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Wizards of Armageddon by Fred Kaplan
and it kind of quickly took a life of it's own as I started to think through the implications...to the point that I just split it off into it's own thread.
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20 years ago in May 2006, I wrote this regarding ICBM launch times -- this was a complete SWAG rectal extraction figure:
Say, 10 minutes or longer the blue touch paper to be ignited and double, triple, quadruple cross checked by the Silo commanders, who then run through the launch sequence with lots of redunancy checks and calling back to home plate "Hey, are we REALLY REALLY REALLY in a war?"
This...is actually very close to the real figure.
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/1934 ... -aerospace
Aerospace Systems Analysis, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, Arms Control Implications of Strategic Offensive Weapons Systems, Volume IV, Technological Feasibility of Launch on Warning and Flyout Under Attack, Prepared for U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ACDA ST/196, June 1971, Secret, Excised Copy
Now, why is Fratricide such a big thing and why does a Minuteman Squadron (50 missiles) have to launch their missiles almost simultaneously?Page 12:
"Other significant delays in the command link are the four minutes required for formatting and transmitting the launch command from the National Military Command Center (NMCC) to the Launch Control Center (LCC) and the 11 minutes needed for decoding and verifying the message and initating the launch."
NOTE: This interval is determined by the slowest crew for fail-safe and attack coordination reasons and by no means is a lower bound on the time required.
Page 39:
The most important and the most surprising of the delays is the 11 minutes required by the launch control crew to receive, decode, authenticate and execute the launch command. This time delay is not a minimum or even the average of all launch crews but rather it is an interval which has been established by Air Force Doctrine to insure that no crew attempts to launch before all crews have completed their pre-launch functions."
There are two reasons why this interval is determined by the slowest crew.
The first results from a fail-safe mechanism built into the Minuteman control. Within each squadron (50 missiles and 5 launch control centers [LCC]) the LCC's are interconnected so that any LCC can cancel a launch command issued by any other LCC. Thus, if even one crew in a squadron has not completed processing of the launch command it can (and must) cancel any other crew's command.
The second reason results from the requirement for a common time reference for all the missiles. This common reference is required in order that the coordination built into the missile targeting can be accomplished; this, in turn, is required to avoid fratricide at multiply-targeted aimpoints and to insure proper sequencing of RV's which are attacking defense units, etc.
It is understood that at one time this interval was fixed at six minutes but some crews were incapable of meeting this standard. The 11-minute delay in the launch control center, together with the four minutes required to process code and transmit the launch command, mean that 15 minutes are required to get Minuteman out of their holes after the decision to launch is made."
RAND R-1754-PR
The U.S. ICBM Force: Current Issues and Future Options (U)
October 1975
was a SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA level study, and it has some interesting commentary:
When you look at historic SLBM launch times --"There is some argument about the technical feasibility of attacks upon the ICBM force using large numbers of closely spaced RVs because of "dust and fratricide," i.e., nuclear weapons’ mutual interference effects. The question is how many RVs can be effectively targeted on each ICBM silo in a single attack that would be sufficiently compressed in time as to deny any intervening opportunity to launch the force. Assuming no shortage of attack RVs, the answer appears to depend upon (a) the time-of-arrival "window" for RVs that will avoid serious mutual interference effects, and (b) the means for controlling the attacking missiles within the time and geometrical constraints imposed.
The weapon interference effects of concern are (a) nuclear radiation, where the prompt neutron effects on nuclear materials could cause weapon failure, (b) shock waves, where the blast and wind loads upon the RV could cause impact dispersions or structural failures, and (c) dust and debris, where erosion of the RV heat shield could also cause dispersions or structural failure. These effects can result from multiple detonations at the same or adjacent targets.
In general, weapons aimed at the same target define the minimum weapon spacing and, hence, a lower bound on the time-of-arrival window because of the potential for fratricide due to shock waves or radiation. This lower bound on weapon time separation is typically 3 to 5 sec, depending upon the RV velocity, which, in turn, depends upon whether the RV has a high or low aerodynamic loading (beta). The upper bound on the window is defined by shock waves from weapons at adjacent targets which could cause dispersions of the incoming RV and is about 10 to 18 sec, depending upon the spacing between adjacent targets (typically 3 to 5 mi in the Minuteman deployments). Even though the time-of-arrival window thus defined is bounded by short-term effects (radiation and shock waves), further windows are believed by some to be closed by dust clouds and falling debris for as long as 30 to 60 min.
If only one RV is targeted on each silo, all adjacent weapons would have to arrive within a span of 10 to 18 sec to avoid interference effects. While this degree of attack control is generally believed to be technically feasible, backup reprogramming missiles after boost failures within this time window appears to be a significant challenge: To reprogram after late failures in the boost phase, the reprogrammed missiles may be launch-delayed by as much as six minutes with respect to the programmed attack, and this difference would have to be recovered in the flight times of the backup missiles. A combination of means has been proposed for this control of flight times: (a) launching the attack from the longest-range sites and reprogramming backup missiles from shorter-range sites, and (b) launching the attack on lofted trajectories and reprogramming backups with depressed trajectories. The arguments about these possibilities are not so much about their technical feasibility as their credibility for an actual attack.
If two RVs are targeted at the same silo, the weapons would have to be separated by at least 3 to 5 sec, and yet all pairs arrive within the same 10 to 18 sec at all adjacent silos. The number of arriving weapons to be coordinated within the narrower time constraints has doubled, and the uncertainties in attack timing and weapon effects (e.g., stem size) are seen as being significant when compared to the attacker’s timing tolerances and risks. Hence, there remains some argument as to the technical feasibility and credibility of a single-wave coordinated attack using two surface bursts on each silo.
Several alternative attack schemes have been suggested as a means for avoiding interaction effects with two RVs targeted on each silo. One is to ignore the minimum spacing required between weapons and use the second weapon as a simple backup should the first RV fail either to arrive or to detonate. Since this approach would compensate only for the weapon system’s unreliability and not for the random aiming errors, it may not be an efficient use of attack resources. It could, however, eliminate many of the complexities of reprogramming the attack; and some would argue that the Soviets need not be concerned that the use of their larger throw weight be efficient.
Another approach would be to minimize the dust and debris by programming the first RV to airburst; this would be followed by a ground burst of the second RV. The timing window might be widened by as much as five minutes in the period otherwise considered closed by early dust and debris effects. This would require airburst fuzing and probably some hardening of the RVs against the airburst effects. Moreover, the airburst may not be as effective against the silos as a ground burst, and the fuzing might be countermeasured.
Still other tactics include delayed detonation of the weapons (earth penetrating mines that could be simultaneously triggered) and offset aimpoints that would separate the arriving weapons in space (straddling the target) rather than separating their time of arrival at the target. These demand sacrifices in RV weight or effectiveness, and they appear to be not so much serious proposals as speculative possibilities for a resourceful and determined attacker.
It is now generally accepted that three RVs on the same silo cannot pass through the 10- to 18-sec time-of-arrival window with any credible margin for error and still avoid serious interaction effects.
...
Abnormal environmental conditions can produce water, ice, and dust in the atmosphere that could accelerate the erosion of the RVs to the point of introducing large dispersions or even destroying them. The problem is most severe for RVs having a high aerodynamic loading. One concern is that large geographical areas (containing targets) may be temporarily protected by passing storm systems that interfere with reentry. The resolution of the present uncertainties will depend upon current efforts to assess weather in the target areas and to ensure that RVs will withstand adverse weather conditions.
The environmental hazards for RVs caused by the detonations of weapons upon closely spaced targets are more severe than those expected from natural phenomena. As was described earlier, the dust and fratricide effects can be mitigated by careful control of the attack timing, at least for one, and perhaps two, weapons per aim point."
That you start understanding, why STRATCOM wanted SENTINEL to replace Minuteman III, instead of just putting everything onto SSBNs -- it's not just USAF parochalism -- and why the US keeps rejecting mobile ICBMs.Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines
By Norman Polmar, Kenneth J. Moore
Page 123 [Referring to Polaris]
“The time to prepare missiles for launching after receipt of a launch order was about 15 minutes; the missiles could then be launched at intervals of about one minute. The submerged Polaris submarine had to be stationary or moving at a maximum of about one knot to launch. The launch depth (from the keel of the submarine) was about 125 feet.”
US Submarines Since 1945
By Norman Friedman
Page 244
“SSBN 598 and 608 classes could launch missiles at the rate of one per minute; SSBN 616 could launch four per minute. These figures apply to Polaris, not necessarily to later missiles.”
Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces
By Bruce G. Blair
Page 62 [Trident D-5]
“101. In addition to longer flight limes, the D-5 launches would be staggered, with time intervals of twenty seconds between each. The last of the Trident's twenty-four missiles would thus fire eight minutes after the first was launched, giving the Russian force additional time to respond.”
Federation of American Scientists (FAS) (LINK)
Page on 667A YANKEE I
“The SSBN 667A is equipped with the D-5 launch system and 16 R-27 missiles with a range of about 2400 km. They are arranged in two rows in the fourth and fifth compartments. The missiles can be launched from a depth of 40-50 meters below the surface, while the submarine is moving at a speed of up to 3-4 knots. The missiles are fired in four salvos each comprising four missiles. The time needed for pre-launch preparation is 8 minutes, and within a salvo the missiles are fired at intervals of 8 seconds. After each salvo the submarine needs three minutes return to the launching depth and between the second and third salvo it takes 20-35 minutes to pump water from the tanks into the launching tubes.”
Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines
By Norman Polmar, Kenneth J. Moore
Page 169
“The 667A/Yankee could launch from depths to 165 feet (50 m), compared to less than half that depth for Polaris launches, and the submarine could be moving at three to six knots, while U.S. missile submarines were required to move considerably slower or—preferably—to hover while launching missiles. The time for prelaunch preparations was approximately ten minutes; the launch lime for a salvo of four missiles was 24 seconds. However, there were pauses between salvoes so that at least 27 minutes were required from the launching of the first and last missiles. (The later Project 667BDRM/Delta IV SSBN could launch all 16 missiles within one minute while steaming up to five knots.)”
Soviet Naval Tactics
By Milan N. Vego
Page 165
“A Soviet SSBN can reportedly start launching its missiles 15 minutes after receiving the order from the command authority ashore. Ballistic missiles can be launched at intervals of one minute or less. For example, the Typhoon class can fire a salvo of two missiles within 15 seconds of each other; by contrast, the older Yankee Is require intervals of almost two minutes.”
The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War
By Bruce G. Blair
Page 161
“For a modern Soviet SSBN on combat patrol the time between the receipt of final launch orders and first missile breaking water was about seventeen minutes according to exercise data collected by the United States. An SSBN crew member who served on Delta II and Delta III SSBNs observed launch sequences that ranged from nine minutes to fifteen minutes. Twelve minutes was typical: six for prelaunch procedures, including message validation, and six more for final launch preparations, which were largely automated. Missiles were then automatically fired from each tube, one at a time, zigzagging from one end of the boat to the other. There was a four- to twelve-second interval between each missile launch.”
It's because SSBNs + Mobile ICBMs have massively unreliable launch times because of how the SSBN + Mobile ICBM force is dispersed -- dozens of boats / hundreds of launchers spread across a massive amount of land/sea, with limited + poor data links, making it all but impossible to do more than local coordination:
* -- All SLBMs on a single SSBN...this BTW makes you wonder about the reasons the US and USSR used to justify going to 24 (OHIO) and 20 (TYPHOON) tubes, instead of 16 on the DELTA/POLARIS boats.
* -- All Mobile ICBMs within a 40-60 mile radius of wherever that Strategic Missile Squadron (Mobile)'s Command HQ has set up their vehicles for that day.
IOW, if you want to do "precise" counterforce against very hard targets (enemy silos + LCCs + other very high VN targets), you need a land based silo force to coordinate it all.
The 12th Strategic Missile Squadron at Malmstrom can launch all 50 of it's Minuteman IIIs within a very tight time interval; possibly within a second of each other given a known time hack to launch from and accurate clocks in each silo (needed for missile accuracy anyway).
By contrast, a single Ohio SSBN can only launch less than half the number of missiles over eight minutes, with 20 second intervals between each missile.
Consider this statement from the RAND report:
further windows are believed by some to be closed by dust clouds and falling debris for as long as 30 to 60 min.
and what it means for targeting a SSBN's missile(s), if it takes 20 second intervals to launch a missile; but the 'window' to hit a target and avoid mutual MIRV fratricide is only about 3 to 6 seconds 'wide' before that target is closed off for the next 20-40 minutes due to dirt thrown up by a groundburst on said 'hard target'.
It's possible that if the range(s) aren't at the missile's maximum and the processing power on the SSBNs high enough, each missile could have it's trajectory individually adjusted before launch (in conjunction with post-boost vehicle manuvering) to achieve a near zero delta for simultaneous MIRV impacts; but you wouldn't be able to do this for more than maybe five missiles. Additionally, the first missiles would have to fly a lofted trajectory compared to the later missiles' flatter trajectories.
BTW, this would mean that Multiple Missile Simultaneous Impact (MMSI) as a technique from a single SSBN would be more vulnerable to enemy ABM systems than a "normal" SSBN launch or siloed ICBM launch.
Trident no matter what the Navies (Royal and US) said/say about it's capabilities, is largely a "counter-medium-hard" system in the first few waves of nuclear exchanges due to hard constraints imposed by timing + fratricide.
It's not ideal for targeting very hard targets such as missile silos or LCCs requiring extreme timing across a large amount of widely geographically separated DGZs, along with extreme precision, which requires a 'clear' sky free of dust clouds.
What Trident could handle in the first wave(s) are the whole clutch of medium-hard targets across the Soviet Union / Russia where a loss of precision isn't catastrophic.
For example at Engels-2 (51.481111, 46.210556); the main runway(s) are about 3 km long; a 455 KT W88 detonated at ground level pretty much covers half the runways in a fireball, the entire runway in 500 REM radiation, and all of the base in 5 PSI airblast per NUKEMAP.
Even if the W88 is off course by several hundred meters after coming down at 20,000+ ft/sec into the sandblast of a previous weapon's mushroom cloud; it's still going to pretty much total Engels-2 as a workable bomber base.
This may be why the Air Force (reluctantly) supported Trident at the JCS level; because the increases in accuracy allowed USN SSBNs to handle a much larger portion of the target set previously serviced by Minutemen, allowing those released Minutemen to be reallocated to the hardest, most time critical targets (i.e. Soviet silo fields + LCCs) -- important as the AF ICBM fleet was fixed at about a thousand missiles.
Another limitation on SSBNs that I've just realized are their launch signatures.
Because of the existence of the SS-N-15 Starfish from 1969 onwards (and the US counterpart in SUBROC), SSBNs couldn't fight a protracted nuclear war during the Cold War: hour one, launch two SLBMs, hour five, launch four more, etc -- because everyone could work back the trajectories required to hit high value targets and produce probability plots of likely launch locations and front load those areas with SSNs during peacetime.
It doesn't matter how quiet your SSBN is if your missile launches dump tons of noise into the water.
With a 40~ nautical mile range for SUBROC/STARFISH plus an hour or two at 25 knot sprint speed for an enemy SSN, it makes no sense to leisurely launch missiles in singletons or pairs and withhold the rest for later use, as someone could be within the required 80~ nm to splash you with a nuclear depth charge after you launch 1/4 of your tubes ... or simply chase you down with a maritime patrol aircraft.
So all the early first and second generation SSBNs are "use them once and done" wargasm type launchers due to this calculus.
With this in mind, it's starting to make sense why the US and USSR both went to supremely gigantic missiles with Trident II (D-5) and R-39 (SS-N-20 STURGEON) giving ranges of 5,000 to 7,000 plus miles.
Both sides' navies knew how inflexible 1st/2nd Generation SSBNs were due to their short ranges -- by going to very large missiles for third generation SSBNs, they could "fort" up the SSBNs:
Russians: Barents+Kara+Okhotsk Sea Bastions
US Navy: South Atlantic + Indian + Pacific Oceans
In areas where almost zero enemy units would be encountered; allowing for the SSBNs to be selectively used (two out of 20 missiles) in each individual attack wave, rather than being forced to expend everything in one smash.
Another realization I made was that while ICBMs can quickly coordinate a massed attack from hundreds of silos within a very tight time variance; the SSBN fleet is much slower to react.
Air Force missileers get their EAMs "relatively" fast due to their flat organizational structure and interior communications inside CONUS; the Bubbleheads are going to have to go through several (lengthy) steps to confirm a valid launch order:
1.) First receive and deciper a ELF message on their towed wire array or a VLF message on their Towed Buoy Antenna "ringing the bell" and telling them to come up shallow. (15 minutes)
2A.) Rise to transmission/launch depth; rectal guess is from 800 ft to 70 ft; that takes about 16 minutes @ 5 knots @ 5 degree up angle.
2B.) Reel in the ELF array or the VLF Buoy while ascending, figure about another 5 to 10 minutes, depending on how concurrently they can do this with #2A. You COULD cut the wire on the array or buoy, but they don't know if it's a test or The Big One (TM).
3.) At transmission/launch depth, receive and decipher a much higher data rate message. (15 minutes)
Total time would be about 35-40 minutes; then a couple more minutes (call it 5) for them to actually set Condition 1SQ Battle Stations Missile and turn the keys; because a lot of launch preparations can be done concurrently with #3 while you wait for them to confirm launch order validity.
You could shave a few minutes here and there off various tasks; but the hard limits of submarine vulnerability and hull fatigue life trend towards a longer (more bits of entropy) "bell ringer" EAM that's harder for the enemy to spoof or Ensign Zipster to accidentially send the "come up for daily check" signal on.
Adding insult to injury is that due to the vagaries of the maritime environment, not all SSBNs are going to receive the Bell Ringers/EAMs on the first transmission cycles -- some boats will respond faster, etc.
The Navy has no idea which boats are going to be in Condition 1SQ Battle Stations Missile in 35 minutes; or which ones are going to need 45-50 minutes... the ocean is a very messy place.
Which is why I feel the operational planning for the SSBN force (past and present) has emphasized pre-scheduling to a point beyond the land-based missile force -- i.e. the Navy's EAMs call out M for Missile Hour at a specified hour/minute/second as far as one or more hours into the future.
This (relatively) late response has several advantages -- it means that the SSBN COs aren't going to "rush" getting into firing position so as to not "miss" thermonuclear war; so they'll be more cautious in ascending to launch depth and sanitizing the area before launch.
A rough guess as to the timeline of a nuclear war based on the above information would go something like this:
30 Seconds (0.5 minutes) for Sensors to detect an enemy launch and raise it to a quality enough to get NORAD involved.
60 Seconds (1 minute) for NORAD to decide if it's a spurious signal or not; and whether or not to call an attack conference.
600 seconds (10 minutes)
to
1200 seconds (20 minutes)
Attack Conference is spun up, bombers scrambled, POTUS dialed in, and a decision made; either by the first detonations of depressed trajectory SLBMs against West or East Coast targets [10 minutes] or when enemy ICBMs are about fifteen minutes from striking their targets and have been picked up by multiple systems all agreeing with each other [20 minutes].
240 seconds (4 minutes) for the NMCC to encode the launch order(s) for non-recallable systems and transmit it to the various branches (AF + Navy etc).
660 seconds (11 minutes) for the USAF LCCs to decode and authenticate their launch orders.
A former MM trajectory guy did some public unclassified estimates on basic trajectory parameters for -30A, -30B, -30F Heavy and -30F Light here:
https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/wordpress ... lation.pdf
It's between 2120 seconds (35.33 minutes) and 2593 seconds (43.21 minutes) for Minutemen to impact their targets in Russia. We'll call it 2260 seconds (37.6 minutes) for general rough purposes.
At this point, there are two different timelines in play:
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TIMELINE A:
If the decision to launch was made following NUDETS on CONUS coastal cities -- i.e. SUBROC-ski into Norfolk, then it's now 26:30 into the war; and Soviet ICBMs are about 8.5 to 10 minutes from impact on CONUS.
It takes about 170 seconds (2.9~ minutes) for an ICBM to be "safe" from damage during flyout, so the Minutemen (and Peacekeepers) will have a 300+ second margin of safety; so our counterforce retaliatory strikes will get off safely.
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TIMELINE B:
If the decision to launch was delayed until a definite confirmation of Launch Under Attack (LUA) was received; i.e. an attack conference of 20 minutes -- then by the time the AF missileers finish decoding their attack orders, we'll be 36:30 into the war; and Soviet ICBMs will already be detonating in the US; or will be only minutes from detonation.
The flyout risk for our ICBMs would have been noted during the attack conference and I'm sure there were scores of mathematical studies on the optimum number of missiles to risk in flyout during a scenario like this.
We'd have to balance the risk of missile lossses during launch against how good we thought Soviet ICBM accuracy was at the time.
Low Soviet Accuracy: Keep most missiles in silo(s) and ride out the attack.
High Soviet Accuracy: Launch missiles, accepting risk of destruction in boost phase; as the missiles will be safer in flight than in the silo(s).
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Because of the confusion in keeping track of two timelines in a serial format; at this point I'm going to switch to Timeline B for ease of it all.
While a depressed trajectory SLBM or SUBROC-ski shot at Norfolk or DC to open the war would be nice; there's greater advantage in delaying a US launch by not providing a "flaming datum" so soon.
At around 37 minutes into the war; the first wave of Soviet RVs impact US ICBM sites and other high value targets, setting the Great Plains on fire, even as Minutemen flyout towards their targets in Russia.
If Airborne Alert is available due to a period of heightened tensions, these aircraft are now executing Wing Attack Plan R.
Also around this time 37-40 minutes into the war, the first SSBN "bell ring" authentications begin at around this time.
56~ minutes into the war; as more Soviet ICBMs continue to rain down onto the US; the surviving American ICBMs start reaching their apogees, while across the oceans, American SSBNs are rising to launch depth for confirmation.
71~ minutes on; the SSBNs finish deciphering their EAMs, which leads into a big timing question coming up in a few minutes...
74~ minutes into the war; the first Minutemen begin hitting their targets in the Soviet Union. In an alternate universe, the first SKYBOLT III missiles (12~ minute flight time) are also hitting their targets on the periphery of the Soviet Union at around this time after being launched by B-52K's. Unfortunately, in our reality, we don't have ALBMs.
This is where we have to do a serious timing "gut check":
It's one hour and fourteen minutes into World War III.
Large portions of high value targets in the Soviet Union and the United States are now burning.
Significant quantities of dust and debris are now floating in the atmosphere, where they'll remain threats to high velocity re-entries for 30 to 60 more minutes by the laws of hypersonic re-entry physics.
If the US SSBN's now available launch a counter-force "hard target" strike ASAP at 74~ minutes into the war against Soviet ICBM fields; they're going to hit the dust clouds; which will still be exant at 1 hour and 51 minutes when those SLBMs arrive.
It's going to take until 134 minutes into the war (2 hours and 14 minutes) for the worst case of cloud dispersal.
As such, incorporating a 30~ minute delay into the SSBN launch order(s) so that they launch at 100-105 minutes into the war is advantageous for multiple reasons:
1.) Ensures more of the SSBN fleet is ready for a choreographed response - i.e. 'laggards' are accounted for; enabling limited cross-boat "hard target" strikes without relying too much on trajectory shaping for Multiple Missile Simultaneous Impacts (MMSIs).
2.) The DGZ's for #1 and other locations will have cleared by the time of impact of dust from the initial USAF Minuteman/Peacekeeper strikes.
So, a potential Ohio SSBN strike package with a prescheduled launch delay might work out like this, if you're fairly certain of SSBN survival to this point:
Attack Package Type A:
SSBNs #1, #2, & #3 all launch with the following pre-allocated targets:
Missile Tube #1: Soviet ICBM Field A
Missile Tube #2: Soviet ICBM Field B
Missile Tube #3: Soviet ICBM Field C
So that each missile field gets at least 3 SLBMs launched at precise known times so that fratricide can be minimized -- this is how you account for missile/post-boost vehicle unreliability if you can only launch once every 20~ seconds and you don't want to get too exotic with trajectory shaping.
Attack Package Type B:
In this alternate, SSBN's #1, #2, and #3 all share the targeting plan with no cross-boat decking:
SSBN #1 goes after ICBM Field A with three missiles.
SSBN #2 goes after ICBM Field B with three missiles.
SSBN #3 goes after ICBM Field C with three missiles.
In both cases (A and B), the SSBN's after launching the Hard Target strike package, shift to softer targets; such as radar sites, enemy airfields, etc to maximize ROI per missile at sea.
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One Hundred Minutes into World War III
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While the first SSBN package is being launched; there's a lot going on elsewhere; with a lot of other "actors" in play:
1.) Communications in the US (and to a lesser extent the USSR) are going to be fragmentary and confused, depending on how much of the NCA in both the US and Soviet Union survived the initial wave one attacks.
2.) Information on what's going on in the Missile Fields is going to be very fragmentary until the dust clouds settle enough -- we might well see a Program 494L Minuteman ERCS be launched by the 510th SMS at Whiteman (they had 10~ MM2 loaded with ERCS instead of nukes) simply as a "hey, we're alive here, the board is green for 21 out of 50 silos" if all other methods of communicating failed.
3.) Europe is a major wild card, thanks to all the INF forces hanging around there. A pre-emptive Soviet attack in Europe would've tipped the US hand towards executing Launch Under Attack (LUA) earlier; so I'm leaning towards the Soviets delaying a decision on Europe until RVs are impacting CONUS.
4.) The SR-71 might be flying a round trip mission from England to Turkey for post Nuclear BDA -- the distance from England->Balts->Belarus->Kiev->Istanbul is about 2,300 miles; within the Blackbird's unrefuelled range.
5.) How federated were KH-11 KENNEN downlinks in the 1980s? It does us no good to use them for post-Nuke BDA if the only downlink near the NCA c.1983 is at NSA HQ in Fort Meade, and it got hit by 300 KT; etc.
6.) The SAC Ground Alert Bombers that took off from the northern CONUS bases (Wurtsmith, Minot, etc) are somewhere over Lower Canada now and about 3800 miles (6.9~ hours) from reaching the Soviet Union's borders; or 3.9~ hours from ALCM launch points.
If Airborne Alert is in action up north near Greenland; they're roughly 2000 miles (3.6~ hours) from the USSR's borders, or 1~ hour of ALCM launch points.
7.) The War At Sea [tm] may not quite have started at this point outside of Strategic Units -- it's important to remember that our current "hyperwar" state of knowing everything that's happening in Moscow ten minutes after a drone attack wave hit it is a very recent development.
You can be sure though that on the CVs and CVNs, the nukes are being broken out of the special weapons exclusion areas and Soviet AGIs are riddled with gunfire and sinking.
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This is getting complicated FAST.
I'm at the point where I need to either get a big giant wallboard and set it up with a Gantt chart; or do it digitally with project management software to try and keep track of what's going on where and why; WWIII c. 1978-1985 and onwards isn't like the more sedate 1950s.
I'm starting to understand what Stu meant with this comment back in 2002:
The key point to all this is that its essential to consider the consequences of actions, not just the actions themselves. Not just first-level consequences but second - third- and fourth-level consequences.
When somebody proposed a course of action a mentor of mine Herman Kahn (pbuh) had a nasty of habit of asking "and that means what?" to each development in the proposal. When somebody couldn't answer they got a stony "Then find out and come back"
