History, Politics And Current Affairs

THE SEA AARDVARK: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY?
By Mike Kozlowski

(NOTE: A recent post on the board regarding the F-111 inspired this essay. I have always maintained that the F-111B was actually a viable aircraft that - had it been continued - would have been an invaluable asset to the USN and US defense/deterrence policy, so I decided I was going to try and put my persuasive abilities where my mouth was. This is going to be a multi-part essay that out of necessity has to go back to the very beginning of the program, so it will show up in pieces over the next few days. All commentary should be considered IMHO, and all board members are VERY welcome to comment and/or challenge. )

PART 1: GENESIS OF THE SEA AARDVARK

One of the most controversial military projects of the 1960s was the TFX (Tactical Fighter Experimental), which eventually became the F-111 series. The result of two utterly different requirements forcibly combined by SECDEF Robert McNamara, the TFX was intended to provide a Fleet Defense aircraft for the USN and a multi-role combat aircraft for the USAF under the SOR-183 RFP posted in June of 1960. The -183 RFP asked for the following:

*Speeds of M2.5 at high altitude and M1.2 at low altitude
*Short (min. 3000 ft) and rough field capability
*Lo level combat radius 800 miles, including a 400-mile dash at M1.2
*Capable of unrefueled ferry across the Atlantic
*1000 lbs internal payload
*Lifting payload of between 15K and 30K pounds

In addition, the USAF was very enthusiastic about the potential of variable-sweep wing technology in order to get all this accomplished. On the other hand, the USN requirement had an odor of neither-fish-nor-fowl about it - a single aircraft that would replace both the F-8 Crusader and the F-4 Phantom in the air and fleet defense roles. It should be pointed out here that 'air defense' - in this case - doesn't necessarily mean dogfighting. The USN aircraft was intended to be a big, comparatively unmaneuverable ship intended to lug huge radar aloft along with six to ten very long ranged missiles that - in theory - would plink off enemy aircraft before they got close enough to hit the CVs. The USN had gotten far enough along to actually get a design underway - the Douglas F6D Missileer. The F6D would have had a three-man crew, and a six-hour patrol capability. Its radar was a pulsed-Doppler track-while-scan system being developed by Hughes (eventually evolving into the AWG-9) and it was to have been armed with the XAAM-10 Eagle - a huge missile with a fully active pulse-Doppler seeker head, and both nuclear and conventional warheads. (See prototypes.free.fr/f111b/...hp3?page=7 for an excellent pic of both the F6D and Eagle)

However, Missileer had two problems - it would have been slow and once the Eagles were gone, the F6D had no way to defend itself. In addition, it had no provision for taking on any other mission that was needed or foreseen at the time (though all things considered, the F6D would have made an excellent electronic warfare aircraft when that need was recognized) and was disturbingly expensive for what the USN would have gotten. With that in mind, the Eisenhower Administration canceled both the F6D and the XAAM-10 in early 1960. This still left the USN needing an aircraft for the fleet defense role.

Just a year later, SECDEF McNamara directed that the USAF and USN develop a single aircraft to meet both the FD requirement and SOR-183. In addition, McNamara directed that the USMC and US Army (!) be able to use it as a CAS aircraft. It was apparent at an early stage that the two requirements couldn't be practically combined, and the USMC and USA dropped out early on. However, McNamara instead on the USAF and USN merging their requirements into a single RFP in June of 1961. Both services knew there was little chance they could get this to work, but followed orders. The entire program had gotten off to a rocky start and it never really did recover. The two missions were so drastically different that there was almost no common ground between the services, and the conflicts were made worse by McNamara's seemingly arbitrary directives. The USAF was made lead service for the program and pressed on from there.

In August of 1961, the Navy reported to McNamara that there was no possibility the compromise design specs could ever meet USN requirements. In particular, weight was a major problem - the USN needed an aircraft that would go at no more than 50,000 lbs gross weight, while the USAF specs would have led to an aircraft that came in around 75,000 lbs GW. Also, the aircraft length was a problem, as it needed to be under 56 feet so as to fit existing CV elevators. In order to get things down to where they needed to be, McNamara ordered that the USN take smaller radar on their version - apparently regardless of the fact that at the time, this would have jeopardized the ability of the plane to do its assigned mission, by being unable to detect targets far enough out.

The actual TFX RFP was issued in September of 1961, going out to Boeing, Grumman, Douglas, Lockheed, Republic, McDonnell, North American, and Northrop. Only Northrop failed to send a proposal back, and the others were all evaluated closely. In January of 1962, the USAF selection board and its USN representative endorsed the Boeing design, but another USAF board turned it down, claiming that it would require too much work to be practical. A second review followed, with both services deciding that none of the designs were really usable, but that the Boeing and GD designs had the most promise, so these two companies were asked to provide more data. This was done in the spring of 1962, and both proposals were quickly shot down again. Boeing and GD tried again in June 1962, with the USAF now endorsing the Boeing design, but the USN completely unhappy with it. McNamara was approaching fury by this point, convinced that the services were deliberately trying to stall the project. He therefore directed that a new selection process be used that evaluated cost, commonality, and performance on an equal basis, rather than the design's overall ability to meet the RFP. Both manufacturers resubmitted their proposals in September of 1962. The USAF staff, AFLC, and BuWep all agreed that of the two, the Boeing proposal (which looked like a much more curvaceous version of the eventual GD design) had the best chance of meeting the specifics of the combined RFP, and made the appropriate recommendation to the DOD. DOD, USAF and USN insiders all agreed that the Boeing design would get the final approval.

On November 24, 1962, DOD announced that GD would get the contract. The official reason given was that the GD bird had more commonality between versions and a more realistic approach to another problem that had raised its head - cost. The original projected price for the USAF SOR-183 was $4.5M USD - the GD bird would be coming in at nearer to $6.3M USD (and the final flyaway price was just over $7.5M USD in 2002 dollars). The Boeing bird was also having cost problems, but there is evidence that the Boeing team was being much more realistic about them than GD was. There was so much new technology in the aircraft that any price estimate was at best an educated guess - not to mention that in both the original Boeing and GD proposals, the main structure of the aircraft was to have been 100% titanium - a material that at that time the industry was just learning to use on a large scale, and is hideously expensive to obtain and tool. Boeing immediately cried foul and was joined by the redoubtable Senator Henry Jackson, who for years had the nickname 'the Senator from Boeing'. Despite severe scrutiny (which also revealed to Congress the heretofore unknown extent of the cost overruns), no reversal was made. There is the possibility - and no more than that - that Boeing may never had any real chance due to GD being a Texas company in President Johnson's home state.

There would be two primary versions - the USAF's F-111A and the USN's F-111B. We'll look at the -A in a little bit, because right now our focus needs to be on the -B. The -A and -B did share the same primary structure and engines (GE TF-30P1 turbofans), but that was about it. The USN was the service that had insisted on the escape capsule (a detail that would haunt them later) as well as side-by-side seating. The USAF had wanted tandem seating (as in the F-4 Phantom), but was overruled. The -B was 8'6" shorter than the -A because of the CV elevator requirement, but had wings that that were 3'6" longer in order to improve cruise and loiter characteristics. The -B would be equipped with the superb Hughes AN/AWG-9 pulse Doppler system and would carry the Hughes AIM-47A Phoenix missile, a smaller derivative of the old XAAM-10 originally intended for the F6D and the Super Falcon, a larger version of the old AIM-4. The -B could be configured to carry up to six missiles - four on wing pylons and two in the internal weapons bay. There were also provisions for a packaged M61A1 Vulcan 20mm cannon that could be loaded in the weapons bay. (NOTE: There is some question as to whether there was ever any real intent for the USN to use the Vulcan due to the weight of the package and its ammo, plus the amount of space it would have taken up, which almost certainly would have been needed for weapons or fuel. In addition, the Vulcan package would have taken up precious room aboard the carriers themselves.) There was apparently no provision at all for a strike capability, although that may have been intended for later models.

There was one other major difference between the -A and the -B - GD wouldn't build the -B. BuWeps was manned by admirals who had flown their wars in Grumman products, aircraft so tough and nearly indestructible that their factory was given the nickname 'Iron Works'. Since the mid-30's, no US CV had gone to sea without a Grumman airplane on its deck, and the USN was deeply suspicious of GD's ability to build a successful carrier aircraft. In an unusual compromise, GD agreed to allow Grumman to assemble the -B as well as do the naval avionics integration work - a decision that would have unusual repercussions later on. Grumman would also be the primary subcontractor for the -A's landing gear and the -B's arresting gear. The first -B was assembled at Grumman Bethpage from GD-built components and was given BuNo 151970. Rollout was on 11 May 65 with the plane being partially disassembled and taken by truck to Grumman Calverton for flight testing. The plane did not have its escape capsule, as the system wasn't yet ready - instead, two ejection seats were installed. First flight was scheduled for 18 May.

So, at this point, what does the USN have? A controversial airplane that it was never truly happy with, built by a company that it was - to be honest - suspicious of for a mission that is somewhat questionable (by this point, it was becoming apparent that the Soviets wouldn't simply fly in a straight line and wait for a comparatively unmaneuverable platform to shoot them down) that was costing nearly two million dollars per copy more than they had planned. Not a good start by any stretch of the imagination, but it could have been worse - and promptly got that way. In Part 2, I'll look at the actual problems the -B had and what steps were taken to try and save the program. 

THE SEA AARDVARK: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY? (PART 2)
TEST, EVALUATION, AND FAILURE
By Mike Kozlowski

On 18 May 65, the first F-111B, BuNo 151970, was readied for its first flight at Grumman's Calverton, NY facility. Crew was Ralph Donnell (pilot) and Ernie Van der Heyden (WSO). Considering the USN?s misgivings about the design the first flight was remarkably trouble free, with the exception of a compressor stall problem that was anticipated, having already been experienced by the USAF's F-111A. Flight testing continued steadily with no major problems through the summer and early fall right up to the next major milestone in the project, the Naval Preliminary Evaluation that would take a hard look at all the test data up to that point.

The NPE was duly held at NATC Pauxtent River RI on 1 Oct 65. On the one hand, so far the plane was performing very well and without any major systems problems or flight difficulties. Unfortunately, the plane was badly overweight. The USN, remember, had specified a gross weight of no more than 50,000 lbs. The SeaVark - with its escape capsule system ? came in at 46,500 lbs empty, and an incredible 72,421 lbs loaded. This of course affected the SeaVark's range, which was supposed to be 800 miles with a full payload and was now considerably less - by some accounts down to under 650 miles with a full warload, though the official figures show 1,092 miles. (This is probably a best-case number with maximum fuel and after the completion of the Super Weight Improvement Program.) By comparison, the F-14A Tomcat, carrying 6 AIM-54, 2 AIM-9 and 675 rds of 20mm ammunition had an unrefueled combat radius of 2400 miles.

Grumman - at this point without a major fighter contract for some years - worked very, very hard to get the SeaVark back to some kind of reasonable weight. GD, on the other hand, never seemed to show an appropriate level of concern about the weight reduction program and almost had to be forced into it by the USN. It was accepted that because of design considerations, not all of the changes could be retrofitted into the first two SeaVarks, so # 4 (BuNo 151973) was the first ship with all the weight reduction changes. Unfortunately, it was also the first ship with the production SeaVark escape capsule built into it (Two test capsules had been built previously, one of which came to a rather unusual end.) and the added weight of the capsule and its associated systems almost wiped out all the gains of the Weight Reduction Program. It should be pointed out that the #3 ship, BuNo 151972, actually had the best performance of any of the SeaVarks, as it had most of the SWIP changes, was the test ship for the TF30P-12, and did not have the escape capsule. In addition, it was now suspected - and later proved - that the SeaVark was somewhat underpowered. This would have been corrected in production ships with the addition of the -12 mod of the TF30, but in the meantime it was one more albatross around the aircraft's neck. As Grumman and GD pressed on, so did the aircraft's test program. Ship 3 was allocated to the only known combat trials of the SeaVark, testing the AWG-9 and the AIM-54. The first successful firing took place in July of 1967, and this was the sole aspect of the SeaVark project that gave little or no problem. However, it was beginning to look as if it was entirely too late for anything to save it.

Although the USN had ordered thirty-nine aircraft (seven test and 32 production), BuWeps was coming to the conclusion that the plane could never be brought into specifications. Had it been up to them, it appears that the SeaVark would have been cancelled sometime in 1966. However, DOD in the person of Robert McNamara was still insisting that the USN improvise, adapt, and overcome, regardless of cost and difficulty. This seems to have been less because of faith in the aircraft and its design as much as it was an apparent belief on the part of the SecDef that the USN was deliberately defying his wishes that the USN and USAF share a joint-design aircraft. Although there may be some validity to that idea, it seems instead that the USN did try its best to get the plane to work and function as designed despite grave doubts among the men who would have to fly it.

Unfortunately, even the dedicated efforts of the USN and Grumman were not enough to overcome the basic problems of weight and performance. In October of 1967, BuWeps and the USN laid the facts on the table before an increasingly skeptical Congress- the SeaVark would never meet its design standards on time or within budget. DOD was furious, but there was no denying the numbers. In May of 1968, both houses of Congress deleted funds for SeaVark development and production, and that was pretty much the end of the flight deck. The stop work order went out on 19 July 68, and the contract was formally terminated that December. After $377M USD had been spent on the SeaVark side of the program, all the USN had to show was five unusable aircraft (two were lost during the test program) equipped with the most advanced air-to-air missile system in the world at that time.

Interestingly enough, flight-testing didn't end. The USN actually did conduct carrier trials throughout July of 1968 aboard USS Coral Sea (CV-42). It should be pointed out, however, that there is no record available to this writer of the trap/cat shot weights for those flights. (A video clip of the trap and launch can be found at f-111.net/t_no_B.htm, along with a detailed list of the final disposition of all seven SeaVarks.) Hughes Aircraft flew #7 (BuNo 1542715) as part of the AWG-9/AIM-54 R&D program until 1971. Apparently just one SeaVark survives in 2002 - Old #7, still remarkably intact at NAWS China Lake. But if you remember I mentioned that one of the two test escape capsules met an unusual fate. Sometime in 1969, one test capsule was taken from Grumman and scrapped, while the other seemed to have vanished.

In October 1978, I reported to Lowry AFB, CO for training and was assigned to a dorm that overlooked what had been the firefighting and crash rescue training range for the base when it still operated aircraft. It was overgrown with the hulks of several aircraft strewn across it, along with what appeared to be the nose of an F-111 sticking up through the weeds. A late-night recon investigation revealed it to be the escape capsule of an F-111B, with the words TEST ARTICLE #2 stenciled in fading red under the canopy rails. How the escape capsule ever got to the Colorado Rockies is unknown, but it remained there until the mid-80s, when the range was cleared for new construction. It was intended to be displayed at the Lowry Heritage Museum, but was too far gone for restoration and had to be scrapped.

So, by the end of 1968, the USN had lost the better part of $500M USD on the project, and still needed a Fleet Defense aircraft. The situation was not as bad as it seemed. The far more maneuverable and adaptable McDonnell F-4B Phantom had entered the fleet, and although it didn't have the AWG-9/AIM-54 system, it was still very capable of tangling with distant threats to the Fleet and was an exceptional attack ship as well. The USN, however, still wanted a dedicated Fleet Defense aircraft and this time was going to get it.

Even before the SeaVark project was terminated, Grumman had very quietly begun design and development work on a company design called Project 303. The exact date of 303's inception is somewhat unclear, but it may have been as early as 1961, because one of the goals of the program was to create an aircraft superior to the F-4 Phantom just then completing its test program. In any event, the program was certainly underway while the SeaVark was being developed and tested, and Grumman was getting a hard lesson in how NOT to design a fleet defense aircraft. The USN put out an RFP on 18 Jun 68, a month BEFORE the SeaVark was officially stopped (timing that has led to speculation ever since), and Grumman replied quickly and efficiently with the airplane that later became the legendary F-14 Tomcat. Utilizing the SeaVark's engines and fire control systems, the Tomcat went on to a career that will span three decades. Although there is a long-lived belief in some quarters that Grumman deliberately sabotaged the SeaVark to open the way for the Tomcat, there is very little beyond speculation to back this up. Most notably, Grumman had no guarantee that DOD and Congress wouldn't find Grumman guilty-by-association for the SeaVark's woes, or that the USN would even find the Project 303 design suitable. To claim that Grumman scuttled the SeaVark is to credit its executives and engineers with prescience that would do justice to Madame Cleo and with business acumen that would have sent John D. Rockefeller crawling away in shame.

Now, the question must be posed: could anything have been done with the SeaVark at all? Here was a program that had cost the better part of half a billion dollars and only produced seven aircraft. Of course it must be said that the program did produce the AWG-9/AIM-54, and I believe it can be said that alone was worth it. And the USN would take greater losses in the future. The A-12 program would lose at least $2B USD, and possibly twice that, and never showed anything more than a wooden mockup. But no one ever seems to have asked if something could have been done with the SeaVark, especially as the USAF was (admittedly slowly) wringing the problems out of its F-111As and turning it into what became the best all-weather strike aircraft in the world for almost two decades. Had the question been asked, the USN would have replied no, for a number of reasons:

1. The SeaVark would not have been able to perform its intended mission on schedule or under budget.

2. The aircraft was too heavy for carrier operations.

3. A better aircraft, Grumman's Project 303, was in the pipeline. (And, the truth be told, the new bird from Long Island was an all-Grumman, all-Navy airplane, intended for no other tasks than the one the USN needed.)

After careful consideration, I believe I can make a case that the USN erred and erred seriously in not sitting down and seeing what COULD have been accomplished with the SeaVark. I will try to make the case in Part 3 that if the USN had looked at the project from some different angles, they would have found themselves with an extremely effective combat aircraft that would have stayed in honored service as long as it's USAF sister did.

THE SEA AARDVARK: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY? (PART 3)
THE ALTERNATIVE
By Mike Kozlowski

Thirty-four years downrange from the last flight of the SeaVark, one aircraft ? from the USN's point of view, probably best forgotten ? sits in the California desert, a memorial to good intentions and the mess that they usually leave behind.

To recap: from June of 1960 to July of 1968, the USN, looking for a Fleet Defense aircraft, did its best to share the F-111 design with the US Air Force, on the direct orders of SecDef Robert McNamara, who insisted that the services could use a common design. At the end of that eight years, the USN had lost nearly half a billion dollars, and still didn't have a Fleet Defense fighter. The F-4 Phantom II would hold down that role ? and several others ? until the F-14 Tomcat became fully operational in the early Seventies. But as far as the Sea Aardvark was concerned, it was as useful ? and extinct ? as a dodo.

I believe that this was not the way things needed to have turned out. The F-111 (in USAF service) overcame a very difficult infancy to become a solid, dependable combat aircraft in service with two air forces, one of which ? the Royal Australian Air Force ? still flies the Vark to this day. The actions the USN took were and are understandable. The SeaVark could not perform its intended task with any degree of competence, and there was no likelihood that it ever could. But I believe one reason the USN refused to consider any further role for the SeaVark was that it simply wanted to get rid of a project that had become a drain on USN budgets and was threatening the ability of the service to do its job. Had the USN been willing to entertain other thoughts ? which they had to do in the near future ? the SeaVark might still be with us. I?d like to start by reminding the reader of the main reasons the USN said the SeaVark was not a viable carrier-based aircraft: It was too heavy and it was underpowered. Okay, no problem there ? both statements are true, but neither one is entirely accurate.

"The aircraft is underpowered." Very true indeed. The Pratt and Whitney TF30P-1 turbofan that was originally designed into the SeaVark was not fully up to the task of pushing the aircraft along at the speeds intended. This was realized very early in the test programs of both aircraft, and a two-pronged fix was applied: first, an upgraded engine, the TF30P-12, and second, a redesigned air intake. Between the two, the Vark got a great deal faster and more powerful. However, only the USAF ever found this out ? the SeaVark had already been cancelled by the time the engine's performance had been fully explored, although at least one SeaVark did get the new engines and intakes.

"The aircraft is too heavy." Based on what the USN wanted and needed, the SeaVark was indeed terribly overweight. The original SOR-183 requirement called for an aircraft that weighed no more than 50,000 lbs. The SeaVark never got much lower than about 40,000 lbs empty, without the escape capsule, and even with an intense weight reduction program, with the capsule was 72,421 lbs with a standard combat load. Thirty-six tons is a pretty hefty carrier aircraft indeed.

But let's compare that weight with the SeaVark's contemporaries:

SeaVark: 46,500 empty 72,421 loaded
Grumman A-6 Intruder: 27,892 empty 71,856 loaded
North American A-5 Vigilante: 32,700 empty 47,530 loaded
McDonnell F-4 Phantom II: 28,000 empty 38,500 loaded
Douglas A-3 Skywarrior: 43,476 empty, 59,550 combat

(NOTE: I've left out comparisons with the Vought A-7 Corsair II and F-8 Crusader because they were in a completely different category than anything the SeaVark ever could have been.)

Note that the A-5 ? very close to the SeaVark in size ? actually comes in much lighter. The Vigilante was used for only two roles: nuclear strike and recon, and the USN knew it would need replacements for it soon?but back to that in a bit. The Intruder's empty weight is much less than the SeaVark?s, but notice it's combat weight ? just 565 lbs, or one Mk82 less than that of the SeaVark. Empty, of course, the SeaVark still weighed more than a loaded F-4 and was almost the same as an empty A-3.

What does this prove? Well, plenty when one remembers how the USN was employing all these aircraft in the 1968-70 time frame. When one takes the SeaVark out of the equation, the three heaviest aircraft ? the A-6, A-3, and A-5 ? were operating regularly off the smallest and oldest CV's in the fleet ? the 27C Oriskany's and the upgraded Midways. In particular, the A-3s were doing just fine off the Essexes.

Now, by no means am I suggesting that the SeaVark could ever have operated safely from the 27Cs, but it did launch and recover safely from a Midway. And it seems entirely logical and reasonable to assume they could have done so from the Forrestals, Kitty Hawks, Enterprise, America, and Nimitz classes just as safely. In addition, remember that the first SeaVarks flew without the escape capsules ? they flew with standard ejection seats, and they flew quite well that way. After all, Ship #3 had both the TF30P-12, most of the WIP mods, and no escape capsule, and it was the bird assigned to the missile trials, primarily because it had the best performance.

Let's back up and review for just a moment. We know that in terms of empty weight, the SeaVark was not a pretty picture ? but it was close to the A-3 and loaded, it was very close to the A-6. Both aircraft were serving honorably and well with the fleet in 1968. We know that the aircraft flew very well and very safely with ejection seats instead of the capsule. In terms of payload, we know the SeaVark was intended to carry six AIM-54s (5,910 lbs) and 20,011 lbs of fuel. Reducing the warload to four AIM-54s brings the combat load to 3,940 lbs. Without even deleting the escape capsule; we?re now down to 70,451 lbs ? LESS than a fully loaded and fueled A-6. (NOTE: There's no way I'd ever suggest reducing the fuel available at launch. I know for Naval Aviators, fuel=speed=life.) Deleting the capsule should save us at least another thousand pounds, bringing us to at least 69,451 at launch. Now remember, this is a worst-case launch weight. If we combine these two points ? adjusting the SeaVark's combat load to cover the weight and deleting the capsule in favor of the A-6's seats ? we have a combat aircraft capable of operating off everything in the fleet except the 27Cs. I therefore suggest that the overall weight of the SeaVark ? admittedly and beyond question a major stumbling block ? was not the showstopper that the USN believed it to be.

Now at this point, a perfectly reasonable objection to what I?ve just suggested is that with only four AIM-54s, the SeaVark is still not doing its job. The F-14 could carry six, and based on what we now know of Soviet tactics, that might not have been enough. Also, with that knowledge, The SeaVark's loiter time would not have been acceptable. The USN's tanker force was not as capable as it would be just a few years later, and a CVs tanker detachment would have had its hands full just servicing the SeaVarks. In addition, the SeaVark would have been as maneuverable as its USAF sister. That is, it would have moved like a bullet and turned like one. Dealing with leakers ? manned or otherwise ? would have been a nightmare in that airplane.

So, what do we do with her?

Well, remember the A-5? Somebody is going to need to step up to the plate to replace her in the nuclear strike and heavy recon roles. Remember the A-3? It's going to need replacement in the tanker, strike, and EW/ELINT roles. Remember the A-6? Tough and long-ranged with a heavy punch, but slow. By 1968, the USN knew that the A-3 and A-5 were getting long in the tooth for their roles, and they were learning that the A-6 wasn't as fast as they would have liked. I respectfully submit that the USN had a perfect single-airframe replacement for each of those roles in the F-111B.

The key would have been replacing the AWG-9 FCS with the USAF's AJQ-20A attack radar and terrain-following radar system. One reason the USN had difficulty with the dimensions of the aircraft in the first place was that the AWG-9 ? in its initial incarnation ? had a much larger dish that was reduced in size to fit the SeaVark, thereby limiting its capabilities to a certain extent. But even if we assume that the AJQ-20A could not have fitted into the SeaVark's fuselage and would instead have needed the full-length F-111A fuselage, that still only gives us an airplane 73?6? long ? three feet shorter than the A-5 and the A-3. It also gives us, based on what the USAF would be able to do with the ?A, the finest strike aircraft in service with any navy anywhere.

The SeaVark was close to production status. The changes I have suggested would have taken time and more money, and probably wouldn?t have put airframes on deck until the early 70's. But the USN could have quite honestly pointed out that they would have been replacing two other aircraft ? both big, complicated and in some cases marginal at what they did ? with a single aircraft that could easily have taken all those roles. In addition, the USN could have redesignated the SeaVark as an attack ship, further deflecting criticism. (In truth, the F-111 was NEVER a fighter. It more properly should have been an A-series ship, and in USAF service might well have qualified as a B-series, because it was more accurately a medium bomber.)

For the sake of this discussion then, I would like to give it the notional designation of A-8A, and in keeping with traditional Grumman names, christen it the Bobcat.

(NOTE: This is NOT intended to be an alternate history. Redesignating aircraft for budgetary and political reasons is an old and honored tradition in the US military, and I believe it would have been a valid strategy in getting the SeaVark into service. I am suggesting the new number/name as a possibility and in order to keep it separate from the USAF's -A model.)

The A-8A would have come into the fleet solidly capable of three jobs and doing them all very, very well:

*CONVENTIONAL STRIKE. Let's round up the combat weight of the Bobcat to 70,000 lbs even. 5,910 pounds of this is warload. In good old-fashioned iron bombs (Mk82s), this is eleven bombs, but let's round it down to ten. Admittedly, less than the A-6 or F-4's 12, but the Bobcat would have been more accurate with its ten bombs than the other two aircraft would have been with their less advanced and accurate fire control systems. When the first Paveway guided bombs came into service, the advantage in numbers carried by the older aircraft would have evaporated - the A-6 and F-4 only carried four to six Paveways each, the same that the Bobcat would have efficiently and safely carried. In addition, the Bobcat would have been very capable of carrying the largest air-to-ground missile the US ever deployed, the AGM-78 Standard ARM, modified from a USN SAM. The F-4 and A-6 could carry two ? primarily due to design considerations ? and were a handful to fly with the heavy, awkward missiles aboard. The Bobcat could have easily carried four, although this almost certainly would have required refueling.

The Bobcat's TFR capabilities would also have been priceless in Vietnam. The Bobcat would have been able to execute fast, accurate low-level strikes in any weather, day or night, from the sea, vastly complicating the PNVAF's air defense problems.

*HEAVY RECON: The RA-5 - fast, powerful, and long ranged - did superb service for the USN during the Vietnam war in the recon role. However, by 1968 it was showing its age, and the Navy was actively looking for a successor. With the huge internal weapons bay and room for external pods, the Bobcat could easily have taken over the heavy recon role from the Vigilante.

*NUCLEAR STRIKE: Again, replacing the RA-5 ? which was never truly successful in the role ? would have given the USN a strategic nuclear punch that would have seriously complicated the USSR's ability to defend itself. It should be pointed out that this capability would not have been fully realized until the TF30 engine upgrade came along some years later, because it would have needed the longer range and greater speed to be used to its maximum potential. On the other hand, a nuclear payload would have been much lighter than a conventional load, which would have extended the range of even the -A model Bobcat and enabled its aviators to use its speed potential to its fullest.

In addition, there were two other roles that the Bobcat could easily have been adapted to:

*TANKER: Utilizing the same systems fitted to the KA-6, the Bobcat would have been invaluable as a tanker, especially if it had survived in service long enough to get the TF30 engines that the USAF's F-111F later got, giving it a range of nearly 3,000 miles.

*EW/ELINT: In the early 70s, the USN knew that there was going to be a need for an aircraft to fill these functions that could travel with the strike force, and the E-6 Prowler was later developed to meet that need. Given the superb service that the EF-111 Raven gave in the late 80s and early 90s; this is a perfectly reasonable and valuable possibility.

I do not believe that getting the SeaVark into service would have been easy or cheap. It would have still required a considerable amount of time and money to do so, even if all of my arguments could have been made and accepted. At best, it is reasonable to assume that it would have been 1973 or later before a modified SeaVark could have entered service, and that would have coincided with the post-Vietnam drawdown, possibly canceling the plane then and there. But I hope that I have made the point that the plane wasn?t a total loss; and indeed had immense potential even in its unchanged form. Whether or not I have succeeded, I respectfully leave to the members of the Board.

GD/Grumman F-111B:
ENGINES: 2 P&W TF30P-1 turbofans (18,500 lbs ST w/AB), to have been replaced in later production with 2 TF30P-12 (20, 250 lbs ST w/AB)
MAX SPEED: 1450 mph at 40,000 feet, 780 mph at sea level
COMBAT RADIUS: 1092 miles (w/6 AIM-54A)
WEIGHT: 46,500 lbs empty, 72,421 lbs loaded, 86,563 lbs max T/O (weights listed for production version with escape capsule)
LENGTH: 68?10?
WINGSPAN: 70?(maximum) and 33? 11?(minimum)

Grumman A6 Intruder
ENGINES: 2 P&W J52-P8B/C, (9,300 lb. ST)
MAX SPEED: 638 MPH at S/L
COMBAT RADIUS: 2800 miles (w/18,000 lbs of stores)
WEIGHT: 27,892 lbs empty, 71,856 max T/O, combat stores load of up to 18,000 lbs
LENGTH: 54?7?
WINGSPAN: 53?

North American A5A Vigilante
ENGINES: 2 GE J79-8 (16,500 lbs ST w/AB)
MAX SPEED: 806 mph at SL, M2 at 40, 000 ft
COMBAT RADIUS: 1290 miles (w/1 Mk27 special weapon and 2 400-gal external tanks)
WEIGHT: 32,700 lbs empty, 47,530 lbs combat, max T/O 62,950 lbs
LENGTH: 76?6?
WINGSPAN: 53?

McDonnell F4B Phantom II
ENGINES: 2 GE J79-8A (17,000 S/T w/AB)
MAX SPEED: 845 mph at S/L, 1485 mph at 48,000 ft
COMBAT RADIUS: 400 miles (w/up to 16,000 lbs of combat stores)
WEIGHT: 28,000 empty, 38,500 lbs combat, max T/O 54,600 lbs
LENGTH: 58?3?
WINGSPAN: 38?5?

Douglas A-3 Skywarrior
ENGINES: 2 P&W J57P-10 (10,501 lbs S/T)
MAX SPEED:
COMBAT RADIUS: 610 miles (w/up to 20,000 lbs of combat stores)
WEIGHT: 43,476 empty, 59,550 combat, 82,000 max T/O
LENGTH: 76?
WINGSPAN: 72?5

Maybe it would have made a fine naval strike aircraft. But I would also propose another solution.

As the Navy learned 30 years later, the F-14 made a fine strike aircraft as well. Would the funding for the hypothetical A-8 be better used developing a dedicated strike version of the F-14? Drop the AWG-9 and Phoenix-specific gear, add ground-attack avionics, and you probably wouldn't need to make major airframe changes.

Mister Sheppard -

Would it be possible for you to go through and edit the question marks out of the the posts and replace them with the appropriate punctuation? Its VERY disconcerting to be reading along and come to a misplaced question mark. Totally ruins the thread of the reading.

Otherwise, its great to see this one back up online.

Thanks!

Belushi TD

GTAE wrote: ↑Mon Nov 21, 2022 1:01 pm Maybe it would have made a fine naval strike aircraft. But I would also propose another solution.

As the Navy learned 30 years later, the F-14 made a fine strike aircraft as well. Would the funding for the hypothetical A-8 be better used developing a dedicated strike version of the F-14? Drop the AWG-9 and Phoenix-specific gear, add ground-attack avionics, and you probably wouldn't need to make major airframe changes.

GTAE,

My thinking is this - in this timeline, we got both the F-14 and the notional A-8, and I suspect that the Naval Aviation community would have been just as much 'not-a-pound-for-air-to-ground' as the USAF was about the F-15. There would also have been an issue where with your Air Defense and Strike Birds being one and the same - see also the F-18. (That's not a slam on the Hornet; it's just that there would have been an all your eggs in one basket situation then.)

There's also the issue of maintenance - the Tomcat, for all her glory, was a maintenance hog. The notional A-8 wouldn't have been much better, but its issues as the F-111 were actually ironed out fairly quickly. If you've got an F/A-14 that has fairly notable readiness issues, you don't have enough aircraft to do either role.

Mike