Stu's statement "Now, if we combine the missiles we designed to knock down high-performance aircraft with the command system we designed to manage a high-speed air battle, we've got a missile defense system, again whether we acknowledge the fact or not." makes sense if you sit down and start looking at the basic data that set up the parameters for an air defense system:
First, you've got to figure out the enemy's Bomb Release Line, or the point where the bomb will be released -- it doesn't matter if you destroy the enemy after he's passed the Bomb Release Line; he's already dropped his nuke.
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High Drag Bomb = 2000 lb bomb based off AN-M64 500 lb Hi-Drag Bomb drag curve)
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B-50 @ 300 MPH @ 35,000 ft = 50 seconds + 3.7~ miles
B-47/50 @ 500 MPH @ 50,000 ft = 65 seconds + 6.9~ miles
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Low Drag Bomb = 2000 lb bomb based off Mk 83 1000 lb Low Drag Bomb drag curve)
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B-58 @ 1300 MPH @ 60,000 ft = 66 seconds + 20.1~ miles
B-70 @ 2200 MPH @ 80,000 ft = 78 seconds + 38.4~ miles
As you can see, by the mid 1960s, the threat was now bad enough that you had to keep enemy aircraft 40+ miles away from whatever you were defending. That means a big missile right from the start.
It gets worse if you assume that your IADS has a six minute reaction cycle from "detect target to fire missile at it"; which leads to the following rates of advance:
B-50 @ 300 MPH = 5 miles/minute = 30 miles
B-47/52 @ 500 MPH = 8.3 miles/minute = 49.8 miles
B-58 @ 1300 MPH = 21.6 miles/minute = 129.6 miles
B-70 @ 2200 MPH = 36.6 miles/minute = 219.6 miles
Plugging all of these together, you get:
B-50: 35~ mile radar
B-47/52: 58~ mile radar
B-58: 150~ mile radar
B-70: 260~ mile radar
as a rough minimum needed for air breathing threats.
You can see how sustained supersonic threats really stress radars and IADS; especially when combined with stealth:
F-117 @ 500 MPH = 8.3 miles/minute = 50 mile radar needed @ 6 minute reaction cycle
F-22/F-35 @ 1050 MPH = 17.5 miles/minute = 105 mile radar needed @ 6 minute reaction cycle
The kind of radar that can achieve a return on a 0.005m2 target (F-35) @ 100 miles would have to:
Have lots of transmitted power
Have very good signal/declutter/recognition algorithms
This would in turn make that radar very good against a 0.005 m2 to 0.8m2 target (Mk 12 Mod 3 RV @ 0 to 30 deg aspect ratio) streaking in at hypersonic speeds; all you'd have to do is crank the radar up to cover the typical angles associated with incoming ballistic missile threats.
Of course...you could significantly reduce the radar requirements (transmitted power/signals processing) if you decreased the reaction cycle of the defense to something like 30 seconds to 1 minute...but this in turn would mean that the system would be even faster reacting against incoming ballistic missile targets.
According to RAND in "RM 3475: Data for ICBM Reentry Trajectories", a 3000 lb/ft2 BC RV coming in at a 30 degree angle @ 24,000 ft/sec when it hits the beginning of the atmosphere at 400,000 ft will be at the following point some 30 seconds from impact:
23,000~ ft/sec velocity
75,000 ft altitude
370,000 ft ground range (70~ miles)
The RV loses a lot of velocity as it punches through the lower atmosphere; by the time it's 4 seconds from impact, it's slowed down to about 5,800~ ft/sec and is about 20,000 ft (3.78) miles from impact at an altitude of about 5,000 ft.
The RAND graph only goes up to about 32 seconds before impact -- but after asking Grok AI for a crude approximation of where it would be at about 40 seconds from impact; it coughed out:
190,000 ft (35.98 mile) altitude
569,000~ ft (107.7 mile) ground range
Those ranges aren't that long; meaning if you had a modern SAM system in "bloodthirsty fully autonomous" mode, you'd have a good enough chance of hitting an ICBM RV to make it worthwhile in trying to engage.
We already have an example of "Bloodthirstyness"...
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/patriot-wars
Sorry for the long digression...Back to the older preserved Essay(s):My initial contact with the Patriot system was in the late 1970s. I was fresh out of graduate school with a PhD in psychology but had some experience with predecessor air defense systems, such as Nike Hercules and Hawk, as an air defense officer in the early 1970s. Patriot was a somewhat different experience. The system has two operating modes: semi-automatic and automatic. Patriot in semi-automatic mode is slightly more automated than its immediate predecessor the Hawk system, but still on that I would term the “main line” of evolutionary development for air defense systems of its class. That is, the system provides more computer-based engagement support than its predecessors, but Patriot in semi-automatic mode is still very much an operator-in-the-loop system. Patriot in automatic mode represented a significant jump in capability. In that sense, there was a discontinuity between Patriot in semi-automatic mode and Patriot as it could be used in automatic mode.
Patriot’s automatic mode is quite different. So different, in fact, that I once asked one of the prime contractor’s systems engineers where they got the engagement-control algorithms used in the system’s automatic mode. He replied that they had been adapted from the engagement control logic of the Safeguard system. Safeguard was the first operational U.S. anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. The system was deployed briefly beginning in the early 1970s and then traded away as part of one of the first treaties limiting U.S. and Soviet ABM systems. Remnants of the old Safeguard system still exist at Ft. Bliss, Texas, and at isolated sites in Montana and North Dakota.
Safeguard was a near-autonomous system. Get a green light to initiate the missile engagement process, and the system mostly took over from there. The computer fought the air battle. That was a reasonable choice, given Safeguard’s mission and operational context: Fight the first salvo of the Battle of Armageddon at the edge of space. However, that level of automation was not an appropriate operating mode for Patriot’s mission and operating environment. Patriot operates in the more cluttered and ambiguous lower-tier region of the air defense operational environment. The potential for track classification and identification mistakes is considerably greater for Patriot than it was for Safeguard. The Army did not fully grasp the impact of these differences, and to some extent still does not. The major problem with Patriot is that the system’s automatic feature is mostly an all-or-none operating mode. In automatic mode, there are few “decision leverage points” that allow the operators to influence the system’s engagement logic and exercise real-time supervisory control over a mostly automated engagement process.
Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing through Patriot’s initial fielding in January 1984, I was involved in a series of system development studies for Patriot. During that time, there was a school of thought in Army circles that using Patriot in automatic mode would be a preferred operating concept. Our early work lent support to the argument that automatic was not a suitable operating mode for Patriot against conventional air threats. Patriot’s engagement algorithms were too “brittle” for the system’s engagement context. Used in this context, “brittle” refers to the machine’s inability to handle unusual or ambiguous tactical situations reliably. The term is now commonly used to describe automation limitations.
The basic issue with brittleness is that computer-based algorithms operate in a black-and-white world; they have a little capacity to handle gray or ambiguous situations. That task falls to human operators, if they have the time and expertise to do so. When Patriot was initially fielded, tactical usage guidance directed that the system not be employed in automatic mode. The automatic mode was included with Patriot because it was available from Safeguard, and there were potential Cold War-related situations in which a mostly automated air defense system might prove useful. Safeguard was intended to be used in a nuclear war context in which all bets are off, so to speak, and risk tolerance is very high. That was not the case for Patriot.
...
One of the more interesting aspects of Patriot tactical operations after the first OIF fratricide incident (the British Tornado) was a decision to have fire units drop their launchers to standby mode.
That way, the system could remain in automatic engagement mode but not actually engage a track until one or more launchers were returned to ready status. Commanders apparently wanted a “second look” before permitting the system to engage.
The second OIF fratricide (the Navy F-18) took place under this modified operating regimen. The system reported a false ballistic missile track later attributable to radar electromagnetic interference. The tactical director at the battalion command and control node gave the order, “Bring your launchers to ready.”
That directive was tantamount to an order to engage. But that was not what the tactical director intended; he simply wanted to get ready to engage by bringing fire unit launchers to ready status.
The subordinate battery fire units were in tactical ballistic missile automatic mode.
The tactical director either did not know that, or he did not remember in the heat of impending action that returning launchers to ready status would result in an automatic engagement by the first available launcher. The F-18 was engaged and destroyed.
...
Army “big missile” air defense units such as Patriot function under the operational control of the Air Force. After the second fratricide, the Air Force denied Patriot units any engagement authority, even in self-defense.
The Tornado incident was a permissible self-defense engagement against what the system classified as an anti-radiation missile. Under the new rules of engagement, Patriot could engage only when specifically authorized by the Air Force controlling authority.
Tactical ballistic missile engagement timelines are often too short for that to be a practical course of action. In essence, that decision took Patriot out of the fight, so to speak.
There were no further Patriot launches during OIF, and, luckily, there were no more ballistic missiles to shoot.
Similar engagement restrictions on Patriot operations are still in place: the Air Force retains engagement authority for any Patriot shots.
...
There are situations in which a high level of automation and near-autonomous operations clearly are required. One such vsituation involves defending against large numbers of incoming ballistic missiles, what analysts refer to as a saturation attack. Human operators performing in-the-loop or too closely on-the-loop in such situations could be overwhelmed and not able to cope effectively with performance demands. Too closely on-the-loop refers to a situation in which operators under-trust the automation and do not permit the system the control latitude the engagement situation demands. This is the flip side of the automation over-trust issue mentioned previously.
In a sense, this requirement led to the development of Patriot’s automatic mode of operation more than 35 years ago. Recall that Patriot’s automatic mode was adapted from the Safeguard system’s automatic mode.
That mode of operation was entirely appropriate for Safeguard’s mission objectives and operating environment. Problems arose when the automatic mode was incorporated into Patriot without a critical consideration of differences between Patriot and Safeguard. That led to imprudent use of Patriot during OIF and contributed to the fratricide incidents.
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Username: Cowboy 455
Nickname: Regular
Posts: 23
Date: 6/5/06 13:36
Dual Use SAMs
Toward the end of the Cold War there was some concern over the possible Soviet deployment of "Dual Use" SAMs. SAM systems that could have both AAW and ABM uses, armed with nuclear warheads, and connected to a ABM treaty restricted 'battle management' system. This is not the ABM system around Moscow, but specifically the SAMs like SA-5 and it's replacement, the SA-10, which made up the Tallinn system. Given it's wider deployment, it was thought to be a counter to some SLBMs in the West, and some even thought it had capability against ICBMs. Was this a valid concern? Did the Soviets massively violate the ABM treaty? Would it have been an effective system, perhaps in the context of defending the Soviet Union after a first strike? Did we compensate for it? Thank you in advance for any responses.
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Username: David Newton
Nickname: Administrator
Posts: 5398
Date: Unknown
Re: Dual Use SAMs
Yes the Soviets did egregiously violate the ABM treaty, just as they violated almost every other arms "restriction" treaty they ever signed up to.
Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with mustard.
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Username: Seer Stuart
Nickname: The Prince of Darkness
Posts: 4926
Date: 6/6/06 3:13
Re: Dual Use SAMs
SAM systems that could have both AAW and ABM uses, armed with nuclear warheads, and connected to a ABM treaty restricted 'battle management' system. This is not the ABM system around Moscow, but specifically the SAMs like SA-5 and it's replacement, the SA-10, which made up the Tallinn system. Given it's wider deployment, it was thought to be a counter to some SLBMs in the West, and some even thought it had capability against ICBMs. Was this a valid concern? Did the Soviets massively violate the ABM treaty?
I think the Soviets did violate the ABM treaty but I don't think they did so with the deliberate aim of setting up a covert ABM system. The problem is that a high-performance aircraft is a much more difficult target that a ballistic missile; if we can build a missile that is capable of intercepting a very high performance aircraft (by which I mean SR-71 standard or above) then that missile almost by definition becomes an anti-ballistic missile. Likewise, the inevitable result of trying to take on such high performance aircraft is that missile range has to go up (or the aircraft has passed overhead before the missile gets up to intercept it). Again, once we have an anti-aircraft missile with that sort of range, it has an ABM capability whether we like it or not.
The same applies to air defense systems (orientated against aircraft) and ballistic missile defense systems. Aircraft are much harder to defend against than missiles so the command system used to control the defenses has to be that much more capable. About the only thing a missile has running for it is that its very high speed cuts down reaction times and the command system has to accommodate that. Against fast aircraft with good ECM, reaction time is cut down to the same extent so again, once we've designed an air defense system that can cope with such threats, we've designed an ABM system whether we acknowledge the situation or not.
Now, if we combine the missiles we designed to knock down high-performance aircraft with the command system we designed to manage a high-speed air battle, we've got a missile defense system, again whether we acknowledge the fact or not. This is getting noted today; a lot of countries are finding that equipping their air defense system with the latest generation missiles is providing them with a missile defense capability. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are already going that way. The Russians are doing quite well with their S-300 SAM for the same reason. If they ever get S-400 working (the tea leaves do not look hopeful at this point; virtually every element of the S-400 has failed and the IOC has officially been pushed back to 2010) then the Russians will be able to offer a very mice anti-missile system.
I believe the real problem was the ABM Treaty itself. This was a terrible treaty, one that should never have been signed. It completely ignored the basic problem that a capable air defense system is also by definition a capable anti-missile system and it had to be hurriedly patched to allow for that. The patch itself was badly thought out; I can actually sympathize with the Russians for eventually deciding that it was more trouble than it was worth. Teh US went the other way; Patriot was severely "cooled down" during its development and PAC-3 is a step towards putting what was taken out back in.
Was the Russian SAM system a concern. You bet it was. Essentially the Russians had a thin defense screen over their entire country that stood a chance of knocking down at least some of the warheads we would have tossed in their general direction. How amny and what we did about it was a matter of great concern when I was working in that area. Sorry, I'm going to have to leave that there.
Hope this helps a bit.
Nations do not survive by setting examples for others.
Nations survive by making examples of others
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Username: M21A1 Sniper
Nickname: Unus offa unus iuguolo
Posts: 5119
Date: 6/6/06 19:22
Re: Dual Use SAMs
Awesome answer stu, thanx.
PS: Keep the wisecracks to your self mod-dolphin.
LOLOLOL.
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"Excuse me sir, i'm going to need your car keys."
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Username: IRay181
Nickname: Old Friend
Posts: 466
Date: 6/6/06 23:45
Re: Dual Use SAMs
"Was the Russian SAM system a concern. You bet it was. Essentially the Russians had a thin defense screen over their entire country that stood a chance of knocking down at least some of the warheads we would have tossed in their general direction. How amny and what we did about it was a matter of great concern when I was working in that area. Sorry, I'm going to have to leave that there."
So without lossing fingers, did this prove that a limited air defence system significantly increase the cost to the offensive team?
Ian
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Username: MarkSheppard
Nickname: Slightly oblivious
Posts: 1654
Date: 6/7/06 0:54
Re: Dual Use SAMs
So without lossing fingers, did this prove that a limited air defence system significantly increase the cost to the offensive team?
Let's do some rough SWAGing.
We got a target, say a factory we want to take out. So we'll use a Minuteman III RV to destroy it; and target another RV from another missile to ensure the target's destroyed in spite of malfunctions.
If there's a "thin protective screen" from the SA-5; there's a high probability that our lone RV which doesn't malfunction will be shot down. So we got to increase the number of RVs aimed at teh factory to ensure that the target's destroyed; say eight. So the defense has forced us to spend 4 times the amount of warheads 8 vice 2 to destroy this single target. Multiply this by the number of targets around the USSR, and you see the problem.
I know that the above is a gross oversimplification, and doesn't take into account the fact that if there are other targets nearby, the RVs assigned to those targets will help overload the SA-5 battery; remember it was designed essentially as a SAM network, with a nice "bonus" ABM capability as a byproduct.
Even though the missile would be capable of intercepting an incoming RV; the battle management capability of the SA-5 system is oriented towards air breathing targets; as Stuart has said, it's not just the performance of one piece of the system, but the overall performance of all the parts.
To elaborate; the radars attached to most SA-5 batteries are IIRC optimized for tracking aircraft. While it's possible for the SA-5 system to have a link to the HEN HOUSE radars, which can track RVs; does every SA-5 system deployed have that datalink, plus the capability to process the information relayed thru said datalink?
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Username: David Newton
Nickname: Administrator
Posts: 5399
Date: 6/7/06 18:34
Re: Dual Use SAMs
To further elaborate: we don't however know which SA-5s have the datalink and the radar so we have to assume that they all have. That's one of the reasons why the costs increase so quickly.
Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with mustard.
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Username: Cowboy 455
Nickname: Regular
Posts: 24
Date: 6/7/06 20:01
Re: Dual Use SAMs
Thank you Stuart, and everyone else, that did help a lot. This stuff fascinates me.
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Username: Cowboy 455
Nickname: Regular
Posts: 25
Date: 6/14/06 18:43
Re: Dual Use SAMs
Does anyone know what the present condition of the Russian "dual use SAM" capability is, in it's present post cold war condition? Since both the US and Russia are dramatically decreasing the total number of strategic warheads (1700-2000 START2), I would think that this system would take on more meaning given the fewer targets it would have to engage. And on the US side, is THAAD also meant for continental defense against ICBM warheads, in addition to the more public NMD (and maybe SM-3) systems? Again, thanks for any replies.
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