Which came first, the CVBG or SSBN for Soviet Long Range Aviation?
Posted: Sun Feb 15, 2026 7:40 pm
I literally had a shower thought earlier.
We've been assuming for years that the main role for the BACKFIRE/Tu95/etc etc Kh-22 combo was to sink CVNs or to put pressure on HATO warships.
But what if they were for damage limitation?
1.) Kh-22 can fly 600~ km in a bit over 6 minutes and can be armed with a nuke.
2.) It has a fairly inaccurate "target geographic coordinates" mode.
3.) It can be carried by Тu-22K ('Blinder-B'), Tu-22M (BACKFIRE), and Tu-95K22 ('Bear-G') strategic bombers on patrol missions.
A roughly six minute flight time combined with the slow fire rate of the 598 and 608 SSBNs (1 missile per minute = 15-16 minutes to launch all tubes)...
...means that an orbiting Soviet Long Range Aviation aircraft could sink a Polaris boat after it fired only 6 or 7 missiles via nuclear depth charging them via long range "geographic coordinate shots".
Granted, by the 616 class, fire rate was increased to groups of 4 tubes every minute so the danger of being nuked by orbiting MPA was much less...
But this begs a serious question...
Was the USN's maritime strategy + outer air battle + CVBGs going up against Backfire regiments actually more about securing air dominance over the North Atlantic Region to enable SSBNs to execute their emergency war target launches without being sunk by Soviet MPA?
Remember that almost all war planning assumed some sort of "lead up" to General Nuclear War precluded by intense pre-crisis maneuvering or limited conventional war.
Remember that UMLS (Trident) only began service in large quantities fairly late in the Cold War -- OHIO didn't execute her first deterrent patrol until October 1982, followed by future boats in yearly intervals.
Likewise, the British had the extremely short ranged Polaris A3T with Chevaline from 1982-1996
The French had the M1 (1,600 mile) M2 (2,000 mile) and M20 (1,900 mile) SLBMs; which aren't that long ranged as well.
Soooo.....
We've been assuming for years that the main role for the BACKFIRE/Tu95/etc etc Kh-22 combo was to sink CVNs or to put pressure on HATO warships.
But what if they were for damage limitation?
1.) Kh-22 can fly 600~ km in a bit over 6 minutes and can be armed with a nuke.
2.) It has a fairly inaccurate "target geographic coordinates" mode.
3.) It can be carried by Тu-22K ('Blinder-B'), Tu-22M (BACKFIRE), and Tu-95K22 ('Bear-G') strategic bombers on patrol missions.
A roughly six minute flight time combined with the slow fire rate of the 598 and 608 SSBNs (1 missile per minute = 15-16 minutes to launch all tubes)...
...means that an orbiting Soviet Long Range Aviation aircraft could sink a Polaris boat after it fired only 6 or 7 missiles via nuclear depth charging them via long range "geographic coordinate shots".
Granted, by the 616 class, fire rate was increased to groups of 4 tubes every minute so the danger of being nuked by orbiting MPA was much less...
But this begs a serious question...
Was the USN's maritime strategy + outer air battle + CVBGs going up against Backfire regiments actually more about securing air dominance over the North Atlantic Region to enable SSBNs to execute their emergency war target launches without being sunk by Soviet MPA?
Remember that almost all war planning assumed some sort of "lead up" to General Nuclear War precluded by intense pre-crisis maneuvering or limited conventional war.
Remember that UMLS (Trident) only began service in large quantities fairly late in the Cold War -- OHIO didn't execute her first deterrent patrol until October 1982, followed by future boats in yearly intervals.
Likewise, the British had the extremely short ranged Polaris A3T with Chevaline from 1982-1996
The French had the M1 (1,600 mile) M2 (2,000 mile) and M20 (1,900 mile) SLBMs; which aren't that long ranged as well.
Soooo.....