author is pressed, the excuse usually is that it "offsets the inferiority" of US or Russian or whatever units. Now ask is the firepower upped to allow for the larger number of vehicles - no, is the defensive values upped - no. In reality, the difference in scales is used to mask the sheer numerical inferiority of the Germans; a 5:1 numerical inferiority in reality is reduced to parity. This goes back to an old wargaming company called SPI (Simulations Publications Inc)who produced the first commercial tactical armor simulations (most notably one called Panzerblitz. They faced the problem that the games were chronically unbalanced because if the historical order of battle was used, the Russians simply swamped the Germans. Given the technology of the era, there was no way to simulate what Russian limitations really were. So the difference in scaling of units was adopted and a counter represnted a German platoon but a Russian company. That's stuck since then.

The implication of all this is that amateur wargaming is simply not useful as a means of analysing what happens in World War Two; the "battles" are distorted by excessive armor availability and the drastic (but concealed) dilution of numerical advantage. Added to that is yet another problem. Most wargames use the points system to decide forces (side A has 5000 points, side B has 3000 or whatever and they "buy" units from a preset price schedule). That means that forces on table always are balanced and have a tank component.

In the late 1980s I (and a couple of members of the company I worked for then, one of whom was Leland Ness) got involved in an amateur WW2 wargame. The poor dumb clucks sort of said, gee you do wargaming for the Pentagon, why don't you look at our rules? So we did (we seriously considered invoicing them for the trouble we went to). What we did was we eliminated the point system completely; we got the official hisories from the Pentagon library and scaled down what forces were actually available. We then created "Chinese menus" (take one from Column A, two from Column B etc). The interesting thing was that when actual forces were taken, the Germans almost never had tanks at all. The Americans almost always had Shermans of one sort or another. The battles were German infantry with a scattering of anti-tank guns and sporadic artillery fire (plus a Stg if they were lucky) against US infantry with heavy artillery and armor support. Suddenly the Sherman was a feared beast; you can laugh at it when you're in a Panther with armor to the nines. When you're a Landser with nothing but your shirt between its 75 and you, a Sherman is a nightmare.

In fact, out of interest we went further. We eliminated the difference between tanks completely. There were three types of tanks. "Above average tanks", "average tanks" and "below average tanks". It didn't matter whether you had a Panther, a King Tiger or a Firefly; they were all "above average". What we did was then concentrate on morale and C3I issues. We never game-tested that part and we were having severe problems due to the impossibility of simulating morale and command control effects. It might be possible today (with 20 years advance in technology) but I doubt it.

To be honest, I don't think your experience wargaming is of any direct value. Your comments have reflected the tank vs tank focus of wargames. What you miss is that most battles were Shermans vs nothing. Where it is useful is that writing rules can help in getting large volumes of information together (even thats qualified; my experience of wargamers is that they ignore any information that doesn't fit their preconceptions). I think you would be well-advised to listen to what Suphi and Dirk are telling you about what happens in the real world and then try to relate that to your wargame experience rather than the other way around.

I've looked up 107s somewhere you don't have access to. The Russians had 107 millimeter mortars and 107 millimeter rocket launchers. The Tsarist Army had a 107 millimeter field gun which was being withdrawn from service in 1940. There were no 107 millimeter AA guns and no 107 millimeter anti-tank guns. Steve Zaloga is a personal friend of mine so I'll ask him about these next time I see him but I think the 107s mentioned in the references you quote are experimental weapons that never went into production. By the way, there is no reference to 107 millimeter Soviet artillery ammunition anywhere today (and bearing in mind French 75, British 13 and 18 pounder ammunition and German 77 is still in production ....). One interesting thing I did come across was there was a 45 millimeter L46 dual-role lightweight anti-aircraft/anti-tank gun that weighed 107 kilograms. I can't help but wonder...

To make my case, how about just one less family gets the notice that a son, husband or father was "KILLED IN ACTION."
In The Business we call that argument "shroud waving". It doesn't make your case, it destroys it. The reason is that its an extraordinarily offensive way of trying to bulldoze opponents into agreeing with something. I know you didn't mean it that way; that's why I am trying to warn you that its not a good line to follow. Its very counter-productive.

I hope you won't take offense at this; I really do respect the amount of information and detail in your posts and enjoy reading your contributions. I'm just trying to fill in a little background for you.

The great issues of the day are not solved by speeches and resolutions in the United Nations. They are solved by the tanks of the US Armed Forces.

Quote:
We could produce just about anything that we wanted

"Just about" is one of the key parts here. The US could build forty-five ton Sherman Jumbos with 90 mm guns that would be slower and far less capable cross country than their lighter counterparts - let alone the German tanks. They would also have fewer of them and they would have more maintenance problems. The result would be higher infantry casualties once they broke out of Normandy and a slower chase across France. This could give the Germans more time to mount better defences - slowing the advance more and causing more casualties.

The other key part is "wanted". The US had every reason to believe that they would face much the same kind of opposition as they were facing in Italy. A few Tigers and medium tanks that were not hard to handle. As it turns out, the Panther was far more capable than they thought and available in five times the numbers of the Tiger.

Quote:
It [the Abrams] follows the "newer" Army pattern of building "better" tanks and having them kill enemy tanks.

Firstly, the Abrams was the result of forty years experience with armoured forces. In 1944, the Tank Corps was only four years old and was in its first serious test of equipment and doctrine. Next, the limiting factors for the Abrams was not shipping space, production capacity, or fuel transport. These were no longer serious factors by the eighties. The limits were the number of tank crews the US could sustain and the money the US was willing to spend. As the M-1 has the same crew as the M-60, this meant that they'd be replaced more or less one for one. As Reagan and later Bush, was President, it meant that money would be found.

Quote:
One of my suggestions was to "at least" accept the British offer of 300 guns

When you believe that your 76 mm and the upcoming 90 mm are as good or better for how you want to use them, why would you complicate your logistics?

Quote:
I am curious how the defenders of the WWII Army doctrine of "tanks do not fight tanks"

It was wrong doctrine. No one here disputes that. We have the benefit of sixty years of hindsight. The US Army in Normandy was stuck with the consequences of a doctrine that seemed perfectly sound on 5 June 1944. After that date, the British were less interested in sharing 17 pounders and the lag time in getting new systems, like M-26 tanks, more 76 mm gunned Shermans, and HVAP ammunition meant that they had to fight the war with the equipment they had at the time.

Quote:
German 77 [mm gun ammunition]is still in production

It is? Where? For whom? I wouldn't have thought anyone would still use it - or the 18 pounder for that matter. I would have though they were all converted to use 25 pounder ammo just before and udring the war. Obviously I was mistaken, but I am now curious.

Quote:
Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two by Steven J. Zaloga and James Grandeen, p. 165, "Prototypes of the KV-14 on a modified KV-1S chassis, were designed in a record 25 days, and on 7 February, barely a month after the capture of the Tiger,perfunctory trials were completed. On 14 February 1943 the GKO accepted the KV-14 for production as the SU-152. The first heavy mechanized gun regiments were formed in May 1943..." 25 days to design and the first unit was rushed into combat at Kursk in 1943. Not "around" 1947 on later...

Is one thing to mount gun in armored box on existing chassis. If we wanted Lopburi could do so in even less tiime. Is quite different thing to produce scaled down version of entire existing vehicle. This mean complete new design. To compare these is most foolish.

Build a man a fire you warm him for a night
Set a man on fire you warm him for all his life

Quote:
Where exactly is the infantry going if they are "pinned down with our butt in the mud?" If you do not have tank support you had better win without tanks!

And you have been shot at how many times?
You have taken part in military actions how often?
You have experience in combat infantry how many years?
You have planned military operations how many?

Quote:
I suspect that the numbers would be very much higher, however, take one "what if." To make my case, how about just one less family gets the notice that a son, husband or father was "KILLED IN ACTION."

And you have written such letters how many times?
You have visited family home to tell of loss how many times?
You have told father only son is dead how many times?
You have told children they no longer have father how many times?

Of course is possible to win without supporting arms needed. But this cost many many more men take much longer give enemy much more chance to escape destruction.

Build a man a fire you warm him for a night
Set a man on fire you warm him for all his life

infantry combat Co. Oh, I don't know but being the dumb ass I am, I just think SHE has more credibility.

Boy you have a seriously over inflated ego. The word ARROGANCE comes to mind.

Try reading and actually THINKING about what the Professionals are telling you. Who knows you just might learn something BUT I DOUBT IT.

Colonel, where do you get your patience?

Quote:
Colonel, where do you get your patience?

Please to imagine big grin. Did not come easy Khun Senior takes much practice. Also takes lessons with voice. For if lose control of voice then my voice start to make squeeks sound ridiculous. When was young pitch of voice was soprano but have lessons from professionals on speech they change tone to contralto. Sound much better. But is necessary to think to bring voice under control. This have advantage for one seconds thought can save many problems.

Also in ours to hide emotions is something taught from early age is very bad manners in ours to lose temper. That is why we have famous Thai smile. Is way of hiding what we really think. Kids in ours are taught from earliest of age to smile and say nothing. National motto is when in doubt smile. In some ways this is bad thing if we were more impatient people country might work better.

But please do not be to hard on Robert. Few civilians understand what a firefight is like. They think they know but do not. Those who play wargames are perhaps worst of these for they know enough of theory to think they understand what is happening but do not understand the real. Stu is same. He know all about theory of what happen can talk command control can talk technology can talk how to make decisions. But he have no idea how all these work in battle at small unit level. Stu would be great general but very bad lieutenant :D . Must apologize to Khun Dirk now for mentioning this again but once was in hasty defense when were two tanks on other side. Comets. With 17 pounders. Think is 17 pounder? Anyway they were upriver from us shelling position on other side. Stu ask why nobody use LAW or RPG on these our infantry have both. Have to tell him that just was not possible. For sure we have these in theory but reality of situation is cannot use. Too much covering fire. Was only when platoon of M41s of ours move up that situation change.

Important thing of this one was how small number of tanks dominate action. Two on their side four on ours. Yet we cannot force decision until their tanks are driven off. And both M41 and Comet are much weaker than main battle tanks used today.

Build a man a fire you warm him for a night
Set a man on fire you warm him for all his life

Quote:
I wouldn't have thought anyone would still use it - or the 18 pounder for that matter. I would have though they were all converted to use 25 pounder ammo just before and udring the war. Obviously I was mistaken, but I am now curious.

Khun Dave artillery is strange thing. Unless is destroyed in action guns may stay around for many many years. Are rarely listed in stores or inventory but are there can be pulled out when needed. Gun will not wear out from being stored. Also many such guns are used for ceremonial purposes. When see official parade where artillery salute is given look at guns used. Sometimes are modern but often are very rare from museum. Even in England. When was there saw troop from Royal Horse Artillery they have horsedrawn guns. Think were 18 pounders but may have been 13 pounders. Perhaps Khun Phil can help. In ours look very hard for guess what? German 77s. We make ammunition for these at Lopburi. Only tiny amount for sure but there. Think Argentina do this also.

Ammunition is another thing never quite go out of production. No matter how old how rare sometimes company will make small batch for order. Often dealer will get call from such asking we think of making say cartridge for Dreyse needlegun. You want any? If so how many? Then they make for that order. Is small company in ours that makes French 8 millimeter Lebel. Because we capture many Berthier rifles chambered for these from French in 1940. Most of these are kept by villages for hunting.

This is why am so doubtful of Russian 107 anti-aircraft gun. We are butte end of nowhere for modern technology. Vietnamese had hand-downs from everywhere. So if any were left is Vietnamese would have them. And they do not. Can find no reference in any source to such guns. 100 yes 85 yes 122 yes but not 107.

Build a man a fire you warm him for a night
Set a man on fire you warm him for all his life

Thank you Colonel. That was, as usual, very informative. As for King's Troop RHA, it uses the 13 pounder, the last dedicated Horse Artillery gun.

13 pounder thank you. So that is very old ammunition still in service na?

Anotehr reason these old guns stay around is they are small compared with modern guns. India and Pakistan still have old English 25 pounder in front line service because it is unequalled as mountain gun. Much better than American 105 for this. Last count were six countries make ammunition for 25 pounder. Sometimes is need for small gun that can be manhandled. Cost nothing to keep in store may be useful sometime anyway good for training gunners on history of artillery.

Build a man a fire you warm him for a night
Set a man on fire you warm him for all his life

The gun that the King's Troop RHA use is the same one that the RHA had in 1914 at the start of WWI. Indeed, I believe that a lot of the weapons are of that vintage.

Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with mustard.

Time was Feb 1968 at a marine firebase south east of Hue city. For reasons that would take too long to write about my gunner and I were temporarily and quite involuntarily part of the base defense. The fire base was built to support and defend 4 to six 105mm howitzers. The howitzers provided fire (about six miles) support for local ops, including the river (Cua Viet &amp; Ben Hoa) supply route to Hue City.

Well I was told by one of the marine gunners that the 105 I was looking at had had her crew "blown away" at Iwo, outside of Seoul and at in Nam in 66. The USMC recovered the piece, rebuilt it and here she was good as new.

"You see, swabby, the Corps don't waste nothing but Marines!"

In his defense, three of the six guns had been taken out by sappers and mortars. He, as a lowly 18 year old CPL, was now a gun captain. Both he and his gun, along with the other two howitzers were disabled while I was at the firebase. The Corps heloed in four more guns and more gunners. The battle for Hue, even at a supporting fire base, ate up a lot of young marines and their old guns. I just thank God it didn't eat up this sailor.

---- Output from Sherman 3.htm ----
Back in July 2003, this was scrivened:

Quote:
Comets. With 17 pounders. Think is 17 pounder?

The Comet used the "77mm gun", which was basically the same as the towed 17 pounder only with a shortened barrel.

"As your attorney, I advise you to not listen to reason" Non Sequitur

Dear Sir

Is anyone correctly reading my posts? I wanted to build a "better" tank killing machine for use in Europe rather than the Sherman. Building thirty thousand better tanks(or more) would hardly cause the infantry to be completely with tank support. We(the Allies) lost about 100,000 troops in Normandy if that series of battles is shortened by a few weeks we save a butt load of lives.

Why would there be a shortage of tanks after building 30+ plus "better" tanks? We took quite a while to deploy the troops from England. The 106th Infantry Division moved into the Bulge in Dec.(?) 1944. I would guess that perhaps others arrived even later in the ETo.

I answered one comment with a "worst case" version of my plan "only" building 21,000 better tanks and doing much better in the fighting than by using Shermans.

I do not understand why building a "better" tank(someone commented on using Pershing tanks, I did not) would limit tank production. With the same amount of war material you should be able to build a lot more than half as many tanks that are maybe a fraction bigger in their tonnage.

We canceled a very large number of ships in the 1943 Naval program, use some of the saved materials from not building so many Shermans to furnish additional tank transport shipping.

The decision to send Shermans instead of half as many "better" tanks was made fairly early in the war. We have time to produce a better tank if only by accepting the British offer of 300 guns(17 pounder) plus ammo each month.

The shipping would seem to provide the same number of these "better" tanks and a big increase in tank killing machines would be deployed.

I raised the issue of the Abrams tank being a "better" tank killing machine. No one wanted to touch that idea. Why?
It has a gun that is designed to kill tanks. You may also shoot HE, however, the ammo supply is very small. Why are the same people saying that the Sherman was better not taking the Abrams to task as being as "inferior" tank?

Put in that 105mm howitzer for infantry support use and use the added space for extra ammo. But the Army turned down that idea in favor of a "tank" killing weapon. A 120mm high velocity weapon(upgraded from the 105)

They say that the Sherman was the tank for the "tanks do not fight tanks doctrine of WWII." The doctrine changed and we built the Abrams. The doctrine changed because the Army found out that "tanks do fight tanks." The Sherman(all 42,000 of them) was able 'with the backing of a huge Allied force plus the Russians' to beat Germany.

Having 21,000-30,000(+) "better" tanks on hand should not cause widespread lack of tank support. We did not build anywhwere near 42,000 Abrams tanks and the troops seem to have done quite well with the limited numbers of "better" tanks sent to fight and win both Gulf Wars.

The Big Red One also had two self propelled tank destroyer units attached at times. Does this suggest a lack of tank support. Using a worst case version of my plan, you would have one and one half battalions of "better" tanks plus two self propelled tank detroyer battalions available. Hardly a complete lack of infantry support.

I named a number of battles without tank support. The airborne divisions did it after each time that they landed behind enemy lines.

21,000 "better" tanks hardly rates as a complete lack of tank support. My suggestion was to build and transport as many as possible number of "better" tanks. Just converting 300 Shermans to 17 pound guns each month(that the British offered and "we turned them down!") would greatly improve the tank killing version of the Sherman. If you only upgrade 300 Shermans each month, you still have 42,000 Shermans for fighting the war.

Try and hide 21,000 "better" tank killing machines in Europe. The infantry and armored formations would likely seek them out and use them in battle. 21,000 is the "worst case" version of my idea.

How does having at least 21,000 "better" tanks provide zero tank support for the infantry?

There were large number of enemy tanks in both Gulf wars and far fewer Abrams and "still" the war was won with a "better"
tank killing machine on the American side.

The Amrican infantry divisions were rotated to quiet fronts(like the Ardennes!) and soldiers got passes to Paris etc. The hopeless lack of tank support with a mere 21,000 better tanks would be very unlikely to have caused problems with these arrangements?

The colonel asked why infantry had "mortars" and I answered. Read her post on the subject. She also said that the Russians lacked a 107mm anti aircraft gun and had only two types(one a recoilless rifle) I listed about five-six additional types for WWII Russian forces. Tank and field artillery type 107mm weapons.

Having 42,000 Shermans(with 300 per month "upgraded" to a 17 pounder weapon) would hardly cause a shortage of tank support for the infantry. Even having 21,000 better armored and better gunned tanks in the ETO would hardly cause the infantry to lack for support. The Germans might have a problem with their tanks being destroyed faster by the "better" tank killing vehicles that were shipped to the ETO.

I did not say the Sherman was inadequete, I do think that it was "inferior" as a tank killing machine. It did have the virtue of many rounds for its main gun. Something that the Abrams tank does not have, however, few comment on this weakness as the Abrams is a "better" tank killing machine.

If you built 82,000 Grant tanks we would have even more tank support vehicles. More Grant tanks and an even bigger problem with killing enemy tanks. If the Sherman is good, the Grant should be even better. It has a 37mm plus a 75mm gun. Support the infantry with both a 37mm or 75mm from the same tank. See I may use straw man arguments too!

We certainly agree on the mobile protected firepower of a tank. I merely want one that will survive contact with the enemy armor. An Abrams maybe? Or a "better" tank killing machine than the Sherman for WWII?

Using that "mobile protected firepower" of a tank cost the Russians close to 100,000 tanks lost during WWII. The infantry isn't the only ones dying out there.

The WWII Rangers have my highest regard. The position had to be taken and tanks, unless they could fly, were not possible. Infantry without tank support took an 80 meter high defended position. A really, really good example. Infantry is capable of fighting in terrain that tanks cannot reach. If the position must be taken, you send in well trained infantry.

If your infantry can only attack with tank support, you will leave the Germans holding an 80 meter high position looking down over Allied beaches. Something that the Americans really did not want and they were prepared to send a highly trained unit of infantry(without tank support) into battle to obtain an important objective.

If losses in combat are bad, the defenders of the Alamo should be trashed for losing 100%. They did not have tanks on either side. I would agree that even a few Shermans would have helped the Americans(Texans?) in that battle.

You would really hate one unit of British troops that fought at Waterloo, they had to defend an open position with out any possible cover. They held all day with 76% losses and not a supporting tank in sight. Their British square kept getting smaller, but it held. My highest regard to the "poor bloodly infantry." They needed to hold a position without tank support and they did their job.

Most of the American troops landing on D-Day were without tank support because the waves were higher than the Shermans could "swim" to the beach with their "swimming gear." I am not joking here, we fitted out Shermans with floatation devices and sent them into the water. We won that battle on 6 June, mostly without tanks. Guts and glory, but few tanks.

The Sherman is still "inferior" as a tank killing machine. Having at least 21,000(worst case version) better tanks would hardly leave the infantry "without" tank support.

I for once am glad that you raised the subject of the Sherman, having a tank with a "better" gun and perhaps better armor would leave you much better off than having some "inferior" Sherman involved in a battle. Better/thicker armor keeps out more/most shells and shell fragments.

The Americans having the best artillery arm in the World is "irrelevant??? The U.S. Offical History of the Battle of the Bulge says that many tank attacks were broken up by the artillery. Even a broken sprocket, wheel or other "minor" damage could cause the enemy tanks to withdraw.

Our overwhelming airforce, artillery, supply, etc. etc. permitted us the ability to field an "inferior" tank force in "very large numbers." To give the Germans the "irrelevant" vastly superior American artillery system(plus vastly more artillery ammuniton) would be to change or perhaps even reverse the outcome of the war.

Germans who had seen combat in Russa and also in the West commented that the American artillery was much more deadly. We had fewer tubes, however, they averaged many more rounds per day than the Russians.

Please again take note on my comments(from offical U.S. History Series) on artillery causing tank attacks to break off. You cannot advance with tank support if the "artillery" is driving you off of the battlefield.

Artillery irrelevant? Ask the colonel about losing everyone in her unit because of a two hour delay. Artillery is a major "killer" on the battlefield and certainly not "irrelevant."

Arnhem. Certainly I am heard about it. I am somewhat surprised that you would bring up should a misguided but heroic stand of infantry against armor. Please explain how an airborne landing a "bridge too far" behind enemy lines does "what" to support the idea that the Sherman is not an 'inferior' tank killing machine?

I am giving the troops at least 21,000 tanks that can "better" fight and defeat the German armor and you say that the infantry support role is missing? 21+ thousand tanks somehow do not manage to show up anywhere on the battlefield? Smoke and mirrors?

I am at a lost to explain your comment on Arnhem. They had 42,000 Shermans produced during the war. The problem with the British airborne was that they had dropped a "bridge too far" and the British did not have the "better" tanks to link up with them and a lousy battle plan to boot.

I already stated that British and American Airborne divisions dropped at D-Day and fought without armor and won.
You suggest that a silly battle plan involving "a bridge too far" somehow makes an point that the Sherman was not inferior? American and British airborne without tank support dropped at D-Day and won. Arnhem was a silly battle plan that failed because it was very likely doomed from the start.

If the British armor moving to support the airborne had better tanks, they might have saved the day.
I doubt it. The advance in horrible contricted terrain against German defences was most likely doomed from the start. German anti tank weapons were quite capable of stopping Allied armor. If the armor had been "better" perhaps the battle might have been won. I think that a victory at Arnhem was a very unlikely possiblity.

If you "do not" have tanks because the terrain, battle plan etc. etc. does not provide them. Your losses will be exactly the same. If the tanks are not there, they do not affect the battle.

If you have an inferior tank killing machine(the Sherman)
you sacifice larger numbers to overwhelm the enemy. With better tanks(Abrams in the two Gulf wars!) you may take the battle to the enemy and lose less people while winning faster.

I am offering you "at least" 21,000 "better" tanks to fight in the ETO and you insist that no tank support will result?

I have said again and again that I want, desire, wish for etc. etc. tank support. However, I want a "better" tank killing machine than the Sherman, if possible. The Sherman had thinnish armor and a short 75mm gun. You might fight with that armor and a 17 pounder gun, however, the combination of poor armor and a poor gun is horrible in the extreme.

Rather more like 6,000+ Panthers and probably a fraction more than one half of them went to Russia.

The Army History Series shows the buildup of German armor from the end of 1943 until D-Day and after 6 June about one half of the armor replacements went East and one half to the West. The Germans had a second build up prior to the Ardennnes(1944) German production in armor hit its high point in August 1944.

The Germans in Russia in 1944 were a beaten army. They had many formations with numbers and not many(any) men. Of the 151 German divisions in Russia in December 1943 ten panzer and 50 infantry divisions were "fought out" and of negigible combat value. Their fighting value continued to drop as the war progressed. Anyone heard of Army Group Centers battle in 1944?

It is a overstatement to suggest that most of the Panthers and Tigers went to Russia. The West had two major build ups. Late 1943 until the invasion and again in the months before the Bulge. German AFV production hit its high point in August 1944.

The large numbers of Panthers and Tigers in the West was the backbone of the German defenses. The fighting in the British sector of Normandy saw the British armor grinding into the mass of the German armor defense. A meat grinder for the British armored regiments.

I never sugggested that the inferior Sherman tank could not fight the lesser "inferior" German AFV. I agree with you on that statement. The Sherman would also have torn apart any left over Mark I or Mark II tanks roaming the French countryside and would also likely destroyed the odd truck, cart or bus driving around France.

The Sherman was good enough to deal with the "inferior" models of German armor. 100% true.

The good colonel added 10,000 Shermans to the Allied side according to my sources. Your viewpoint seems to me to be that at least 21,000 "better" tanks would provide "zero" infantry support and would be unlikely to win the battles faster and cheaper. If you let me have an extra 10,000 "better" tanks instead of adding 10,000 never built Shermans to the mix, I will have "something" in the "ballpark" figure of what I proposed to have in numbers for my "better" tank production. Say 31,000 "better" tanks instead of 21,000.

Why a 30+ ton tank going up 8-10 tons would result in one half of their numbers being build seems odd to me. The Russians kept building larger numbers of AFV and they kept getting bigger with more armor and bigger guns as the war went on.

Converting 300 Shermans per month to the 17 pounder gun(which again, I will state the British offered us the guns plus ammo and we refused!) would result in a final figure of 42,000 Shermans. A couple of thousand of them being "better" tank killing machines.

I will certainly drop the comments on tank numbers if you will. Errors in the order of 20-25% such as the 52,000 figure and your 5,000 Panthers instead of 6,000+ do seem to need revising.

The 17 pounder fired a poor HE round and had other bad features and the "unaware" British still kept changing Shermans from the 75MM gun to the "poor" 17 pounder gun. It might have had its drawbacks, however, it was a superior "tank killing weapon" to the Shermans short 75mm gun.

Perhaps the 17 pounder is not an anti aircraft gun. I did see a mention of at least one 17 pound model gun being a anti tank gun. I will do some checking around.

The defender of the Sherman and its infantry support role is defending the British decision to build both 2 and 6 pounder guns "without" an HE round? Tell me again how a British tank with either a 2 or 6 pounder gun does not have problems during an infantry support role without an HE round?

You are 100% correct that the American 76mm HE role was inferior to the 75mm HE round. We still produced the 76mm gun and the tankers sought them because they were a "better" tank killing weapon.

Again it is "irrelevant" that a "better" tank killing machine(the Abrams!) fought in two Gulf Wars and won quickly and cheaply. What was the "source" of the problem with the Sherman again? That it won by using its large numbers to grind out a costly victory?

I am suddenly curious, why do you and you alone get to label ideas "irrelevant?" You demand that I "prove my assertion, however, you neither "prove" yours and in addition get to use the silver bullet of an idea being "irrelevent" because you do not agree with it.

The Abrams is a "better" tank killing machine with a weapon that is certainly not designed for supporting infantry. It has many fewer rounds than the Sherman and it(unlike the Sherman) wades in a wiped out enemy armor with few losses in record times.

What was not well equipped about the U.S. Army that landed in Normandy(except for having the Sherman)? We had from 7 Dec. 1941 until 6 June, 1944 to train and/or produce weapons. It takes you more than two and one half years to train a combat soldier? Many of our troops in both of the Gulf Wars had less than two and one half years of training.
Our troops at Normany were very well trained and well equipped(except for the Sherman) and supported by tens of thousands of aircraft, control of the sea and supplies almost without limit. We also had that irrelevant(your comment) best artillery arm in WWII backing them up. Those battleships, crusiers etc. etc. offshore were also shooting in support of the landings.

In both Gulf wars we had a "better" tank killing machine and also most of the advantages listed in the Normandy fighting.
The Abrams was able to "drive over" enemy formations after shooting them apart during their advance. The U.S. infantry never seemed to mind that their chosen tank was a "better" tank killing machine with a limited ammo supply for infantry support.

Please just explain why we would leave the "proven" Sherman tank doctrine of "tanks do not fight tanks" and build a "better" tank killing machine for the Gulf War? If infantry support is so important, why not build a 105 howitzer gunned tank with lots of ammo. You would lose any near equal tank battles, however, you would have a superior infantry support weapon. Did we have large numbers of these 105mm howitzer gunned tanks in the Gulf Wars that I simply missed entirely?

Please to explain why the Allies with fewer weaponds and men won two Gulf wars quickly and cheaply(for our side) and it is "irrelevant" to whether having a "better" tank killing machine available helped out this result? Why not keep building the Sherman since it is such a war winner. Picture a couple of thousand Shermans moving forward to fight T-72 tanks dug in behind berms. The Abrams shot into the berms and took out the tank behind the berm. The Sherman would still be shooting its 75mm gun without measureable gain.

I notice that when I said the Sherman was a good tank in 1942 and poor in 1943-45 and you leapt to 1953. Would you please picture Shermans up against the better Russian models from 1943-45? You had better bring the Eight Airforce, our "irrelevant" artillery and supply along. In a tank vs tank fight they will wipe out the Shermans. They produced something around 100,000 tanks during the war. 42,000 Shermans does not win with "numbers" against the Russian production totals.

They were still "inferior" tanks in 1953 in Korea. They had better crews(which often decide both air and tank combat) and faced left over Russian junk.

Sherman and brilliant in the same sentence. Perhaps those two words do belong. The brilliant fire from the burning Sherman. It was a good tank in 1942 and a "inferior" tank in 1943-45.

You are happy with an "inferior" tank because it was built in America. We also built the Essex, Iowa, B-17, B-29, P-51 if not some of the best in the world than certainly up there with our "irrelevant" best in the world artillery. So if we can build all of these really good weapons with the same handicaps that you believe gave us the Sherman, how did we get all of these other "really good" weapons in the same time frame and under the same conditions?

Brilliant may be used when speaking about those other weapons, but the Sherman? The 16 inch 50 battleship gun likely to be the best or tied for best in the world. The Iowa the best or tied for the best battleship in the world. The B-29 the best bomber(if the ME-262 isn't counted as a bomber) The Essex as the best carrier in the world. Brilliant describes many American WWII weapons. The Sherman does not deserve to be mentioned in such "brilliant" company.

Did I mention that we built a lot of numbers of aircraft, ships and artillery? Many being really good weapons. You are allowed to build good weapons in large numbers. We did and we also built large numbers of "Shermans."

I seem to recall that there was a problem putting a 90mm into a Sherman tank. I suspect that we would have put it in the Sherman unless it had major problems. Too big maybe?

You admit that we knew about the Tiger in 1942 and you still think that it was "brilliant" of us to stop building a better tank while coming out with the Essex, Iowa, B-29, B-17, P-51 etc. etc. etc.

You are attempting to put words in my mouth "that I did not use." Please note if I type it I likely mean it. If you want to put words in my mouth, please quote me.

The Germans with better trained tank crews, a better artillery arm(irrelevant, I know) control of the air surprised and beat up an mostly unprepared Russian force in the early fighting.

The Russian tank crews were mostly either poorly trained or not trained at all. Some had only a few/zero hours of training. Many tank were short/out of fuel and some vehicles did not have ammo. Many Russian tanks could not be driven because of spare parts/rust. The Germans busted the Russians up pretty good in the early battles of 1941.

There were a whole butt load of Russians(dare I say tens of millions) and supply problems at about 300 miles into Russia. The worse winter in many years did nothing to help the German cause.

Why the Germans who had fought in Russian in WWI were surprised by a Russian winter is still unknown to me, but that is another story.

For your information and please feel free to quote me here. The Germans with smaller numbers of better trained tank crews defeated the more numerous Russian armor in the early battles.

The KV and T-34 tanks both had better guns and armor than German tanks, however, they did had some major problems. Poor training, a four man crew(gunner and either commander or loader but not both until T-34-85 went to a five man crew) Radios were few and far between and that nasty German airforce seemed to bomb the fuel supplies with gusto.

You may also quote me as saying that we beat the Germans with inferior tanks(Shermans!) All those other allied forces plus the 'irrelevant' best artillery arm in the world combined with the "inferior" Sherman to win the war.

We agree again on the poor Russian weapons. The Russian 76mm on the early T-34 were poor tank weapons after 1941. They were only "better" compared to the "really bad" German weapons. The 85mm gun should not even be mentioned in the same sentence as the Panther's 75mm except of course, for having a better HE round.

The Germans had inferior guns and armor(compared to the best Russian tanks) in 1941 and won. They regained the lead in armor quality during 1942(but were losing the numbers game) and finally in 1943-45 the Russians built more and bigger AFV.

Notice that the Russians using only some 100,000 tanks managed to drive into Berlin with the Allies coming the other way and Germany getting round the clock bombing from the skies. Numbers often win battles. They tend to lose a lot against "better" weapons, however, numbers often win. So does quality. The Abrams in two Gulf wars won with quality.

When pray tell did you "PROVE" your position? You say that having the worlds best artillery arm in support of the fighting is "irrelevant" and in another place say that artillery is a killer. I do not understand a "killer" weapon system being "irrelevant."

I am still waiting for you to explain why if the Sherman was so brilliant that we later built the Abrams tank with its 'better' tank killing gun rather than a butt load of Shermans?

The 17 pounder fit and the British converted a butt load of Shermans into Fireflys. I still suspect that the 90mm does not fit into a Sherman(and still work) or we would have done so.

You have repeated this idea of putting a 90mm into a Sherman, however, you have not "proven your assertion." Why not? Am I the only one that must "prove my assertion" or do you get a free pass from some unknown reason?

We agree again that the U.S. Army turned down the offer of 17 pounder guns from the British.

And why would the troops suddenly change their minds about the Sherman and its 75mm gun after Normandy? Seeing their shells bounce off an enemy tank and the landscape littered with burned out Shermans change their minds?

It takes two years to produce a Sherman? The Russian kept bringind new AFVs on line and still managed to produce a butt load(several times the number of Shermans built) AFV.

Why did the airforce switch from amoung others the P-40 to P-47 and P-51 during the war? The navy created a whole new class of Essex carriers during the war. We built a 56,000 ton battleship in 27 months and it takes two years to produce a Sherman?

It is late, however, I will get a reference from the 12th Army Group report(I think) about the Sherman and its gun. Ike's biography also mentioned(I think) several cutting remarks about the 75mm gunned Sherman and even more about the "improved" 76mm.

Regards,
Robert
(edit to remove large number of line feeds at bottom of article - text untouched)

Huh? If I donate "X" numbers of dollars or join a secret club, do the same rules apply to everyone?

Regards,
Robert

I have made mistakes(plenty) and try to admit to them.

If it matters, I enlisted in the U.S. Army on 18 Oct. 1967 and served three years mostly as a NCO.

I tend to be gentle if treated as such. I noticed a lot of what I saw as "bad manners" that apparently went without notice. I was told to "prove" my assertions and somehow I never noticed others being told to do the same thing.

When I was in the military, if one man did the low crawl in several inches of freezing water, everyone(the enlisted men anyway) did the low crawl. We returned to barracks and changed shortly thereafter.

The new officers were told to listen to the NCOs and the smart ones did just that. I never valued an officer because of his rank. My opinion was formed by how he did his job.
I knew officers that were SOBs and officers that were of the highest standard.

When we had machine guns firing over our heads one night in Basic, I noticed captains bars on one of the guys ahead of me, my respect for my captain rose that night as I watched him low crawl along with his troops. He was not afraid to get dirty, while doing what the troops were doing.

I am more than happy to listen to the colonel in matters of
winning infantry battles that she has won or lost and many other subjects. I have read many of her comments and felt that I learned from reading those. She is a favorite writer with often deeply moving comments.

I respect the colonel's postings because I respect the writer. Being a colonel was never even a small part of that respect. I knew crazy enlisted men in the Army and officers who were almost as nuts. Crazy did not seem to just limit itself to just certain ranks.

I followed orders in the Army. When I became a civilian again, I still believed that nonsense about all men are created equal. Some men grow and others do not. I hope that I have grown, I certainly do not believe that colonels/NCOs are always right. I am a civilian now and proud to be one. No regrets for leaving the military. I served my time and my country.

Your comments about the Abrams are well chosen. Certainly, you presented a much better view than I had previously seen on this forum.

I still do not agree, but perhaps in America at least, honest men may have honest disagreements. If this forum feels otherwise, I shall take my leave without regret as I would not like to be amoung people who do not share my values.

If we all believed the same thing, we would not bother to read this forum. It would all be written up the same exact way.

I agree that the Lancaster equations are not accurate nor up to date. It was a generalized statement that was intended to spread interest in an somewhat little known area of learning. I only touched on the subject in reading about naval matters. My lack of knowledge about the equations is due to a lack of available material.

I merely stated my wargaming interest to provide some background. I completely agree that it does not carry any meaningful weight. Since Dirk being an NCO carries weight, I hastened to mention that I was once an NCO. Almost thirty four years have gone by since that time.

Funny, I would never have mentioned my military time until you mentioned that Dirk was an NCO. I knew about the colonel from having read so many of her postings.

My father(a 20 year lifer, Navy Chief) never considered me to have been in the military, three years in the U.S. Army was more like a two week boy scout camp to him.

Certainly the Army and Marines spending time and money on wargames is of no importance. I watched a number of wargames played by active duty troops over the years. I also see where the military has funding wargames for the troops. They have a tank tactics game that is widely played at least in years past. I have mostly lost touch with the younger military age group as I move into my mid fifties.

Perhaps the Germans are favored in WWII battles because they caused more damage to the other side on numerous occasions.
Nappy often won battles and lost many others for a good many years. His being on the field was supposed to be worth 40,000 to some wargamers. Maybe and maybe not.

You and I agree that most wargames are junk. I also read SF and one of the famous writers wrote 90% of SF is junk, 90% of most anything is junk. Or words close to that effect.

I played wargames all of these years because I enjoyed the company. Win, lose or draw we had fun and told and retold the stories that have become semi-legendary. I was there many times and the stories keep growing with the retelling.

You have "seen" a number of poor wargames. I never did like SPI games(most of them anyway)

You are quite right about the lack of German armor and plentiful numbers of Shermans(most of the time) I hope you are not offended if I mention that close air support would very likely be directed against the German player.

For morale and control problems you might want to check into a game by SPI(?) it had reach into a jar and pull out a counter which gave you morale levels. Americans had much better choice for the Third Army and the Germans had inferior odds with security type units values. The Third Army fighting in Lorraine from an old SPI wargame.

Panzergruppe Guderian had upside down Russian counters, you only found out their combat value when combat happened. You might have a bunch of tigers or men running for their lives.

I offer an apology for "shroud waving." I felt that I had been told over and over again about the lives saved by using tank support and yet when I used the phase "killed in action" it was considered "bad form." I think that I now understand the concept, however, I still do not understand the mistake on my part not being preceded by other's similiar comments. I am truly sorry if I offended anyone. I did not know that meaning.

My father was a 20 year lifer a Navy Chief. Except for his family, he had no greater pride nor love than the United States Navy. I would not make any comment that gave insult to a member of the military. When he was being buried, we did not know if the Navy(his Navy) would send a detail to furnish the last full honor to one of their own.

I was both moved and touched when we drove into the cemetary and saw a bus lableled U.S. Navy. My father would have been very proud. I joke that my father would have rolled his eyes skyward that the burial detail was commanded by a woman and several of those members were also women.

He was old Navy, he went down to enlist the day after Pearl Harbor. He would have rolled his eyes skyward, however, he would be damn(his word) proud that the burial detail was professional in every movement and looked every inch the part of "his" United States Navy.

I did enlist and was an NCO, however, I was never told of that meaning of "shroud waving." Duty, honor and country. yes, I knew them. But not shroud waving, I am truly sorry if that comment offended anyone. It was not meant to hurt nor harm.

I was tired and a little bit "ticked" off that a number of people seemed to be allowed to tell me that I had not "proved" my case/point, however, they were allowed to continue to repeat their views without any such "proof."

I merely responded in the same style as I felt I had been subjected to "without cause." I did not mean harm nor insult. I just wanted to be treated fairly at this forum.

Saving a life is one of the highest values, except perhaps giving one's life in defense of the things that you believe in. The military puts their lives on the line day in and day out.

I rarely saw my father for almost a year in Nationalist China(Formosa) he went to work before I got up and (sometimes) came home after I was asleep. He served without question and without doubt. At his burial I commented that he had never showed any doubt about "his" Navy, he just did what he believed to be correct. He just did his job.

The colonel is always right in the Army. No question here, however, I would sooner question an Army colonel than a Navy Chief.

My father was always correct about "his" Navy. It broke his heart to retire after "only 20 years." A four star Admiral recommended him for E-8 and they did not promote him. He left the Navy, but, the Navy never really left him. I never ever heard him say anything but the bulkhead(he meant wall) and deck(he meant floor) needed something done.

That the colonel and NCOs are always right strikes me as something I cannot fully understand from my three years spent in the military nor my 55 years on planet earth. I met some really bad officers, NCOs and other EM in the military. They were a disgrace to the Army, their country and themselves.

I also spent a couple of weeks of stockade duty. People who had stolen weapons during Vietnam and sold them for profit.
I enjoyed sometimes posting on this forum. I was unaware that it was a part of the Business. Perhaps you should post a notice telling people about your unspoken "rules" and that the colonel and NCOs should not ever be doubted nor questioned.

I prided myself in the Army of 1967-1970. I never doubted for an instant that we would pull together for the U.S.A.
If it meant my life, I would do the correct thing.

I understand tonight why I left the military. I could not be part of the Business if it meant that all colonels and NCOs were always right and never questioned. I followed orders in the military. That is how the military works and no other way is possible.

I taught 11th grade U.S. History(as a student teacher) and I tried my very best to teach the students to think for themselves. If I taught them that all colonels and NCOs were always correct, I would be a failure bith as a person and as an American citizen.

Every man should be judged on his/her merits. If the colonel/NCO is always correct, you had better be in the military. Personally, I am locking up the people who stole weapons during Vietnam to sell for profit. Some of them were NCOs and their actions were wrong. They sickened me.
They still do.

I am glad to have this chance to get some things off of my chest. I was a citizen soldier not unlike the early Greeks. I only wanted to serve my country. "Come back carrying your shield or on it." I served my three years and left without any doubts.

If the colonel and NCOs are always right, who shall guard the guards?

A buddy of mine was a quartermaster in the U.S. Navy(he steered the ship) and a young officer was ordering small changes in course. After a couple of turns, the officer ordered yet another change. My buddy replied, "Aye Aye Sir, but we will run aground." Was he really wrong to question the officer? I think that he did the right thing. Like my Dad he just did his job.

If the colonel and NCOs are always right, who shall guard the guards?

Thanks,
Specialist Fifth Robert Arthur Barrow
U.S. Army Signal Corps

p.s. I am a PFC=Proud F--king Civilian now and proud of it

you stated earlier that the Sherman was out-dated in 1943. The Israel's used them to good effect until 1973, beating T-34/85's and more modern soviet armour. They upgraded the gun, using a French 75 mm, initally, then managed to squeeze in a French 105 mm (44 cal) gun.

However, should production have gone into better tanks? No. If you want to be productive put the spare resources in to more landing craft. There were never enough, particularly after the great storm destroyed the American artificial harbour.

Two cannibals are eating a clown.
One says to the other: "Does this taste funny to you?"

77 millimeter thank you. Was there much difference between this and 17 pounder? Was ammunition same? Please excuse questions but these were never in our inventory.

Build a man a fire you warm him for a night
Set a man on fire you warm him for all his life

Production of Sherman Tanks
Total production of M4 tanks was 49,234 or these 12,596 were M4A3 model. Also to this are added 1,142 M7 and M37 self propelled guns and 1,061 M32 armored recovery vehicles for total of 51,437 M4 series armored vehicles produced.

Yes is possible for infantry to work without proper support. Can be done has been done. But this costs too many people. To try to manoeuver against defended position without proper support will cost very much. Ask again. You have assaulted how many defended positions? Not sarcastic question serious one. Until you do this for yourself you have no idea what is involved. And to say infantry will be happy to wait for two hours is foolish. How defense works is to use fortified infantry to force attacker into cover then use mortars and artillery to search out and kill attacking infantry. If have no means of suppressing fire from defended positions then all can do is lie there and wait for mortars to find where you are. You have been in this position how many times? Is not very happy time for canb see enemy mortar fire getting closer can see it pick off groups of your people all the time.

But if there is tank for support then is different tank uses HE from main gun and machineguns to suppress defensive position so we can manoeuver to take it out. If there are enemy antitank guns then our tank can hold down infantry that support it so we can take down antitank gun. This is called combined arms tactics. Is big saver of people. Using these can do things at much lower cost than any other way.

Want to see what happen when tank vs tank action dominates all others? When army thought looks only at tanks not at combined arms? Take Israeli Army between 1967 and 1973. They make same mistake you do. Assume main job of tanks is fighting other tanks. Even today this is not true. But in WW2 was most certainly not true. Main job of tank then is to support infantry. Please to note Germans use specialized Stg for this. To fight other tanks is secondary thing.


As for 107 guns still can find no reference to any of these. If existed at all must be experimental guns only. Say again is no reference now is no sign of such guns surviving anywhere. Things you quote all refer either to old guns from First World War perhaps modernized or to experimental things with no service version. Say again. Are no 107 millimeter anti-tank guns other than B-10 recoilless no 107 millimeter anti-aircraft guns.




Build a man a fire you warm him for a night
Set a man on fire you warm him for all his life

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I wanted to build a "better" tank killing machine for use in Europe rather than the Sherman.

But why should the US do so in May of 1944? In fact, given the lead times required, it would have had to be the summer of 1943? As far as they knew then, their mix of 75 and 76 mm Shermans and 76 mm TDs was good enough for the job. They had just placed a 90 mm TD into production and were (they hoped) within a few months of producing a forty-five ton heavy with the 90 mm. They simply did not know that:

- The ground in Normandy would restrict manoeuvre making flanking shots difficult;

- The doctrine that TD fought enemy tanks while US tanks engaged non-armoured forces in Blitzkrieg style was unworkable in practice, especially in Normandy; and

- The standard German medium would be as well armed and protected against Allied fire as the Tiger.

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Building thirty thousand better tanks

Your assumption here is that a better tank was available. It was not. At best, they could have equipped Shermans with 90 mm guns starting in 1943 if they knew they would need them.

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Why would there be a shortage of tanks after building 30+ plus "better" tanks?

If they could move half as many to Europe as they did historically, how would there not be a shortage?

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We canceled a very large number of ships in the 1943 Naval program, use some of the saved materials from not building so many Shermans to furnish additional tank transport shipping.

Its a very safe assumption that in the wartime economy, all that material went to other things. There was little, if any spare capacity going unused.

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We have time to produce a better tank if only by accepting the British offer of 300 guns(17 pounder) plus ammo each month.

Again, why bother? As far as they knew, the US 76 mm was good for anything other than the few Tigers they might occasionally face, and they believed they could outmanoeuvre them with fast, very mobile TDs. That theyd face five times as many Panthers as Tigers, and that the Panther would be at least as formidable against Shermans was not known until too late. Not to mention that all those 17 pounder gun Shermans saw service anyway, as British and Canadian Fireflies. Once the Normandy battles began, the UK was not interested in diverting them to the US.

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I raised the issue of the Abrams tank being a "better" tank killing machine. No one wanted to touch that idea.

It was thanks to the Normandy experience that the US decided that they would not settle for tanks that were less capable than their opponents again. As I said before, the Abrams was developed with forty years of armour experience in mind. In 1944, they only had four and Normandy turned out to be the first test of US doctrine and equipment.

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The airborne divisions did it after each time that they landed behind enemy lines.

They were also deliberately dropped in areas where they would face minimal resistance. In the Bulge, the 101st was reinforced by a number of heavy assets. In MARKET GARDEN, the US airborne was supported by the tanks of UK XXX Corps. The British had no tank support there. They were destroyed.

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If you built 82,000 Grant tanks

Seeing as the Grant was essentially a Sherman with a 37 in a turret and a sponson mounted 75, I doubt you would build any more. The problem with a forty-five tonner in place of a Sherman is firstly, that with technology available to the US in 1943 it would be slow and mechanically unreliable with inferior cross country performance (actually, they found it was just about impossible), secondly, shipping, cargo handling arrangements in particular, would only be able to ship half as many over seas, and thirdly, theyd need more POL products to be shipped first to England, and then to France.

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If losses in combat are bad, the defenders of the Alamo should be trashed for losing 100%.

You may want to reconsider this argument. It appears youre saying that higher infantry casualties were not important. If thats the case, then the higher tanker casualties were not important either. We had the tanks and crews to lose and still be at the German border in September 1944. I would have preferred neither, but I probably would have made the same choices in 1943 and early 1944 with the information available had I been in charge of American AFV development.

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The problem with the British airborne was that they had dropped a "bridge too far" and the British did not have the "better" tanks to link up with them and a lousy battle plan to boot.

The reason that bridge was too far was because of two SS Panzer divisions in the area of operations. If we had half the tanks we had historically, many allied infantrymen would find themselves in similar straights as UK 1st Airborne did at Arnhem. Fewer tanks mean higher infantry casualties. It also means a slower advance because infantry attacks are not as successful and when they are, take longer.

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If the British armor moving to support the airborne had better tanks, they might have saved the day.

I suspect that against that opposition, Pershings would have faced similar problems. German AT weapons, remember, also had to face Soviet equipment including heavy KVs. With the road restrictions and close terrain, German 7.5 cm PAK 40 AT guns could handle armour that heavy at those ranges.

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If you have an inferior tank killing machine(the Sherman)

But Shermans were not supposed to be tank-killing machines. Besides, they were thought quite capable of handling ninety-five percent of German tanks and assaults guns until they found out what Panthers could do.

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I am offering you "at least" 21,000 "better" tanks to fight in the ETO and you insist that no tank support will result?

No, you are offering to trade half of all Sherman production for (non-existent) better tanks. Many of those were built in 1942 to 43 when the Sherman was possibly the best medium tank overall on the battlefield. Others were sent to the Pacific, the Med, or kept at home for training. Allied tank strength in Normandy was 5,300. Most of those were Shermans but a significant number were 75 mm armed Cromwells and Churchills. You can safely assume that if they could have deployed more, they would. They had a limited number of tank crews, a limited amount of shipping to move tanks across the Channel especially across the beaches, and a limited amount of POL they could get to France to support them. What you are suggesting is that we reduce Allied tank strength to about 2,600. By contrast, the Germans had nearly eight hundred Panthers and Tigers and twelve hundred Mark IVs, Jagdpanzer, and Sturmgeschuetze. In the hedgerows of Normandy these along with AT guns and Panzerfauste would still have killed quite a few Pershings.

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Anyone heard of Army Group Centers battle in 1944?

Operation BAGRATION which began about two weeks afterD-Day?

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one half of their numbers being build

Not built, but shipped (via England) to France.

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Converting 300 Shermans per month to the 17 pounder gun

Which, again, was done by the people who owned and controlled those guns after it became clear that US (and UK) equipment and doctrine was flawed in Normandy.

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I did see a mention of at least one 17 pound model gun being a anti tank gun.

Indeed you have. It was the standard British AT gun as the 76 mm was for the US Army. We put our standard AT weapon in our tanks and the US put their standard AT weapon in theirs. At the time, there likely didnt seem much reason to complicate logistics with a unique weapon when one apparently as good was available.

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We had from 7 Dec. 1941 until 6 June, 1944 to train and/or produce weapons.

Yet Normandy was the first large scale tank battle fought by US troops. Even the British were taken by surprise by the fact that they faced at least six times as many heavy German tanks as they had expected. They had little intelligence on the Panther from the Soviets and only a few opportunities in Italy (the first apparently being in February at Anzio) to see it in action. It didnt prove to be a problem during those encounters (which in hindsight means those encounters were atypical) and there was no opportunity to evaluate a Panther closely. You cant prepare for something you dont know is there.

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In both Gulf wars we had a "better" tank killing machine

The US also had a very good idea of what equipment their opponents would field years in advance. They hadnt been producing Abrams for two years, but for ten and the Iraqi tanks were the same T-55s and export T-72s the US had been preparing for ten years earlier.

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Please just explain why we would leave the "proven" Sherman tank doctrine of "tanks do not fight tanks"

Because obviously, Normandy proved the doctrine was faulty. How would they have known that, though, on 5 June 1944?

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Please to explain why the Allies with fewer weaponds and men won two Gulf wars quickly and cheaply

Please explain why the Germans with fewer weapons and men lost, not just Normandy, but the whole war.

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Picture a couple of thousand Shermans moving forward to fight T-72 tanks dug in behind berms.

It could probably be done in fact. The Israelis used Shermans with French 75 mm guns to good effect against Arab T-55s in 1967. We would probably have had casualties like Normandy. Thats why we didnt do it. Unfortunately, you cant learn a lesson until it is taught.

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You are happy with an "inferior" tank because it was built in America.

Im not happy with the Sherman, I simply recognize that it was the best available Allied tank at the time, and it did do the job it was supposed to do. It could have been better, but clairvoyance was not an option.

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We also built the Essex, Iowa, B-17, B-29, P-51

With all that going as planned for the US, it was inevitable that there would be something that was going to be second rate. Unfortunately for Western tank crews in Normandy, it was tanks. Note, BTW, that no other allied country had a better medium than the Sherman.

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I suspect that we would have put it in the Sherman unless it had major problems.

It should have been possible. The Israelis managed to put a 105 mm on a Sherman and the M-36 was a 90 mm TD on a Sherman chassis. One problem with the 90 mm gun is that all its production was spoken for by AA artillery, the Tank Destroyer Force, and finally, by the M-26.

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You admit that we knew about the Tiger in 1942

And were able to handle them at that time. Remember that Tigers only represented about five percent of German tank strength.

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Why the Germans who had fought in Russian in WWI were surprised by a Russian winter

They were surprised to still be fighting when the winter of 1941 came. They hadnt had armoured vehicles (or many motor vehicles of any type) in WW1, so they knew little about how theyd adapt to the cold.

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Seeing their shells bounce off an enemy tank and the landscape littered with burned out Shermans change their minds?

Yep. Before that the Sherman was having little trouble on the battlefield. Italy vets Ive spoken to, for instance liked their Shermans a lot, while their counterparts in France using the same or better equipment at the same time were being slaughtered as if it were Paschendaele all over again.

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It takes two years to produce a Sherman?

It took about that long in WW2 to design, test, produce, and field a whole new tank from scratch. If you can accept something not very mechanically reliable, you can knock six to eight months off that total. If you just modify an existing design, you can have something sooner. With the exception of a very few T-44s in 1945, all the Soviet tanks were based on vehicles in production in June 1941. The Tiger started development before BARBAROSSA and entered unit service in late 1942. The Panther was the response to the T-34 and saw its first action at Kursk in 1943. The Sherman was a development of the Medium M-2 of 1939 and was not ready until 1942.

Sorry to jump in on a nitpick but

Quote:
A buddy of mine was a quartermaster in the U.S. Navy(he steered the ship) and a young officer was ordering small changes in course. After a couple of turns, the officer ordered yet another change. My buddy replied, "Aye Aye Sir, but we will run aground." Was he really wrong to question the officer? I think that he did the right thing. Like my Dad he just did his job.

Should that not have been helmsman , who steers the boat , while the quatermaster would issue stuff from stores and the like ?

Declan

Cry Havoc and let slip the Hampsters of war.

HTML Comments are not allowed

SPQA

Declan,

In the USN, quartermasters steer and navigate.

In some cases, this is amazing, because you need a jackhammer to actually get them out of their racks. The USS Maine incident? It wasn't a coal explosion, someone tried to wake a QM. It's too bad we didn't have one around to confirm this, but wait...Karl used to be a QM before he became an ATC tech.....

;-)

Kevin


"f u cn rd ths, u cn gt a gd jb n cmptr prgrmmng."

Quote:
In the USN, quartermasters steer and navigate.

Damm, learn something new all the time , lol

thanks for the info kev

Declan

Cry Havoc and let slip the Hampsters of war.

Quote:
Was there much difference between this and 17 pounder? Was ammunition same? Please excuse questions but these were never in our inventory.

No problem. The 77mm had a shorter barrel, however the main change compared to the normal 17pounder was the adoption of a new concentric recoil system. It took up less space and let the gun be mounted further forward in the tanks turret. That provided more room for the crew and ammunition.

The ammunition was different then that of the 17pounder, the cartridge cases where shorter to match the reduced length barrel.





"As your attorney, I advise you to not listen to reason" Non Sequitur

I certainly do not believe that colonels/NCOs are always right.

Perhaps you should post a notice telling people about your unspoken "rules" and that the colonel and NCOs should not ever be doubted nor questioned.

That isn't the point. The issue is that, when considering the dynamics of a field engagement, those people who have actually taken part in such engagements are much better placed to comment on how things happen in them than those who have not. In your original posts you gave the appearance that you were using wargaming experience to argue against people who had actually undertaken combat experience and were including such statements as the infantry wouldn't mind waiting a couple of hours for support. Even I, plodding civilian that I am, can spot the outrageousness of that. Here, we are fortunate in that we have genuine experts in a very wide variety of disciplines on tap. As a result, we can get expert opinion on everything from automobile engineering to advanced neural biochemistry (in other words, everything from the intensely practical to the advanced theoretical). That doesn't mean the experts can't be questioned, it does mean thatteh background and circumsatnces of people should be taken seriously into account when evaluating their statements.

I never did like SPI games(most of them anyway) You are quite right about the lack of German armor and plentiful numbers of Shermans(most of the time) I hope you are not offended if I mention that close air support would very likely be directed against the German player...... For morale and control problems you might want to check into a game by SPI(?) it had reach into a jar and pull out a counter which gave you morale levels. Americans had much better choice for the Third Army and the Germans had inferior odds with security type units values. The Third Army fighting in Lorraine from an old SPI wargame. Panzergruppe Guderian had upside down Russian counters, you only found out their combat value when combat happened. You might have a bunch of tigers or men running for their lives.
SPI had a very serious problems (one of their ex-managers, Dave Isby, is another personal friend of mine) that stemmed from differences within the group. There was one faction that spent all its time looking up ever more precise details of armor and gun penetration etc while others were trying to work out why games did not reflect the dynamics of what actually happened on the battlefield - which meant concentration on things like command control and morale. The result was an uneasy compromise between the two and, in the final analysis, thats what killed SPI. The needs of maintaining that compromise resulted in games that were simply unplayable. None of their attempts at simulating C3I and morale ever came close to working. There was no chance that they ever would; the technology to do the job simply didn't exist back then.

The close air support issue is an interesting one; its amazing the excuses people who wrote rules found to eliminate or marginalize it.

There is no magic key here; I took the trouble to top you off, not to suggest that certain people were infallible but to point out that you appeared to be arguing on very suspect theoretical grounds against somebody who had done the operations for real. It was, therefore, worth considering whether the theoretical background was actually applicable or appropriate.

The great issues of the day are not solved by speeches and resolutions in the United Nations. They are solved by the tanks of the US Armed Forces.

Well Kevin actually, aside from Special sea Details, you hardly ever see a QM (Quartermaster) actually manning the helm. It is usually a Deck/Weapons Department station during normal steaming watches. The QM's primary responsibility is safe navigation of the ship and keeping up an accurate rough log.
Now that we have doen away with Skivvy Wavers (Signalmen)
he also has that duty.

Skivvy Wavers? We used to call them Flag Fags. Of course we don't any more. That would be bad.

Especially since I saw a 6' 3" Naval Signalman drag queen get very angry at someone who called her that.

Now, I call them whatever they want to be called.

Kevin

"f u cn rd ths, u cn gt a gd jb n cmptr prgrmmng."

Quote:
Then there are the problems with transmissions. The US was not building transmissions capable of running heavy tanks. When we tried, they broke.

This leads to a dramatic decrease in the availability of tanks. The Germans had this problem in spades. Their somewhat finicky machines had a significantly lower availability rate than ours. I don't care how good a tank killer it is, it ain't killin' nothin' in the shop.

Say what you will about the M-4, it started and it ran. It's kinda like Jeff Cooper's First Law of Gunfighing, "Bring a gun."

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Are the ports in both the US and newly liberate Europe going to be able to handle larger, heavier tanks? Specifically are the cranes going to be able to handle them.

IIRc from talking with my father, who did this for a living once, the rigging on a Liberty Ship, and probably the Victory Ships, would not accommodate an M-4. You had to moor another ship with heavier rigging alongside the pier and use it to sway the cargo across to the dock. This gets really exciting, when you're doing this with locomotives, but tanks are bad enough. The heavier the loads, the slower the operation. Port space was always at a premium. You're trying to pour sand through a funnel.

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[Market Garden] was doomed from the start. The kind of tank was irrelevant (well, Im sure the Shermans did better than WW1 heavy tanks would have, but you get the idea), no corps sized advance down a single road was going to work.

Heavier tanks might have been worse. At the close ranges available to the PAKs, nothing we were likely to field would have been survivable enough. Pushing burning M-21s off the road would have been worse than pushing burning Ronsens off the road. The heavier vehicles would have torn up the roads more, reducinf an already too slow rate of advance. The secondary bridges, culverts, etc, would have had more difficulty carrying the loads, and more of them would have failed. European roads were not up to today's truck loads.

No so applicable to Market Garden, but the available bridging equipment was less suitable for heavy tanks than for mediums. Yes, you could build stouter bridges, particularly with Baileys, but it took more time and more materiel. Again, we're fighting the issue of trying to pour more sand through that logistical funnel.

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The M1 is also accompanied by the Bradley (at least within the US Army), which carries a huge amount of 25mm HE rounds.

The whole M-4 vs M-1 argument is an apples and oranges thing. We've learned a helluva lot since 1944. Some of it we learned in Normandy. As a result, we have a combined arms team that the WW-II Dogface could not dream of. Different weapons, and different mixes of weapons, for different times. WRT thick skinned vehicles, our mix of M1 and Bradley is more akin to the failed Cruiser Tank and Infantry Tank concept of the 30s. But with modern technology, we can make it work. Again, different times, different weapons.

Speaking of combined arms, the fact that we had radio communications down to platoon level, and because of our superior artillery capability, and because of our close air support capability, and because we had lots of trucks that ran most of the time, we were able to field a rudimentary (by today's standards) combined arms team. This was of inestimable value in defeating the Germans.

Our ability in combining the various arms enabled us to get much more utility out of the M4 than, say, the Germans might have. Its inadequacies were that much less significant because we had countervailing capabilities.

Would I have rather have gone ashore on Normandy with M-48s or Centurians? Well, yeah, if I could get them ashore, and across the beach, if I could keep them fed, if I could get them across rivers. But that's a fantasy argument anyway.

We had a reasonable, but imperfect, compromise weapon.






- Dennis
--
Victory at all costs,
victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be;
for without victory there is no survival.
-Sir Winston Churchill

http://www.battlefield.ru/guns/field_10.html
www.battlefield.ru/guns/field_10.html - LINK

Initially, the 107-mm M-60 Cannon was developed in two variants. The first one had a barrel which pulled off during transportation (to reduce the gun's dimensions) like the 107 mm Cannon Model 1910. The second variant had a barrel which turned round to the limber (to reduce the gun's dimensions also). The second variant was rejected however, because there were apprehensions of how to deploy a gun in the forest etc. As a result, the first variant of M-60 was accepted.

The M-60 has a separated loading ammo. As well as 122 mm Howitzer Model 1910/30, the M-60 has a piston lock. Its recoil system consist of hydraulic recoil brake and hydro-pneumatic reflexive mechanism. Recoil brake put inside the gun-crandle. Elevation mechanism had one sector which mounted onto the gun-crandle. The traversing mechanism was screw. Gun's wheels YaTB-4 taken from a trolley bus. The limber had a steel wheels with a rubber rims. The limber has nothing except winch. For transportation on short distances the gun's barrel didn't turned round and gun could be carried with speed up to 67 km/h.

Factory #172 had manufactured 4 experimental guns by the fall 1939. After the successful factory's trials, in December 13, 1939, two guns have been sent to the ANIOP's proving grouns (the first gun had normal rifling, the second one - deep rifling). Those trials consisted of 1633 shots and 1968-km race. The trials have showed the same results for both guns:

Max range of a gun with normal rifling - 18 440 metres;
Max range of a gun with deep rifling - 18 360 metres.
Accuracy of both gun was equal. Practice rate of fire 6-7 shots per minute. Trials revealed one serious drawback: the recoil brake worked unsatisfactorily.

From 11 to 25 October, 1940, after correction of that drawback, an experimental battery (consisted of two guns M-60) was sent to the army's trials which passed near Pushkin town. During that trials, the battery run 732-km race. The maximum speed (towed by an STZ-5 artillery tractor) on road - 18-20 km/h; on firm dirt road - 10-12 km/h; on muddy road or off road - 6-8 km/h. An attempt to tow gun by two crews was failed. It took 23 minutes to rotate gun on 180.

According the conclusion of a special commission the 107 mm M-60 Cannon successfully passed all trials and was recommended for service. However, commission pointed to instability if fired with small elevation and unsatisfactory work of the gun's lock. Commission recommended to correct these disadvantages but according to archival documents they weren't.

Mass production of the M-60 gun was entrusted to the new Artillery Factory #352, in Novocherkassk. In 1940, the factory manufactured first 24 guns, in 1941 - another 103 guns. After the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Novocherkassk was occupied by Germans and besides, in 1941-1942 Red Army had a small interest in that gun, thus manufacture of the M-60 was cancelled and never resumed in future.

I once served in a ship nicknamed "Skivvy Honcho" by the Serving Wenches at the Texas Bar in Yokosuka. Needless to say, these "ladies" had collateral duties above and far beyond just hustling drinks--))

Khun Sorivar. This is a very good turnout of cybergnomes. One extra evening pass for each.

Build a man a fire you warm him for a night
Set a man on fire you warm him for all his life

[MKSheppard]

---- Output from Sherman 4.htm ----
Back in July 2003, this was scrivened:

The Jumbo tanks were highly desired by troops for their use as infantry support weapons and having a "slower" tank with considerable more armor protection seems like a good idea to the troops, tankers and commanders alike while supporting the infantry.

The British called the Sherman the "Tommy cooker" and it also was called the "Ronson" after a famous brand of lighter. It lit first time and every time and continued to burn is good in a lighter and somewhat "less" good in a tank. They did often "brew up."

Early Shermans moved about 24MPH and some late war models made 30MPH. Moving at 22MPH for a Jumbo does not seem all that much lost of speed since "some" late war models were only 4MPH faster.

The troops in the field seems to like the trade off of a little speed for more protection. In the Pacific they added 2x10s or 2x12s wooden framework around the Sherman and filled in the space with 4-6 inches of concrete. "After the battles of Saipan and Iwo Jima, the additions were in tatters. However, to my recollection, we only had one tank pieced and that was by a 46mm." George Forty M4 Sherman p.93.

All/most tankers in both the ETO and PTO tankers added extra track and built frame work into their tanks. Pictures of logs, spare parts etc. added to tanks are fairly common in WWII film clips.

I tend to agree with you on this matter about the Jumbos, however, I do not disagree with the troops adding "extra" protection. Since I feel that the matter is a close call, let the troops modify their tanks "if it makes them feel safer."

I suspect that the 90mm gun cannot fit(and still fire) from a standard Sherman or we would have converted/made up a bunch. They ran into a bunch of problems "just" adding the 17 pounder to a Sherman.

I think that a new Osprey "book?" addresses the problem. I will check in a couple of days when I next return to the mall.

Advance rates are rarely limited by the speed of the vehicles. Check the advance rates of troops during the last couple of thousand years. If the advance rates were the speed of the tanks, the Germans would have entered Moscow in June 1941. The Panzers made 80 mile advances in a single day and Moscow was "what" some 600 miles away. Slightly over a weeks worth of travel at 80 miles per day.

Vehicle speed in Normandy did not greatly hinder the advance rates, we fought a six week battle of attrition to wear down the Germans. After their lines broke and we could now advance "as far and as fast" as our supply line would let us.

It is boring to most poeple, however, the colonel has mentioned the supply problem several times. Professionals talk logistics and many "other" types talk about battles/weapons etc. etc. I am a tweener, I mostly like battles and weapons, however, I have several volumes stricting dealing with supply and "sometimes even" enjoy reading them.

A slower rate of advance in battle might actually speed up the rate of advance of the troops overall. The supply planners "projected" a slower advance and based their actions on a slower movement of the battle lines. If the troops are calling for more ammo and fuel, the supply guys rarely start moving "hardware(a pipeline?) for future use" into the battle area while cutting back on current demands for ammo and fuel.

They might have checked with the troops in Africa, the intelligence people, spies, the Russians etc. etc. We
"knew" about the German armor and its various types before the Normandy landings. Overall our intel was quite good.
We knew the number and general equipment of the German armour in France. We just did not tell the lower ranking troops because we did not want to scare them.

My latest rereading/reading of some of my tank books document that the Americans were "shooting" themselves in the foot over both tank production and design. The story is rather long and involved so I will post it in another day or two.

The main problem was that "some" higher ups had decided that tanks do not fight tanks. The tank destroyers fight tanks and the tanks are used to exploit on the battlefield. "Wait six weeks and we may get to use our tanks to exploit an opening in the German lines."

The calvary people of the American Army was mostly in charge of developing the armored force. They saw tanks as the new calvary using the same type tactics.

General Mark Clark(from the Italian battlefield) "Unfortunately, the Sherman had more than its share of shortcomings. Its profile was far too high, its armor was woefully thin, and its gun was hopelessly underpowered. interior stowage and access was poorly organized. The suspension gave a rough ride while the converted civilian engines were underpowered and tended to overheat. Both suspension and engine were difficult to maintain." George Fourty, M4 Sherman again.

I suspect that some of these comments are a just a "tiny" bit harsh, however, they show that the Sherman did have some "minor" drawbacks.

I did notice that the doctrine of "tanks do not fight tanks, tank destroyers do" was "dropped" after WWII. George Fourty, M4 Sherman, p. 117, "Despite an excellent war record the TD force was axed at the end of the war, because battle experience had shown that the more vulnerable TD, with its light armour and open turret, was not as versatile or cost-effective as the better-protected tank."

The tank force doctrine and tanks were fairly new and we still "knew" that the Sherman had serious problems.

I could not have phrased it better myself, "Firstly, the Abrams was a result of fourty years experience with armored forces. In 1944, the Tank Corps was only four years old and was in its first serious test of equipment and doctrine."

How old was the German Tank "force" in equipment and doctrine in 1939 Poland? They still had various types of armor formations and very few modern tanks by even 1939 standards. Guderian in Germany and Fuller in England were but two of a fairly decent number of spokesmen that had spoken/written about tank warfare and we generally ignored the warnings.

I am not big fan of Guderian, however, some men listened to Guderian, Fuller and the others. Some Americans listened and learned.

I keep throwing the Abrams at you to show the trend towards better weapon types. We discarded the "inferior" 'TDs fight tanks' theory very shortly after WWII. We moved upwards with the late/Post War 90mm gun tank, the M-60 and lately the Abrams etc.

The "TDs fight tanks" theory was discarded after shortly after the war ended and the build a "butt load of inferior tanks" school of fighting was discarded and replaced by a more enlightened view of building "better" tank killing machines.

Shipping is a big problem for the Abrams tanks. They do not move over an ocean(without help) and our enemies have have nice to let us have 6 months or a year to move the heavy armor into position before a Gulf war starts.

Much ink has been shed in examining the depoyment of American power overseas. A new lighter more mobile force or something close to that has taken up a lot of newspaper space for many years now.

I did not believe that the 76mm was as good as the 17 pounder because of proving ground armor testing results. The 90mm might fit into a Sherman(I suspect it does not and still retain the abilty to fire) however, we did not put any into Shermans(not in combat anyway) The 90mm was late war featured in some TDs and a handful of 90mm gun armed tank(Pershing) reached the battlefield in the ETO.

Complicate my logistics? With a second tank gun of greatly improved hitting power? We had maybe a dozen or so various artillery types with the troops. We had jeeps, 1/4 ton, 3/4 ton, 2 1/2 ton and 5 ton vehicles and likely many others.

The Sherman was built with 75mm gun, turned into Kangagoos(remove the turret and transport infantry!) 76mm guns, 105mm howitzer...

We had Shermans powered by 9 cylinder 4 cycle radial petrol engines, 30-cylinder 4-cycle muiltibank petrol, 8-cyclinder 4 cycle 60 degree petrol and 9-cylinder 4 cycle radial diesal engines.

I have no tank engine person, so please forgive any(non fatal) errors here, merely listing some of the various engines as part of the logistics nightmare. The tank engines were often upgraded to add to the logistic requirements.

We designed a 12-cylinder 2-cycle twin in-line diesal(a superior engine to the standard Sherman, but was never put into production. Apparently we did not like diesal tank engines, we gave most away to the British.

The Shermans came with assorted engine, cooling and other variants. One production run had five(5!) engines hooked inside the vehicle with 5(count them five!) cooling systems hooked to a common drive shaft.

The M4A6 model Sheman(only 75 built) was cancelled, "due to production difficulties with the engine and the need to rationalize engine types in use." British and American Tanks of World War II, Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis,
p. 116.

Apparently, Ike and Bradley were not let in on the "real" secret of our 76mm gun until it was much too late. "You mean out 76 won't knock these Panthers out? General Eisenhower exclaimed angrily, 'Why, I thought it was going to be the wonder gun of the war.' 'Oh, it's better than the 75,' replied General Omar Bradley, 'but the new charge is much too small. she just hasn't the kick to carry her through the German armor.' Ordance told me this 76 would take care of anything Germans had. Now I find you can't knock out a damn thing with it!' Bradley, a Soldiers Story.

"...epitomises the profound anger and frustration which the discovery must have engenered." George Fourty, United States Tanks of World War II, p.116

"There was, however, one type of Sherman that could deal effectively with the heavier German tanks and this was the British version which mounted a high velocity 17-pdr gun, making it probably the most powerfully armed British tank of the war. George Fourty, United States Tanks of World War II, p. 116

George Fourty slightly overstates the case "for" the 17 pounder and "undestated" the value of both the 75 and 76 guns(but not by much) The British knocked out Tigers in Afrika with the 17 pounder at ranges and places that American 75(or later 76mm) guns simply could not duplicate.

Prior to WWII(Poland 1939) Guderian and Fuller and many others did not use hind sight to argue for more and "better" armor. Guderian wanted 400 tanks per division(don't we have slightly over 400 Abrams per armored division now?) WWII U.S. armored divisions had 186 tanks and 3 armored infantry battalions. There were two heavy armored divisions(2th and 3rd?) with larger numbers, however, they fell far short of pre war estimates by the leading armor thinkers of the day.

The doctrine was denied "better" armor killing machines by a combination of "in fighting" between power groups in America's military. They wanted to defend their 'turf' and blocked progress in building both "more" and"better" armor for the fighting troops.

I hate Monday morning quarterbacks. As a wargamer, I try to give the 'players' limited options of "knowing" the exact enemy order of battle and arrival times. My goal is to place them in the same "condtions" that the fighting men faced. I have revised many/most of the order of battles of many wargames and let people play without telling them of the changes.

We agree that the doctrine was wrong. I(hope) that I am not using 20-20 hindsight to base my opinion. Fuller and Guderian wrote about this subject many years before 1939.
Many of their ideas were and are reasonably current. I am using information prior to the war to make my suggestion for change. Information after that time is only submitted to confirm my view. I also sometimes add information that "weakens" my case, however, I try to present a reasonably balanced view.

I have gathered additional information that both pleases me greatly and "weakens" some of my "long winded" position. You wanted to say "long winded" and I admitted "one" of my many faults. I welcome the chance to post new info that added to my knowledge and gives me a better view of history.

I have gained a lot of good information while writing some of these posts and wish to thank most/all of the people who have helped me wish to "hit" the books again. The lost of sleep hopefully has not been in vain.

You have been of great help in my quest for knowledge.

Many thanks,
Robert

I presented a view of the value of the Sherman in 1942 rated "good" and 1943-45 "inferior" compared to Panther and Tiger Tanks.

The Arabs have really not done well desprite having larger numbers or men/weapons vs non arab fighters in current wars.

Two Gulf wars suggest their inferiority to be overwhelmingly
bad vs current Western forces and it seems to be getting worse for them in war fighting.

The Six day war and many others suggest that they will also be handed their hands in other battles. O.K. sometimes the unsupported tank charge by Israeli troops leads to a reevaluation of tactics.

As a general rule, refer to the following joke. A large number of Arabs come running away from a small building. "Our battalion wanted to attack that "reported" Israeli soldier in that building, however, it was a trap. There were three of them."

The Sherman frame was used with both new armor and gun. I have suggested again and again to add a "better" gun and hopefully no one that knows me would deny that I like more and better armor(most of the time, if the tank cannot move, perhaps we will take off a 1/4 of so.)

We agree completely that more landing craft were needed. That issue was never raised in what appeared as a tank production issue. I support your view 100% on building additional landing craft.

I am going to post some of the problems in the historic tank production run of the Sherman and will touch on where the cuts were made and who got the left overs. The airforce carried off some resources when a 5,000 M6 tanks production order was cancelled during WWII, but that is another story.

How tank production goes to the airforce(must be the production people) as the materials seem a trifle heavy for building aircraft?

Regards,
Robert

The Jumbo tanks were highly desired by troops for their use as infantry support weapons and having a "slower" tank with considerable more armor protection seems like a good idea to the troops, tankers and commanders alike while supporting the infantry.

We should note here that there were fewer than 300 M4A3E2 Jumbos built. They all came with the 75mm M3, although some were subsequently refitted in the field with the 76mm M1.
The British called the Sherman the "Tommy cooker" and it also was called the "Ronson" after a famous brand of lighter. It lit first time and every time and continued to burn is good in a lighter and somewhat "less" good in a tank. They did often "brew up."

As I said in my first post in this thread, the Shermans problem in Normandy was that its crews were unsure of when they would be resupplied and thus stuffed their tanks with ammunition. When there are 75mm shells laying about the fighting compartment when the tank is penetrated, it tends to cause bad things to happen. Once the supply situation improved, the tanks tended to spontaneously combust rather less ofthen.
Early Shermans moved about 24MPH and some late war models made 30MPH. Moving at 22MPH for a Jumbo does not seem all that much lost of speed since "some" late war models were only 4MPH faster.

Lets compare apples to apples. The Jumbo was the M4A3E2, powered by the 500hp Ford GAA. The baseline M4A3, powered by the same engine, made 30 mph and the M4A3E8, with the same turret (from the T25) as the Jumbo, but armed with the 76mm M1, made 28 or 29 mph. Adding all that armor to the Jumbo slowed the tank 7 or 8 mph. 6th Armored Divisions report from France in September 1944 specifically requested Ford engined tanks because the M4 and M4A1s they were using were too slow.

The troops in the field seems to like the trade off of a little speed for more protection. In the Pacific they added 2x10s or 2x12s wooden framework around the Sherman and filled in the space with 4-6 inches of concrete. "After the battles of Saipan and Iwo Jima, the additions were in tatters. However, to my recollection, we only had one tank pieced and that was by a 46mm." George Forty M4 Sherman p.93.

Since the Japanese didnt have a 46mm gun, you might want to take that quote with a grain of salt. You are correct that lots of add on protection was added, but it was mostly intended to keep out shaped charge warheads, like the panzerfaust, or to prevent Japanese magnetic anti-tank mines from sticking, which is why youll find pictures of M4s in the Pacific with split logs attached to their hulls. Thicker steel armor would not have helped either problem appreciably.

All/most tankers in both the ETO and PTO tankers added extra track and built frame work into their tanks. Pictures of logs, spare parts etc. added to tanks are fairly common in WWII film clips.

See above.

I tend to agree with you on this matter about the Jumbos, however, I do not disagree with the troops adding "extra" protection. Since I feel that the matter is a close call, let the troops modify their tanks "if it makes them feel safer."

If the troops add several tons to their tank and burn out its transmission, theyve done the enemys job for him. Still, I cant really fault the crews for doing it, either.

I suspect that the 90mm gun cannot fit(and still fire) from a standard Sherman or we would have converted/made up a bunch. They ran into a bunch of problems "just" adding the 17 pounder to a Sherman.
I think that a new Osprey "book?" addresses the problem. I will check in a couple of days when I next return to the mall.

The 90mm would not fit in the standard M4 turret. Neither would the 76mm. Both did fit in the turret from the T25, which was used on the E2 and E8 tanks. These turrets are easy to spot they have a large, flat gun mantlet and a sizable couterweight. The original M4 turret has a small, rounded mantlet and a very small couterweight. To squeeze the 17 pounder into the original turret, the Brits had to cut a hole in the back and weld on an armored box behind so they had a place to put the radio. They also had to flip the gun on its side, which further complicated and slowed the loading process.

Advance rates are rarely limited by the speed of the vehicles. Check the advance rates of troops during the last couple of thousand years. If the advance rates were the speed of the tanks, the Germans would have entered Moscow in June 1941. The Panzers made 80 mile advances in a single day and Moscow was "what" some 600 miles away. Slightly over a weeks worth of travel at 80 miles per day.

Right. But the mechanical reliability of the tanks is a serious issue, as is their fuel economy. If the tanks use more fuel than they did historically, you must either move fewer of them or move them a shorter distance. Logistics do not stretch. And if your tanks break down constantly (like, say, the Tiger), youre going to further strain both the logistics and maintenance systems. In the context of the breakout from Normandy and the pursuit across France, you cant afford to strain either system any more than it already was.

Vehicle speed in Normandy did not greatly hinder the advance rates, we fought a six week battle of attrition to wear down the Germans. After their lines broke and we could now advance "as far and as fast" as our supply line would let us.

See above. Lets try not to unduly abuse that supply line, shall we?

It is boring to most poeple, however, the colonel has mentioned the supply problem several times. Professionals talk logistics and many "other" types talk about battles/weapons etc. etc. I am a tweener, I mostly like battles and weapons, however, I have several volumes stricting dealing with supply and "sometimes even" enjoy reading them.

The reason professionals talk logistics is that they do not give. The best equipment used with the most tactical flair and lan accomplishes nothing when the fuel tanks run dry and the guns and troops go unfed.

A slower rate of advance in battle might actually speed up the rate of advance of the troops overall. The supply planners "projected" a slower advance and based their actions on a slower movement of the battle lines. If the troops are calling for more ammo and fuel, the supply guys rarely start moving "hardware(a pipeline?) for future use" into the battle area while cutting back on current demands for ammo and fuel.

Im not quite getting the logic of that. The problem was that the Allies were getting progressively further from the ports and beaches. This meant that they used more fuel moving their supplies as they had to drive farther and farther. I dont see how the pace of either the tactical or the operational advance is really going to change that equation at least not until the advance take more ports.

They might have checked with the troops in Africa, the intelligence people, spies, the Russians etc. etc. We "knew" about the German armor and its various types before the Normandy landings. Overall our intel was quite good.

Yes, and our AP ammunition was terribly unsatisfactory. We didnt know that at the time, though. The 76mm HVAP was a decent round, but it was in terribly short supply. Even so, it was still far more likely for a US M4 to face unsupported infantry than to fight German tanks. And if it did fight German tanks, it was far more likely to face something other than Panthers or Tigers.

We knew the number and general equipment of the German armour in France. We just did not tell the lower ranking troops because we did not want to scare them.

Um, yeah. Based on our (limited) experiences with the Panther in Italy, we didnt think it would be much of a problem. Ditto the Tiger.

My latest rereading/reading of some of my tank books document that the Americans were "shooting" themselves in the foot over both tank production and design. The story is rather long and involved so I will post it in another day or two.
Well, youve sort of lost me.

The main problem was that "some" higher ups had decided that tanks do not fight tanks. The tank destroyers fight tanks and the tanks are used to exploit on the battlefield. "Wait six weeks and we may get to use our tanks to exploit an opening in the German lines."

Tanks are also used to support the infantry. The TD idea was indeed a bad one (especially the open topped turrets Ive never figured that one out), but using armor for pursuit was not.

The calvary people of the American Army was mostly in charge of developing the armored force. They saw tanks as the new calvary using the same type tactics.

Thats an oversimplification. Patton was certainly a cavalryman, but he also had WW1 experience with tanks in the infanry support role. And you have to admit, during the pursuit across France, armor did act like cavalry.

General Mark Clark(from the Italian battlefield) "Unfortunately, the Sherman had more than its share of shortcomings. Its profile was far too high, its armor was woefully thin, and its gun was hopelessly underpowered. interior stowage and access was poorly organized. The suspension gave a rough ride while the converted civilian engines were underpowered and tended to overheat. Both suspension and engine were difficult to maintain." George Fourty, M4 Sherman again.

Some of those criticisms are valid. The M4 was very tall (a legacy of its lineage from the M2 Medium). 6th ADs report seems to confirm that the aircraft radial engined M4 and M4A1 were underpowered. This is the first Ive heard of the suspension giving a rough ride. For the time, it was quite good. The Vertical Volute Spring Suspension was replaced with the Horizontal Volute Spring Suspension and the tracks went from 16 wide to 23 wide, which greatly improved things, but Ive not heard that the VVSS was unsatisfactory. The internal stowage was altered (leading to the wet stowage that started this thread), so it may have been poorly laid out to begin with. As far as the armor, one cant say that the engine is underpowered and in the same breath demand heavier armor. At least not if one expects to be taken seriously. Since this is Mark Clark, I dont really. BTW, in Italy M4s spent an awful lot of time as SP artillery, where their 75mm was just about perfect for the job at hand.

I suspect that some of these comments are a just a "tiny" bit harsh, however, they show that the Sherman did have some "minor" drawbacks.

I dont think anyone has claimed the M4 to be perfect. Weve just said that, given the conditions under which it was designed and produced, it was very good. Oh, and it did the job.

I did notice that the doctrine of "tanks do not fight tanks, tank destroyers do" was "dropped" after WWII. George Fourty, M4 Sherman, p. 117, "Despite an excellent war record the TD force was axed at the end of the war, because battle experience had shown that the more vulnerable TD, with its light armour and open turret, was not as versatile or cost-effective as the better-protected tank."

What Forty misses is that the TD force also included all of the towed AT guns. In fact, it was intended to be almost entirely towed AT guns, but like many bureaucracies, it started empire-building. The towed gun went away at the end of the war and so did the TD force, along with its amored vehicles.

The tank force doctrine and tanks were fairly new and we still "knew" that the Sherman had serious problems.

Yes we did. We also knew that we could not fix them and still produce enough tanks. And we knew that, despite its problems, it would get the job done.

I could not have phrased it better myself, "Firstly, the Abrams was a result of fourty years experience with armored forces. In 1944, the Tank Corps was only four years old and was in its first serious test of equipment and doctrine."

How old was the German Tank "force" in equipment and doctrine in 1939 Poland? They still had various types of armor formations and very few modern tanks by even 1939 standards. Guderian in Germany and Fuller in England were but two of a fairly decent number of spokesmen that had spoken/written about tank warfare and we generally ignored the warnings.

So? While thats true, Im not quite sure what it has to do with the M4 and your criticisms of it. We didnt pay attention to the development of armor and its doctrine, which is why you see pictures of US troops training with wooden machine guns and trucks with signs marked tank. That is what happened and the M4s development happened in that environment. Unless youre suggesting that in addition to the M4 being replaced with something that is better at killing tanks, we also need to go back to the 20s and 30s and develop armored doctrine. Thats fine if thats what you want to do, but that is not the argument you have been making thus far. Which leads me back to that word that seems to bother you so much: irrelevant.

I am not big fan of Guderian, however, some men listened to Guderian, Fuller and the others. Some Americans listened and learned.

See above. This is outside the scope of the argument.

I keep throwing the Abrams at you to show the trend towards better weapon types. We discarded the "inferior" 'TDs fight tanks' theory very shortly after WWII. We moved upwards with the late/Post War 90mm gun tank, the M-60 and lately the Abrams etc.

The M1 is a completely different beast than all of its predecessors. The M26 Pershing and M46/47/48/60 Patton series were all built with the same ideas in mind. They had a decent (some more decent than others) gun, moderate mobility and as much armor as practical. The M1 is freaking fast, very well armored (due to technological advances which led to a change in philosophy) and well armed.

The "TDs fight tanks" theory was discarded after shortly after the war ended and the build a "butt load of inferior tanks" school of fighting was discarded and replaced by a more enlightened view of building "better" tank killing machines.

Not true. We still built an awful lot of Pattons, but we were building them for a peacetime army that shrank from nearly 90 divisions to 10 and then slowly rose to 18. We therefore didnt need as many tanks because we didnt have as many tank units. Thats just a benefit of being at peace and it is one more reason you shouldnt be comparing the wartime M4 with post- and cold- war tanks.

Shipping is a big problem for the Abrams tanks. They do not move over an ocean(without help) and our enemies have have nice to let us have 6 months or a year to move the heavy armor into position before a Gulf war starts.

Much ink has been shed in examining the depoyment of American power overseas. A new lighter more mobile force or something close to that has taken up a lot of newspaper space for many years now.

Not related to the topic at hand.


I did not believe that the 76mm was as good as the 17 pounder because of proving ground armor testing results. The 90mm might fit into a Sherman(I suspect it does not and still retain the abilty to fire) however, we did not put any into Shermans(not in combat anyway) The 90mm was late war featured in some TDs and a handful of 90mm gun armed tank(Pershing) reached the battlefield in the ETO.

The 76mm, even firing HVAP, did not penetrate armor as well as the 17 pounder firing APDS, although it was significantly more accurate. The problem with the 90mm was not that it wouldnt not, nor that the tank couldnt shoot it. The M36 TD was built on an M4A1 chassis and managed just fine. The problem was prying 90mm guns loose from the Anti Aircraft Artillery.

Complicate my logistics? With a second tank gun of greatly improved hitting power? We had maybe a dozen or so various artillery types with the troops. We had jeeps, 1/4 ton, 3/4 ton, 2 1/2 ton and 5 ton vehicles and likely many others.

Yes, complicate your logistics. Why do you think almost all of the production of M4A4s with the Chrysler multibank went to Britain, the Marines received mostly diesel powered M4A2s and the US Army kept most of the M4A3s? That was an attempt to simplify the logistics as much as possible. Adding 105mm howitzer armed tanks was no strain, since that was the standard field artillery piece and that caliber ammunition was coming anyway. 75mm ammunition is a given, since there were so many baseline M4s, not to mention M8 GMCs. And the US was committed to the 76mm (since it was already arming TDs) and 90mm. And now you want to add another caliber, and this time one that is not even manufactured in the US?!? BTW, for artillery, I count the 75mm (same ammo as the 75mm M3), the 105mm, the 155mm and the 8. Im not sure about time frames for the 175mm and 240mm, but even if both of them were used, that is six, not a dozen.

The Sherman was built with 75mm gun, turned into Kangagoos(remove the turret and transport infantry!) 76mm guns, 105mm howitzer...

The Kangaroo was a British/Canadian critter so I dont think it enters into a discussion of US logistics. And as I said, the 75mm, 76mm and 105mm were all in use on other pieces of equipment. They are still going to be required even if your improved tanks dont use them.

We had Shermans powered by 9 cylinder 4 cycle radial petrol engines, 30-cylinder 4-cycle muiltibank petrol, 8-cyclinder 4 cycle 60 degree petrol and 9-cylinder 4 cycle radial diesal engines.
I have no tank engine person, so please forgive any(non fatal) errors here, merely listing some of the various engines as part of the logistics nightmare. The tank engines were often upgraded to add to the logistic requirements.

See above. As much as possible, engine types were issued in blocs, so that no unit had to deal with all of them. There were an awful lot of radial engined M4s and M4A1s, so they were pretty common everywhere, but given the low spot on the totem pole that tank engines had, we had to take what we could get.

We designed a 12-cylinder 2-cycle twin in-line diesal(a superior engine to the standard Sherman, but was never put into production. Apparently we did not like diesal tank engines, we gave most away to the British.

No, it wasnt that we didnt like diesels. Its that the US had limited capacity to produce diesel and most of it went to the Navy for its submarines. We did send diesel powered M4A2s to the Pacific, but there was not a lot of flow of diesel into NW Europe.

The Shermans came with assorted engine, cooling and other variants. One production run had five(5!) engines hooked inside the vehicle with 5(count them five!) cooling systems hooked to a common drive shaft.

Yeah, the Chrysler multibank. Five six-cylinder inline car engines. Like I said, tanks were waaay down on the priority list when it came to engines, so we had to improvise.

The M4A6 model Sheman(only 75 built) was cancelled, "due to production difficulties with the engine and the need to rationalize engine types in use." British and American Tanks of World War II, Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis, p. 116.

IIRC, the M4A6 was diesel powered, so that was another strike against it. And by the time it was started, the purpose built Ford GAA was actually available and was the engine of choice for the US Army.

Apparently, Ike and Bradley were not let in on the "real" secret of our 76mm gun until it was much too late. "You mean out 76 won't knock these Panthers out? General Eisenhower exclaimed angrily, 'Why, I thought it was going to be the wonder gun of the war.' 'Oh, it's better than the 75,' replied General Omar Bradley, 'but the new charge is much too small. she just hasn't the kick to carry her through the German armor.' Ordance told me this 76 would take care of anything Germans had. Now I find you can't knock out a damn thing with it!' Bradley, a Soldiers Story.

As I said above, the problem with the 76mm was not the best AT gun ever built. With decent ammunition (HVAP), it was not bad, though. BTW, this is a case where decisions were made on the basis of incorrect information. However, that is the information that was available when the decision had to be made.

"...epitomises the profound anger and frustration which the discovery must have engenered." George Fourty, United States Tanks of World War II, p.116

That doesnt change the fact that when the decision was made, it was believed the 76mm was up to the task of killing German tanks.

"There was, however, one type of Sherman that could deal effectively with the heavier German tanks and this was the British version which mounted a high velocity 17-pdr gun, making it probably the most powerfully armed British tank of the war. George Fourty, United States Tanks of World War II, p. 116
George Fourty slightly overstates the case "for" the 17 pounder and "undestated" the value of both the 75 and 76 guns(but not by much) The British knocked out Tigers in Afrika with the 17 pounder at ranges and places that American 75(or later 76mm) guns simply could not duplicate.

Remember that George Forty is British. There is a fair amount of national pride in the 17 pounder generally and the Firefly specifically. The 17 pounder is an undeniably powerful gun, but the mounting in the Firefly was not at all satisfactory. I suppose it was better than a 75mm baseline Sherman for killing tanks, but the Firefly was effectively a TD itself. The bow MG was eliminated (along with the co-driver) in favor of ammunition storage and since the Brits did not use .50 cal AA MGs, that left the Firefly with only its coaxial MG and a very poor HE round to deal with anything other than enemy armor.

Prior to WWII(Poland 1939) Guderian and Fuller and many others did not use hind sight to argue for more and "better" armor. Guderian wanted 400 tanks per division(don't we have slightly over 400 Abrams per armored division now?) WWII U.S. armored divisions had 186 tanks and 3 armored infantry battalions. There were two heavy armored divisions(2th and 3rd?) with larger numbers, however, they fell far short of pre war estimates by the leading armor thinkers of the day.

The light (1943 pattern) armored divisions were quite well balanced with 3 tank, 3 armored infantry and 3 armored artillery battalions each. Most of the prewar estimates seriously underestimated the amount of infantry an armored formation would need. Oh, and a Force XXI armored division has five armored battalions with 44 tanks each, plus a total of six armored cavalry troops (3 in the DivCav squadron, plus one for each brigade) with 9 tanks apiece, for a total of 274. A Force XXI mechanized infantry division would be identical except that it would have four armored battalions and a total of 230 tanks.

The doctrine was denied "better" armor killing machines by a combination of "in fighting" between power groups in America's military. They wanted to defend their 'turf' and blocked progress in building both "more" and"better" armor for the fighting troops.

Im not quite sure where youre going with that. Yes, the TD Force had the mission of killing tanks, but it had been created solely for that reason. I agree that that was not a great decision, but that is the environment in which the M4 was created (unless you want to change that along with having the US do more on armor doctrine in the 20s and 30s).

I hate Monday morning quarterbacks. As a wargamer, I try to give the 'players' limited options of "knowing" the exact enemy order of battle and arrival times. My goal is to place them in the same "condtions" that the fighting men faced. I have revised many/most of the order of battles of many wargames and let people play without telling them of the changes.

??? What that has to do with your theory about the M4s inadequacies or with any of the counterarguments I have no idea.

We agree that the doctrine was wrong. I(hope) that I am not using 20-20 hindsight to base my opinion. Fuller and Guderian wrote about this subject many years before 1939.

IMHO, you are in fact, using 20/20 hindsight. You have the advantage of history to tell you which theories were good. And also the advantage of not having the field cluttered with the now disproven theories, since a good many have been forgotten or at least buried in the dusty end of the library. Remember that prior to WW2, all of that work by Fuller, Guderian and the rest was an untested theory.

Many of their ideas were and are reasonably current. I am using information prior to the war to make my suggestion for change. Information after that time is only submitted to confirm my view. I also sometimes add information that "weakens" my case, however, I try to present a reasonably balanced view.

Right, some of those ideas were really good. But youre asking for an awful lot of change to get the US Army to buy into any of it. Heck, you even have to change the law, since by law, tanks belonged to the infantry and were for the purpose of aiding the advance of the walking rifleman. There was also the problem of the isolationism of the 20s followed by the Great Depression. Where is the US Army supposed to get funding to try out all this new fangled, untested theory stuff?

I have gathered additional information that both pleases me greatly and "weakens" some of my "long winded" position. You wanted to say "long winded" and I admitted "one" of my many faults. I welcome the chance to post new info that added to my knowledge and gives me a better view of history.

I have gained a lot of good information while writing some of these posts and wish to thank most/all of the people who have helped me wish to "hit" the books again. The lost of sleep hopefully has not been in vain.

You have been of great help in my quest for knowledge.

Welcome to the board.


SPQA

You are the one advocating change, hence the burden of proof lies with you. For you to convince the rest of us to go along with your theory, you need to do exactly what Golconda said (and I would add that you need to prove you could build the tanks). We aren't trying to convince anyone to take action, even retroactively, but you are. Now if wanted to make the case that the US should have built Shermand armed with 90mm guns, I would need to show that,

1. it was possible and,
2. it would be beneficial to the US.

I might be able to make that case, but it is very iffy.

Your argument falls fairly flat because you haven't specifically defined what you want to build instead of the Sherman. It is therefore impossible to prove that you could even build the thing, much less show what sort of impact it would have at any level of the war.

SPQA

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Now if wanted to make the case that the US should have built Shermand armed with 90mm guns, I would need to show that,

1. it was possible and,
2. it would be beneficial to the US.

I think given the experience with the M-36 and postwar 105 mm armed Shermans we can tke it as a given that Number 1 is possible. The timing might be a bit tight though as you need the turret developed, tested and ready for production by the early 1943. Consider:

Recall that the Allies had 5,300 tanks in Normandy. Sherman production was about 1,200 per month (49,000 divided by 42 months). At least half of these were going to the Pacific, the Mediterranean, training units, and the Soviets. This leaves 600 per month to go to the invasion force or nine months production. Based on the experience with the Jumbo, it took about four months to get from the factory to the front. This means that production of a thirty ton Panther killer has to start by April 1943 ten months before the Panther is first seen in combat by the West.

As for Number 2, it would indeed have been beneficial for the US - in hindsight.

In April 1943, the standard German medium tank was still the Mark III with a 50 mm gun, though Mark IVs with the KwK 40 were starting to enter service. At that time, the Allies had no reason to believe the next German medium would jump to nearly twice the size. Tigers would be troublesome, but the 76 mm proved to be able to penetrate its front armour at 1,500 meters - on the testing range. They had no real world experience to on which to draw.

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They did often "brew up."

So did Panthers and T-34s when penetrated. As Dirk Mothaar has noted, the problem in the Sherman was made worse by the tendency of crews to stow ammunition in excess of the designed stowage capacity.

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The troops in the field seems to like the trade off of a little speed for more protection.

Some of their commanders were less enthusiastic, Patton for instance. Nor is mobility a simple matter of road speed. Cross-country mobility is affected by ground pressure and flotation both of which are directly affected by weight. The ability to move over roads and bridges is also affected by weight. Damaged 1940s French infrastructure was not designed with 45-ton tanks in mind. Another very important is availability. If your 45-ton tank is in the shop, it isnt out killing Germans. It also isnt killing Germans if it isnt in France where the Germans were.

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I suspect that the 90mm gun cannot fit(and still fire) from a standard Sherman

Seeing as the 90 mm would fire from the M-36, which was based on the Sherman, and that the Israelis later mounted 105 mm guns on Shermans I suspect that you are wrong. It would, however, require a new turret design and those resources, as well as the guns themselves, were going to the M-26.

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They might have checked with the troops in Africa, the intelligence people, spies, the Russians

The troops in Africa faced a small number of Tigers, and beat them with 6 pounders. Tigers never made up more than about six percent of the German tank force in Normandy in any case. The Soviets apparently did not provide much detail about the Panther except to say that they had little trouble with them. Intelligence didnt see Panthers in Italy until Anzio in February and did not complete an evaluation until April. By that time, it was far too late to do anything about it by the beginning of June, even if they correctly evaluated the threat.

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General Mark Clark . . . The suspension gave a rough ride while the converted civilian engines were underpowered and tended to overheat. Both suspension and engine were difficult to maintain.

Oddly enough, most Sherman users said the opposite. General Clark obviously never had to worry about the maintenance and ride of some of the Shermans contemporaries.

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"Despite an excellent war record the TD force was axed at the end of the war, because battle experience had shown that the more vulnerable TD, with its light armour and open turret, was not as versatile or cost-effective as the better-protected tank."

Emphasis added. Until they had that experience, they had no way to evaluate that doctrine in Northwest European conditions.

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How old was the German Tank "force" in equipment and doctrine in 1939 Poland?

Their armoured corps was officially about four years old, but had been training and developing doctrine in cooperation with the Soviets for several years before that. The Germans were also greatly assisted by the fact that neither the Poles nor the French had any idea how to fight them. Note that they also drastically reorganized their armoured forces to reflect lessons learned in 1939 and 1940.

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Shipping is a big problem for the Abrams tanks.

Not nearly as big as for the Sherman, however. Cargo handling infrastructure has improved greatly since 1944. Theyre also not trying to move five thousand of them across beaches with improvised harbours in a couple of weeks.

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I did not believe that the 76mm was as good as the 17 pounder because of proving ground armor testing results.

Proving ground results in 1943, though, showed that the 76 mm should have been able to penetrate Tiger frontal armour at about 1500 meters. In practice, this turned out not to be the case but they had to wait for real world experience to find this out.

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With a second tank gun of greatly improved hitting power? We had maybe a dozen or so various artillery types with the troops.

A fourth tank gun you mean, and one whose ammunition came from someone else who had a limited capacity to supply you as well as Commonwealth forces.

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We designed a 12-cylinder 2-cycle twin in-line diesal(a superior engine to the standard Sherman, but was never put into production. Apparently we did not like diesal tank engines, we gave most away to the British.

It wasnt that much better than the gasoline powered versions, if at all. Actually a large number of diesel Shermans was produced. They went mostly to the Marines, as the Navy used quite a fair bit of diesel-powered equipment, and to the Soviets who preferred diesel powered tanks. The Army did not want to complicate their logistics in Europe even more by having to supply a large force of diesel vehicles if they could help it.

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Apparently, Ike and Bradley were not let in on the "real" secret of our 76mm gun until it was much too late.

What secret? They found out the same time as every one else that the Panther was effectively as well armoured as the Tiger and that the proving ground results were not applicable in the real world.

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The British knocked out Tigers in Afrika with the 17 pounder

IIRC, the 17 pounder was not ready for use in North Africa. The British used 6 pounders to kill Tigers in Africa, admittedly, with difficulty.

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I(hope) that I am not using 20-20 hindsight to base my opinion. Fuller and Guderian wrote about this subject many years before 1939.

As did many writers. Most of them were very far off. Its only in hindsight that we see how close Guderian and others were to the way the situation worked out in real life. Even then, there were modifications. Many tank theorists, like Guderian, believed that a force that was very tank heavy, say three tank battalions for every infantry one was an optimum ratio. Even during the war, it became evident that something closer to fifty-fifty was a better mix.

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How tank production goes to the airforce(must be the production people) as the materials seem a trifle heavy for building aircraft?

The engine production, in particular, was adaptable for aircraft use. The Sherman was designed to use an aircraft radial, for instance, and a version of the Merlin found its way into British tanks post war

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It wasnt that much better than the gasoline powered versions, if at all. Actually a large number of diesel Shermans was produced. They went mostly to the Marines, as the Navy used quite a fair bit of diesel-powered equipment, and to the Soviets who preferred diesel powered tanks. The Army did not want to complicate their logistics in Europe even more by having to supply a large force of diesel vehicles if they could help it.

We were not very much dieselized until loing after the war. Almost all our truck fleet, in ETO, were gasoline powered. Our M48s were still gas powered, long after the war. Shipping diesel engines to ETO would have been a big deal.

The Navy preferred the diesel M4s, so they got them. They already had a lot of diesel equpment in service, so supplying diesel fuel was no problem for them. Some silly prejudice against fires at sea, I think.



- Dennis
--
Victory at all costs,
victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be;
for without victory there is no survival.
-Sir Winston Churchill

I did notice that the doctrine of "tanks do not fight tanks, tank destroyers do" was "dropped" after WWII. George Fourty, M4 Sherman, p. 117, "Despite an excellent war record the TD force was axed at the end of the war, because battle experience had shown that the more vulnerable TD, with its light armour and open turret, was not as versatile or cost-effective as the better-protected tank."

Actually, this isn't correct. Tank destroyers were not dropped after WW2. The Tank Destroyer arm was dropped after WW2 but the tank destroyers themselves continued on. We can draw a parallel with the Machine Gun Corps in the British Army. That was disestablished in the 1920s but it didn't mean the British Army abandoned machineguns. What it meant was that the weapons were no longer regarded as being something special, they were simply an integral part of an infantry units. The US did exactly the same thing with tank destroyers.

In fact, the US Army actually took the development of tank destroyers very seriously throughout the 1950s. They came up with (IIRC) the M-56 which was a very small, mobile tank destroyer mounting a 90 millimeter gun (recoilless) and the Marines came up with the Ontos that had six (count'em) 106 millimeter recoilless rifles. These are classic tank destroyers. The problem was that they weren't too effective since armor technology was outrunning the ability to build light armor-penetrating guns. The 106 rifle was also deployed on armored personnel carriers and jeeps; again, a classic tank destroyer. Later, of course, the armor penetration problem was solved when anti-tank missiles were developed. An M113 with TOW is a classic and very effective tank destroyer. So the suggestion that the US Army abandoned tank destroyers simply doesn't hold water.

The great issues of the day are not solved by speeches and resolutions in the United Nations. They are solved by the tanks of the US Armed Forces.

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In fact, the US Army actually took the development of tank destroyers very seriously throughout the 1950s. They came up with (IIRC) the M-56 which was a very small, mobile tank destroyer mounting a 90 millimeter gun (recoilless)

M-56 Scorpion, entered service around 1953 and had no armor at all. It was designed for airborne forces and built out of aluminum to be airdroppabul. However the 90mm gun wasn't recoilless, it was the same weapon as that of the M-47 tank.


"As your attorney, I advise you to not listen to reason" Non Sequitur

However the 90mm gun wasn't recoilless, it was the same weapon as that of the M-47 tank.
Which really makes the point even more forcefully; the US hadn't abandoned tank destroyers (and still hasn't), it simply integrated them into the force structure. Conceptually there isn't any difference between an M-113 firing TOW and an M-36 firing a 90 millimeter gun.

The great issues of the day are not solved by speeches and resolutions in the United Nations. They are solved by the tanks of the US Armed Forces.

But we don't use M113's firing TOWs anymore. We don't even use M901 ITVs anymore. We have HumVees that carry TOWs and then we have Bradleys. The fact that the Bradley carries its own TOWs means that mech infantry units were able to get rid of their old "E" company, which was the anti-tank company. Even without it, the mech infantry battalion has three or four times the AT firepower that it used to.

The Marines do still use TDs in the form of LAV-ATs, but we (the Army) don't have anything that fits the US WW2 form of a somewhat armored, tracked vehicle that hunts and kills tanks.

SPQA

The M551 was also evidently a direct replacement for the M56, and its high mobility, low protection and heavy firepower fit with other TD's. A few times I've seen the direct fire FCS variant described as being a tank destroyer, and that would seem to be the case.

"As your attorney, I advise you to not listen to reason" Non Sequitur

Wouldn't the LAV-105 be a TD?

Kevin

"f u cn rd ths, u cn gt a gd jb n cmptr prgrmmng."

we (the Army) don't have anything that fits the US WW2 form of a somewhat armored, tracked vehicle that hunts and kills tanks.

Arguably, an M998 with TOW equates to a tank destroyer - in fact, there are significant numbers of wheeled tank destroyers around today. In the US Army, the role is still there but its been folded into the portfolio of the Bradley.

In fact, we can take this line a bit further. The key distinction wasn't Sherman tank vs M-10/M-18/M-36 tank destroyer but multi-role vehicle vs specialized anti-tank vehicle. The Sherman was the jack-of-all-trades, capable of doing more or less anything even if it did none of them well. The tank destroyers were optimized for killing tanks and were pretty ineffective at anything else. Up-gunning the Sherman to improve its AT capability meant a corresponding decline in other capabilities (inferior HE round etc). Following that line of thought, we could argue that the multi-role Bradley is the lineal descendent of the Sherman while the dedicated anti-tank M-1 is a descendent of the tank destroyer.

The great issues of the day are not solved by speeches and resolutions in the United Nations. They are solved by the tanks of the US Armed Forces.

The really interesting bit is that Bradleys with their ordinary guns proved quite effective at killing some types of Iraqi tanks during the recent campaign. Therefore, it can be accurately said, that whilst a Bradley with a Bushmaster cannon can't take on modern tanks, it certainly can kill tanks that date from about 1960 or earlier.

Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with mustard.

Wasn't an M1 knocked out by Bradley 25mm fire during OIF? IIRC it was the one that was reported hit by an AA weapon at the time.

Kevin

"f u cn rd ths, u cn gt a gd jb n cmptr prgrmmng."

The M6 was to have been powered by a Wright engine - Wright as in the aircraft company.

In this springtime of hope, some lights seem eternal; America's is. - Ronald Reagan

It's basically the ITV turret on top of a Stryker hull, much like the LAV-AT. Every brigade is supposed to have companies worth.

"As your attorney, I advise you to not listen to reason" Non Sequitur

Dear Colonel, any NCOs or EM serving or retired on this forum I have the highest regard for the military. I also believe that NCOs, colonels or anyone else are not perfect.

I had the pleasure and priviledge of knowing Brigadier General William Wadsworth while in college in the early 70s. A group of former military types(mostly NCOs, however, officers were freely able to join) formed an informal group in the history department at the University of Maryland. We debated and talked about the WWII battles over a time period of several years.

Bill or William(as the Brigadier liked to be called) never suggested that his views were not to be questioned simply because of his rank. He also never spoke of a problem called "shroud waving." I only later learned of his rank and time spent in wartime Korea from a trusted Navy vet that I have known since high school.

Hundreds of NCOs and dozens of officers(one of my fathers six brothers that served in WWII was an Airforce Colonel) never expressed any problem about raising a question.

I have played bridge for many years and found numerous members to be serving/ex officers, NCO and EM in that world.
Chats about WWII have resulted with interest by assorted ranks.

I worked for a retired 30 year Command Sergent Major who did mention(after I had known him for almost ten years) that he had served in WWII. He led a platoon of 17 men(Orville was the ranking man(as an E-5, since all the higher NCOs and every officer was out of action) out of the Battle of the Bulge. I never questioned him on WWII and he only spoke of his combat that one time.

Orville never minded questions and was always willing to answer them. I almost always agreed with him. We disagreed twice(I think in ten years) He was my boss and I followed his orders. I liked and respected "the Boss" still he was only near-perfect.

The military has my highest respect. They are not perfect and I do not expect my view to change.

I was jolted by your figure of 52,000 Shermans. Never have seen any figure that started with a "5" for the Sherman production numbers.

I have see figures ranging from 30,000(?) to anywhere in the 40's. My 42,000 figure was from a long ago memory. Counting all of the various variants of Shermans as Sherman tanks will certainly come up with a number well into the 40s.

I expect that my 42,000 figure did not count many of the non-tank variants built off/from a Sherman "family" variant.
America built a number of carrier type ships off light cruiser hulls. Are they cruisers or carriers? I count them as carriers even if they have most parts come from a light crusier hull. They were labeled carriers by the Navy and I tend to agree with them.

Depends on how you count various things like mine clearing vehicles or self propelled guns, etc. etc. Are they Sherman tanks or armored personel carriers, self propelled guns etc. If you take the turret off of a vehicle and use it as an armored personel carrier is it still a tank or a personel carrier?

The United States Army gave many of the vehicles that you listed as Shermans with production numbers that did not start with the M4 series tank production numbers.

My books do not count self propelled guns and tank recovery vehicles in the total for Sherman tanks. Perhaps the writer did not consider them Sherman tanks? Neither do I.

I did not include the M7 or M37 self propelled guns or the M32 recovery vehicles in the M4 Sherman family. The U.S. Army lists Shermans as M4 and their variants as M4...

M7, M37 and M32 plus numerous non-tank types may be counted in the total however, not all writers agree with you in this matter.

I will cheerfully agree on your figure of 51,437 if you want to count vehicles "with" different production numbers in the M4 production number totals.

I certainly defer to the colonel on any issue involving attacking a bunker or other fighting position. I would not dare to question someone who appears to be quite knowledgeable in this matter.

I have never assaulted a bunker. Not one.

A serious question to you. How many division size or larger armored assaults have you commanded in the ETO of WWII?

I was simply giving "my opinion" of what type tanks should be landed for a fight consisting of some 20 odd divisions on a side with considerable tank numbers on either side fought several years before I was born.

Many most infantry formations of WWII era did not have tank support until very late in the war. The German infantry won in Poland, France and Russian without tank support(except in very few battles) The German massed their armor into armored divisions, corps and Panzer Groups.

As has been pointed out by several postings from other people on this forum, the German infantry often fought "without tank support" in Normandy, France and Germany.

The battles in Normandy lasted some six weeks. How did the German infantry(often without tank support) last more than "two hours" fighting some of the best trained and equipped troops?(with very large numbers of Shermans and the best artillery arm in the world) The answer is that they fought as best they could and traded losses at almost "evens" with the Allied forces during six weeks of heavy fighting.

I do not believe that I said the infantry would be "happy" to wait for tank support. If I did, I typed without carefully proof reading my post. I meant that the infantry "might have to wait" until tank support arrives. "If tank support were not available, for whatever reason," the infantry would continue to fight.

I was expressing "my opinion" for the best result for the entire ETO. If we have massed a large number of "better" tanks and broke out faster, it(in my opinion) would likely shorten the six weeks of fighting in the fields of Normandy, it would also result in lowering our total losses in both tanks and infantry.

That is only my opinion and you are free to express another view. Why should an former-NCO American citizen not be allowed the same freedom to express his view? I seem to recall different viewpoints posted on this forum.

If you list the rules, I will try to follow them, however, if rank means anything, William Wadsworth(Brigadier) never vetoed different viewpoints.

I have never been under hositle artillery/mortar fire. How often have you been involved in WWII ETO division/corps level type fighting? I am simply offering one man's opinion on the weapons to be used to fight an ETO type battle fought some sixty years ago.

I offered numerous examples of infantry fighting without tanks and both taking and holding positions in WWII battles.
How often have you defended a position under attack by ETO style attack? A serious question. That is the issue I have been addressing, the "doctrine and battles for ETO type fighting."

The remains of the German Panzer Lehr Division faced 700 guns, a massive heavy bomber attack and followed up by a massive ground attack supported by a very large force of tanks.

After six weeks of fighting, the German line finally broke.
The German infantry often fought "without tank support" and it still took a tank-heavy Allied force(with almost complete command of the air and the worlds best artillery arm in support) six weeks to finally break the German lines.

There were numerous exceptions, however, in general the infantry(unless hugely outnumbered) normally stood their ground against tank attacks in WWII. Two American infantry divisions held the northern shoulder of the Bulge against the Sixth SS Panzer Army. The 101st Airborne Division held Bastogne against numerous tank supported attacks.

Combined arms is certainly the way to fight battles. I want all of the tank support that is available to support any infantry type troops. However, if tank support is not available(and it often was not available for most armies in WWII) the infantry fought as best they could.

The Israeli army has made mistakes while "winning" every war with the Arabs. They have a tank heavy army that wins each time and often fairly quickly. That is how tank warfare works at its best.

When the Israeli army attacked using "unsupported" tanks into well defended infantry positions, they were defeated.

This is a not a good example of infantry stopping tank attacks. Even relatively poor quality Arab troops can stop unsupported tank assaults given the proper weapons.

When did I suggest using tanks in combat without supporting arms? If I did wrote that(and I strongly believe that I did not) it was clearly a typo. I did write that if the tanks are not available(for whatever reason) the infantry will continue to fight as best they can.

Armor fights best in combination with artillery, infantry, air support, engineers, etc. etc. I believe that I never wrote anything otherwise. I did point out that good infantry was capable of fighting without tank support and gave numerous examples of these types of battles won by infantry.

The Israeli Army is one of the best on this planet and tends to use combined arms whenever possible. They also sometimes make mistakes. Cold Harbor in American history ranks right up there as a "mistake" with infantry frontally attacking a strongly defended position.

We strongly disagree on tank combat in WWII. Tanks were a very important part of a nations forces(supported by artillery, infantry, etc. etc.) in massive armored battles.

France fell to armor. Poland fell to armor. Russia almost fell to armor. Africa was taken back by tank heavy Allied forces. Berlin fell to two tank heavy Russian Army groups with a tank heavy armor force approaching from the Western Allies.

The Germans built their infantry supporting vehicles because the infantry wanted support and tanks were too expensive. Sometimes the reason that infantry fights without tank support is that is "it not simply available."

The German doctrine also called for massing tanks in armored divisions. The Russians, Americans, British etc. etc. also built armored divisions instead of using tanks as simply infantry support weapons.

The French in 1940 used their tanks mainly as "infantry support weapons" while the Germans massed their tanks and the Germans captured France in record time.

Guderian the father of German tank doctrine said, "Boot them, do not splatter them." He meant concentrate the tanks into massive armor formations and hit the enemy with a concentrated armored force. He did not want to dilute his tank force to support infantry division attacks.

I found additional citations for the 107mm gun and have an e-mail from another member of this forum posting additional data relating to there existence. I have no doubt that some/most of the 107mm guns cited are limited numbers(or pre production weapons,) however, several of my citations show solid data for these weapons. Listing one source as stating, "the 107mm M-60 corps gun Model 1940" is serious evidence that they exist "at least" to my satisfaction, when added to the numerous other listings.

The history department maintains that "one" witness is "no" witness. When a 2nd, 3rd, 4th etc. etc. come forward, some value is attached to the reports.

Here is another source for this matter. Red Army Handbook 1939-1945, Zaloga and Ness p. 221 A table listing Russian artillery has a line listed under Field artillery, 100,107mm guns: 100 built in 1941, 300 built in 1944 and 1945 another 300 built. A number of German tank type weapons only had production numbers in the hundreds, however, they did exist.
I seem to remember a book on a Jadgtiger Battalion formed from a production run of something about 100 vehicles. They existed and even a book telling about them. I did not buy it because it was a very limited combat use. But they did exist as more than trial weapons.

I am still trying to find a source on Russian anti aircraft weapons as I suspect that might yield more and better data. I have very limited sorces for Russian anti aircraft/artillery weapons and yet these very limited sources still yield numbers of citations of the 107mm Russian weapon.

I never claimed that the 107mm gun survived the war. I simply mentioned that it existed in Pre WWII and in the WWII era and was "suggested" as a tank/assault weapon. I have cited two pictures of KV tanks armed with 107mm guns. The source cleared stated that they were to be used to arm the KV tank, however, the war started and...

Several of these sources could very likely be pre production or trial models, however, a few of these sources list 107mm guns as corps guns and in addition listed them in the Russian Field Artillery inventory with model numbers of 1940 (hardly a Tzarist 107mm weapon if built in 1940)

I was told by a certain source, "Ahem" that Colonels and NCOs were not to be questioned(or words to that effect)
One of my sources "Colonel Glantz" listed a 107mm anti aircraft gun. Do the rules apply only to certain colonels or equally to all colonels?

Guderian certainly far outranks a either a Colonel or any NCO. He has different views than certain people on this forum. His views do have not place in a posting on fighting using armor in WWII? How about Rommel, Patton or Ike?

I am still looking for additional sources. The anti aircraft area of guns seems my best guess for finding additional even "larger" numbers of 107mm guns.

A serious question(if somewhat tongue in cheek) One of your supporters stated that the 107mm weapon did not exist in Russian hands in pre war/early WWII because he could not find the ammo listed for sale(in AD2003) and used this "evidence" as proof of its non existence.

How much does an 800mm railroad gun shell cost? The Germans had a couple of 800mm railroad guns in WWII(Dora was the name of one gun) and I would be curious if they never "existed" or if the ammo is still available for sale?

I do not concur with this indirect method of proof. Others might, however, I strongly disagree. They are entitled to their opinion as I am to mine.

You do not admit that a gun labeled 107mm corps gun Model 1940 exists after reading a source. You should have that right to voice your opinion. Neither would I "believe" unless I looked up and listed a number of other sources on this forum. Honest men/woman may agree to disagree.

With the greatest respect for a Colonel in the military. I would also mention the greatest respect for the hundreds(thousands?) of NCOs, EM and other officers that I have "shared views" with over many decades on WWII.

Regards,
Robert



















That being said, I would venture to give a opinion on what "I" would like to give the troops for in a 1944 ETO combat.

It has been more than 30 years, however, I seem to recall he was a quartermaster and also steered the ship.

Except for being a navy brat for 21 years, I know very little about navy ship handling.

I was a mortar locating radar operator, however, I never worked in the job for which I was trained. I worked in air defense radar. Learned the job OJT and afterwards taught the new guys.

Feel free to voice your opinion and ask questions. I support everyone giving their view and reasons to support same.

Regards,
Robert

---- Output from Sherman 5.htm ----
Back in July 2003, this was scrivened:

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The 101st Airborne Division held Bastogne against numerous tank supported attacks.

Reinforced by Combat Command B of 10th Armored Division and elements of Combat Command R 9th Armoured Division, the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and four extra artillery battalions. Also note thay were defending.

The Allies would have beat Germany with half the number of tanks thay had historically, but it would have taken longer and cost many more casualties.

Quote:
I expect that my 42,000 figure did not count many of the non-tank variants built off/from a Sherman "family" variant..... Depends on how you count various things like mine clearing vehicles or self propelled guns, etc. etc. Are they Sherman tanks or armored personel carriers, self propelled guns etc. If you take the turret off of a vehicle and use it as an armored personel carrier is it still a tank or a personel carrier? The United States Army gave many of the vehicles that you listed as Shermans with production numbers that did not start with the M4 series tank production numbers. My books do not count self propelled guns and tank recovery vehicles in the total for Sherman tanks. Perhaps the writer did not consider them Sherman tanks? Neither do I.I did not include the M7 or M37 self propelled guns or the M32 recovery vehicles in the M4 Sherman family. The U.S. Army lists Shermans as M4 and their variants as M4... M7, M37 and M32 plus numerous non-tank types may be counted in the total however, not all writers agree with you in this matter.I will cheerfully agree on your figure of 51,437 if you want to count vehicles "with" different production numbers in the M4 production number totals.

Please to remember we are talking production capacity. Total number of chassis built. If there are enough to allow conversion of such to other roles then these still much be included in total. In similar way should include derivatives of other tanks also. We are not looking at roles but production capacity that build vehicles. If Sherman production is stopped then none of these other vehicles will be built.

Quote:
I do not believe that I said the infantry would be "happy" to wait for tank support.

EXACT QUOTE The infantry did not mind waiting a couple of hours for artillery, tanks, air or anything else to bust a couple of bunkers.

This is statement that make me angry for is one nobody who understand what fighting is like could make. Please to note you make this positive statement of fact did not mind. Not opinion should not mind Will say again yes we do mind very much because every delay in getting support means more of my people killed. Most platoon company battalion level actions even small number of tanks is huge force multiplier. Any tank not best tank not good tank any tank. Our M41s have lighter armor than any Sherman ever have they still do job. Our Scorpions have worse 75 than any Sherman ever have still does job. Means can get job done faster better with fewer casualties. Have been there have done that. Know how much different it is to have proper support.

Quote:
How often have you defended a position under attack by ETO style attack? A serious question.

Serious answer. Twice. Once by Vietnamese at Mon Mak Moon counterattacked destroyed enemy unit other time by Shan States Army held ground until relieved. Also carried out battalion level assault against fortified position held by United Wa Army. Took that.

Quote:
The Israeli Army is one of the best on this planet and tends to use combined arms whenever possible.

Are very few professionals who agree with any of that. Read Van Creveld on s

Build a man a fire you warm him for a night
Set a man on fire you warm him for all his life

We agree 100% that starting to build a "better" tank in May 1944 is much too late. I never suggested trying to starting to fix the problem in 1944. Addressing the issue in March 1942 or earlier(Dec. 8, 1941 was certainly two good options)
I still would like the "option" to upgrade the Sherman by replacing the 75mm with the 17 Pounder(even as late as 1944) since the British were doing it.

That the U.S. did not "know" ignores a large part of the historical record. M4(76mm) Sherman Meduium Tank 1943-65,
Steven Zaloga, p.4, "In August 1942, Ordnance recommended modifying the production contracts so that 1000 tanks would be built in the M4A1 (76mm) configuration with the new gun. The head of the Armored Force, General Jacob Devers, refused to support the plan, complaining that it had not been tested by his organization.(My own note included here, "It had been tested at Aberdeen Proving Ground in the summer of 1942.")
In December 1942, Devers was a member of a team of U.S. officers sent to North African theater on a fact finding mission...the American M4 medium is the best tank on the battlefield...They were briefed on the next generation British tank gun, the new 17 pounder, and witnessed a demonstration of both a towed and tank mounted version. Although the British Army was content with the performance of the 75mm on the Sherman tank, they were convinced that the Germans would continue to increase the armor thickness
on their panzers, and that this would require a continual escalation in gun power to retain parity on the battlefield.
Devers changed his earlier opinion about the 76mm gun project"..."the further perfection of the M4 tank, the best on any front today, should be aggressively continued."

"The British Army had a fundamentally different view of tank armament than their American allies...Britain started in 1939 with most of its tanks armed with machine guns...British experiences in France and the North African Desert led to yet another shift...The continual escalation of German tank armor and firepower, largely propelled by the tank arms race on the Eastern Front, had forced the British Army into a continual series of improvements in tank firepower."

America did not "know" about tank warfare from Poland, France, Africa, Russia? The battlefield reports from those battlefields by American military were not being read?

"In practice this meant that the future British tank force would be based around tanks with a dual purpose 75mm gun, while two tanks per troop would be fitted with the new 17-pounder anti tank gun."

"The British liaison office in the United States raised the issue of equipping US tanks with the 17-pdr. in August 1943,
but Ordnance was largely indifferent to the offer for a variety of reasons."..."But the real problem was that the US Army did not have a realistic appreciation of the future tank threat. Attitudes about the 17-pdr. option would change abruptly after the Normandy fighting in June 1944."

Those are the words of Steven Zaloga, however, they might just as well be mine, since they almost completely duplicate my study of the historical record. The U.S. military looked at the world using rose colored glasses and closed their minds to the well documented facts from "at least" 1939 forwards.

I did not assume that there was a "better" tank available(if you do not count the 17 pdr. upgrade) in the U.S. inventory.
I wished to "build" one starting say in March 1942(or perhaps starting after 7 Dec. 1941, since the world had become a much more dangerous place)

Neither the Tiger or Panther existed in Dec. 1941 or early 1942, however, the Germans did manage to produce them in fair numbers by Kursk in mid 1943. You "assume" that it was not possible to envision what the British had "predicted" and we had "seen" in Africa, Sicily, Italy and Russia(our people had been shown the German tanks after Kursk, to suggest that we did not know about the heavy German tanks well before 1944 is to ignore many "known" facts.

The "summer of 1943" timeframe that you comment on is not a good example(we had "examined" the German Tigers and Panthers in Russia, our military personnel "reported only after taking" careful detailed measurements.) Your assumptions for that time in history ignore the battlefield reports from American military at Kursk. You also "suspend belief" in American reports from Africa, Sicily and Italy.

You say "they simply did not know that." What that the current Shermans would not be top of the line tanks in 1943-1945? No one could "know" the future, however, we had many reports from our own military "after detailed battlefield measurements." We "choose" to ignore the numerous battlefield reports from our own military.

Read my posts very carefully and "quote" me whenever I suggested a "at start" date of "May 1944" since "you picked" that date for being a time much too late to begin building a new "better" tank. We agree 100% that May 1944 was too late, however, I never suggested nor agreed to that starting date.

I am suggesting a starting date in late 1941 or early 1942 since the historical evidence had already given us "some guidelines" for building a "better" tank than the Sherman.

I have repeatively suggested building fewer "better" tanks and using some of the other production to "build" additional
shipping to move the tanks into the ETO. I have mentioned the large cutback in the 1943 naval program and only wish to build a fairly small additional shipping force to move the tanks to the ETO.

We canceled a 5,000 tank order for the M6 in Sept. 1942. We canceled a huge building program for naval shipping in 1943.
I am simply making quite modest building suggestions. If I concede to "your suggestion" a "worst case number" of only 21,000 "better" tanks, there is a bunch of war material, workers, etc. left over to give me the shipping to move them into the ETO. I feel something in the 30,000+ range to be a much fairer target.

Why bother to upgrade the Sherman into a Firefly? You get a much better tank by upgrading. The U.S. ignored both the historical record and battlefield reports from our own military.

A better question would be "why we did not read the reports starting as early as Poland 1939" and "build a better tank" in time for 1943-45 timeframe? The evidence was sitting on our desks and we ignored it.

Why not accept the British offer for 17 pdr. guns? They saw service in British hands anyway. Yes indeed, they did, our tankers wanted them and were denied them because of our refusal to field a "better" tank.

We only saw the need after the fighting in Normandy? Poland, France, Africa, Sicily, Italy and Russia furnished detailed battlefield measurements and we "only saw the need after Normandy?" Seems like we were very slow learners to ignore all of the reports/history prior to Normandy.

Normandy was the first test of American tank doctrine? Kasserine, Africa, Sicily and Italy did not happen prior to 6 June 1944? Guderian, Fuller and a host of other armor thinkers went ignored and unread for years before the 1939 fighting in Poland.

The Germans mangaged to field both the Panther and Tiger by mid 1943. We could not be bothered to build a "better" tank after being given an additional year(or more) in addition to studying the battlefield reports from the American military?

If you read the plans for the airborne at Normandy, you will note that they were dropped to protect the approaches to the landing sites. They were not dropped to have minimal resistance. They could have avoided all resistance by simply not being used in combat.

The 101st(at Bastogne) managed to acquire many assets including about 40 tanks, many guns, anti tank, etc. etc. by setting up roadblocks and directing the retreating troops into the defense area. You are 100% correct on this point.

Why exactly did the British airborne not have tank support?
Something about the title of a book called "A Bridge Too Far" seems to spring to mind.

If you mean that dropping airborne troops too far behind enemy lines may get them destroyed, we completely agree.

If you mean that having "better" tanks available to relieve airborne troops dropped too far behind enemy lines is a good idea, we completely agree.

If you mean that having a "very bad battle plan" leads to troops being destroyed, we completely agree.

I suggested building many more Grants in place of the Sherman with tongue in cheek. If you wanted to build large numbers of "inferior" tanks, why not stick with the Grant? If there is no reason to improve on the Sherman, why improve on the Grant? They both carry a short 75mm and the Grant has a 37mm in the turret

American tank production fell sharply in 1944 after a huge run in 1943. If we had kept production steady from 1943 onwards and concentrated on the Grant rather than "wasting" time and energy on "better" tanks, we could have built a whole butt load more tanks.

United States Tanks of World War II, Fourty, p. 21, "Chart reads American tank production 1942 24,997, 1943 29,497 and 1944 17,565 and 1945 11,968 The British built 1942 8,611
1943 7,476 1944 2,476 and 1945 zero.

These figures suggest that tank production fell way off in England(I guess to provide manpower for their military)

I was going to save this for my essay on American tank production, however, it seems like a good time to drop additional historical facts into this post.

British and American Tanks of World World War II, Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis, p. 114, "...On President Roosevelt's personal orders tank production schedules for 1942, provisionally set at 1,000 medium tanks a month, were doubled. To achieve this additional production facilities were required and...This would mean that M4 medium tanks would be built at a total of 11 plants in 1942." Production was doubled simply because the President set a new higher bench mark.

"Events in Europe in May/June 1940, which gave rise to the adoption of the new American National Muntions Program, showed that tanks-especially medium tanks-would be needed in far greater numbers than had been forseen the previous October when the light tank building programme was initiated...William S. Knudsen, President of GMC, was the member of the National Defense Advisory Commission responsible for co-ordinating industry to American defense needs...In Knudsen's view tank production was analogous to automobile production, and, except for manufacture of armour plate, there was not reason why the automotive industry, rather than the heavy engineering industry, should not become the prime producers of tanks, making them from the ground up all under one roof...Knudsen suggested that a purpose built plant should be established in Detroit and arranged that Chryler would build and operate this plant on behalf of the American Government...On August 15, 1940, the contract was signned...Events moved fast from than on. Building of the plant commenced on a 100 acre site outside Detroit in September 1940. The building was 1,380ft long and 500ft wide...Final M3 design work was completed in March 1941 by which time construction of the huge Arsenal building was almost finished, the whole operation taking just six months."

M4 Sherman, George Fourty, p. 20, "Yet Chrysler made the first two M3 pilot tanks in April 1941, and made its first production tank in July, had delivered more than 500 before Pearl Harbor and all of the first 1,000 by January 26 1942, eight months ahead of schedule." Page 22, "A Chryler engineer was meanwhile sent to Aberdeen where designs of the new M3 were coming off the drawing boards. He mailed copies of blueprints to Detroit, relayed other information by telephone, and along with representatives of the railway equipment companies offered Ordnance designers valuable suggestions on engineering changes that would mean cheaper and faster production."

They built(or rebuilt) 25,059 medium and heavy tanks at that "one" newly purpose built Chysler plant during the war..."For planning and directing the building and equipment of the arsenal, Chryler was paid a fee of just four dollars."

United States Tanks of World War II, George Fourty, p. 18,
"After the USA had entered the war Roosevelt again raised the tank building requirement, calling for annual production rates of 45,000 in 1942 and 75,000 by 1943. It could well have been, as some biographers have concluded, that he was merely ordering such target figures as a means of capturing the imagination of the American people by giving them an even greater challenge. 'When Harry Hopkins questioned the President on the figures, Roosevelt shrugged, "Oh...the production people can do it if they really try."

By concentrating on the Grant, and not reducing tank production in 1944, the U.S. could have built many thousands more tanks.

We did build 88,410 light, medium and heavy tanks during 1939-1945. If we could not build 82,000 odd Grant tanks, we could have given it a heck of a try.

You suggest that U.S.military found that they could not produce a reliable 45 odd ton tank by mid 1943. How about by mid 1944?

United States Tanks of World War II, Forty, p. "...A sad indictment of the squabbling that took place is also contained in the same volume(The Ordnance Department on Beachhead and Battlefront) 'Gen. Barnes and Col. Colby maintained that the best American tank of the war, the Pershing, had to be developed in the face of "bitter opposition" by the using arms. Colby believed that if the AGF(Army Ground Forces) had given the go-ahead early enough, the Pershing could have been available in quantities for the beachhead landings on D-Day; and that the record supports his belief.'

I "keep repeating" that I have additional shipping for additional ships for transporting tanks. 21,000 40ish odd ton tanks do not use the same material as building 42,000 33-39 ton Shermans. The left over production may go into shipping tanks to the ETO.

21,000 40ish odd ton tanks use much more POL than 42,000 Shermans? I would guess that fewer tanks(only fractionly bigger) would use less POL than twice as many Shermans.

I never stated, suggested or believed that "higher infantry casualties were not important." If you would please point out "anything that I have posted" that might make "any reasonable person" think such foolishness?

Straw man arguments are not a great way to influence reasonable people. I have maintained from my first posting that a "better" tank would "save lives" by winning the ETO battles faster and cheaper. Some "other" writers have suggested otherwise.

I have never stated, suggested or believed that "higher infantry casualties were not important." To suggest otherwise is "shroud waving" in my opinion, as what sensible, normal person military or otherwise would wish "higher infantry casualties" on his own forces.

No one has shown me where building even as few as 21,000 "better" tanks would completely(or even partly) deny tank support to the infantry. My suggested figures(best guess are 30,000 odd tanks not just 21,000.

My copy of Report of Operations(Final After Action Report)
12th Army Group, Vol. XI, p. 67, Chart lists average TOE Medium Tank Strength and losses

June 1944 703, July 1153, August 1,709 Covers the fighting in Normandy. A high figure of 1,709 tanks used by the 12th Army Group. The highest figure was in April/May 1945 3,716 medium tanks.

Losses(cumulative) to date June 1944 187, July 467, August 899 and 3,256 by May 12, 1945.

Total for the 12th Army Group until the end of August 1944 is a high of 1,709 medium tanks present and losses of 899.

2,608 tanks to cover all medium tanks present plus all losses. With a better tank, the tank losses should be less and in "my opinion" would additionally shorten the fighting.

The higher tank losses were a direct result of sending the Sherman into battle instead of a "better" tank.

I do agree we had the tanks and crews to lose and still be at the German border. Your opinion is to follow history, mine is to check out "what if?"

My opinion is that there was a "cheaper" way in tanks, tank crews and also cheaper infantry losses by following a different method. A number of writers seem to support my views in their books.

I agree that it would be "your choice to follow the path taken by history." Perhaps, you are unaware of certain facts that I have listed. Perhaps, you chose to ignore some historical facts or chose to believe that Poland, France, Africa, Sicily, Italy and Russia never produced any information. Perhaps the writings of Guderian, Fuller and assorted other writers "well before WWII" did not influence tank doctrine.

The title of the book stems from an officer saying that they would drop "A Bridge Too Far" was made in the planning stage and the location of two SS Panzer divisions were unknown to the Allied force. The plan was flawed because they were dropping too far behind enemy lines. Had the two panzer divisions been miles away, they would have arrived and crushed the British with much the same results. The relief column had "too far to go" into the teeth of a German defense aided by highly constricted terrain.

I just listed the entire medium tank TOE for 12th Army Group including August plus the entire tank losses counting the entire month of August. Where is this terrible tank shortage coming from? 2,608 tanks total present plus all losses.

Granted, I suspect that the Germans would have higher losses in both tank and infantry because they would be facing "better" tanks. The fighting should be shorter and less costly in all arms because of "better" tanks.

I fully expect my planned production to cover 2,608 total tanks used by 12th Army Group well past the time of the fighting in Normandy.

The British drew the bulk of the German armor into battle in the north and fed their Sherman crews into a meat grinder. It wore the Germans down. The attacks of the Americans met much less armor and the German infantry(without nearly as much tank support) still managed to hold for six weeks.

I can cover the total 2,608 tank plus losses from production. The battles take place with the infantry fully supported by better tanks. The German armor is worn down by the orginal Allied force having "better" tanks in less time and at less cost.

You do know about the horrible constricted terrain at Arhem? We again completely agree that Pershings would likely have failed to relieve the British(since the battle plan was so very badly flawed)

You stated in this post(please refer to your first comment of this post) that the doctrine that TDs engage tanks and tanks engage non armored forces "was unworkable in practice" at Normandy. So now you state, "But Shermans were not supposed to be tank killing machines."

By invading Normandy, the Allied "knew" about the terrain and that their "doctrine" would have to pit tank vs tanks with the Sherman being both undergunned and underarmored compared to both the German Panther and Tiger. When the Germans attacked again in the Bulge, the "doctrine" was still "unworkable in practice."

The Panther was examined in detail at Kursk and in Italy by U.S. military and their reports were forwarded. The Tiger was engaged in Africa and also "examined" in detail after Kursk. We knew about the Panther and Tiger complete with detailed measurements. To say that we did not know, is not my view.

One of my proposed "better" tanks examples is supported by
documents from the U.S. Army. See my earlier comments on Gen. Barnes and Col Colby.

I "sometimes offer" to except "a" worst case figure of 21,000 to avoid "splitting hairs." My best guess is something about 30ish odd thousand "better" tanks.

Gen. Barnes and Col. Colby seem to support my case in U.S. Army documents.

We agree that the Sherman might be the best tank in 1942(I am ignoring "nit picking, very limited numbers" of Tigers)
In 1943, the Sherman loses ground very rapidly. By the end of 1943, the Sherman is badly outclassed.

You raised the "beauty" of having a "better" tank, if the crowded battlefield limits the numbers of tank possible, you want the limited number to be of the highest quality.

No, I expect to duplicate the numbers available on the battlefield or come very, very close. Remember, I built addition tank transportation shipping. You must have read that is one of the many, many times that "I carefully wrote that feature down."

We agree that many Pershings would be lost to the German weapons. Do you agree that the number would be smaller on the Allied side if the tank numbers went unchanged? Replace a Sherman with a Pershing one for one. Would not the Germans lose more of their AFV quicker to the same number of Pershings as there were Shermans.

Your numbers on Allied tanks in Normandy seem awfully high.
The numbers for German tanks also seem awfully high. Might I have a source? Even if every German AFV in the France showed up at Normandy those figures seem high. Army Group Patton was still waiting in the wings to invade higher up the coast. This fixed a number of German armored formations in additional to numerous infantry type formantions.

We agree on the start of the summer 1944 Russian attack.

Both built and shipped. One more time, reduced numbers of "better" tanks, however, additional shipping to move them to the ETO.

Please note that divisions kept arriving in the ETO. The 106th Infantry division moved into the Bulge just before it started in Dec. 1944. Normandy would be won earlier and cheaper due to the "better" tanks present at Normandy.

The German Army would suffer more losses, faster fighting "better" allied tanks and would lose both the fighting in Normandy and later at a "faster" rate and with more losses to the Germans. The Bulge would likely "not happen" or take place with a much reduced German force.

The British were "very short of men" for their military after six years of war. Since we turned down their offer to supply 17 pounders, they very either likely cut production or kept it steady. Their tank production fell off rapidly, later in the war. I am fairly sure that the men released suddenly found other work or a draft notice shortly thereafter.

I decline to repeat the numerous weapon systems/variants in WWII U.S. Army. Please refer to my earlier posts if interested in logistical problems.

Africa, Sicily and Italy did not give the U.S. troops any notice about the German armor?

Please list a source for the British being surprised by facing "six" times the expected heavy German armor.

My sources say that American military sent specific detailed measurements back from Kursk. I expect that they would also send measurements from Africa, Sicily and Italy.

We knew about the Tiger and Panthers and choose to ignore the warnings. M4(76mm) Sherman Medium Tank 1943-65, Zaloga,
p. 14, "The first inkling that this might not be the case came in a joint Allied intelligence report released on February 22, 1944 on the basis of a German prisoner of war
who stated that the Wehrmacht was shifting the organization of its panzer regiments to a new configuration consisting of one battalion of PzKpfw IV tanks and one battalion of Panthers. This was formally recognized in an Allied report on the German panzer division on April 30, 1944."

The Russians had to have given us some data on the Germans and spies, intell, foreign workers, etc. must have revealed additional data on the Panthers numbers.

If you did not read your own Allied intelligence reports, you will not know what you will be facing?

The Germans kept up grading their armor in Russia as early as 1942. Longer guns and additional armor, 1943 the Tiger and Panther. By 1944 we still do not have a clue after reading the intelligence reports?

They "knew" the facts and choose to ignore them.

I would be nervous about the Panther by just looking at that very long gun. After detailed measurements of that sloped armor came in from both Italy and Russia, I would have "known something."

In both Gulf Wars the U.S. fielded an overwhelming force plus the Abrams. The enemy was not nearly as well trained, equipped, led, etc. etc. T-55s in combat vs an Abrams, shooting ducks on the water.

We planned on entering the continent of Europe and trashing the German army. To invade across the beaches of France and not face major tank vs tank fighting seems more than a little silly to me.

That is partly the reason that I suggested bringing a "better" tank to the fighting. It may or may not be as good as a Panther/Tiger, but I am trying to give the troops the best matchup possible.

The Germans had fewer men and weapons and so lost WWII to superior numbers of enemy forces. All other things being egual, bigger numbers normally win.

If you do not wish to explain the quick victory by the Allied forces in two Gulf Wars, my response would be "better" weapons and "better" almost everything else. A "better" tank killing machine in the Abrams seems to be right at the top of the reasons for inferior numbers winning in both wars.

We agree again, perhaps even Shermans could win vs Arab troops. I suspect that the T-72s might improve the odds instead of fighting T-55s. Sherman losses might very well be as heavy as at Normandy.

The point that I am "still trying to make" is that having a "better" tank killing machine "helped" us win "with very light losses" and in record time in both Gulf Wars.

Perhaps, consider an option suggested by Gen. Barnes and Col. Colby. You may not have known about this option, however, it seems to have existed in at least the minds of two officers.

The British seemed to think that a "better" tank was needed, the Russians also seemed to share that same view. We seemed to be alone in our "view" that we could fight the battles of 1944-45 with a tank from 1942-1943.

The British tank industry was covered in a tank scandal book. The American tank program seemed to "shoot itself in the foot." We built some pretty bad aircraft at the start of the war. American airplanes became some of the best in the world. Our ships were second to none.

Why build bad tanks, when the evidence suggests that a "better" tank might be needed? Both Gen. Barnes or Col. Colby believed that the problem could be solved and had it published in a post war U.S. Army volume.

Might I have your short list of the "second rate" weapons that the U.S. Army took into two Gulf Wars?

The British had the Firefly as a "better" medium tank than the American Sherman. They took a second rate tank and make it "better," something that I suggested as an improvement for WWII U.S. Army tankers.

The troops were screaming for a solution to Panthers and Tigers and they loved the 90mm TDs. If the 90mm fit in a Sherman and still fired, perhaps someone would be making changes. The 17 pounder needed considerable work to fit into a Sherman turret.

The M36 does not have a tank turret. More room. The Israelis took out the Sherman's engine, armor and gun and replaced all three. Perhaps the turret they replaced was a bigger one? Just guessing.

Some German tanks were not upgunned because the size of the turret ring limited the size of the gun.

By late in the war, we were pretty sure that the M26 was not going to fight in any great numbers. If the 90mm fit into a Sherman, "make the change" since you do "know" that the M26 is not going to arrive in time.

At the beginning of their production run, the Tiger was only 5% of the German armor force. Who could have guessed that the numbers would increase? We did get specific measurements back from Kursk from Allied military people.

The Mark III and Mark IV fought in fairly limited in numbers Poland and France(were there any Mark IVs in Poland?) The Mark I and Mark II had all but vanished in 1941 Russia. Newer models with longer guns and better armor kept showing up in German hands in Russia.

Who could forsee that the German armor in France might be made up of decent numbers of Panther/Tiger tanks?

WWI German troops had fought in Russia in WWI, that no one "knew" that it got cold in Russia after fighting a war there in WWI?

We agree that they were surprised to find themselves fighting in Russia in the winter. But to be surprised that it was "cold" in a Russian winter, after fighting a war there 20 odd years before. Someone(now probably senior NCOs/officers) knew that it got cold in Russia in the winter.

Shermans in Korea seemed to be preferred to the M26 because it was more mobile in hilly(mountainous) terrain(somewhat like Italy) so that does not surprise me.

Many tankers in France favored the 75mm gun.

Two years from scratch seems fine if the program starts in Dec. 1941 or maybe March 1942. Two years and change before Normandy.

We may field a "better" tank using Gen. Barnes and Col. Colby's guidelines, we could push Pershings out of the production pipeline in "numbers" by Normandy.

Use a reliable chasis and attach a reliable gun. If a JSIII is a family member of the T-34/KV family, I suspect that a better tank may be cut off the Sherman/M26 family tree.

I like your timelines for tank development. The Sherman appears in 1942 and it takes two years to build a new tank. Where is the 1944 "better" built/designed two years after the 1942 Sherman? Maybe Gen. Barnes and Col. Colby "knew" something after all?

[edited to remove large number of superfluous line feeds]

Thanks indeed.

Seems like almost everything I type is questioned.

Someone agrees with me?

Thank you Kevin

My Highest Regards,
Robert

My apology for misunderstanding your comments.

I believe that you also might have "read" something into my comments that were not meant/intended.

I am a seeker of knowledge for knowledge sake. Some of my posts tend to support other positions that I do not believe are correct. Examine the facts and see if some "truth" may be found.

The Colonel should expect her comments to carry a great deal of weight. In refighting a ETO level tank heavy battle, I submit that her opinion is of somewhat lesser value than in her field of infantry combat.

Perhaps I have read something into her comments that was not intended. If so it is clearly an unplanned fault of mine.

I took someone's comment that serving NCOs and colonels were not to be questioned as a "very strange" viewpoint and certainly not one that I shared.

I have the highest regard for the military and have known many hundreds/thousands of EM, NCOs, and officers as fine people. I have also known some "not" nearly as nice EM, NCOS and officers. Some ended in the stockade and I shed no tears at their getting their just reward.

Thanks for dropping me the "heads up."

Regards,
Robert

Dear Sorivar

Thanks for more data on 107mm Russian weapons. It appears to add yet another type into the 107mm listing.

If you look at the data(that I listed) for the 107mm gun it fires to a slightly shorter range(almost 1,000 meters less) with a rate of fire or just over one half of your stats.

I still hope to find more plentiful numbers of 107mm weapons in the anti aircraft field. Maybe, maybe not.

Seeker of truth.

Best regards,
Robert

Here is the 105 mm mounted on a Sherman
<!--EZCODE IMAGE START--><img src="http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/ ... /m51_4.jpg" style="border:0;"><!--EZCODE IMAGE END-->

This is a good website, note the counter weight.
http://www.israeli-weapons.com/israeli_ ... icles.html

Two cannibals are eating a clown.
One says to the other: "Does this taste funny to you?"
</img>

Fourty is Aces in my book.

It was my mistake, not his.

47mm not 46mm

Thanks for catching "the" error.

Thanks for the information about the 90mm "not fitting" the Sherman. I had guessed as much, however, it is nice to have solid evidence rather than "fumble" with a guess.

I have read about the problems with adding a 17 pounder to a Sherman. I seem to remember something about "left handed" loading being used. Would you please explain "in simple" terms the details "if any" of this problem?

If the rate of the advance had kept somewhat more closer to the "planned rate of advance" the speed of advance might have been higher. If you plan on bringing in pipeline material during week seven and find that you need it in week six, your supplies could become mixed up as fuel, ammo gives way to material to build a pipeline.

In Normandy they landed more ammo at first and switched to more fuel after the breakout. "Somewhere" the surplus ammo "sat" while they moved up the extra fuel.

I go into some detail on the tank production snafu in another post. Still hope to expand on those problems.

I really like the idea of chasing a beaten enemy. First of all you have to beat him in battle or he is unlikely to start running.

Much like belling the cat, after someone puts a bell around the neck, you can hear the cat coming. Who gets the job of belling the cat seems to be left open to someone to be named later. Nobody seems to want that job!

Never said that all cavalry men were bad. Simply suggested that a number of people were not working in the best interests of the troops in the field.

Suspension rarely drew complaints in most of my reading. I do not alter quotes, merely report them. This one does not seem nearly 100% accurate.

I found a quote from a senior commander in Italy and used it to suggest that the Sherman had its problems.

You added the detail on the towed AT weapons. Fourty seems pretty good to me. A book is limited in what it may present. I am impressed by several of his books. Perhaps, I am too easy to impress. Perhaps not.

I am responding to a post that states something to the effect that our doctrine was only four years old and had nothing more than four years to mature. The tank fighting in Poland, France, Africa and Russia seems to have no effect (on the posting by another writer) on tank fighting or doctrine.

You appear to be at least reading what I typed. Many others seem to want to put "words" in my mouth that I never typed.

I was again responding to a post claiming various types of non tanks as being Sherman tanks. Counting self propelled guns as tanks seems a bit off the mark to me.

Fourty is British. I believe that I mention in my comments that his comments were slightly overstated. I try to be fair.

Some Americans seem to have fallen in love with a Sherman tank and do not see any problems.

I somehow came away with the idea that you were always short of armored infantry. A somewhat simple view, but in the ballpark?

Two Fireflys and three Shermans made up a troop? Fireflys killed the bad tanks and the Shermans threw 75mm HE.

Now you have lost me. I am not comparing the Sherman to post war tanks.

I am merely pointing out that the M-1 seems to be a "better" tank. If the idea of the Sherman was an ok gun and fairly thin armor is good, why evolve towards "better" tanks? Why not build 105mm howitzers armed "tanks" if infantry support seems so important?

With more than a little tongue in cheek I even suggested building 82,000 odd Grants since it had a short 75, moderate armor and a 37mm in a turret as a bonus.

I am way out of the loop on current tank TOE. I probably was using some 1970-80s type TOE of 5 tank battalions and 6 mech or something like that.

I could be wrong, however, my limited reading suggests that several power blocks were defending their turf even if it hurt the war effort in WWII tank production.

I am pointing my focus at the early and "middle" war years. I think that we could have done more and better if the turf battles were kept somewhat in check.

Not using 20-20 hindsight, I resent anyone using that method. "They" are fans of whoever "won big" last weekend and will change "after" the coming weekend.

Some seem to feel that I worry about the Sherman being so-so by "knowing" multiple decades worth of future history.

Please feel free to offer your opinion. I hope that you will let me offer mine as well. Guderian and Fuller and others theory were untested, however, some people claiming that the U.S. tank doctrine was only four years old in 1944 are ignoring any possible reading of the published materials.

Poland happened in 1939 and France in 1940 and Normandy in 1944. Perhaps I am splitting hairs but that leaves out any lessons of the fighting in Poland and perhaps France.

My general concept of war going back to the time before Christ is that "better" weapons seem to win battles/wars.
There are numerous exceptions, however, the guys with iron swords really wiped up the field with the guys with copper weapons and so on down history lane. The guys with repeating rifles butchered the spear throwers etc. etc.

If that general concept is wrong please advise. I would be very interested to hear something else.

I am growing somewhat tired on hearing how building thousands of ok weapons is a great idea. Sometimes you win with vast numbers and sometimes you pile up bodies in front on a British square.

An ex-Navy chief(a buddy of mine since high school) says, "It is O.K. to fight with a few against many as long as you have the right few."

I did not raise the issue of shipping Abrams, another posted that comment on shipping Abrams and I suggested that I did not agree.

Money was a problem. Thinking is fairly cheap. Buy books out of your own pocket if needed to evolve some theory about doctrine.

The posting that I was answering suggested that the U.S. had nothing at all to guide it except the time from 7 Dec. 1941-44. Poland and France did not offer any information of any kind? The inter war years were a vast empty void with no help to form tank doctrine?

You seem quite to have a lot of good info of this tank stuff. I will look forward to reading your future postings.

Regards,
Robert
[edited to remove large number of superfluous line feeds]

You seemed to want a more complete description of U.S. Artillery types in ETO.

Report of Operations(Final After Action Report)
12th Army Group p.90-91

Not counting use of captured German/foreign guns and ammo.

76mm gun 90mm gun

3 inch gun 105 How M2

4.5 gun 155 How

155 gun 8 inch How

8 inch gun 240 How

Regards,
Robert

Thanks for the comments. They clarify a number of issues.

I have stated that I would expand on the tank production problems at a somewhat later date. I guessed a day or two, however, answering so many posts seems to be slowing me down. This evenings posts include additional data to hopefully help "prove" my case.

Still seems somewhat "unfair"(to me) to make the burden of proof set to me. A number of other writers make "claims" and are not required to follow up with the same "standard" of proof.

Proof must be offered for any change? Why does the current status not need defending?

The earth was known by nearly everyone to be flat at one time or another. The sun also revolves around the earth. If I have a mob behind me with burning torches, do I prove to you that the earth is flat and the sun revolves around the earth?

If Roosevelt had said, "NO" to the Manhattan project, would I have to "prove" that the atomic bomb could be built during the war years because one man had ordered the project stopped?

Who gets to make the rules for proof? Serving NCOs and officers? People who have visited this forum for a long period of time? I am curious as to "who" set up the rules and causes them to be known? Names?

Might I take a vote on "if" proof is required and "who" gets to set the rules of this forum?

Why must I prove something is beneficial? If you disagree with my opinion, why is the burden of proof not on you?

I like chocolate ice cream, however, I see no way to proof that it is beneficial. It is in fact bad for me. I still like it and enjoy eating it. I just cannot eat it very often. I like something that is bad. Proof anyone?

If you had asked, I would have answered the question of what I wanted to build. I had not gotten around to the specifics because of so many strawman arguments, false claims of "what I said" and other problems are been thrown at me.

The person claiming that I was in favor of "higher losses to friendly troops" hit a new low by my standards of decent people. A strawman argument of the very worse kind. Did you warn them or do the rules not apply to everyone?

One of my solutions, which I have mentioned several times is to simply mount a 17 pounder at 300 per month(I found a second source that claims only 200, so that issue is in some doubt)

The British were making them as fast as possible and seemed to like the Firefly. If you object to the Firefly being a "better" tank, why is the burden of proof not set directly with you? The Firefly is the historical norm and your challenging that norm seems to put the burden of proof on you. What is good for the goose is good for the gander.

I have argued the virtues of various weapons over many years. Some have advantages and disadvantages that seemingly cancel out. How can you prove that a favored weapon system is "better?"

I happen to like the Aoba class Japanese cruiser, however, it is a strange choice. With only six main battery guns, moderate armor and small size, it hardly rates with many/most other ships. I still like it and would be hard pressed to show "any" reason why that choice is mine.
It just is a neat ship that causes me to smile.

If I am to understand your "rules" regarding "who" shoulders the burden of proof, permit me to ask "who" came up with these rules? I have never encountered such a tightly bound set of rules. Why do you not tell the people involved, until they break some local custom?

I have had bull sessions for many decades with hundreds/thousands of EM, NCO and officer types plus thousands more civilians and never ran into these complicated rules.

Common sense and "treat others as you would have them treat you" seemed to be fine in 99.99999% of the world. This forum seems to have rules that are "assigned" by "certain people" and told to "certain other people."

In case I did not mention it, I "was" an NCO. I am a civilian now and "not" bound by any military rules. I do not have to answer to anyone except those that "I choose" to give a reply.

I was cautioned on "shroud waving" and yet it seems to me that many others seem to wave shrouds without these "rules" coming into play. Are there different standards for different people or is the playing field level?

In America(if I might wave the flag of my homeland and I will wave it no matter what your reply ) people are free to voice their opinion. Proof is only needed in a libel/slander suit. Since voicing my opinion is rarely libel/slander, I wonder where the "rules" for this forum came from and "who" directs where/how they are applied.

I know that I am not allowed to yell "fire" in a crowded movie, however, I am relatively free to voice my opinion otherwise.

I assumed that I was offering too much documentation with my posts as many seem free to offer opinion without anything except their opinion to "prove" their case.

When a claim seemed "out of normal" ranges, I have asked for a source and seemingly have not recieved that data. Perhaps it is posted and I have not gotten around to it. Perhaps under these "rules" of proof, certain people need not prove their case, nor submit sources for their "claimed" data.

What if I just wanted to post an opinion and did not care if I "proved" it or if you "accepted" my opinion? Would the stars fall from the skies or the earth cease turning? If you are really that powerful, I want to know before I offend you.

The Lord of the Cybergnomes put the "fear" into me, however, I still do not "know" if there are any limits to your power.

I had a National Guard person in charge of me(maybe thirty years ago) and he did not know when a formation had executed a left face or right face movement. We obeyed his orders and he was unhappy because we did a left face as ordered and he did not know that we had in fact executed his command.

I am trying to gain some idea of who "rates" on this forum.
Where exactly do you believe that you should be placed in the grand order of things?

Thanks for the help and comments.
Hope to have my questions answered so that I can function as a proud citizen of America on the Internet.

I am proud to be an American and too rarely offer to show that pride. Something about your "rules" and demands for "proof" brings out that pride and my flag waving.

God Bless America.
Land of the Free and Home of the Brave.

Confusion to our enemies!

Regards,
Robert

Quote:
One of my solutions, which I have mentioned several times is to simply mount a 17 pounder at 300 per month

Before 6 June 1944 that was a solution in search of a problem. The 76 mm Shermans and the tank destroyers were thought sufficient for the job. After that, I doubt the British were interested in giving the Americans any 17 pounders as they needed them all for their own forces.

As for "proof" you are not required to post any on any topic (so long as it is not tantamount to libel) unless, of course, you wish to be taken seriously.

Quote:
The Sherman was the jack-of-all-trades, capable of doing more or less anything even if it did none of them well. The tank destroyers were optimized for killing tanks and were pretty ineffective at anything else. ... Following that line of thought, we could argue that the multi-role Bradley is the lineal descendent of the Sherman while the dedicated anti-tank M-1 is a descendent of the tank destroyer.

Or rather that we swapped the Special Purpose and the Multi Purpose roles according to the requirements of evolutionary changes in tactical doctrine.

I suppose the WW-II equivalent of the Bradley would be a halftrack with a bazooka, but it just wasn't good enough at any role to be a viable multi role vehicle.



- Dennis
--
Victory at all costs,
victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be;
for without victory there is no survival.
-Sir Winston Churchill

Quote:
still would like the "option" to upgrade the Sherman by replacing the 75mm with the 17 Pounder(even as late as 1944) since the British were doing it.

You're still not saying where those 17pdrs would come from. Once we wised up to the 76mms deficiencies, there were no 17 pdrs to be had. Before that, we didn't need them; we thought we had the solution.

Quote:
I wished to "build" [a better tank] starting say in March 1942

If you decide to build a better tank in March 42, you won't have a model suitable for serial productioon until 1943. That's too late to have sufficient numbers for Overlord.

The tanks that went ashone on D-Day were ordered in 42.

Quote:
Neither the Tiger or Panther existed in Dec. 1941 or early 1942, however, the Germans did manage to produce them in fair numbers by Kursk in mid 1943.

Not in sufficient numbers to be decisive in 1943, nor in 1944.



- Dennis
--
Victory at all costs,
victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be;
for without victory there is no survival.
-Sir Winston Churchill

Thanks for the comments. They clarify a number of issues.

No sweat.

I have stated that I would expand on the tank production problems at a somewhat later date. I guessed a day or two, however, answering so many posts seems to be slowing me down. This evenings posts include additional data to hopefully help "prove" my case.

Ill see if I can find those.

Still seems somewhat "unfair"(to me) to make the burden of proof set to me. A number of other writers make "claims" and are not required to follow up with the same "standard" of proof.

Proof must be offered for any change? Why does the current status not need defending?

For the same reason the prosecution, not the defense, must prove its case. The status quo is presumed to be okay, much like the defendant is presumed to be innocent.

The earth was known by nearly everyone to be flat at one time or another. The sun also revolves around the earth. If I have a mob behind me with burning torches, do I prove to you that the earth is flat and the sun revolves around the earth?

???

If Roosevelt had said, "NO" to the Manhattan project, would I have to "prove" that the atomic bomb could be built during the war years because one man had ordered the project stopped?

Yes, you would, because it would not have happened.

Who gets to make the rules for proof? Serving NCOs and officers? People who have visited this forum for a long period of time? I am curious as to "who" set up the rules and causes them to be known? Names?

Relax on that serving NCO and officer thing. Stuart simply made the point that (especially) Suphi and I know a smidge about the topic and you ought to take that into consideration. Suphi is definitely an expert on the topic of infantry and what is needed to support them. As to who set up the rules, the rules of formal logic were established by the ancient Greeks.

Might I take a vote on "if" proof is required and "who" gets to set the rules of this forum?

You may not.

Why must I prove something is beneficial? If you disagree with my opinion, why is the burden of proof not on you?

Again, you are advocating changing the status quo, not I. You have to prove that changing the status quo would be beneficial. If I had to prove it wouldnt, I would be in the impossible position of proving a negative.

I like chocolate ice cream, however, I see no way to proof that it is beneficial. It is in fact bad for me. I still like it and enjoy eating it. I just cannot eat it very often. I like something that is bad. Proof anyone?

I havent the faintest idea what that has to do with anything.

If you had asked, I would have answered the question of what I wanted to build. I had not gotten around to the specifics because of so many strawman arguments, false claims of "what I said" and other problems are been thrown at me.

Like what?

The person claiming that I was in favor of "higher losses to friendly troops" hit a new low by my standards of decent people. A strawman argument of the very worse kind. Did you warn them or do the rules not apply to everyone?

Ill have to check (I have not read every post in the thread and will try to get to it), but I suspect what you were told is that what you are advocating would in fact cause higher losses to friendly troops.

One of my solutions, which I have mentioned several times is to simply mount a 17 pounder at 300 per month(I found a second source that claims only 200, so that issue is in some doubt).

That solution has been dealt with several times. First, in 1942/3 when it would have had to be done, we did not believe we needed a better gun than the 76mm M1 coming on line. Given the information available at the time, why would anyone have wanted the 17 pounder? From what we (thought we) knew at the time, the 76mm was adequate to do the job. So all the 17 pounder would do is provide us a small number of guns for which we did not and could not produce parts or ammunition, while providing no benefit. While that turned out to be wrong (the 17 pounder was obviously a better armor penetrator), we didnt find that out until we were engaged in Normandy, by which time it was too late to do anything. Sowhat do you propose to do to change that paradigm?

The British were making them as fast as possible and seemed to like the Firefly. If you object to the Firefly being a "better" tank, why is the burden of proof not set directly with you? The Firefly is the historical norm and your challenging that norm seems to put the burden of proof on you. What is good for the goose is good for the gander.

I thought I did provide some proof. As I said earlier, I am 8,000 miles from my library and cant source this, but the Firefly had only 1 machine gun (the coax) and a poor HE round, making it effectively a tank destroyer. Due to its poor HE round (and lack of a .50 cal), the Firefly was also at a disadvantage trying to engage anti tank guns. The gun was difficult to load due to being mounted on its side and stuffed into too small a turret, leading to a low rate of fire. The 17 pounders best tank killing round, the APDS, was fairly inaccurate, although the standard AP round was apparently good.

Nonetheless, the Firefly did give the Brits a decent chance to kill Tigers and Panthers at a distance. What I would then ask is how often those tanks engaged US tanks at great range? The majority of Allied tank losses in Normandy happened in the bocage at spitball range, so Im not sure how being able to kill a tank at 1500m really helps that situation.

I have argued the virtues of various weapons over many years. Some have advantages and disadvantages that seemingly cancel out. How can you prove that a favored weapon system is "better?"

List the advantages and disadvantages, then show that the former outweigh the latter. In many cases, you may not be able to prove your case and will only be trying to persuade the others in the discussion to come around to your point of view.

I happen to like the Aoba class Japanese cruiser, however, it is a strange choice. With only six main battery guns, moderate armor and small size, it hardly rates with many/most other ships. I still like it and would be hard pressed to show "any" reason why that choice is mine.
It just is a neat ship that causes me to smile.

That is an odd choice. I think moderate may overstate the armor, but I know what you mean. North Carolina is my favorite warship, because I proposed to my wife in the shade of her aircraft crane.

If I am to understand your "rules" regarding "who" shoulders the burden of proof, permit me to ask "who" came up with these rules? I have never encountered such a tightly bound set of rules. Why do you not tell the people involved, until they break some local custom?

As I said, the ancient Greeks established the rules of formal logic. I would hardly call this a local custom. Try <!--EZCODE LINK START--><a href="http://www.mtroyal.ab.ca/programs/arts/ ... /logic.htm" target="top">this site</a><!--EZCODE LINK END-->.

I have had bull sessions for many decades with hundreds/thousands of EM, NCO and officer types plus thousands more civilians and never ran into these complicated rules.

That does not change the fact that they exist.

Common sense and "treat others as you would have them treat you" seemed to be fine in 99.99999% of the world. This forum seems to have rules that are "assigned" by "certain people" and told to "certain other people."

Um, no. We try to be as even-handed as possible.

In case I did not mention it, I "was" an NCO. I am a civilian now and "not" bound by any military rules. I do not have to answer to anyone except those that "I choose" to give a reply.

Formal logic is definitely not a military rule. It is a basis of western civilization, though.

I was cautioned on "shroud waving" and yet it seems to me that many others seem to wave shrouds without these "rules" coming into play. Are there different standards for different people or is the playing field level?

Shroud Waving is a logical fallacy. You did in fact wave a shroud and it was pointed out to you. As to others waving said shrouds, show me examples.

In America (if I might wave the flag of my homeland and I will wave it no matter what your reply ) people are free to voice their opinion. Proof is only needed in a libel/slander suit. Since voicing my opinion is rarely libel/slander, I wonder where the "rules" for this forum came from and "who" directs where/how they are applied.

First, this board is a benevolent dictatorship. When in doubt, refer to that principle. Second, you are free to say whatever you want, but if you are making an illogical argument, dont expect the rest of us to take it seriously.

I know that I am not allowed to yell "fire" in a crowded movie, however, I am relatively free to voice my opinion otherwise.

See above.

I assumed that I was offering too much documentation with my posts as many seem free to offer opinion without anything except their opinion to "prove" their case.

You dont necessarily need to document everything (although its nice to be able to do if someone challenges a fact you have presented), but you do need to properly construct your argument.

When a claim seemed "out of normal" ranges, I have asked for a source and seemingly have not recieved that data. Perhaps it is posted and I have not gotten around to it. Perhaps under these "rules" of proof, certain people need not prove their case, nor submit sources for their "claimed" data.

You challenged my numbers on Panther production and I told you that I am in Kuwait and nowhere near my library. Therefore I am unable to provide the documentation you request.

What if I just wanted to post an opinion and did not care if I "proved" it or if you "accepted" my opinion? Would the stars fall from the skies or the earth cease turning? If you are really that powerful, I want to know before I offend you.

The earth would not cease spinning, but the discussion wouldnt really go anywhere, would it?

The Lord of the Cybergnomes put the "fear" into me, however, I still do not "know" if there are any limits to your power.

The board is benevolent dictatorship. Still, Sorivar is far more powerful than any of us. His cybergnomes are downright evil!

I had a National Guard person in charge of me(maybe thirty years ago) and he did not know when a formation had executed a left face or right face movement. We obeyed his orders and he was unhappy because we did a left face as ordered and he did not know that we had in fact executed his command.

Sorry excuse for an NCO, that.

I am trying to gain some idea of who "rates" on this forum.
Where exactly do you believe that you should be placed in the grand order of things?

On this board, I rate with David Newton (the board founder), Seer Stuart, Supatra and Sixth Crew Member, my fellow Administrators.

Thanks for the help and comments. Hope to have my questions answered so that I can function as a proud citizen of America on the Internet.

Youre welcome.

I am proud to be an American and too rarely offer to show that pride. Something about your "rules" and demands for "proof" brings out that pride and my flag waving.

No rule against patriotism. Just dont try to justify an argument about the merits of a weapon system because of it.

God Bless America.
Land of the Free and Home of the Brave.

Confusion to our enemies!

Tak tochna!


SPQA

Quote:
Devers changed his earlier opinion about the 76mm gun project"..."the further perfection of the M4 tank, the best on any front today, should be aggressively continued."

And they did, one year later, the 76 mm gunned Sherman was in production. 76 mm-gunned TDs were already being produced. Proving ground tests showed that the 76 mm would penetrate a Tigers frontal armour.

Quote:
The British Army had a fundamentally different view of tank armament than their American allies

Considering that the US started putting their equivalent to the 17 pounder into tanks at the same time as the UK, and as standard production, not a stopgap improvisation, this would seem not to be the case. Its also notable that the UK did not get an equivalent to the US 90 mm gun into a tank until well after the end of the war.

Quote:
America did not "know" about tank warfare from Poland, France, Africa, Russia?

The lessons of Poland, France, and the beginning of the Russia campaign showed that hordes of lightly armoured, lightly armed tanks would devastate the opposition. In France and Poland, a very large proportion of German tanks had either machine guns or 20 mm cannon as main armament. Most of the remainder had 37 mm guns that were impotent against heavy allied tanks such as the Char B and Matilda II. With this example, the 75 mm gun Sherman should have been ideal.

The lessons learned from Africa were that combined arms tactics were far better than the pure tank or pure infantry battles the British had originally been trying to fight. They showed that AT guns were perhaps the leading killers of tanks, which implies that improved. Mobile AT guns might do as well or better. They also found towards the end of that campaign that the Germans were starting to deploy small numbers of heavy tanks in special support units. They found that existing AT weapons could take them out if permitted to manoeuvre. Improved AT weapons, like the 76 mm, should be able to do so more easily. There was no indication in Africa that the next generation of German medium would be nearly twice the size of existing German tanks and armoured
nearly as well as their new heavy.

Russian lessons were less direct as they had to be filtered through the Soviets. Even then, the information on the Panther was late and limited.

Quote:
The U.S. military looked at the world using rose colored glasses and closed their minds to the well documented facts from "at least" 1939 forwards.

General Devers, your chosen example, came to the conclusion in late 1943 that improved guns were required, and so they were installed very shortly after the first Fireflies start appearing. As for closing their eyes from 1939, note that in 1942, the US had tanks in battle that were better than anything the British had until 1944, and better in many ways than what the Soviets had at that time. US tanks continued to be as good or better than the Soviets throughout the war while the British had to wait until the Comet came out in late 1944 to get something only slightly better armed than contemporary Shermans.

Quote:
I wished to "build" one starting say in March 1942(or perhaps starting after 7 Dec. 1941, since the world had become a much more dangerous place)

And what were the standard German tanks in December 1941 or even March 1942? They were twenty to twenty-five ton Mark IIIs and IVs armed with 5 cm L42 and 7.5 cm L24 guns. The standard British tanks were even smaller, still armed with 40 mm 2 pounders, and the best American tank was the stopgap M-3 series. Its as big a leap from the Mark III to the Panther as from the Crusader to the Centurion. Note that the Sherman is considerably heavier than these tanks and much better armed.

Quote:
The "summer of 1943" timeframe that you comment on is not a good example

On the contrary, July 1943 is the very first time the Panther appeared in combat, and it was not an auspicious debut. Again, note that less than six months after that, the 76 mm Sherman is in production.

Quote:
You also "suspend belief" in American reports from Africa, Sicily and Italy.

You mean where existing AT weapons, like the six pounder and the 75 mm Sherman were able to take out Tigers without serious loss? Note that they dont start meeting Panthers in Italy until February and it is not until April that technical intelligence is able to complete a report on them.

Quote:
I am suggesting a starting date in late 1941 or early 1942 since the historical evidence had already given us "some guidelines" for building a "better" tank than the Sherman.

Interesting, BTW, that the British were only able to get 75 mm gun Cromwells in service by the beginning of 1944, and that was certainly no better than the Sherman. The Soviets didnt get T-34-85s in service until January 1944, the same time the US got 76 mm Shermans off the production lines. It was only slightly better as a vehicle than the US tank, and had a slightly inferior gun. The M-4A3E8 was easily its equal and probably its superior. Why should you expect the US to do all that much better than any of their allies?

Quote:
using some of the other production to "build" additional shipping to move the tanks into the ETO.

Cargo handling upgrades as well? Thats the key limitation here, not hulls. This means ships and ports including those in German occupied Europe. It also means heavier tank landing craft designed and in production no later than the middle of 1943.

Quote:
We canceled a 5,000 tank order for the M6 in Sept. 1942.

The M-6 was less reliable, less mobile, and had the same main armament. The transmission, in particular was troublesome. As a heavy tank, it would only have supplemented the Shermans in any case, as the Tigers supplemented the Mark IVs and Panthers.

Quote:
Why bother to upgrade the Sherman into a Firefly? You get a much better tank by upgrading.

For anti-tank work that is. For any other purpose it is notably inferior. It also uses a non-standard weapon and ammunition that are not available from US sources and as far as can be determined before Normandy, offers little or no practical improvement over the 76 mm as an AT gun.

Quote:
Kasserine, Africa, Sicily and Italy did not happen prior to 6 June 1944?

None of which were serious tests of US armour doctrine. They were all much smaller scale actions with limited forces on both sides.

Quote:
Guderian, Fuller and a host of other armor thinkers went ignored and unread for years before the 1939 fighting in Poland.

Easy to see that they had a good idea of what they were talking about now isnt it? Yet except for anti-tank doctrine, the US got it right. They had large numbers of tanks with good tactical mobility, and excellent strategic mobility and C3, they used them in armoured formations indeed even a US infantry division was virtually a Panzer division by German standards. Their armament was sufficient for the majority of engagements, including those against AFVs. They had a useful HE firing tank two years before the UK, for instance. Finally, they realized tanks work best when used to penetrate the enemies lines where he is weakest and get inside his decision making loop. This means primarily NOT using them against tanks. They realized that armour needed to be employed in flexible, combined arms formations and did so as well or better than anyone else during the war.

Where they went wrong doctrinally was in overestimating the value of SP AT guns, and underestimating the need for tanks to have as good a dual-purpose armament as they could get.

Quote:
The Germans managed to field both the Panther and Tiger by mid 1943. We could not be bothered to build a "better" tank after being given an additional year

And if we had been fighting T-34s and KVs in Russia in 1941, we might have done the same. OTOH, the Germans also seriously considered fielding a T-34 clone that would have been considerably easier for the Sherman to handle one on one than the Panther. Given that it would have been cheaper and more reliable, it may well have been a better choice for them. Oddly enough, the Germans were not telling the rest of the world what lessons they were learning in the east.

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If you read the plans for the airborne at Normandy, you will note that they were dropped to protect the approaches to the landing sites. They were not dropped to have minimal resistance.

You will notice that they were dropped in the German rear areas intended to face unprepared forces rather than close to the front lines to fight dug in troops and that they still took very heavy casualties.

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Why exactly did the British airborne not have tank support?

The point we have been making here is that infantry suffers heavily without armour support, with Arnhem as an example of what happens when unsupported infantry meets tanks. This is in contrast with your stated view that lack of such support is a comparatively minor inconvenience. Remember: The infantry did not mind waiting a couple of hours for artillery, tanks, air or anything else to bust a couple of bunkers.

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United States Tanks of World War II, Fourty, p. 21, "Chart reads American tank production 1942 24,997, 1943 29,497 and 1944 17,565 and 1945 11,968 The British built 1942 8,611
1943 7,476 1944 2,476 and 1945 zero.

These figures suggest that tank production fell way off in England(I guess to provide manpower for their military)

Once youve produced enough to equip your forces, there is little reason to build more than is required to replace losses. Even then, the delays inherent in designing, producing and deploying new tanks means that the war will be nearly over before they can see much if any use. By 1945, there is no point in producing tanks for the ETO as they knew the war would be over before they could get there. Nearly all war-time production started to wind down in late 1944 and 1945.

I doubt that 1945 figure for the UK. IIRC, at least a few Centurions were built that year.

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By concentrating on the Grant,

Whatever makes you think the Grant was any easier to produce than the Sherman? It uses exactly the same chassis and radio equipment, has an additional gun, and two more crew.

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You suggest that U.S.military found that they could not produce a reliable 45 odd ton tank by mid 1943. How about by mid 1944?

How about by mid 1949? Thats when they actually did it with the M-46.

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Colby believed that if the AGF(Army Ground Forces) had given the go-ahead early enough, the Pershing could have been available in quantities for the beachhead landings on D-Day; and that the record supports his belief.'

The record shows that a reliable transmission was not nearly ready enough in 1943 and barely reliable enough in late 1944.

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21,000 40ish odd ton tanks use much more POL than 42,000 Shermans?

Five thousand forty-ton plus tanks would use considerably more POL than five thousand Shermans, assuming you could get that many over to France. If not, you cause a tank shortage that will slow the dash across France and increase infantry casualties. Not to mention that your forty-ton tanks are going to spend more time in the shop than the Shermans will.

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vI have never stated, suggested or believed that "higher infantry casualties were not important."

Then what was the point of your litany of unsupported infantry engagements that resulted in massive casualties?

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No one has shown me where building even as few as 21,000 "better" tanks

Contemporary estimates were that the US would only be able to ship half as many forty-five ton tanks as thirty-tanks.

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Losses(cumulative) to date June 1944 187, July 467, August 899 and 3,256 by May 12, 1945.

And how many would have been lost if they were Pershings or Fireflies rather than Shermans? You can assume that most of the ones killed by mines, breakdowns, accidents, and AT guns will still be destroyed especially the Fireflies. A large number of the ones killed by Panzerfauste will still be casualties, the Pershings side armour is not much better than the Shermans. A good number of the ones killed by German tanks will be casualties, again especially the Fireflies. Recalling that you are starting with half the tanks and can only bring half the replacement tanks, this will still leave a serious shortfall.

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By invading Normandy, the Allied "knew" about the terrain and that their "doctrine" would have to pit tank vs tanks with the Sherman being both undergunned and underarmored compared to both the German Panther and Tiger. When the Germans attacked again in the Bulge, the "doctrine" was still "unworkable in practice."

By then, the equipment to fulfil the doctrine was already in place and it was simply not possible to replace it and retrain an entire army in the time available. Its also a bit early to make the kind of thorough examination that can be done at leisure in peacetime, and recall that the people involved were a touch busy.

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The Panther was examined in detail at Kursk and in Italy by U.S. military and their reports were forwarded. The Tiger was engaged in Africa and also "examined" in detail after Kursk.

The Kursk reports were of a mechanically unreliable POS that occasionally self immolated and was available in limited numbers. The Italian reports were not available until April 1944 far too late to be of any use.

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Your numbers on Allied tanks in Normandy seem awfully high.
The numbers for German tanks also seem awfully high. Might I have a source?

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Please list a source for the British being surprised by facing "six" times the expected heavy German armor.

I didnt say that. What I said was That theyd face five times as many Panthers as Tigers, and that the Panther would be at least as formidable against Shermans was not known until too late and it is in reference to the US forces. From what youve posted, it seems clear that the US did not know either until at least February 1944, and more likely no sooner than April. I rather suspect the full impact was not apparent until June.

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"The first inkling that this might not be the case came in a joint Allied intelligence report released on February 22, 1944 on the basis of a German prisoner of war who stated that the Wehrmacht was shifting the organization of its panzer regiments to a new configuration consisting of one battalion of PzKpfw IV tanks and one battalion of Panthers. This was formally recognized in an Allied report on the German panzer division on April 30, 1944."

Note those dates. February and April 1944. This will not help the Normandy fighting.

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It may or may not be as good as a Panther/Tiger, but I am trying to give the troops the best matchup possible.

Given the data available about both the Germans and their own kit, thats exactly what we did do.

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The point that I am "still trying to make" is that having a "better" tank killing machine "helped" us win "with very light losses" and in record time in both Gulf Wars.

Yes it did. Its also the legacy of forty years of Cold War and lessons learned at great price in Normandy and after. The choice facing US armour was not many cheaper tanks, but either a moderate number of very good, expensive tanks, or the same number of cheaper, inferior ones. To assume that these lessons can be applied retroactively to Normandy is unrealistic.

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Why build bad tanks, when the evidence suggests that a "better" tank might be needed?

We didnt. The Sherman was not a bad tank. It was very well suited for mass deployment across the world using 1940s technology and was probably the most mechanically reliable medium tank of the war and was as good or better on the battlefield than all but one of its contemporary mediums. The available evidence suggested that a heavier gun, i.e. the 76 mm should become standard and it became so.

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If the 90mm fit into a Sherman, "make the change" since you do "know" that the M26 is not going to arrive in time.

Unless you have a 90 mm gun Sherman turret designed and ready for production, you wont see any in Europe a long time, certainly not before the M-26.

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the Tiger was only 5% of the German armor force. Who could have guessed that the numbers would increase?

In Normandy it was still only about six percent 126 out of some 2,000. About eight percent if you exclude Sturmgeschuetze and Jagdpanzer.

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We did get specific measurements back from Kursk from Allied military people.

And range testing in 1943 showed that available weapons, the 76 mm in particular, would handle the Tiger with no great problem. As it happened, the testing was wrong.

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WWI German troops had fought in Russia in WWI, that no one "knew" that it got cold in Russia after fighting a war there in WWI?

How many tanks or motor vehicles did the Germans have in the east in 1918? When and where would they be able to test their designs and develop the necessary specialized modifications for extreme cold weather operations? They probably expected the cold weather casualties in the winter of 1941/42 as they had made no preparations for fighting past the fall, but they had no way of evaluating what the Russian climate would do to mechanized operations as they had never tried them under Russian conditions.

Tank production grew greatly until 1943, fell sharply in 1944 and climbed back up again in 1945. We built almost 30,000 tanks in 1943 and less than 20,000 tanks in 1944.

I have already posted the medium tank numbesr(and losses) for June, July and August 1944 plus some at the end of the war for 12th ARmy group. 2,608 total medium tanks for 12th Army Group covers June 6 until the end of August.

I have also posted my suggested "begin" time in recent posts. One writer suggested a two year time frame for scratch to battlefield. Starting in late 1941 to early middle 1942 leaves two years and change for production of a new tank.

A minor part of the American "production" history is also included on recent posts. A 100 acre site built from scratch and that "one" plant built some 22,000 tanks plus rebuilt over 2,000 more. The plant was expanded during the war to increase production.

A single plant built from "scratch" produced in excess of 22,000 tanks.

Panzer IV &amp; Its Variants, Walter J. Spielberger, p. 54, "Production of the Panzerkampfwagen IV (7.5 cm) (Sd.Kfz.161/1) Ausf. G began in mid 1942. By the Summer of 1943, Krupp-Grusonwerk, Vomag, and Nibelungerwerk had produced 1700 Panzerkampfwagen IV with the 7.5 cm KwK 40 in the chassis number series from 82701 through 84400."

"In June of 1942 an order was issued that called for strengthening the front armor of the Panzer IV to 80mm.As of August 15, the final version of the 7.5 cm KwK 40, with a barrel length of L/48, was available for testing. From then on, all Panzer IV vehicles that were repaired in Germany were to be rearmed with the 7.5cm KwK 40."

Seems like the Germans were trying to improve the numbers and quality of their armored force during the summer of 1943. 1700 Mark IV with the 7.5 KwK 40 produced by the summer of 1943 and hundreds of Panthers and Tigers also saw action in the summer of 1943.

If the Germans are not sending a "warning" by this constant upgrading of both armor and gunpower, just look at the progress of their armor from Poland forwards. Mostly Mark I and IIs. France more modern and better tanks. Africa still more modern and better tanks. Russia a constant improvement in both armor and gunpower.

The tanks are Kursk were "measured" in detail by the American military.. But you say, we had no warning and could not have "known" of "better" tanks coming from German factories. We closed our eyes and saw "nothing" from the battle reports of Poland, France, Africa, Sicily, Italy and Russia. We did not have a clue.

Just look at the barrel of a Panther tank and picture the short 75mm of a Sherman. If that 'comparison' does not cause some doubt, check the armor measurements sent back from Africa, Sicily, Italy and Russia. The Germans have been adding armor and better guns to their tanks since Poland. We also have detailed battlefield measurements from 1941 onward. How could we have possibly guess that the Germans "are not stopping" their constant improvements in both gunpower and armor?

Regards,
Robert

You stated that I used the word "happy" in this matter. I still do not see that word from any of my posts on the subject that you found upsetting. I freely admit that I used a poor "choice of words" and hope that my clarification of my intent will bring better understanding between us.

I apologize for any concerns that were caused by my poor choice of words. I hope that my expanded statement further down brings better understanding between us.

Production capacity? We cancelled an order for 5,000 M6 tanks in 1942. The U.S. Naval construction program for 1943 cancelled a "huge" amount of warship construction. The U.S. production capacity is WWII virually overwhelms the mind with both its promise and the resulting flood of weapons.

You write that we are talking about the total number of "chasis" built. You picked the word "chasis" only after I had already been posted on this forum. I will cheerfully agree to use that term "chasis," "after" I have been informed of a "change" in the subject under discussion.

I did not use the phrase/word "chasis" built as a limiting factor for the numbers of Sherman tanks "built" in any of my postings. State the terms of contest and I will comply with your wishes.

I realize that this is likely a second language for you, however, I need to be informed of any changes made in "after the fact" in how to count the numbers of "items" being discusssed.

I agreed to "use" your "51,000" odd Sherman tank "figure" which requires counting self propelled guns(and other vehicles) as "Sherman tanks." I did note that several authors and "others" do not normally count self propelled guns(etc.) as Sherman tanks.

The United States Army lists self propelled guns and other vehicles with different production numbers than the M4 series production numbers. I served in the U.S. Army and tend to follow their system of counting vehicles in the M4 series as "Shermans" and vehicles "outside" of the M4 series production, such as M7 and M37 production series as non M4 series vehicles.

Since you are using a second language for these postings, I will accept "any terms" that you care to use provided that I am "made aware of the change" prior to my posting something.





I do agree that I could have phrased my wording "much better" about the infantry did not mind waiting for a couple of hours for artillery, tanks, air or anything else to bust a couple of bunkers."

I served in the U.S. Army of 1967-70 and "we" had a different view of war than our Marine friends. The Marines policy(as I understood it at that time, from the stories that I had "heard") was to rush snipers as they could not get many of the Marines before the Marines got the snipers. The Army tended to "wait" for tanks, air, artillery or anything else before they rushed a sniper. I had assumed that this "method" of fighting also included bunkers, fortified positions, the West Wall and/or other defended areas.

My reading of history seemed to support this general theory of American warfare(I was writing about the Allied vs German combat in Normandy). The Germans claimed that we used a war of material against them and I agree with that claim.

If requested, I will furnish numerous examples of the U.S. Army holding up their advance while waiting for armor, air, artillery, etc. etc. to destroy/weaken the enemy "before" they advance. There are exceptions, however, this general policy seemed the normal way of fighting a war by the U.S. Army in modern times.

I apologize for any and all misunderstanding of my poor choice of "words" for that sentence. I understand that you(as a serving infantry officer) have the greatest concern for the men as your highest priority.

In my own time in service, I rated officers and NCOs that were concerned for the welfare of their men as "superior" officers/NCOS.

My meaning was that the infantry "did not mind" waiting for support, "as it would save lives to wait."
Since the U.S. Army normally provided air, tank, artillery or something "within" a reasonable timeframe, the infantry normally "did not" make a hasty attack that would result in high losses "if there was a choice" available of waiting for tank, artillery, air, etc. etc. to arrive and attack the enemy with heavy firepower.

I do understand that if tank, artillery, air support etc. etc. is needed right now, the infantry do not want to wait a single second before the supporting firepower is available. To think otherwise, would make me a terrible monster without feelings of any kind.

If you misunderstood that my feelings were anything other than for the welfare of the troops, I sincerely apologize for my error. It "was" a poor choice of words and I hope that I have corrected any misunderstanding from my post.

I completely agree with you that any tank is better than no tank when tank support is needed.

The question that I wanted to ask you, "was have you commanded a ETO level, Corps/Army level(tank heavy) battlel? Not battallion or regimental size(and very rarely as small as a division sized force) fighting, but Corps/Army level tank heavy fighting? Something like 15/20 divisions on either side and thousands of tanks fought at Normandy. That is the level of fighting which I am writing about.

An armored assault by several divisions with hundreds of tanks and guns plus thousands of aircraft in support? Have you commanded such a force? I have no experience in handling such a force and I assumed that true it was true for both of us.

The handling of small infantry(by ETO Corps/Army level battle scale) actions is your field of expertise. I accept your views on those battles a very likely 100% correct.

Unless you have commanded Corps/Army(tank heavy) ETO level fighting, I expect that your experience
is much less at the Corps/Army(tank heavy) fighting levels that I am attempting to discuss.

I have one or two books by Van Creveld, which book and what parts? Have you read anyl of DuPuy's books? His rating of the Israeli Army gives them very high ratings. Major Kenneth Machsey in his Tank versus Tank Book also seems to think highly of the Iraeli tank forces.

A civilian(who bought planes and missiles for the U.S. Navy) seemed to think that the Israeli airforce was ranked right up there with the U.S. Carrier planes for best fighting peformance.

Regards,
Robert

You write that we are talking about the total number of "chasis" built. You picked the word "chasis" only after I had already been posted on this forum. I will cheerfully agree to use that term "chasis," "after" I have been informed of a "change" in the subject under discussion.

Robert, stop being such a litteral minded pedant, it's not helping your argument in any way. It is valid to talk about the chassis because the chassis IS the basic frame of the vehicle which EVERY other major componant is attached to. The suspension, the engine, the transmission, the armour, etc. Without the chassis, there is no vehicle, period. If you can only produce 100 chassis per month, than you can only build 100 tanks per month based on that chassis. If you can produce 10,000 chassis per month, you can produce 10,000 tanks per month based on that chassis.

If you want a tank with heavier armour than the Shermen, the chassis is what that heavier armour is attached to. The weight has now gone up. That weight is supported by the suspension, so now we need new suspension. That weight also affects the power/weight ratio of the vehicle, which limits it's performance, on road and off road. We can improve the power/weight ratio of the vehicle by using a more powerful engine (what other engines were available which were suitable for a tank, how many were being produced and how reliable were they?). That extra power needs to pass through the transmission, so now we need a stronger transmission. See how the effects of one change flow on to other aspects of the vehicle?

Is the existing Sherman chassis suitable for all these changes, or is a completely new chassis needed for all these changes to be worthwhile? Are there any Sherman production lines which will not be able to produce tanks based on this new chassis (the machinery of the production line can't handle the new chassis, componant supplies for the new chassis are limited at that production line by transportation, etc)?

Will your better tank be available in similar numbers to the Sherman, or will there be fewer of them? While you argue that a better tank would have been more able to take on the heavier German designes, if there are fewer of these better tanks, there is less chance that there will be one in the right place at the right time to deal with the heavier German tanks when opposing units detect each other. Will this better tank have the same battlefield mobility as a Sherman, or better, or worse? Reliability? A "better" but less reliable tank spends more time being repaired/less time actually fighting. Add in a lower number of them in total and it means that at any given moment, there are fewer tanks supporting the infantry and fewer of them in the right place at the right time to deal with the German tanks when they're located?

As the saying goes: better is the enemy of good enough. Sure, a "better" tank than the Sherman could have been built, but would it have been reliable enough and available in enough numbers to be in the right places at the right times to have the same impact that the Sherman had? That's what you need to establish in your argument. Not only that a "better" tank should have been built, but that the people responsible for making the decisions about tank designs and production had enough information to know they'd need something better than a Sherman, and that the resulting vehicle would have been more effective, not only measured individually, but measured against the effect of the masssed numbers of Shermans built and deployed during the war.

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The Germans have been adding armor and better guns to their tanks since Poland.

So has everyone, the US included. Yet you would have us believe that it is entirely predicable for the Germans to go from the incremental improvements they had been making, to doubling the size of their standard medium in one go.

The Americans didn't do that, the British didn't do that, and the Soviets didn't do that. Why would they have thought the Germans would?

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The tanks are Kursk were "measured" in detail by the American military

I keep seeing a different story, namely that they did not have such measurements from Kursk, that the Soviet information was misleading, and that the first detailed Western report on the Panther was not ready until the late spring of 1944. If you have a different source, I'd like to see it.

I revived this topic because I've come into some interesting information that throws an entirely new light upon the whole issue. This comes courtesy of Dr Norman Friedman and stems from his latest Design History on Amphibious Warfare.

One of the problems facing the designers of amphibious warfare ships was getting tanks ashore early in a landing. When the design specs were laid down for tank landing craft, the British and US ship designers quite seperately asked their tank designers what was the maximum weight that tanks were likely to grow to within the next four or five years. In both cases, the answers they were given was that 30 tons was the likely maximum except for some limited-production, special purpose variants. Thus, when the design teams sat down to produce the production tank landing craft, they designed around tanks that would weigh about 30 tons.

The result of this was that the 75 millimeter Sherman (rated at 30 tons) was the heaviest tank that could be carried by landing craft. In fact, it was even worse than that because the 76 millimeter Sherman (rated at 32 tons) was actually slightly more than the landing craft could carry - it was done but at serious safety and material damage risks. It wasn't just a question of modifying the landing craft - the materials available to the landing craft designers were simply incapable of bearing the load of tanks significantly heavier than the Sherman. It wasn't just that landing craft capable of carrying heavier tanks hadn't been designed, they couldn't be designed without diverting other materials away from other parts of the defense effort. (Its important to remember landing craft were considered expendables so they were built of non-essential materials such as wood and low-grade steel).

In short, the landing craft situation meant that the Sherman had to remain in production. Replacing it with a heavier tank would mean suspending all operations in the Pacific until new landing craft could be designed and built (based on previous experience, a two-year delay at least). the landing sin Europe would be delayed by a similar amount. The other option, of course, was to keep the Sherman in production and build a new heavy tank but that would cause major disruption and reduction in total tank output.

Postwar, a new tank landing craft family that could handle the M-26 and M-46 was designed and built. However, it had to use shipbuilding steel and shipbuilding facilities and could only be produced in relatively small numbers. The mass production of landing craft that had featured in WW2 simply could not be repeated due to the sophisticated designs required for the new, heavier, tanks.

Thus, it appears that the reason for the retention of the M4 Sherman family was primarily an outgrowth of the landing craft situation. Tanks (whether in Europe or the Pacific) had to be capable of being landed over a beach (both in the initial assault and in follow-ups until an operating port was taken) and that limited them to the capacity of the existing landing craft - 30 tons.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

---- Output from Sherman 6.htm ----
Back in October 2003, this was scrivened:

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In short, the landing craft situation meant that the Sherman had to remain in production. Replacing it with a heavier tank would mean suspending all operations in the Pacific until new landing craft could be designed and built (based on previous experience, a two-year delay at least).

I don't see where that necessarily follows. It would not have been inconceivable to maintain Sherman production for the Pacific while changing ome plants over to newer production. The M4 was about the ideal tank in the Pacific, unless you want to design some fantasy hybrid of the Sherman with the T-34's tracks. The Japanese had essentially no armor capability, and a heavier tank would have caused more problems than it solved. Arguably, we could profitably have used less of a tank in the PTO.

Friedman's argument makes sense in the ETO, where the lead times leading up to Overlord had to be respected.

While I don't think the logistic difficulties of maintaining two disparate lines of tank production were insurmountable, the problems with the automotive inferiority of the M26 confirm the decision of maintaining the Sherman family as long as we did.



- Dennis
--
Victory at all costs,
victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be;
for without victory there is no survival.
-Sir Winston Churchill

Just to clarify; the information about landing craft comes from Norman, the application of that information to the Sherman production question was mine. The key point to me is not that landing craft capable of carrying heavier tanks weren't built; it was that the design and materials technology then available meant that such landing craft couldn't be built.

It certainly would have been possible to split tank production; to some extent this was done between the M4 and the M24. However, the mechanics of mass production meant each split meant a penalty in total numbers. The US had a history throughout WW2 of ditching promising designs because they would have disrupted the flow of mass production. For example, the lightweight P-51s were never put into production despite their considerable advantages over the standard models because of the disruption they would have caused. Merchant shipping is another example; the mass production of Liberty ships was continued even though a better model (the Victory Ship) was available until sheer numbers weren't needed. The penalties of splitting production can actually be quite severe because they echo all the way down the production chain. One of the worst problems the Germans faced was that they did split their production lines up and paid a serious penalty due to it.

I think what the landing craft information does is change the fundamental terms of the debate. Previously the question was whether the Sherman should have been discontinued in favor of a heavier tank. The landing craft situation rules that out, now the question is whether a significant proportion of Sherman production should have been terminated in favor of a heavier tank that could not be landed over a beach.

Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

They would also have needed larger capacity landing craft and landing ships in the ETO if they were deploying heavier tanks, not to mention imporved handing facilities at European ports and on Liberty ships themselves.

In other words, they would need not just a new tank production line starting in 1943, but new LCT and LST lines as well - plus other infrastructure improvements.

It may well be that the production penalty might have been worth it, if they could get a sufficient number of forty-five ton, 90 mm gun tanks to Europe to counter the Panthers and Tigers. As it seems that they could not, building tanks that best fit the logistics pipeline was their best bet.

In other words, they would need not just a new tank production line starting in 1943, but new LCT and LST lines as well - plus other infrastructure improvements.

But the problem was that, given the materials and technology then available, new LCTs and LSTs capable of handling 45 ton tanks couldn't be built. The landing craft and most of the landing ships (up to and including LSTs) were regarded as expendable; they were built of cheap, low-grade steel and wood. The footprint of a 45 ton tank isn't so very much larger than the 30 ton tank so its stress loading on the ship underneath it is 50 percent higher. The only amphibious warfare ships that could handle the load were the LSDs - that were warships, built to warship standards and of warship materials. If the US had gone to 45 ton tanks, their LCTs and LSTs would have to be built the same way which immediately put pressure on supplies of shipbuilding steel and shipyards. Effectively, there would have to be a policy decision to cut back on warship production in favor of amphibious landing craft construction. In 1942/43 that would have to be a very hard decision. Also, the base of construction (number of yards) would be much smaller so the numbers produced would be much smaller.

Look at what happened postwar. The new postwar LCTs and LSTs could handle 45 (and 60) ton tanks - but they were built in tiny numbers. A few dozen instead of literally thousands. The modern equivalent of the LCT is the LCU - 96 built between 1952 and 2000 as opposed to 1,435 between 1942 and 1945. LST production is even more dramatic; 49 between 1952 and 2000 as opposed to 1,054 between 1943 and 1945. Its not as if there was a great deal of difference in sophistication - an F-15 is a totally different animal from a P-51 but a postwar LST is almost identical to the wartime version - except for the difference in construction materials and stress loadings. Put a P-51 pilot in an F-15 and he wouldn't know where to start. Put a wartime LCT crew in an LCU and they'd have her up and running within 30 minutes.

This is, I think, the key to the whole thing. The disruptive ripples of a major increase in tank size goes far beyond just the tank industry; they hit the war effort in virtually every single area. By the way, the 90 millimeter gun Sherman did exist, it was the M36B1. The turret from the M-36 mounted on a Sherman hull. I can't help wondering if that was a compromise based on weight as well.


Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

Suddenly the Sherman was a feared beast; you can laugh at it when you're in a Panther with armor to the nines. When you're a Landser with nothing but your shirt between its 75 and you, a Sherman is a nightmare.

I can attest to this effect; I've done it to my computerized opponents in "Steel Panthers MBT"; Even a LVTP7 Amtrac with just a .50 caliber or 40mm AGL cupola is a feared beast if you're a guerilla insurgent with just an AK.

This post shall not be carried in aircraft on combat missions or when there is a reasonable chance of its falling into the hands of an unfriendly nation, unless specifically authorized by the "Moderator."
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Sorry, but what about the Chruchil's?

As far as I know Hobart's Funnies rolled ashore off bog standard LCT Mk.3's or 4's... probably Mk.4's. There's 50 ton of tank on the hoof at the big moment.

I'm not saying weight restrictions for shipping were not a factor in favour of continued M4 production, and IIRC the larger dimentions of M-47's direct ancestors were enough to keep them out of unmodified wartime Landing Craft.

But the general consensus over on tanknet, by people who eat breathe and write books about AFV's, is that the basic motivation from the long run of M4's was high volume production. All the other benifits the M4 platform might have bought with it, were just iceing on the cake.

shane


Rule .303
Shoot straight, you bastards.

As far as I know Hobart's Funnies rolled ashore off bog standard LCT Mk.3's or 4's... probably Mk.4's. There's 50 ton of tank on the hoof at the big moment.

Not so; they were landed from British-built 193 foot tank landing craft that were built to warship standards and were designed around a 40 ton tank. They were called TLCs rather than LCTs precisely to avoid possible confusion. The British actually cancelled a number of frigates in order to free up the building capacity and materials supplies for those ships.

Even then, there weren't enough of them. Many years back, Nevil Shute Norway wrote a history of the Department of Miscellaneous Weapons development (DMWD) that included some interesting insights into the landing craft problem. There were a series of weapons being developed for deployment from landing craft including Hedgerow (a version of hedgehog designed to clear minefields), the Great Panjandrum etc. Hedgerow in particular was a problem since it couldn't be installed in American landing craft at all and could only be fitted to British built craft if they were especially strengthened to take the firing shock. (Hedgerow was sent out to be used in Anzio but nobody knew what it was so it was removed from the specially strengthened LCTs. It was later re-installed in standard LCTs - and firing it sank them.

[bBut the general consensus over on tanknet, by people who eat breathe and write books about AFV's, is that the basic motivation from the long run of M4's was high volume production.[/b]

Hmmm. From what I've heard of Tanknet, they see everything through AFV eyes and only through AFV eyes. The expert comment (guess who from) I've had on them is that they're great on AFV issues but anything outside that and they get very unreliable.



Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others

I grant you Tanknet have a certain ah... focus. But like any board 'unreliable' very much depends on the who and the what. I'd never acuse 'I guess who' of being on 'conre durgs' (a pure tanknetism as it happens), but they do have a broader view than just AFV's. Anyway the 'M4 story' is rather tank related isn't it?

I'll have to see if I can dig out my Landing Craft stuff, I had 'TLC' down as the precursor name for LCT's, fitting between A-Lighters and LCT... oh well. Not the first time I've been wrong.

I still like the 'Western Desert Lighter Force' as a name - We Die Like Flies is one way of looking at doing the Tobruk run in 10 knot craft.

By the way you might find:

http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstrea ... 2whole.pdf
ses.library.usyd.edu.au/b...2whole.pdf - LINK

...interesting. I hope the bloke is a better ecconomist than he is a technologist, all the same it looks like a decent bit of work.

shane
ed for a knotty typo

Addendum:
It looks like I was wrong above, in that the name 'TLC' predated the 'A-Lighter' which was only a Med thing. But from what I've found the Churchill was the criteria used for UK LCT design almost from the start.

Hawthorn Leslie delivered the first TLC(1) in 11/40. TLC(2) capable of carrying three Churchills (or 6 Valentines) was ordered in 12/40 and was produced in Britain, the US and India.

John Brown's converted a TLC(1) into TLC(3) by bolting five hull sections together insetead of four (for a TLC(2) ) specifically to carry 5 Chruchills. Then in 42 they were all renamed LCT's to fit with the general 'L' for 'landing' scheme.

The LCT4 was a new design intentionally flimsier than the old run of LCT1, LCT2 and LCT3's. ordered in Oct/41 and entered service in Sept/42, but I can't find any mention of its capacity for Churchills.

Given that the older craft (Mk.1, 2, 3) could carry Churchills and were once known as TLC's, while the Mk.4 was notably less robust and may or may not have carried Chruchills. I think its easy to see where our two lines cross. Whoopee we're both right - gott'a love it.

shane
Rule .303
Shoot straight, you bastards.

A late last note here.

For the record the 77mm gun and the 17pdr used the same projectiles but that was it.

The 77mm was a Vickers private venture based on the 3" 20cwt AA gun, that was bought out and dusted off when it was found the 17pdr would not fit in a Cromwell.

The only real difference is the barrel length and the shorter smaller cartridge case.

Both 17pdr and 77mm did have HE rounds, in the 17pdr's case and I believe the 77mm, the early rounds were full charge, but later a reduced charge was adopted before the end of the war.

shane
Rule .303
Shoot straight, you bastards.

[Nathan45]

Great thread, although it appears the idea we fought the heavy tanks with aircraft doesn't seem well supported by recent evidence, by and large, German armor was thought by our armor, and sometimes we had a tough go of it.