In the original cut-n-paste posted by hohaho; there's this line:
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BIG NOTE: There was a thread in the old "Essays" board labelled Battle of Britian (2).
Did anyone save that?
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Subject: Battle of Britian (1)
Posted By: Hoahao Old Friend
Posted At: 4/21/02 0:25
Please note. This version has had Tim Hanna's comments edited out.
If any other poster wishes to have his contribution lost to posterity, kindly inform the moderators and we shall be sure to delete your posts permanently.
Hope I get the order right!!
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Sealion - Was a German invasion of Britain feasible...
Billy Boy - Old Friend
Posts: 146
(12/2/00 4:59:54 pm )
In 1941-2?
Could they land enough troops and move on London.
And what effect would this have had on the rest of Britain?
Edited by: Supatra at: 2/28/02 8:29:00 am
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Re: Was a German invasion of Britain feasible...
IanRay - Old Friend
Posts: 73
(12/2/00 5:14:38 pm )
Unlikely even without going into Russia.
The main problem that comes to mind is the maritime assests to do such a landing and to support the logistics network. Troop numbers would not be my first concern.
Ian
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Anthony EJW
Posts: 1
(12/2/00 7:21:06 pm )
No, not a chance at all.
There are numerous reasons why a German invasion of Britain was unfeasible, political but mostly practical.
If Hitler had been persuaded to strike and destroy Britain before turning to his true goal, the invasion of Russia, there were numerous things that were vital for the success of the invasion that the Germans simply did not have.
For a successful naval invasion there must be transport to move the required troops and materials to that location and then be able to supply them. There has to be, at the very least, air superiority and a navy capable of defending those transports from an opposing navy. Of course, one also needs an army, but Germany had no shortage of armies.
Germany had few transports and they were of poor quality. The plan mainly consisted of converting Rhine river barges. The problem with this was simply that they were not designed for ocean use. They would of been swamped in all but the mildest weather (and it was the English Channel they had to cross...)The German high command estimated they could get 10 divisions to England. 10 INFANTRY divisions because they could bring little heavy equipment with them. Even after losing a lot of heavy equipment after the fall of France, Britain could easily outnumber the Germans in anything- infantry, artillery, anti-tank guns etc. Even the few hundred tanks Britain had left would outnumber anything Germany could bring across.
Numerous ideas have been proposed to get around this weakness, but none of them would of worked.
Paratroops? Excellent against pinpoint targets, but of little use in invading an entire country.
Poison gas? More beneficial to the defender than an attacker
The excellence of the German army? German troops did beat larger numbers of British and Commonwealth troops, such as in North Africa. However, 10 infantry divisions against all of Britain? That is simply getting far fetched.
Suppling this force would of been even harder. Again the problem of few transports arises, made worse by any loses on the landings themselves.
Thus, Germany could not even ship a force even half the size of what was needed to have any chance of a successful invasion, much less supply it.
Third is the factor of air superiority- easily the most famous.
It has lead many people to falsely to belive this was all Germany needed to win.
However, even if Britain was not consistently out-producing Germany in terms of aircraft, even if Germany continued to attack airfields rather than London, even if Britain did not have radar etc. Germany could NOT win air superiority for the invasion. This was due to a geographical quirk -- northern England and Scotland were out of range of German fighters. Even if the RAF had somehow lost, they would move everything they had left north then simply flood the skies with aircraft when the invasion started, negating any advantage the Germans had.
Fourth is naval superiority, something which is almost always ignored when coming up with ways to make Sealion work. After all, they had to cross a body of water known as the English channel. Water is the domain of the Royal Navy.
A navy that was considered by many to be the finest in the world. Germany had nothing to parry it. There own navy was miniscule compared to the RN. They had no specialized naval attack aircraft. Submarines were great for commerance raiding but quite useless for securing naval supremacy. Even in the pacific, with both the USN and IJN both using 100's of specifically designed naval aircraft battles would still last for days. All the RN needed to wreck any landing attempt was hours, and every ship would be thrown in in defense of the home country.
Again, Germany had absolutely no chance with the resources they had in 1940, even taking into account Britain's disorganized forces. By 1941 onwards Britain was heavily defended and was even more so every passing year. If they had wanted to invade Britain, Germany would of had to prepare years in advance- something they could not do. They first needed to build an army and an airforce from almost scratch and even if they had started preparations Britain would of seen that all those transports and battleships had no purpose other than the invasion of Britain.
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Dick B - Extravagantly well fed Texican, stuffed with Beef Fajitas and Lone Star Beer
Posts: 182
(12/2/00 8:11:10 pm )
Not in 1939, not in 1940, not in 1941, not in 194
Never had a dog's chance. Ever.
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Countess Marina
Her Ladyship
Posts: 601
(12/2/00 9:32:50 pm )
But there was a chance for negotiated peace.
If those bumbling idiots on that one bomber flight hadn't accidently bombed London during the Battle of Britain, Churchill would have never ordered Berlin bombed, resulting in a Fuhrertantrum that switched the attacks from airfields to turning London into Rubble.
If they had bombed the right target, then the Battle of Britain would have continued as historical, and the RAF, IIRC, would have been annihilated in 6 weeks.
Unprotected except for ground AAA, Britain could not continue the war. If Churchill did not ask for terms, then his government would most likely fall and be replaced by one that would.
"Like a tiger, in the cage, we begin to shake with rage.."
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Apis4
Regular
Posts: 28
(12/2/00 10:21:27 pm )
Re: But there was a chance for negotiated peace.
If Hitler had not attacked Russia, he very well could have invaded Britain. People have stated that German Transport ability was extremely poor. But this was only because they didnt need to focus on Naval transpot to attack Russia, which was the main aim of the Germans. German production could have easily been focused on transports, and this might have pushed back an invasion by a year or so, but it would have given them what they needed. Additionaly the Tanks they had in France wouldnt have been needed and could have been landed in Britain, though this invasion might have been logisticaly tricky, I think they could have in maybe 1943. The question would have to be though, what would the British forces do???? I mean when we were threatened by Japan in the War, we withdrew 400,000 troops from Eroupe and the Middle East, would Britain have done the same??? Or would they attempt to invade Europe with the North Africa and Indian/Burma forces??? Even if the Germans did land in Britain, it would be a bloody and costly battle for every inch gained, and they couldnt land enough at once to try the whole Bltzkrieg bit, so they would be making very very slow gains and this would tie them up from a fast withdrawl as well if British forces somehow managed to land in say Holland or go through Portugal, which they might well have had Britain itself been invaded. I think that they could well have pushed up into German lines in France, and broken through for that matter, isolating the German forces in Britian, so even if the Germans managed invade, they well could have been caught in another Stalingrad, on a much larger scale.
The only way I think they could have done it AND been successful was if they waited and dragged the War out until 46, whcih they could have if they didnt launch Babarossa since it wasd Stalins insistence on another front in Europe that lead to D-Day, when Franco's plan to launch a surprise attack on Allied foirces and enter the War as a German ally was to take place. With Franco controlling Western Europe Germany could have launched an invasion on Britain secure in the knowledge that its lines of supply and retreat were secure. But who knows??? It didnt happen so we cant say.
I do have one question though, if Germany had not have attacked Russia, and instead thrown everything at Britain with a chance of success, would the Russians have informed the British??? The Lucy Ring was still opperating inside the Oberkomandowermacht at the time and could well have found out abouyt the invasion. Would they have informed British intelligence???
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Theodore
Old Friend
Posts: 100
(12/3/00 12:18:38 am )
How the invasion was prevented.
It was the RAF that did it - British bombers, aided by minelaying and hit-and-run bombardment raids, sank or damaged over a thousand barges, transports, and other ships and craft meant for the invasion. Germany didn't have enough barges, and she didn't have any way to adequately protect them while assembling the number required (which didn't happen either.)
The vast numbers of craft requisitioned for Sealion also severely hindered the waterborne commerce of Germany, the occupied territories, and her allies.
Submarines actually didn't have much luck operating in the Channel. Mines alone made it very hazardous. Stukas could be neutralized by fighting at night, something the Royal Navy was very good at.
Give a man a fish and he will eat for a day. Teach a man to fish and he will be gone all weekend.
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Sorivar
Regular
Posts: 24
(12/3/00 1:42:30 am )
Reply
The Invasion of the United Kingdom
With a certain Corpral in charge, it would never have happened. It could have happened but several things would have had to happened first.
1. Absolute control of the air. The RAF would have to have been driven from the sky. German aircraft would need to deny the Royal Navy any real access to the Channel.
2. The German Navy would have to be able to keep the Royal Navy out of the Channel at least for a short while. All of the German Navy would need to be available to protect the invasion fleet. Any British sortie would have to be annhilitated with a combination of German airpower, mines and submarines and E-boats.
3. German Paratroops would have to be available. This means no Crete or the units would have to have been rebuilt. These troops would need to help reinforce any bridgehead and cut off any British reinforcements or at least impede their movement towards the invasion area.
4. Forget the invasion of the Soviet Union.
5. It has to be done before December 7, 1941. Realistically, the Germans need to get things done before relations between the Americans and Japanese turn very sour since there is no way that they could know what day the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor.
6. German infantry would have to have some sort of assault craft available. Barges would not do. R-boats and other craft would work backed by destroyers and torpedo boats. Production of all of these fast craft would have to have been increased before the invasion. Minesweepers would be needed to sweep the channel, again in large numbers.
7. The invasion force would have to quickly capture a port. Then German merchant ships could bring in heavy artillery and armor needed to expand the bridgehead. If they can break onto the Salisbury Plain, they will win.
It was possible. It was not probable. Hitler made it impossible with all of his various stupidities.
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Apis4
Regular
Posts: 30
(12/3/00 1:56:33 am )
Re: The Invasion of the United Kingdom
If Hitler had started the War even two years later he very well could have won it, and invaded Britain in the process.
I agree, Hitler was stupid
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Johan Lup
Old Friend
Posts: 54
(12/3/00 3:43:31 am )
A window of opportunity....
I would recommend Kenneth Macksey's book "Invasion" - it makes a good case for an invasion in July-Aug 1940, based on the assumption that Hitler had ordered the necessary planning&preparations to commence early enough (in May).
Those in positions of responsibility in the UK at that time certainly took the invasion threat very seriously at least until mid-September 1940.
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David Newton
Old Friend
Posts: 113
(12/3/00 10:33:18 am )
Re: The Invasion of the United Kingdom
I do not believe that the UK could have been successfully invaded, even if the war had started two years later. You have to remember that the UK and France were rearming anyway for a couple of years before the real war started. Things like the production of the Spitfire and Hurricane, the laying down of new battleships and aircraft carrier production speak of this.
If things had started in 1941 instead of 1939, then the UK would have had more advanced fighter aircraft, it would have had some modern battleships on line, and more a lot closer to production, and it would have had a great many more escorts built. Most important, it would have had the army more fully mobilised and equipped.
The UK was never under threat of invasion and loss of the war from Nazi Germany. Even if the Germans had somehow got troops ashore they would have been slaughtered by superior British number as their bridgehead got cut off from supply by the combined efforts of the RN and RAF.
Conversely Germany could never have been beaten by Britain alone. The best that could have been done would have been clearing out North Africa. Britain could have beaten Italy or Japan alone, but Germany was simply too large a power.
The only chance that Germany had of beating Britain was winning the Battle of the Atlantic. That would also have been substantially more difficult if it had started two years later. Not only would there be more UK escorts, but there would have been more long range coastal patrol aircraft. It was the latter that really killed U boats, that and escort carriers which would also have been coming on line.
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Dick B
Extravagantly well fed Texican, stuffed with Beef Fajitas and Lone Star Beer
Posts: 183
(12/3/00 12:56:40 pm )
ETO
No point beating a dead horse, eh?
The discussion raised this point in my mind, anyway.
Could The British Empire, aided by masses of Russian Infantry in the east, and American material in the west have defeated the Axis without American troop involve-ment. (Buchanan's premise in has recent book.)
I say yes.
Consider that Germany was not completely mobilized until 1944, and even then, not at the scale of Britain.
Consider that Canada, though small in numbers, had a vast potential, the RCN assuming over half the North Atlantic convoy duties; providing virtually all pilot training for Commonwealth and allied pilots; raising and equipping two field armies; plus her production capabilities paralled the US at a smaller scale.
Consider the manpower available in the Empire. The Indian Army was prepared to deploy 200,000 men on the first day, with millions more available. India was producing small arms and ammunition, and had a few shipyards in operation, there was huge potential there. The record of the Indian soldier speaks for itself.
Consider the South Africans. Though restricted to Africa by agreement with Churchill, Smuts had a very respectable force and even more potential. The Black colonies had any number of militarily useful men.
Consider Australia and New Zealand, small in numbers like Canada, but the absolute best quality soldiers around, and with useful navies and air forces.
Consider the French, the Netherlands, the Belgians, all had colonies from which to draw support in aid of Britain's (And thier own) war efforts.
Consider Churchill - if he had given them their head, what prodigies the colonies might have accomplished over and above the remarkable record they did achieve. Had he not antagonized DeGaulle; had they not alienated the French Navy and colonial authorities . .
Consider the US, relieved of an unlikely European "threat" and facing Japan at full strength. Likely no Pearl Harbor, likely no Force 'Z'; likely no Malaya
(In the discussion above, it is decided that Germany had not the ability to cross the channel, if that's so, what threat did she pose to the Atlantic Coast of a neutral US?)
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DY
Regular
Posts: 19
(12/3/00 8:12:20 pm )
No. The die was cast in 1936 or 1937.
Although perhaps no one knew it at the time, Germany lost the Battle of Britain before it began when aircraft types were decided on before the start of the war. Invasion became impossible when the decision was made to orient the Luftwaffe towards ground support and base aircraft type selection on that. Perhaps a similar argument could be made about the German Navy. When the battle ships were laid down at the expense of other capabilities, pershaps one could say the die was cast as well for the role of the German Navy in any potential invasion of the UK
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Re: No. The die was cast in 1936 or 1937.
Apis4
Posts: 33
(12/3/00 8:51:14 pm )
I would Just like to say Kudos to you for recognising the ANZACS. Whenever I see Documantaries on WWI or WII the Diggers are so rarely mentioned and they were such first class soldiers and its really really disappointing. I really think that Both the ANZACS and Idian/Nepalese soldiers in WWII needed to be recognised much more than they are. When ever I see anything on WWII its always the US, UK or USSR for the Alies, and Germany, Italy and Japan for the Axis nations.
I want Finland Romania Australia New Zealand India Nepal China and all other nations that took part in either WWI or WWII get the recognition they desreve, they sent people to die too, and they often had far less people to lose than Japan Russia US UK or Germany, so the cost was potentialy much higher.
Edited by: Apis4 at: 12/4/00 12:02:15 am
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CdrHornblower
Worlds most liberal Cornflower
Posts: 457
(12/3/00 9:19:03 pm )
Invade with what?
Germany lost half of her destroyers in Norway. The RN would have sacrificed itself (and to be honest not alot of ships would have been lost) to destroy the invasion fleet.
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Theodore
Old Friend
Posts: 103
(12/3/00 11:49:29 pm )
Re: How the invasion was prevented.
Mine the likely invasion beaches and mine the enemy harbors. Both of these were done - and the Germans did not have many minesweeping assets. The battlefield is the Channel; it isn't going to shift.
As for night actions, it has been pointed out elsewhere in this topic that in the unlikely event any German troops did get ashore the British would be able to sever their supply lines with ease. This would have been achieved largely by night bombing and bombardment. The Germans might have controlled the area by day, but not by night, and the British could have done more than enough damage during the dark hours.
Give a man a fish and he will eat for a day. Teach a man to fish and he will be gone all weekend.
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Stuart Slade
Prince of Darkness
Posts: 453
(12/4/00 9:42:53 am )
Re: Was a German invasion of Britain feasible...
In a word, no. This is one of the great questions of history and has been studied in immense depth. Back in the 1970s, the Royal Military College at Sandhurst did a detailed examination of the German plans while some other historical groups did less detailed but other-perspective investigations.
Really it boiled down to three questions.
Firstly, could the Germans develop a situation where an invasion seemed practical?
The answer is probably no. The real trouble the Germans had was that their fighters could only reach the south eastern ten percent of the UK where there was very little of interest. There were some aircraft factories (most notably Supermarine at Woolston and Shorts at Rochester) but they represented only small proportions of total fighter output. Castle Bromwich, the shadow Supermarine plant, was way out of range. Much the same applies to the rest of British industry; it was where the Germans couldn't get at it - not in daylight anyway.
Also, all of the airfields north of the Thames were out of range so if 11 Group was totally defeated, the airspace over SE England could be defended from the 12 Group and 10 Group airfields. The Me-109s couldn't get at them. If they had tried to get at them they would have had to use either unescorted bomber formations or ones escorted by Me-110s. That threw them straight into the jaws of the British second-line fighters (want a surrealistic mental image? Try a Bolton-Paul Defiant dogfighting with an Me-110). All the British pilot training facilities are out of range.
There is an answer to this of course; drop tanks. Contrary to myth the Germans had them although they didn't understand how to use them. The problem is that even if we extend the Me-109s range, the situation doesn't get much better. The fighters still can't reach the vital things and if they get even minor damage they have a long way to go across hostile territory before getting home. The US found that out in 1944 - a long range fighter is wonderful until it gets hit and has to fly 500 miles belching smoke.
To summarize Britain is an extremely difficult place to attack. Very hard indeed. We have a disinterested analysis to support that. In 1947 the Soviet Union tried to construct an atatck plan for the UK and had exactly the same problem - the geographical location and orientation of the island makes it hard to pound on. If its going to be done, it has to be done from the sea using carriers.
Secondly - if the Germans had decided to go, could they have got across?
Again the answer is probably no. Their historical landing plans were examined in detail and are completely unworkable. Put crudely, where amphibious operations were concerned, the German Army didn't have a clue. They looked on the trans-Channel operation as a glorified river crossing and didn't realize that wasn't the case. They simply took plans for a river crossing and scaled them up a bit. We can get an idea of the magnitude of the error by looking at the resources the allies needed to land five divisions in Normandy in 1944 and the German plans to land ten division on the South Coast. The basic problem is a total lack of fire support (the Germans on shore would have been light infantry equipped only with what they could carry. No naval gunfire of any consequence so any defenders dug in would have had a field day. The Germans did have some amphibious tanks but not enough to be of any consequence). There is no lift capacity for resupply, fuel, food, or replacement ammunition. The Royal Navy would have a field day dealing with that mass of virtually unescorted shipping. U-boats would have been ineffective (the chance of a submarine hitting a warship going flat out are fairly small - once a warship is shifting above 20 knots she's virtually invulnerable to submarine torpedo attack unless she's very unlucky. If you look at warships that were torpedoed, they were usually hit while cruising). S boats in daylight were little more than helpless targets. The vestigial German Fleet would have been in the position of a rabbit trying to face down a herd of stampeding elephants. That left the Luftwaffe. Remember those bases North of the Thames? Its a fair bet the RAF would have thrown everything they had into the battle without much regard for whether they could get home. We'd see Gladiators and Gamecocks taken out of store (there were a lot of Furys left around and quite a few Demons, Hinds etc) We'd see the Blenheims and Battles striking at the barges plodding across the Channel (its 20 plus miles from coast to coast - thats four or five hours crossing time). The poor old Luftwaffe would spend most of its time trying to cover the barges from lunatics flying obsolete aircraft (mix in civilian aircraft - an unarmed Dragon Rapide painted green looks menacing - its easy to imagine the British throwing unarmed civilian aircraft flown by civilian pilots at the barges in order to darw fire from the armed aircraft). Then the Luftwaffe also has to protect the bombers attacking the fleet. The Ju-87s are the only real threat - the Germans had no significant torpedo bomber force at this time; level bombers aren't worth a damn against fast-moving warships. The Germans, by the way, are very short of armor piercing bombs. The Ju-87 is helpless against fighters unless escorted; even a Gamecock flown by a 60-year old veteran of WW1 would have no problem in bringing one down.
In summary we have a huge. chaotic and extremely bloody battle with the German infantry sitting in their barges waiting to be massacred. No matter how good the Luftwaffe was enough Royal Navy ships would get through to take down the German invasion fleet. The destroyers wouldn't even have to fire at the barges - just sail past them flat out and sink them with the wake (thats a funny - not serious).
Thirdly, could the Germans win once ashore
Probably not. They are light infantry without fire support and cut off. They are in hostile country with no means of resupply and facing a hostile population. They can't base aircraft in the UK because of the supply problem. We're running into the German perception of the Channel crossing as a river crossing again. Cross a river and the crossing point is supported by a bridge - thats where the word bridgehead comes from. It doesn't seme to have ocurred to the Germans that they can't build a bridge over 20 miles of fairly nasty sea. Winter's coming; fall is here. The Channel gets very stormy and weather gets very bad. Its easy to visualize the Germans isolated in their beachheads and slowly getting starved and picked off one by one. By winter it would be all over and the only Germans left in the UK would be PoWs.
So 1941? 1942? Same as above only worse for the Germans and better for the British.
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David Newton - Old Friend
Posts: 115
(12/4/00 10:34:25 am )
German Morale
It is interesting to speculate what a defeat of this magnitude would have done to German morale.
The shock of the RAF's first bombing raid on Berlin combined a few weeks later with the realization that the Battle of Britain had been lost was bad enough. This would be the total destruction of several army divisions, the loss of the rest of the surface navy left over from the Norway campaign and a savage mauling inflicted on the Luftwaffe.
The repercussions would probably be felt right up to the highest levels of the German command.
Britain savaging German forces would probably have done more to dent morale than all of the bombing raids of the war put together.
If Germany had managed to land forces in Britain and got clobbered over late 1940 to early 1941, it would also have set their campaigns in the rest of Europe back a great deal. I suspect that the Germans would have sat back on their haunches for a while and tried to figure out what on earth happened to them. I think that Hitler would still have been insane enough to invade the Soviet Union though. Whether it would have happened in 1941 or in 1942 is open to interpretation. What I think would have happened is that the campaign would have gone ahead in 1941 due to Hitler pressing forward with his usual disregard for sensible millitary action, but later than historically. It wouldn't have got as far as it did and would still have frozen to a halt when winter hit on December 5th and Germany's defeat would have happened sooner because the Soviets wouldn't have had as much territory to recover, and wouldn't have had as many of their forces knocked out early in the campaign.
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Sealion - Was a German invasion of Britain feasible... -
Mike Kozlowski
Old Friend
Posts: 190
(12/4/00 10:47:29 am )
Re: Was a German invasion of Britain feasible...
Stuart -
A few questions occur to me.
Assume for the sake of argument that the Germans DID try it - if I'm reading everyone's posts properly, it would have been approximately ten divisions. The Luftwaffe gets thrown at the RAF in one last attempt to knock them out of the sky (and what a story line the last Gladiators would have made). The RN and the Royal Army, along with the Home Guard and probably every civilian who can carry a gun, goes after the landing force.
1. Would it be out of the realm of possiblity that the two forces could pretty much incapacitate each other, with the UK ending up bloodied but unbowed, the RNs light forces gone and the RAF victorious but wrecked, and the Germans missing most of the Luftwaffe, a 10 division hole in their OOB, and the Kriegsmarine more of a concept than a fighting force?
2. Do you think this would lead to - basically - a 'time out' for about, say, 12 to 16 months while everyone rearms and reequips? Would it have led to an earlier US entry alongside England, or would we have just kept on pumping stuff out as fast as we could, and still not formally entered the war?
Eagerly awaiting your comments.
B/r,
Mike
*SUDDEN SCREECHING NOISE*...WHAT Soviet plan to invade the UK?....
...There is no human problem so difficult that it cannot be handled with a suitable application of high explosives.
Edited by: Mike Kozlowski at: 12/4/00 10:52:02 am
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David Newton
Old Friend
Posts: 116
(12/4/00 1:11:22 pm )
Reply
Out for the count
Mike, I don't think that both sides would have been out of the fight entirely.
The Kriegsmarine would certainly be dead as a doornail as surface navy, but of all the services it would the exception. Even the Kriegsmarine would have retained its U boat arm. I suspect that all this time the Battle of the Atlantic would have continued.
The biggest problem for the Heer would have been the simple losses of men. 10 divisions getting captured and killed is a pretty big chunk of men, about as bad as Stalingrad and Tunisia. Given the lack of transport for equipment I don't think that would be much of a problem. If paratroops were used in the assault that is one area that Germany would certainly feel the pinch.
The Luftwaffe would have the larger problem. If such a climactic battle erupted, there could well be substantial damage to its pilot cadre The planes could have been replaced, but I don't think we would have seen British airspace challenged again.
The British army had already suffered a massive loss at Dunkirk, so it would be starting from essentially the same point minus those who had been killed in the defence of the country. The RAF could also be rebuilt, although as with the Luftwaffe the pilot cadre would take a while to rebuild. I also believe that the RAF would not have to be thrown in with just obsolete planes. British aircraft production always kept pace with losses, or for the most part exceeded them. Planes were not the problem during the Battle of Britain, pilots were.
The Royal Navy is the service that I believe would come out of this one affected the least. If this sounds strange, think about what happened at Crete. There was an analagous situation. The RN went into a situation where an island was being attacked by the Germans, and took the full weight of the Luftwaffe in the area. Yes they lost ships, but they still managed to help evacuate a great many men. That situation I would argue was considerably worse than the one that would be faced in any invasion of Britain. Around Crete the Luftwaffe had essentially uncontested control of the skies. Round Britain they would have the full force of the RAF to contend with. Round Crete the RN ships were also much further from their bases. There were also not sufficient British ground forces to clobber the Germans.
Although a significant number of the RN's lighter units would be lost, if needed there could be a withdrawal from the Med. Although Malta was a nice place to have given the damage that it allowed to be done to Italian convoy traffic, it was not vital. Confining British naval activity to the immediate area around Gibralter and to the east around Cyprus and the Middle East would have required considerable less naval units. There could still be harrasement raids, and things like Taranto could still definetly have been pulled off, but the country could bide its time before taking on the full might of the Italian navy.
If the US didn't enter the war in Europe at the same time as historically, I believe that once Britain was safe again, attention would have shifted to Africa. Sufficient forces were available there to hold any attacks off, and once the home island had been secured Axis forces could have been knocked out.
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Grunta
Regular
Posts: 28
(12/5/00 12:13:46 am )
French?
What would the French have done were the Germans to lose half the Luftwaffe, most of the Kreigsmarine and 10 divisions?
This would leave the Germans severely weakened. How pro-Nazi was the Vichy regime (which had been allowed to hang on to significant assets, especially in Africa). Could De Gaulle have promoted an insurgence of some kind? What chance the French North African and Middle Eastern territories being bought in to the Allied fold? Remember, this is a couple of years before the Germans had mucked with Vichy leadership and command.
BTW, David, parochialism is all very well, but claiming the UK could have single handedly taken down Japan?
Come on mate ... not even ... (You do realise it is on the other side of the world don't you?)
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Countess Marina
Her Ladyship
Posts: 612
(12/5/00 7:16:41 am )
I've always wondered about Petain...
If the guy really was the slime that history makes him out to be.
I wonder if, in a situation like this, with the Kriegsmarine annihilated, half the Luftwaffe smashed, and ten Heer divisions wiped off the face of the earth, not to mention the paratroopers that would be lost (Probably ALL of them), and any Glider units that the Nazis had, (Again, probably ALL of them)...
Well, maybe Petain would act.
If he did, I don't know how De Gaulle could not support him..
And Mussolini might get cold feet and start inquiring about a peace treaty if he can keep what he has troops on...
Maybe Stalin will decide that the rest of Eastern Europe is doable, after all..
And, of course, there's also the looming possibility of The Conspirators:
IE, the men who plotted to kill Adolf Hitler if he failed, essentially. They attempted to kill him in 1944, when it was clear Germany was losing the war, but if an invasion of the UK fails on such a tremendous scale, they might decide to take out Hitler then and there.
Interesting scenario:
Fighting in France between Vichy Forces and hardliners from De Gaulle's forces and the Communists.
Russia is invading eastern Europe.
Hitler is dead, and Germany is ruled by a Military Junta.
Mussolini is attempting to worm his way back into neutrality.
And the UK has to decide if they should side with the new, Military Dictatorship Germany, ignoring what the old Nazi Germany did, to defeat the Red Menace..
The kind of devastating losses being described here as possible should the Nazis have attempted operation Sealion opens up a heck of alot of possibilities.
"Carthago Delenda Est!!!"
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David Newton
Old Friend
Posts: 119
(12/5/00 8:33:36 am )
Japan
Why couldn't the UK take down Japan itself?
The UK had the bases in the area. The UK had shipbuilding capacity to do to Japan exactly what the US did. The UK could outproduce Japan in all areas. The reason that the UK didn't make a larger effort in the far east than it did was because most of its resources were tied up dealing with Germany and Italy. Had things gone onto operations Olympic and Coronet then things would have been different, but obviously the US would still have had the far larger presence in the area.
The UK had bases at Trincomalee, and in Australia. Therefore the UK fleet had places out of which to operate. These places were pretty much beyond the range of the Japanese fleet just as much as Pearl Harbour was. Even though Trincomalee is rather more tenuous, it is still eminenetly defendable with land based airpower in lieu of carriers.
With shipbuilding everybody focuses on the amazing effort that the US put in, building over 20 fleet carriers, 10 modern battleships and a legion of smaller vessels. What is often forgotten in this is that the UK had the second largest shipbuilding program in WWII. Outside of the US, the UK was only beaten in one category, submarines, and Germany beat even the US in numbers there. The UK put half a dozen fleet carriers, dozens of escort carriers, five battleships and many, many smaller vessels into the water itself. All this was whilst supply convoys were being torpedoes across that Atlantic and the shipyards were quite often under bombing attack. By war's end the UK was within a year of having many more light fleet carriers in the water, and was also well under way with the Audacious and Malta classes which would have matched the US ships in power. What could have been done without German pressure on the shipyards, and having to watch out for the Kriegsmarine and the Regia Maria?
The UK beat Japan in Burma virtually by itself. The UK also did manage to put a fleet into the Pacific by 1945. This was done whilst fighting Germany and Italy, what could have been done without them to worry about.
What I reckon would have happened had the Japanese gone on a conquering spree and had the US stayed out of it was that there would have been similar Japanese successes initially. Britain would have learnt some hard lessons about airpower. Once those had been learnt the Japanese would have found themselves facing more numerous opposition within a moderate timespan. The campaign would have been longer since Britain would have had to have come through Burma and the Dutch East Indies to get to the Pacific islands, but it would still have gone the way of Britain.
The British Empire had more industrial resources, more population resources and more design teams who could work on and improve things than Japan. It would have taken a while, but Japan would have been just as doomed fighting Britain as fighting America.
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Countess Marina
Her Ladyship
Posts: 614
(12/5/00 8:37:56 am )
I concur completely.
This is the British Empire we're talking about. The sickly, slowly dieing British Empire, but still the British Empire.
Like an old man staggering off his sickbed with a double-barreled shotgun, the British Empire could clean Japan's clock permanently.
Rather like with WWII, though, I think that by the time it was over, a British-Japan war, fought exclusively between those two nations, would be a pyrrhic victory, as the colonies would slowly slip away from the United Kingdom as they did historically.
Still, the English could hold their heads up high and say they beat the Japanese, single-handedly, without any help outside the Empire.
This is still the British Empire we're talking about, people, not some tiny island nation.
The sun had not yet set in 1941.
"Carthago Delenda Est!!!"
===========================
DEW
Old Friend
Posts: 129
(12/5/00 8:59:27 am )
Reply
I've always wondered about Petain...
Petain has never deserved his villification. No one did more to defend France during the First World War. He just didn't have the stomach to see it happen all over again when it was obvious that victory was no longer possible. Someone needs the common sense and moral authority to salvage something out of situations like that, and that person always ends up being despised by the diehards.
I understand the urge to fight until the last (hey, my ancestors were Confederates, I know all about fighting long past the point of any hope). But I've never thought it was right to villify someone with the common sense to make the best of a bad situation when they have the (perceived or real) good of the country in mind. Petain was no Quisling, he didn't sell out for money or power, he surrendered to save France and hoped that he could keep things together until the tide turned.
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Philip Boshier
Old Friend
Posts: 57
(12/5/00 1:13:48 pm )
Not completely
You mention the half dozen aircraft carriers, the US launched nearly two dozen with nigh on a thousand other combat vessels. Sure the UK was second but the gap was very, very wide and much of the US kit was quite frankly far better than the RN.
Look at the Iowa class BB
Look above all at the Essex Class - the RN had nothing to match the carrying capacity of those carriers and the only good Fleet Air Arm planes were flying US Hellcats, Corsairs etc. We produced 6 carriers that could carry about 50 planes compared to the Essex 90 odd.
Worse, the Japanese Naval Air Arm was considered the best in the world back then and had a far better grasp of naval tactics than we, who sent PoW and Repulse unsurported to their doom. We who had nearly every carrier that existed pre-war sunk. We whose Stringbags barely crippled the Bismarck.
Remember that Singapore was lost not so much through lack of forces but bad moves on the commander's part and Japanese smarts.
Singapore would probably still be lost, as would most of our carriers probably in a Midway where it is our four carriers sunk.
Who supports China now?
The Empire - the finest troops in the world granted but how can they get anywhere if the Japanese controlled the seas?
I think it would be a case of cutting our losses and making a deal with the Japanese.
"My house is, and hath been full of soldiers this fortnight; such uncivil drinkers and thirsty souls that a barrel of good beer trembles at the sight of them, and the whole house is nothing but a rendezvous of tobacco and spitting."
Si vis pacem, para bellum
===========================
Billy Boy
Old Friend
Posts: 185
(12/5/00 2:01:38 pm )
For planes...
Stick Supermarine Spitfires as fighters on the carriers, if we don't need to fight the Germans. I'm sure we could get some decent torpedo planes and bombers if we had too.. our tanks, although not as good as the germans, are a LOT better than the Japonese, and we can swamp them with numbers in infantry, planes and tanks in groud campeigns in Burma, China and Indonesia.
As for at sea... well without having ot worry about germany, we'd be able to build BB's and CV's a LOT quicker, my guess is the Lions and Vangaurd coming on line in 1943-4. Plus the KGV. And if the Japonese wiped our clock with CV's... well we'd BUILD more! We launched 6 when under HEAVY attack and with loads of other commitments... if we could concentrate on the Japonese I'd guess we could DOUBLE that! And speed up construction. And your forgeting one thing... we had DAMN good suberines in the T, S and U classes... so we could do to Japan int he Japonese Sea what the USA did... wipe out their merchant marine...
It might take a little longer... but we'd win.
When the Universe has smashed you too your knees... only one thing is certain. It's about to drop kick you in the teeth.
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Dirk Mothaar
Old Friend
Posts: 271
(12/5/00 2:21:02 pm )
Re: Seafires
The Seafire was a dreadful carrier-based fighter. It suffers from flimsy landing gear, which ensures a high accident rate in deck landings. It also suffers from very short range. This was adequete for an interceptor flying above its own bases, but is nothing like what is needed for long, overwater flights.
My assumption of a UK vs Imperial Japan scenario that assumes no European war and no US involvement is that Britain intially gets her clock cleaned. The RN is not designed for ops in the Pacific and the FAA is woefully inadequete compared to Kido Butai. HOWEVER, with no drain on her resources from a European war, the British Empire will build up a war machine that will grind up the Japanese much the way the US did.
Having said all that, I think you ought to read mekozak's thoughts on Imperial Japan (as well as Stuart's reply to them) on the Essay board. Even if something really strange happened to prevent a war in Europe, the US was going to become involved against Japan.
Never underestimate the courage of the French for it was they who discovered that snails are edible.
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Billy Boy
Old Friend
Posts: 186
(12/5/00 2:34:40 pm )
Re: Okay on the Seafires,
But after our first few defeats, and one swhich we could recover from, we'd come up with a GOOD fighter and torpedo plane! When you think about the Japonese versus the British Empire, our home land is immune to them, and with the whole RAF and Army on call they'll not push us to far back on land. So the Japonese will sieze a few Islands, MAYBE Malaya and Signapore... but won't get far in Burma or Australia. At the same time our submarines are tearing great big holes in their merchant marine, while our ground and air forces fight back. The RN wold just wait for a fewmore carriers with effective planes, and mayeb the Vangaurd and first Lions and then counter attack. Eventually we'd drive them back. And then bomb Japan similar to the Americans. We'd not invade though, and I doubt we'd build the Bomb on our own, so a negoitated truce?
When the Universe has smashed you too your knees... only one thing is certain. It's about to drop kick you in the teeth.
===========================
Dirk Mothaar
Old Friend
Posts: 272
(12/5/00 2:40:36 pm )
Re: The end
I'd be surprised if Britain gave up its efforts to develop the atomic bomb. Britain was closer than Japan, and if nothing else ended things, that would. Britain could have built the huge forces needed for Pacific ops if undistracted by Hitler, which would allow her to outbuild the Japanese in much the same manner as the US did. As I said though, it's almost impossible to figure how this huge war could go on in the Pacific without involving the US. Other than putting God in the lap of the Japanese...
Never underestimate the courage of the French for it was they who discovered that snails are edible.
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Johan Lup
Old Friend
Posts: 55
(12/5/00 3:29:40 pm )
Unternehmung "Seelöwe" - Stuart
As you say, the retrospective practicality of this operation has been a major historical question. Therefore, perhaps not even the vaunted RMA has the final, unassailable word?
Historically, operation Sealion was hampered by planning being started too late, giving the UK a chance to regain strength and the Wehrmacht missing the summer months with clement shipping weather. In that respect, the Germans became victims of their own success - they expected a drawn-out war in France and did not foresee that an option to try to invade a weakened UK would appear.
In reference to your points, I would respectfully contest some of the things you say.
a) The basic condition for invasion - to gain air supremacy over the intended invasion area and the adjacent sea - required a general attrition of Fighter Command and the neutralization of the infrastructure in the 11 Group area. Without going into details, on the critical day - Sept 7th - FC aircraft losses and in particular pilot attrition had reached a point where the fighting power of the whole Command - not only 11 Group - was being worn down by numbers and approaching the breaking point. Although the Germans had bad targeting intelligence, 11 Group facilities were only maintained in moderately decent shape by an overworked repair organization. This is borne out by Dowding's post-action report.
It would have helped little if 10 and 12 Group airfields remained intact if there would have been too few combat-capable squadrons left to operate from them.
The maligned Bf-110 was superior to the Hurricane (which accounted for 62% of FC single-engine fighter strength) on all accounts except manouvreability. With the right tactics it would have done much better.
The poor Defiant was withdrawn from daylight operations fairly early in the battle. A Bf-110 would have used its much greater speed and 20 mm cannon to fight the Defiant outside the range of the latter's 0.303 MGs.
I would conclude that air superiority over Southern England was within the reach of the Luftwaffe in early September, had they been allowed to persist attacking FC assets.
b)Comparing the D-day landing force with the German plan is a bit misleading since the respective attacking forces had/were expected to face a completely different level of opposition.
Assuming air superiority as per above, a combination of mines, U-boats and Luftwaffe anti-shipping strikes would have made it difficult for RN units to approach the assault shipping lanes area. Mines&shoals would have have made high-speed ship operations very risky.
For anti-shipping work the Luftwaffe had not only the Stuka but also the Ju-88 (as a dive bomber) and the He-115 as a torpedo bomber (the last again assuming air superiority).
Your picture of throwing anything that flew against an invasion fleet (kamikaze in a bowler hat?) is imaginative, but is there anything historically to bear that idea out? Were any preparations made along these lines? I recall that RAF RoE forbade attacking civilian property in Germany until May 1940 - hardly a state of mind conductive to committing even your own non-combattants to battle, be it in a repainted DH Rapide..
IIRC the RN bases for destroyers and possibly some cruisers would have been Harwich and Portsmouth, which is a not inconsiderable distance from the landing beaches, given the expected opposition.
c) As always, the importance of gaining a harbour to land heavy equipment would have been paramount to the Germans. However, they would not have completely lacked supporting weapons at the start, given the existence of mortars and pack howitzers and the facilities for air landing them. Of course, we all know about the Stukas as artillery.
Once an airfield had been captured (probably by an initial air assault), the Luftwaffe had a substantial airlift capability (in particular given the short distance) with their force of several hundred Ju-52s.
However, the most critical factor as regards the future of a German force, once landed, would have been the size&quality of the British forces opposing them. Had the invasion taken place in July it would only have met a single Infantry division, badly equipped, in the landing area. Of course, historiaclly no landing was possible in July, so this assumes prescient early planning by the Germans from the start!
All in all, I would conclude that a German invasion - planned in good time - would have had a fair chance of success in July 1940 when the fighting power of the British Army and the RAF had not yet recuperated from Dunkirk and the losses over France.
Thankfully, that was not to be!
Sources:
The BoB, Hough&Richards
Invasion, Macksey
===========================
Dirk Mothaar
Old Friend
Posts: 273
(12/5/00 3:49:31 pm )
Re: A few thoughts
"Your picture of throwing anything that flew against an invasion fleet (kamikaze in a bowler hat?) is imaginative, but is there anything historically to bear that idea out?"
How about the "Miracle of Dunkirk?" If English yachtsmen were willing to rescue troops in unarmed craft under threat of air attack, I see no reason that civilian pilots would be unwilling to fly old but armed aircraft to save their country. I do not know if plans were made for this, but how much planning went into Dunkirk?
"Once an airfield had been captured (probably by an initial air assault), the Luftwaffe had a substantial airlift capability (in particular given the short distance) with their force of several hundred Ju-52s."
I'm sorry Johan, but that is a pitifully small airlift force. In order to legitimately supply a landing force, the Germans will have to bring in armor, heavy transport, heavy artillery, ammunuition by the hundreds of tons, fuel and food. Several hundred Ju-52s may look impressive, but they cannot carry anywhere near enough payload to keep a landing force supplied. Not to mention their complete vulnerability to any fighters that catch them - including ancient birds like the Gladiator or Gamecock.
The Germans possessed nothing remotely resembling the logistics capability to successfully invade England in 1940 - or ever, for that matter. Never underestimate the courage of the French for it was they who discovered that snails are edible.
===========================
Philip Boshier
Old Friend
Posts: 58
(12/5/00 4:15:36 pm )
Re: Unternehmung "Seelöwe" - Stuart
I would conclude that air superiority over Southern England was within the reach of the Luftwaffe in early September, had they been allowed to persist attacking FC assets.
But by September the Channel starts to get choppy, the days start to get shorter and the weather gets bad. This is not conductive to mounting an amphibious assault especially one conducted using barges. Also by September the British Army had made good quite a lot of the losses of heavy equipment. Human casualties in the fighting in France were not particularly heavy – I don’t have any sources available right now but I think about the 30,000 mark all causes. There was also a fully equipped New Zealand Division (incredible fighting troops) and I 2 Canadian Divisions. The Germans even if they could land 10 infantry divisions we could concentrate more firepower to contain the landing zone. The narrower the front the easier it is for the army; the wider the front then the easier it is for the navy. The Germans have to get their supplies across the Channel in choppy seas and bad weather under at least sporadic RAF attack and tenacious RN attacks. There is no retreat for the British people, this is everything – a battle to the end if we are to believe Churchill and as long as the Germans never get too far it will remain so. What I mean is if German forces began to move in-land then the will to resist may flag once the situation becomes hopeless. We have a very good road network and a rail system far superior to today (yeah – our railways have become third world with the repairs and checks and flooding and derailments and . . .) Plus after sufficient forces were re-constituted we moved away from the idea of a GHQ line to a more mobile defence. Also I believe that the tide and moon conditions were not good enough until too late to conclude an operation before winter.
Comparing the D-day landing force with the German plan is a bit misleading since the respective attacking forces had/were expected to face a completely different level of opposition.
I don’t think so. Both had to cross the Channel, just in different directions and land opposed. British reserves numbered about 20 divisions, some fully equipped like the New Zealanders and more tanks were being produced that had they been concentrated could well have destroyed the few German ones that struggles ashore. Who’s to say the Germans can even concentrate their tanks, ships might get lost, land on the wring beaches, sink or turn back. Had the Germans launched an invasion they too would have had air superiority. What Stuart was saying I think is that it took 5,000 ships and 5 divisions in the first wave alone backed up by even more divisions to begin to expect success in an operation like this. If it took us 5,000 ships to land 2 armies in France how could German land 10 with barges and face a RN?
Assuming air superiority as per above, a combination of mines, U-boats and Luftwaffe anti-shipping strikes would have made it difficult for RN units to approach the assault shipping lanes area. Mines & shoals would have made high-speed ship operations very risky.
U boats would find it hard to operate in the shallow waters in the Channel. Anti-shipping strikes, not by night and the RN were good at night fighting or at least good enough to plough through some barges and a scattering of destroyers. Risky, hell yes, war is risky. The Captain’s would be taking a risk just leaving port – I don’t think that any Captain would shun the danger if the stakes were so high, unless the risks far outweighed potential losses. It made it difficult, but it is not going to take much to give the German bobbing about in their barges a sound beating.
For anti-shipping work the Luftwaffe had not only the Stuka but also the Ju-88 (as a dive bomber) and the He-115 as a torpedo bomber (the last again assuming air superiority).
Like you say, assuming air superiority, which would not be absolute – I believe it is called air dominance when you do not as yet own the skies – or is it the other way around?
Your picture of throwing anything that flew against an invasion fleet (kamikaze in a bowler hat?) is imaginative, but is there anything historically to bear that idea out? Were any preparations made along these lines? I recall that RAF RoE forbade attacking civilian property in Germany until May 1940 - hardly a state of mind conductive to committing even your own non-combattants to battle, be it in a repainted DH Rapide..
I don’t know about preparations but it honestly would not surprise me if we did that. We were willing to form units of old men and young boys in the Home Guard. Also, this battle means everything as far as Britain is concerned. For the people of this island it would have been a battle for national survival. British Generals even now are surprisingly pragmatic. The SAS in the Gulf were considered expendable and according to stories coming out of New Zealand the effort to recover Bravo Two Zero was not thought worth it. In the Falklands we were prepared to sacrifice an entire SAS Sabre Squadron that was planned to crash down on Rio Grande (I think, cannot remember) in two C130s and killed all the pilots to negate the Exocet threat – the operation was called off at the last minute. Look to at the civilians who assisted at Dunkirk in the call for the little boats – not unfeasible there would be a call for the little planes and enough mad bastard to answer it.
IIRC the RN bases for destroyers and possibly some cruisers would have been Harwich and Portsmouth, which is a not inconsiderable distance from the landing beaches, given the expected opposition.
Dammit, I don’t have my sources but I am quite sure the bulk of the RN was away from the south coast, mostly along the east coast. Portsmouth, given luck would have been another Cherbourg hopefully.
As always, the importance of gaining a harbour to land heavy equipment would have been paramount to the Germans. However, they would not have completely lacked supporting weapons at the start, given the existence of mortars and pack howitzers and the facilities for air landing them. Of course, we all know about the Stukas as artillery.
Dieppe? They would probably have to attack from overland. Mortars and Pack Howitzers need ammunition for sustained attacks. Stuka’s were crap, they were more feared than dangerous and at Dunkirk the British learned this – they were dive bombed daily but learned the Stuka’s generally couldn’t hit a football pitch. Useful but no decisive against seasoned troops of which there were plenty in 1940.
Once an airfield had been captured (probably by an initial air assault), the Luftwaffe had a substantial airlift capability (in particular given the short distance) with their force of several hundred Ju-52s.
Capture it first then you have to clear an area around it so as no artillery can reach it and you have to fortify it from raids. Also, if an airfield is captured everyone knows exactly where the transports are going.
I think the Germans had they somehow launched an Invasion in September would have been defeated – not on land so much but at sea in the channel where the RN would slash through every night scattering barges here and there, sinking supplies, tanks, men and terrifying the Germans. During the day the RAF throws everything they have which is still considerable and we have nothing to lose. There were also some strange things like oil that would seep up from underwater pipes and then be ignited as the Germans landed. Not sure what they might have been able to accomplish. So the British ashore are outnumbering the forces very quickly, Matilda’s are cutting through the Germans formations as they cannot be easily stopped. At sea the channel is choppy, barges are going missing, supplies not turning up, the men ashore lacking food and ammunition and under constant attack are being picked off. Eventually they wither on the vine. It would have been over in a week in my opinion.
Germany would have lost, and what a good thrashing they would have received and deserved every bit of it.
**Removed for the sake of maintaining good international relations**
"My house is, and hath been full of soldiers this fortnight; such uncivil drinkers and thirsty souls that a barrel of good beer trembles at the sight of them, and the whole house is nothing but a rendezvous of tobacco and spitting."
Si vis pacem, para bellum
Edited by: Philip Boshier at: 12/5/00 5:53:52 pm
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Dirk Mothaar
Old Friend
Posts: 274
(12/5/00 4:21:43 pm )
Re: You were doing pretty well up to the end
Burning the White House indeed!
Never underestimate the courage of the French for it was they who discovered that snails are edible.
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Philip Boshier
Old Friend
Posts: 59
(12/5/00 4:24:18 pm )
The Airfield
It seems that a lot of luck would be required to get this airfield a viable option. For the sake of argument the Germans have enough transport capacity to land what they need.
Now you need a big airfield, it must be capable of sustaining this effort which means the facilities need to be captured relatively intact.
We then need to clear an area around it of at least 15 miles to prevent British artillery really messing up this densly packed airfield bursting with supplies.
You need men and fuel to unload and fuel the transports.
You need a good road network around the airfield to distribute what you are bringing in or it all gets too slow.
The RAF now knows exactly where every single Tante is going and can give them a hard time - they don't need to do much just force them to divert, turn back, crash into the ground or maybe we could strafe the field and block the runway for a few precious hours.
So, I don't think that the airfield really is a viable option unless you captured quite a large number and there were not many in the landing zone vicinity, just one or two that would be tenaciously defended.
Just my opinion
"My house is, and hath been full of soldiers this fortnight; such uncivil drinkers and thirsty souls that a barrel of good beer trembles at the sight of them, and the whole house is nothing but a rendezvous of tobacco and spitting."
Si vis pacem, para bellum
===========================
Philip Boshier
Old Friend
Posts: 60
(12/5/00 4:26:31 pm )
A man can dream!
Just kidding. Don't see much point in burning the White House. All the smoke would attract swarms of well fed and well armed Americans determined to kill something
"My house is, and hath been full of soldiers this fortnight; such uncivil drinkers and thirsty souls that a barrel of good beer trembles at the sight of them, and the whole house is nothing but a rendezvous of tobacco and spitting."
Si vis pacem, para bellum
===============
Sealion - Was a German invasion of Britain feasible...
Dirk Mothaar
Old Friend
Posts: 275
(12/5/00 4:27:48 pm )
Re: A man can dream!
Just keep dreaming. Have you seen the flame wars that can develop from discussing the War of 1812? See ya tomorrow - work is done.
Never underestimate the courage of the French for it was they who discovered that snails are edible.
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Philip Boshier
Old Friend
Posts: 61
(12/5/00 5:52:25 pm )
No
Do I know anything about the 1812 War. No, only that it was in 1812 and we burnt the White House. Never said I knew anything and I have never seen any flame wars on it.
Just a light hearted joke - guess my sense of humour doesn't translate well into type. I'd edit it out but I don't have time and am going away for a few days.
"My house is, and hath been full of soldiers this fortnight; such uncivil drinkers and thirsty souls that a barrel of good beer trembles at the sight of them, and the whole house is nothing but a rendezvous of tobacco and spitting."
Si vis pacem, para bellum
===========================
David Newton
Old Friend
Posts: 121
(12/5/00 6:18:08 pm )
Re: The end
Dirk and Billy are making precisely the point I was trying to. The British Empire was a very powerful entity. Britain was still a superpower in its own right back then.
We are not talking about now when Japan has the second largest economy in the world and Britain is a rather distant fourth behind them, Germany and the US, we are talking about 1940-ish. Back then obviously the US had a much larger economy and had done so since overtaking Britain either in the last decade of the 19th century or the first of the 20th. Germany also had a slightly large economy, although nothing like the gap today. Japan on the other hand had an economy that was about one fifth the size of Britain's. THAT is the kind of economic disadvantage they are facing.
What has been said about initial defeats (almost certainly heavier than they inital US defeats due to carrier defficiencies) and a comeback is also something I was trying to emphasize.
As for the numbers game, Britain may have only actually got six fleet carriers into service during the war, but that is more than Japan did. There was also a massive building program underway. The Colossus and Majestic class light fleet carriers were just starting to come online at the end of the war, and indeed some of them were part of the British Pacific Fleet for the final strikes on the Japanese home islands. Those would have been in service considerably quicker without Germany to worry about. As also mentioned, Vanguard and the Lion class would have made it into the naval war as well. That nearly matches the US total for battleship building. Britain also did have CVs in the pipeline to match the Essex class vessels. That was the Audacious class. There were less of them, but they were around. Two of them of course eventually became the postwar carriers Ark Royal and Eagle. The UK even had something in the works to come near to the Midway class in power, this was the Malta class. The UK could also and did put large numbers of escort carriers and cruisers and destroyers and destroyer escorts into the fray. Japan always had a problem with destroyers, never really built destroyer escorts and if memory serves me finished a grand total of one escort carrier.
Japan would have been outclassed by the Royal Navy. It would have taken them some time to get going, but exactly the same thing would have happened to the IJN as happened to them against the USN.
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Johan Lup
Old Friend
Posts: 56
(12/6/00 2:59:56 am )
Thanks, Philip, but....
I agree that an invasion in Sept 1940 was even more chancy due to worsening sailing conditions and the other reasons you state. However, my point was that historicaly the Luftwaffe was close to gaining air supremacy in September. A basic condition for my reasoning, as stated further down, is that German preparations for Op Sealion would have started some months earlier than they actually did. If so, air supremacy - the basic condition for everything else - could have been gained in July.
There is no comparasion btw the size and capability of the German Army in France in June 1944 and the size and equipment&training state of the British Army four years earlier. The German Army organization in 1940 was infinitely "lighter" than the Allied one in 1944, and German planning assumed that resistance would be mainly infantry during the initial phase. In June 1940, the British Army in the UK could hardly equip two divisions - the 12 training divisions were untrained and "almost totally un-equipped", the remnants of the BEF were badly disorganized and lacked everything but personal weapons, according to Bryant's "The Alanbrooke Diaries". Furthermore, East Anglia was for quite some time regarded as a more likely landing area than Kent, with a disposition of forces according to this impression (same source).
German U-boats and RN units would have had to take chances equally. But the clearing of German mining would have been problematic, given the air situation. An addition: Rail-borne German coastal artillery would have added to the difficulty of approaching the Straits from the east.
I do not think anybody disparages the fighting tenacity of the Brits. However, even they need appropriate tools and are much more efficient with some organization and co-ordination.
Your evaluation of the Stuka as "crap" is pretty unique.
I agree that airfields/landing grounds need to be defended. However, given the state&location of the British Army in July it is not a given that this would have been an immediate concern for the Germans.
What I'm saying is that the best chance the Germans had for a successful invasion was in July 1940 - provided that they had started to plan & prepare for it in good time.
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Johan Lup
Old Friend
Posts: 57
(12/6/00 3:23:20 am )
Thanks, Dirk, but...
Kindly see my posting in reply to Philip.
In addition:
Macksey quotes a total number of Ju-52s exceeding 500, so let's say 350 operational, with a flying distance from base to target of say 50 miles. The payload of the Ju-52 was some 7.000 pounds (incidentially, a bit more than the C-47). This capacity can hardly be labelled "pitifully small". Of course I'm assuming local control of the airspace, but the stray re-surrected Gamecock would not have overturned re-supply.
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Johan Lup
Old Friend
Posts: 58
(12/6/00 3:33:08 am )
By 1942/43 the Luftwaffe airlift capacity was a wasting asset divided on several fronts. The distances involved, the weather and the level of infrastructure btw these two areas of operations were fundamentally different. Therefore, I would hesitate to see much of an analogy btw the failure to supply the 6th Army by air and the hypotethical performance of the same organization 2.5 years earlier in a likewise hypotethical operation.
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Warspite1805
New Guy
Posts: 4
(12/6/00 7:52:57 am )
Britain Vs Japan
The odds are if Britain was expecting a war against Japan then the British warmachine would be more Pacific orientated rather than being optimised for a European war.
In the land war against Japan British armour would be more numerous and would help smash the Japanese army.
Fighting along side the British soldiers there would be ANZACs, Gurkhas and soldiers from Empire such as Africa and India, plus possably Canada.
Additionally I we assume that France had not collapse then we assume that French IndoChina has not been taken over by the Japanese. This would leave Britain in a stonger position.
I can't see a war between Britain and Japan without the Dutch and French being dragged into it, which makes things considerabnly harder for the Japanese.
The Japanese could easily be cut off from foreign tradfe, while the British (plus possably French and Dutch) could by armanents from countries such as Germany, America, Italy and France (if not in war).
I magine the war would take longer, but the result woukld be similar.
I would expect similar US involvement in the war like the USA was involved in the European war before Germany declared war on the USA. As I doubt the US government would want Japan to conquere the British Empire in ther Pacific, as that would go against US interests.
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Dirk Mothaar
Old Friend
Posts: 276
(12/6/00 8:12:59 am )
Re: No, that was fine
I was also attempting humor - and on short notice. I literally turned off everything as soon as I posted and went home for the day.
Never underestimate the courage of the French for it was they who discovered that snails are edible.
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Stuart Slade
Prince of Darkness
Posts: 466
(12/6/00 9:24:52 am )
Drowning Sealions
Johan, I read your comments with great enjoyment and really appreciate the time and work you must have put in to get all this together. You make some very good points that I would like to examine further.
There is no doubt that 11 Group was in critical condition by mid-September. However, the other Groups were not so badly affected and 12 Group (covering the North and Scotland) was hardly affected. The RAF had a rotation policy that allowed mauled units to recover in the quieter areas prior to being recommitted. There is a key factor buried here; when the RAF lost an aircraft, most times the pilot bailed out and was over friendly ground. In contrast any German pilot (or crew) hit over the UK was over hostile territory ans was lost. This meant the cadre of skilled German pilots was being depleted much more quickly than its equivalent in the UK. This a point often neglected when looking at the state of the RAF in September 1940; if we look at Adolf Galland's memoirs or the relevent German unit histories we find that their fighter units were also badly mauled. I would compare the situation to that of two punchdrunk heavy boxers flailing at eachother, too exhausted to go on much further, too committed to pull back. The difference is that the RAF units have a rear area sanctuary thats still within range of the battle area; if they want to win the Germans have to fly to that sanctuary - and if they do they can't get back.
I think your assessment of the Hurricane and Me-110 is badly off; the 110 might have comparable performance specs on paper but its performance as a day fighter was lamentable. The sorts of things that neutered it don't appear on paper. It was a big target, it accelerated slowly and its transition time between manoeuvers was sluggish. It couldn't compete with the Hurricane as a day fighter and was pulled from daylight combat for exactly that reason. I do agree that the aircraft was unjustly maligned; it had fine qualities that made it excellent in other roles (including night fighter and light bomber) but a day fighter it was not. By the way, during WW2 the range of all aircraft weapons greatly exceeded the abilities of gunsights to aim those weapons so the range of an individual aircraft gun didn't matter. The effective range of a .303 was the same as that of a high-velocity 20mm gun - the range of the sight that aimed them. (This began to changel later in the war, particularly when the Luftwaffe had to shoot at large, 4-engined bombers. Then gun range did become important. However, in 1940 and in fighter vs fighter combat, the rule was still to get as close as possible.
I don't think air superiority over the UK was within reach of the Luftwaffe any time in 1940; the sanctuaries north of the Thames ensured that. They could have established a situation that, with planning and effort they could do whatever they wanted but that isn't air superiority. Air superiority means that the other side is completely unable to interfere with any air operations in the disputed area. The Germans never got close to that and couldn't.
While the Ju-88 was undoubtedly the most effective bomber the Germans had during 1940, there were very few available in combat units. In fact, according to Air Enthusiast 29, there were less than 100 on operational strength and the most that were ever used on a single day was 63. These were not capable of dive-bombing since they had serious problems with their dive brakes that were not resolved until late 1940. The He-115 was only available in very small numbers; in the sort of mass engagement we are talking about they are inconsequential (again, hitting warships moving at high speed is very hard, for torpedo bombers as much as anybody else - the Japanese didn't score a very high percentage of hits against PoW and Repulse and they were far more skilled at the art than any crews liable to be available to the Germans).
Mines? A major minelaying effort would be necessary. i don't think the Germans had the assets available tyo do it - or, more precisely I don't think they had the assets to do it along with everything else they had to do. Shoals are not a problem. I grew up in that area and know the waters well. So do all RN officers - look at where Dartmouth is.
The plans to throw everything that flew or could walk or otherwise move against an invader are pretty well established. The British did it in part at Dunkirk and again with the organization of the Home Guard (orginally known as the Local Defense Volunteers or LDV - a name that was quickly changed when it was pointed out that the initials also stood for Look, Duck and Vanish).
Harwich is about two hours high-speed run from the invasion beach. Portsmouth less than 30 minutes. Thats for the light (cruiser/destroyer) forces. The slower ships would take a bit longer but the times are not consequntial. To all intents and purposes, the British are operating in their own back yards, in waters they know well and can reach easily.
I don't know the exact number of Ju-52s available on strength in 1940 nor the number that were available for airlift. However, the hop isn't short and the Ju-52 isn't fast. it doesn't carry much in the way of cargo. We are probably looking at a real, sustained airlift capability measured in tens of tons per day. Logistically, thats the equivalent of supporting a regiment at most.
While the British Army was in poor condition immediately after the fall of France, this wa srecified very quickly. The graphs and status levels by division are in Winston Churchill's History of the Second World War. They are eye opening. By September the British were in reasonably good condition. Manpower and small arms were never in really short supply and the deficiniencies that did exist were rectified quickly. The famous emergency arms imports of 1940 basically went to equip the Home Guard (personal note; my father commanded an artillery battery that was evacuated over the beach at Dunkirk after blowing up their 3.7 inch anti-aircraft guns. When they got back to Harwich, there were a new set of guns waiting for them. They were upset. No leave.
Had the Germans followed on the heels of teh British Army after Dunkirk they probably could have established their beachead. That just wasn't possible. As you so rightly point out, it would have taken an incredible level of prophetic fore-knowledge to know that France was going to collapse the way it did. Even then, after the fall of France, the German Army was in no shape to go anywhere until it had rested, re-equipped and refitted. By the time that was done, the window of opportunity such as it was had passed.
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Dirk Mothaar
Old Friend
Posts: 279
(12/6/00 9:49:55 am )
Re: Airlift
350 Ju-52s carrying 7000 pounds each. That works out to 1225 tons - assuming you get enough places to land that you can get all of them in at once. That also assumes that your forward airfields have the capacity to handle the cargo and all are close to the Channel. Even if you get your best case and you can fly in 1225 tons per sortie, how much is that actually going to accomplish? Most of your capacity is going to be used trying to bring in fuel so that you can base fighters at your new airfields.
With what's left, you'll have to supply 10 divisions. These divisions will be crushed without heavy weapons, particularly artillery, anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns. Could a Ju-52 even carry a field gun? You might be able to carry a few 3.7cm anti-tank guns, but the Wermacht was already referring to them as "Doorknockers." A few Matilda IIs will cause absolute havoc amongst the German landing force. The thought of an intelligently handled battalion of Matilda IIs hitting such a force is - unpleasant at best for the Germans. If the Brits get ANY artillery in range of the beachhead, they can shell it at will. The Germans have no artillery and no naval gunfire support to reply. Their only answer will be the Luftwaffe, which is already going to have its hands full trying to get and maintain air superiority.
Invading Britain is just more than Germany can handle.
Never underestimate the courage of the French for it was they who discovered that snails are edible.
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Martyn
Old Friend
Posts: 226
(12/6/00 9:54:41 am )
Airlift maths
How are you going to refuel the Tante's when they arrive in the UK? All of the forward airbases are occupied by the Me-109's. The Tante's must be based in the French interior, so they have to fly POL out with them so they can return.
"Politics is supposed to be the second oldest profession. I have come to realize that it bears a very close resemblance to the first." Ronald Reagan
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Dirk Mothaar
Old Friend
Posts: 280
(12/6/00 9:59:02 am )
Re: Exactly
Too much stuff to carry - too few aircraft with too small a capacity. I not sure that a one-for-one replacement of Ju-52s with C-130Js would yield enough capacity to adequetely support 10 divisions. I have no figures on which to base that - just a gut feeling. The more I think about it, though - where are the massive supply dumps in France that would be required for an operation like this? Surely Bomber Command would try to bomb them...
Never underestimate the courage of the French for it was they who discovered that snails are edible.
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Stuart Slade
Prince of Darkness
Posts: 468
(12/6/00 10:14:01 am )
Re: Thanks, Dirk, but...
OK So we have 500 total. They haven't got the forward airbases to work from (they are filled with fighters and bombers) so they are probably well back. The first question is how are those aircraft assigned. Remember these are the only transport aircraft in Germany. Many of them are doing other things. They are also the trainers for multi-person crews (and the Germans are losing a lot of bombers). They are flying spares and other priority cargo. Lets assume that around 60 percent of the Ju-52 force is available for airlift. That assumes 300 aircraft for an airlift.
Now lets look at servicability rates. The Germans were not very good at this; if we look at the Ju-88 units we find only about a third of the strength was actually available. This is probably unjust because the Ju-88 was a new and virtually unbugged aircraft. Lets give the Ju-52 50 percent availability. That means we have a daily available force of 150 aircraft. That gives us a lift capacity of (at most) 450 tons per day. Assuming nobody interferes with the operation, it runs perfectly and that all the supplies at both ends are fully available.
I wish Suphi was still able to get in here. We NEED somebody who does Logistics for a living. For my inexpert self, I think thats about the tonnage of supplies needed to keep a leg infantry division in the field.
Now how does the supply get from the airhead to the troops? The Germans don't have trucks and we can take it for granted every horse in southern England has been shot and every motor vehicle has been burned. They are going to have to backpack supplies. Doesn't work. Can't do it. The Germans can use airlift to supply a single fixed point but not a campaign in the field. Also, they have to fly replacement troops in and wounded out. The Channel is probably closed (by weather if nothing else; Americans probably don't realize how nasty the English Channel is in winter. Its double-plus unfunny).
You know we could have a new military legend developing here. The siege of Kent with the Germans trapped and starving in an English winter while the beseiging British slowly close in. A heroic airlift with massive casualties failing and the eventual sight of the invasion force being led away to PoW camps. Oh, yes and the British are now really annoyed. No objections when Stalin suggests mass executions in Germany in 1945.
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Johan Lup
Old Friend
Posts: 59
(12/6/00 2:49:11 pm )
Sealions are great swimmers....
Thank you for your kind comments - it is a pleasure to get your own views so thoroughly analyzed.
I think I have answered several of your comments in my other "replies on replies" re this subject. However, there are some points where your detailed answer warrants some comments.
It was not only 11 Group but all of FC that was being bled. In early September the squadrons then assigned to 11 Group were down to 70% of nominal pilot complement, while the other Groups had less than 60% of their complements - because their squadrons now largely had been worn-out while fighting assigned to 11 Group. One third of all flight commanders had been lost.
The policy of rotating squadrons was a sensible one, but meant that the capabilities of the other Groups was probably worse, unit by unit, than that of 11 Group. After all, many of their squadrons were there to rest after having been decimated in the fighting down South. According to Dowding, in early September there were no fresh squadrons remaining to replace those worn down, and he was forced to introduce a new scheme ("the Stabilization scheme"), whereby the experience pilots would have been concentrated in 11 Group squadrons, leaving the rest with a very much reduced complement and not intended for much fighting.
Yes, FC had a sanctuary for their squadrons up North, but that meant withdrawing from the main fighting, ultimately conceding SE England to the Luftwaffe. And there was no sanctuary for the ground organization.
All in all, based on this reasoning I am less sanguine than you regarding the outcome of the air battle in September, had the Luftwaffe been allowed to continue attacking 11 Group and related targets. Under my basic assumption - prescient early planning
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Johan Lup
Old Friend
Posts: 60
(12/6/00 2:55:54 pm )
There is a well-written short story by C.S. Forester on this subject, but I have not used it nor any other work of fiction as a basis for the facts I put forward.
Macksey's book is a very well annotated "what-if", referring to the source for each fact that is wowen into the story, and I find his basic reasoning pretty credible.
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Johan Lup
Old Friend
Posts: 61
(12/6/00 3:33:50 pm )
Airlift logistics
Sorry, I didn't see these postings when replying to Stuart.
There is naturally no question of air-supplying 10 divisions. It is a matter of managing until a harbour is captured and sealift organized and to supply the initial force of perhaps 2-3 divisions that have not yet gotten their heavy weapons ashore.
Accepting the reasoning that the nearest airfields in France would be otherwise occupied, the best bet for the location of the German supply base would be Belgium. With a range of 800 miles the Ju-52 would have had no problem in making an un-refuelled round trip. Further, it would not have been unreasonable to expect most planes to make two trips a day, which puts the daily airlift capacity at over 2000 tons. Stuart's figure is in the right ball park (assuming no profiligate use of artillery), and under the conditions stated there is capacity to spare.
Distribution of supplies from an airfield or a beach remains a problem - the Germans would have had to bring horses (which were an integral part of most units).
The British Army had no armoured units in the invasion area in July. The closest organized armoured unit was the 1st Armoured Division, located at least a day's march away in Surrey.
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Hoahao
Old Friend
Posts: 94
(12/6/00 3:59:02 pm )
Mmmmmmmm.........
An interesting read, Johan. I am curious about this use of mines though. My own view of defeating an invasion would be to simply run destroyers and light cruisers down the channel at night to shell the beach head as well as engage who ever was attempting to cross over with men and supplies at night. They could be well away before first light and thus not subject to bombing. Germans putting down mine fields seems to open some questions. Free floating mines are as much a hazard to an invasion force as to the Brits. Sowing mine fields which are anchored to the bottom would seem to imply laying the field right up to the British coast. How many mines do you need?? If I spot/observe your mine field while you are busy putting it down, might it not indicate exactly where you plan to land?? Sounds like a lot of mine laying subs/ships needed and open to loss. I would not exactly sit around and watch if it were me. Maybe Stuart, et al, could give us some nuts and bolts of WW2 early war mine laying.
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Johan Lup Old Friend
Posts: 62
(12/7/00 12:55:50 am )
Mmmmmmmm.........
Good points.
I agree that operating at night would have eliminated the air threat against the RN while at sea. However, negotiating minefields and minesweeping require very good station-keeping, which woud have been that much harder in the dark, given the lack of radar on most ships.
Floating mines are out as a weapon on the open sea. Mines would have been of two types, moored (exploding on contact) and lying on the botton (magnetic initiation).
Moored mines were swept by mechanical means pulled by minesweepers or larger ships. Obstacles for sweeping existed, such as devices on the mine mooring cables that explosively destroyed the sweeping gear.
Magnetic mines were new at the time, and the primary defensive measure was de-gaussing all ships (making them magnetically neutral). I do not know if active magnetic sweeping gear (towing a big coil that generates a magnetic field to initiate the mines) was yet in use.
You are correct in that keeping your sea area under constant observation can yield valuable information, and to do so is mandatory. Mine-laying can be very risky, even if preferably done at night. Some of it would have been done by aircraft, particularly in harbour entrances. The purpose would have been to cordon off the shipping lane area, which could have given some information as to the intended landing area in general - but fake mining operations can be mounted to confuse the defender in that regard.
The number of mines needed would depend on circumstances. If you could get fairly close to the RN bases, use bottlenecks and be fairly sure that you could impede sweeping for some time, that would obviously reduce the required number of mines. Otherwise, I can just guess that we are talking about thousands. All in all, obviously a substantial undertaking during several nights.
I would expect that Stuart can tell us much more on this subject!
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Stuart Slade Prince of Darkness
Posts: 469
(12/7/00 8:28:24 am )
Re: Mmmmmmmm.........
I've got some real numbers to work with now. These come from Green's monumental work on the German aircraft of WW2.
The Germans started May 1940 with 571 Ju-52s of all types on strength. Of these they had lost 242 during the fighting in France and Belgium leaving them with a total of 329. However approximately 61 were delivered in the relevent time period to give a total on strength of 390. The key here is the phrase "of all types". This includes the versions equipped with magnetic rings for minesweeping (circa 18 ) , the floatplanes up in Norway (c 36), the aircraft used by the training establishments (probably another 40 plus) and those used for communications and cargo flights. If we assume the minesweeping/floatplane/training roles eat a total of 100 birds (a fairly solid number) and utterly-must priority cargo lift inside Germany another 100 (a rectal extraction) we are left with an available transport lift of around 200 aircraft in total.
I looked at the actual servicability of the Ju-52 units (same source). The 50 percent servicability starts to look about right so lets get a final day-on-day servicability rate of 100 aircraft.
I also looked at actual airlifts using the Ju-52. Iron Annie wasn't a very effective airliner or cargo hauler; the fuelage was the wrong shape and wrong dimensions. the doors were ill-placed and too small. The interesting thing is we can compare the tonnage of supplies delivered with the number of sorties needed to deliver that tonnage. The result is quite startling; the average weight of cargo delivered per aircraft is approximately one metric tonne. So the Luftwaffe had a cargo lift of 100 metric tonnes per day. Thats about enough to support a single German-TOE leg infantry regiment.
I also have the number of operational He-115 aircraft on strength in July 1940. The total is 18, none of which were fitted to carry torpedoes. No field modification kit to allow torpedo carriage was available until 1942.
Now mines. The Germans didn't have much in the way of minelaying capacity. Their S-boats could lay a few each, their bombers a few more. The bombers would be laying magnetic mines, the S-boats contact weapons. These are both quite effective when used in the guerilla role, a few being laid off key ports but by the time in question, this effectiveness was declining sharply. The magnetic mines were copies of a British mine laid off the coast of Flanders in 1917 and in the Baltic in 1918/1919 - once the British had one and knew how the polarization of the fuze worked (for people who know mines, I know thats a simplification but its a peripheral issue) the magnetic mine was effectively neutralized. Now to protect an invasion fleet using mines, two large barrages would have to be laid. This needs literally hundreds of thousands of mines and the Germans just didn't have the capacity to lay them nor did they have the inventory to support the fields. In contrats the British had all the assets needed to make a very effective use of minefields. So mines work for the British, not the Germans.
Coming back to the air battle, I don't think anybody is arguing that the RAF is in a critical state by late September 1940. However, thats far from being the whole story. The Luftwaffe, in particular its fighter wings, was in an equally bad condition, they were losing more aircraft and the crews were being killed or captured. Because they were fighting over hostile territory they were their pre-war trained cadre of pilots faster than the British who were over home ground (it would have got worse had their been an invasion. There were some cases of German pilots coming down in the English countryside and being pitchforked to death - had the Germans landed, any German bailing out over hostile territory - thats means anywhere - is likely to get the same fate). The punch-drunk fighter analogy I used earlier is to the point. Both forces were badly mauled and both were hurting. Galland's memoirs makes the fall in morale due to pilot losses quite clear while the histories of JG-1, JG-26 and Jg-52 give an idea of how extensive those losses were.
However this isn't a static situation. The great aircraft factories of the Midlands are out of German reach and their production is ramping up. Any one of them could outbuild the German fighter production of the time. The pilot training schools of Midlands are out of reach (in fact the Germans did try to reach tehm with Me-110s later in the war; it failed). So the RAF, hurt bleeding and mauled, is still a force to be reckoned with. The Germans of course are also building new aircraft and training new pilots but their production is lower in both cetgories. They are losing "experten" faster than the British so their quality trend downwards is faster.
Lets look at objectives. We need some definitions.
Air supremacy is defined as a situation where one side has total control of the air and the other is prevented from any type of air operation. The Germans never had a chance of reaching this situation, the sanctuary north of the Thames prevented that. The squadrons based there were always sufficient to prevent the Germans attaining air supremacy. To give some idea of time/distance, its about 20 minutes flying time from one of those bases to the invasion beaches in the South. Its about 30 minutes from a German base in France to the same location. That means an unescorted Fairy Battle has a good chance of getting through, dropping its bombload and being on its way home to its sanctuary before German fighters arrive on the scene. The only way the Germans can stop that is to have standing fighter patrols over southern England. The Me-109 hasn't got the endurance; it would require a massive outlay of force and the Germans haven't got it.
General air superiority is defined as a situation where one side has dominant air power over the whole battlefield and can execute its own operations in relative security. However the other side retains the ability to operate itself and can make local and sporadic operations, even attaining transient local air superiority on occasions. The Germans probably achieved General Air Superiority over the Channel but never got close over Southern England. They might just have achieved General air superiority over Southern Enland on a temporary basis but that state would have been tenuous and would ahve been lost once the RAF had regrouped in its sanctuaries.
Local air superiority is where by planning and concentration of forces, one side achieves air superiority for a limited time over a limited area. Usually this is gained by conceding local air superiority in other areas. This is probably the best the Germans could actually achieve over Southern England and it just wasn't good enough.
Edited by: Stuart Slade at: 12/7/00 8:29:35 am
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Sealion - Was a German invasion of Britain feasible...
Martyn
Old Friend
Posts: 229
(12/7/00 9:14:07 am )
Pilots needed?
Were the RAF short of Pilots? Not so sure about this, they had a very large pool of expirenced pilots sitting around or flying in Scotland. 301 and 303 (Polish) fought in the BofB, but there were many more around. Getting them converted from biplanes to spits and Hurries was taking a long time. There were light bomber pilots (Battles) and bolton-Paul Defiant pilots who could have converted to fighters esily. The RAF had huge numbers of bomber pilots around. The RN also had a great number of pilots who could have transfered, as to a lesser extent did the Army cooperational squadrens. The pilot shortage is a myth.
"Politics is supposed to be the second oldest profession. I have come to realize that it bears a very close resemblance to the first." Ronald Reagan
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Stuart Slade
Prince of Darkness
Posts: 470
(12/7/00 9:15:22 am )
Lifting armor
The logistics involved in lifting and supporting armored units are incredible; just getting the tanks from a panzer division over the channel would take something like 500 specialy-designed landing craft. Its the weight distribution that gets you; designing amphibs is very hard; I know - I've been there. Its not just carrying the beast (although thats tricky - the weight is concentrated in one spot so the hull pan needs very careful stress analysis) landing it is difficult. As the tank moves forward over the ramp (which has to be very strong) there are violent and unexpected trim changes that can actually flip the tank over or sink the landing craft. Most of this stuff is well-known today but in the 1940s, the problems were only known to a select few.
My guess would be if the Germans had been serious they would have assigned the Gebirgsjaeger and Falschirmjaeger troops to the job. Not because there are any mountains to be climbed or aircraft to be jumped out of but because their TOE gives fewest problems. The fact that they were talking about using standard infantry shows they didn't really have a clue what was involved in a major amphibious operation. My guess is that even if they had gotten across the channel unscathed and unhindered, they would have been trapped on the beaches by an almighty foul-up while the Home Guard had a field day rounding up the stragglers.
Amphibious operations took an immense amount of skill and planning; they couldn't just be cooked up in a few months. The fact the Germans thought they could showed how much they regarded the Channel as a glorified river crossing. Or does it?
There is another possibility here and that is that the Germans knew it was impossible, never seriously attempted to do it, never wasted any serious time on planning it and were just going through the motions to keep a few people happy. Its easy to imagine a situation where a couple of German Generals are going into a Paris restaurant with MAWs (Model-Actress-Whatever) on each arm when an aide turns up with the message "Make plans for the invasion of Britain immediately." To which one General says "Blast that idiot corporal in Berlin" and the other says to his aide "Heinrich, dear fellow. Generate some paperwork." Then the Generals get back to their dinners and their MAWs and the aides assemble some documents to keep the nut-cases quiet. The Navy get the same instructions, take a look at the shambles of their surface fleet and do the same. Only Goering and the Luftwaffe take it seriously and actually try and make a go of it.
Another possibility is that the whole thing was a feint. If we look at what the Germans actually achieved, they crippled Fighter Command and most of 2 Group of Bomber Command. It was late 1941/early 1942 before the UK was able to mount real offensive operations over Europe using those commands. If the BoB was really intended to give a pulverizing blow to the UK so the Germans wouldn't have to worry about trouble from that quarter before the invasion of the USSR, it was actually quite successful
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Stuart Slade Prince of Darkness
Posts: 475
(12/7/00 10:30:35 am )
Proportional losses
I don't know the exact numbers but my gut feel says that the RAF was hit worst.
I don't argue that the Luftwaffe won the fighting over the UK; my point is that they didn't and couldn't win by a decisive enough margin to allow an invasion attempt.
One thing that most histories don't bring out is that the German land and air forces were badly chewed up by the fighting in France and needed a long time to recuperate. Really they were in no position to make more than a feint which is why some historians believe that there was never any serious invasion plan.
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DEW
Old Friend
Posts: 135
(12/7/00 10:43:38 am )
Psychological warfare
Why invade if you can break the RAF and convince folks that an invasion is imminent and (ideally) intimidate them into reaching a settlement rather than watch German troops land in their backyard? Knowing that the British had the vision of what happened to France fresh in their minds it wasn't an unreasonable assumption. Certainly worth a shot at any rate. As has been pointed out, the Wehrmacht needed a break after conquering France anyway, why not spend time on this effort while ramping up for the invasion of Russia (Hitler's ultimate goal all along). It makes a lot more sense that way (not that Hitler was all that sensible).
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Johan Lup
Old Friend
Posts: 63
(12/7/00 11:38:25 am )
[deleted post?]
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Johan Lup
Old Friend
Posts: 64
(12/7/00 1:01:56 pm )
A Sealion only for show?
Thank you for your detailed information. Based on your figures, I certainly stand corrected in several of my assumptions (although they were based on other sources).
However, I think some comments & questions are in order.
As you say yourself, the figure indicating that the Ju-52 only used 1/3 of its nominal capacity in actual operations is astonishing. What were they carrying? Hay?
As ammo and fuel can be handled in handy packages, I would expect that space and CoG considerations would allow a much better usage of nominal capacity.I would expect that a maximum effort during a limited period would have seen most available Ju-52s assigned to supporting the invasion, as two sorties a day being the norm. The days were long and the flying distance moderate. The initial lack of regular artillery would have reduced resupply requirements somewhat.
A minor item: Green's "Warplanes of WWII - Floatplanes" gives the He-115B (delivered from 1939) torpedo-carrying capability. So had the slightly earlier He-114A-2 that was sold to Sweden.
Mines. Any massive barrages were obviously out of the question. I would have expected interdiction/attrition tactics, using the fairly numerous M-boote 35 (once they could operate with impunity). Provided the acoustic mine was available operationally at that time, it would have created a severe problem if air-dropped outside the few RN harbours. If not, the magnetic mine would have had to do.
The Air Battle. Yes, both sides were hurting, but the German JGs probably less than Fighter Command as they had a numerical advantage to start with and were, as far as can be computed, turning in victory ratios of btw 2.5 to 5.5. (Source: Caldwell, "JG26", chapter 3). The Luftwaffe managed to continue their attacks for several weeks against the much more demanding target of London. What would the same effort, continued against the reeling 11 Group, have resulted in? I quote VAM J.E. Johnson as saying: "...the Luftwaffe could have won dominance over southern England with two weeks of concerted effort....." (Same source as previously).
Defending Kent from 12 Group turned out to be impracticable, so the matter of air dominance over the invasion area hinged on the continued capability of 11 Group.
I agree with your reasoning regarding flight times and the protection of the beach-head against air attack. Obviously at least temporary basing of Bf-109s on British soil, asap, would have had the highest priority. Eventually, with refuelling/rearming bases in England for the Bf-109s the sanctuary would have been in peril.
On the strategic level, as discussed in other postings the difficulties of Op Sealion as actually planned by the Germans should have been obvious. There may be other reasons for all the actual effort (such as diverting barges from serving the domestic industry) than simple incompetence. "Hybris" after the success against Norway may have played a part.
However, why was the British leadership so concerned? This includes the normally reputedly unflappable (Alan)Brooke. Did they focus more on thir own weaknesses than the enemy's?
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Johan Lup Old Friend
Posts: 65
(12/7/00 1:12:28 pm )
Pilots
Transfer and re-training of pilots from the sources you mention actually took place.
However, it was not enough to avoid a situation where Dowding was forced to begin breaking up the vaunted squadron cohesion to give the units fighting in 11 Group a vital influx of experienced pilots, even if it meant bleeding the other squadrons.
He would hardly have done so based on a myth.
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Stuart Slade Prince of Darkness
Posts: 480
(12/8/00 9:46:10 am )
Catching fish
Firstly on the Ju-52. The one tonne figure seems remarkable so I went over the airlift figures and did a lot of calculations based on what was actually lifted and how. If we do a calculation based on standard airlift criteria (a tonne of cargo equates to a tonne of cargo, 11 people equate to a tonne of cargo, 350 gallons of fuel equal a tonne of cargo), Iron Annie lifted on average between one and two tonnes per sortie. Thats pretty solid data over a range of airlifts.
The Ju-52 had a range (internal fuel) of 620 miles and cruised at 130 mph. Now an aircraft burns most fuel taking off especially when heavily loaded. Its normal to allow for this by assuming that the radius of operation of an aircraft is equal to 1/3 of its maximum range. So the radius of operation of a Ju-52 is around 210 miles. Bearing in mind the distance across the channel and the fact the Ju-52s would be based well back, we are left with the Ju-52s operating right at the upper limit of their range (therefore at the lower limit of their payload). Now we have a problem. If they are taking off, flying to their objective, landing, reloading and taking off again to fly back to base before refuelling they are taking off twice on the same load of fuel. That means they are going to burn fuel even less efficiently.
By the way my guess for the load of the Ju-52 is that the aircraft bulks out before it weights out. In other words the fuselage is physically stuffed full of goodies that collectively weigh less than the maximum weight payload of the aircraft. A lot of transport aircraft are like that - the US C-130 and C-141 had exectly the same problem which is why their fuselages were lengthened with plugs. The DC-3/C-47 was the other way, it would reach weight max before its fuselage was full. There was a famous case during the Berlin Airlift of C-47 that was flying pierced aluminium planking (PAP) for airfield repairs to Berlin. The crew got used to stuffinga given number of crates of PAP into the bird without trouble. One day the C-47 could hardly get off the ground. It made it to Templehof (on the verge of a stall the whole way) but the undercarriage collapsed on landing. When the cargo was inspected it was found that somebody had made a mistake and what was labelled PAP was in fact PSP - pierced STEEL planking.
Casualties (figures from Green's Warplanes of the Third Reich). The Germans started the Battle of Britain with 805 Me-109s and lost 610 of these during the battle. Thats approximately 75 percent of their starting strength. They had around 300 aircraft delivered during the course of the battle leaving them with a final force in place of just under 500 aircraft, a net loss of 300 aircraft. The British lost 1,034 Hurricanes and Spitfires but built approximately 1,300 aircraft of those types during the battle. This suggests a net gain of around 300 aircraft on strength. On kill ratios, 610:1034 is a rate of around 1:1.6 in favor of the Luftwaffe; quite creditable but not overwhelming.
If we add in the second-line fighters (235 Me-110 for the Germans and 23 Defiants plus 115 Blenheims for the British) we get overall fighter kills of 845 German fighters lost for 1,172 British. That pulls the odds much more round to the British side. in addition of course the Germans also lost 947 multi-crew bombers to give a total German loss of 1,792 German aircraft as opposed to 1,172 British.
Cranking all those figures together I would suggest they show fairly conclusively that the Luftwaffe fighter groups were shot; Green describes them as emasculated. The crippling loss is that 75 percent figure; those planes went down over the UK and each loss represents a veteran pilot gone (only three German PoWs ever escaped from British custody - having remote colonies really helps sometimes). Although I susepct teh British loss is approximately 100 percent of their starting strength, most of those planes went down over friendly territory and the pilot was recovered. So qualitatively as well as quantitatively the Germans are on a faster slide down.
Now 12 Group defending Kent. This is nothing to do with practicality and everything to do with ego. The strategic concept of Fighter Command was that 11 Group was the front line, 12 Group the reserve. In practical terms this meant that 11 Group was the home of the small squadron that would get up fast as instant response to an inbound raid. 12 Group was the home of the"Big Wing", a group of several squadrons that would take off, assemble into a large formation and strike a concentrated blow. The provblem was that the commander of 12 Group was obnoxious in the extreme and truned what was basically atactical difference based on role and location into a pissing contest. If we read the biographies of Stanford Tuck and Douglas Bader, we get a very clear picture of this from both sides of the fence. 12 Group could not udnerstand (because their commander would not let them understand) that big wing tactics were impossible in the 11 Group area because there was not enough advance warning to allow the wings to assemble. The result was when 12 Group was expected to help defend Kent, they refused to give up the Big Wings, spent the time needed for intercept assembling their wings and never managed to get into combat.
Mines. No acoustics. Magnetics were countered. Only contacts left. This area is still a major British, not German, advantage.
Lastly why were the British so concerned? Because they couldn't see the other side of the hill. Its an old military problem. Commanders know the problems they face and the deficiencies of their own forces. They do not know the problems the other guy has or how badly he's been hurt. So they think the worst of their own, the best of the enemy (thats why military always believe the other side had better equipment). Very, very common story.
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Philistine
New Guy
Posts: 1
(12/9/00 12:57:52 am )
Questions RE: harbors, numbers and blocking of
OK, we knew the Germans couldn't land much of anything on the beaches, and now airlift is out of the running as a serious contender as well. Johan earlier suggested that the German troops ashore would be going for a port - now it seems that the only hope a proposed cross-Channel invasion has, assuming they get across in the first place, is to seize a port right away and put it to use. Now, assuming (again) that they actually manage this:
1) How many ports in Southern England would actually be suitable for the purpose - big deep harbor, facilities to unload lots of heavy equipment quickly, good roads out, and whatever else I'm missing here?
2) Could those ports be rendered useless in an emergency (perhaps by sinking ships in the harbor mouths?), and if so how hard would it be/how long would it take? Ideally it shouldn't be anything permanent, merely something that would take a couple of weeks of work with heavy equipment to put right.
TIA,
Philistine
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Johan Lup
Old Friend
Posts: 66
(12/9/00 5:07:28 am )
Some items...
The distance from W. Belgium to say Hawkinge is approx 150 miles. If the aircraft bulks out volumewise at say half of nominal load capability there shouldn't have been a conflict btw max fuel and payload. Return cargo would have been WIAs - strictly space-limited on stretchers. Airfields in France could have been used in emergencies. I would conclude that air-supplying the initial landing force (artillery-thin) would not have been easy by any means, but perhaps not the Wehrmacht's greatest problem.
According to Caldwell, JG26 had 107 pilots on strength on June 29th, 1940, and lost 56 pilots July-December. The other JGs may have been worse off. I have no figures for replacements nor for losses up to Sept 7th.
12 Group defending Kent. With 11 Group airfields, radars and control centers knocked out, the squadrons operating from 12 Group would have worked under a great disadvantage. No early warning, little fighter direction (the Observer corps would presumably have remained and, if possible, been patched into 12 Group filter rooms), and no own airfields underneath for rapid re-arming & re-fuelling. The quabble over the Big Wings was, as you say, a matter of ego, but that is another matter.
Mines. Are you saying that the magnetic mines had been made ineffective by the summer of 1940? Was the impermanence of de-gaussing already understood? (anybody interested in Mine Warfare is heartily referred to your posting on this subject on the Tech Board).
Fears & concerns. It appears that the Germans, with little&misunderstood intelligence, were full of confidence up to a point, while the British, with Ultra information improving and other advantages, should have a fair insight into the situation, and were nontheless very concerned!
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Johan Lup
Old Friend
Posts: 67
(12/9/00 5:54:44 am )
Harbours and landings
Technically, the Germans would have been able to land infantry and a pretty limited amount of heavy equipment over the beaches. Weyer's Flottentaschenbuch lists a number of different types of ferries and lighters in the 150-300 tonnes class (such as the famous Siebelfähren), but I do not know how many were available in 1940.
The Germans had capacity to airlift at least one regiment (parachutes and gliders) in the assault, but air re-supply & re-inforcement would have had limitations, as Stuart has showed.
As to your questions, the only harbours meeting the requirements you state would, AFIK, have been Dover and Folkestone. Captured intact, and served by train ferries, their capacity would have been substantial. However...
The history of harbour demolition and clearing is pretty mixed. With cranes&quays blown into the basin, locks blow-up, block-ships sunk in the entrance and the area booby-trapped, clearing could take months. On the other hand, full scale-destruction like that takes a long time and is not easily decided upon.
Historically, even the issuance of the codeword "Cromwell" on Sept 7th (meaning highest readiness and action stations to repel an invasion), did not initiate any demolitions.
The possibility, as expressed by others, of a German landing force withering for lack of seaborne re-inforcements & supply, certainly appears realistic.
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Hoahao
Old Friend
Posts: 99
(12/9/00 8:26:48 am )
Re: Harbours and landings
I would say one regiment of German airbourne would merely provide target practice for whoever was about when they came floating down. Crete pretty well decimated the German airbourne for awhile; look at how heavy the airbourne losses were for the allies on D-day, and look at how many of them there were and how well equipt. I do not believe that the Germans could have maintained an air tight CAP over their beachhead. Even obsolete aircraft breaking through and strafing landing barges and the shore would throw the landing into chaos. Trying to capture a port where every house has been turned into a mini fortress would have bled the Germans white. Even without the British blowing up the port facilities, it would end up useless if the British put a minefield in the harbour.
"The shovel is brother to the gun." C. Sandburg
Edited by: Hoahao at: 12/9/00 8:30:27 am
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Johan Lup
Old Friend
Posts: 68
(12/9/00 9:57:43 am )
Harbours and the like..
Thanks.
If we stay with my basic assumption - a landing in July based on an earlier start of planning and preparations than actually occurred - the British Army was in a sorry state, as previously related. This is one of the basic conditions to make a landing have any chance. A regiment - or two - of Fallschirmjägern would have landed in the dark.
In July the British had as yet had little time to prepare for an invasion as regards fortifications and demolitions. One problem was that different British commander were at odds regarding how to prepare - build fortifications for early defence or train for a counter-attack.
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Allen Hazen
Regular
Posts: 42
(12/9/00 7:54:29 pm )
Airlift capacity
At the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, Franco supposedly airlifted a significant number (what was that number?) of troops from Morocco into southern Spain: enough to make a serious military difference. I think that at least some of the aircraft involved were Ju-52s. In the light of the information about the limited capacity of the Ju-52, this seems surprising.
Possible factors making it easier for Franco than it would have been for the Germans:
(i) Perhaps the planes were able to refuel at both ends, so could carry heavier payloads.
(ii) Perhaps, even though the Straits of Gibraltar are comparable in width to the Channel, the effective range was less (because the Moroccan starting point might not have been as far back from the coast).
(iii) Perhaps, at the very onset of the Spanish Civil War, even a few hundred men from the Moroccan army were enough to make a difference. Does anybody have details?
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Stuart Slade
Prince of Darkness
Posts: 487
(12/11/00 9:05:00 am )
Re: Some items...
The casualties on JG-26 I think prove my point; 56 out of 107 is around 55 percent. Earlier we were discussing the RAF being in critical condition because their pilot establishment had dropped to 70 percent (ie 30 percent casualties. How much more so then for the Luftwaffe whose establishment (according to this figure) had dropped to 45 percent (55 percent casualties). This really shows what I was referring to when I compared the situation to punch-drunk boxers too exhausted to continue. Neither fighter arm was in much condition to continue; the difference is that the British were outproducing the Germans across the board (pilots as well as aircraft) so would reconstitute faster. There is another minor point; the Germans wouldn't get the improved Me-109F for almost a year; the E would have to soldier on until then virtually unchanged. In contrast the British were already getting the Spitfire II and Hurricane II in September 1940; these were major improvements over the Mark 1 versions delivered earlier.
I would argue your next point. The operations centers and so on were group assets. The possibility that 11 Group's were gone (possibility, by no means a certainty - a lot of this stuff was dispersed, difficult to find, difficult to hit and easy to repair) simply throws 12 Group back on its own resources. Assuming that they changed their ways once they were the front line there is no reason why they couldn't continue to fight on effectively. They are operating over British territory so the volume offered by that airspace now equates to the area covered by radar stations along the south coast moved north. By the way, there is no reason why facilities south of the Thames couldn't be usable as an emergency arm/refuel strips. Just because a few German survivors are clinging to beach-heads on the south coast is no reason why the bases inland become unusable. Grass strips can be repaired easily; new ones can be created.
Basing German aircraft in the UK? Utterly Impossible. Supplies are already critical (and grossly inadequate). A fighter group based in the UK would break the supply route. Its not just fuel (which must come from Germany; German aircraft can't use captured UK fuel - the octane ratings are different). Ammunition, spare parts, tires, everything must come from Germany. The Ju-52 airlift would be consumed by that requirement alone. At best the Luftwaffe could use British airfields (if they got far enough to capture any) as emergency landing fields for crippled birds.
On another matter; over the beach supply? NO WAY. Not in 1940, not using the technology available to the Germans, not in mid-winter. Mass supply over the beach needs the production capacity of teh US Navy for landing craft; it needs specially designed landing craft that were developed by the US, it needs the expertise developed by the US Navy. None of this was available to 1944 and it took a lot of experimentation to get there. Then we have the killer; its winter in the Channel. The Channel looks benign in summer; its far from it. In fact its one of the nastiest, most treacherous pieces of water in the world. A midwinter storm in the channel puts ships at risk even today - they go down every year. Barges and lighters don't stand a chance. When we get to the beach, trying to put supplies across is hard - I wouldn't like to put a modern LCAC across a British channel beach in midwinter. Tides, crosscurrents, storms, everything works against the effort. Try it with 1940 technology and the supply craft will broach and be lost. By the way, its important not to compare the channel shipping today with that of the 1940s. The network of navigational radars and shore traffic control that exists now wasn't there in 1940. In fact, its a creation of living memory - I can remember times before that network was built when the Channel shipping would be shut down for days by storms. I can also remember a spectacular six-ship pile up (four sank) in the shipping lanes that lead to the radar network being upgraded.
Ports? Lot of small fishing ports along the South Coast. No big cargo handling ones until we get to Southampton. Again a technology problem. All the freighters in 1940 are what we now call break-bulk freighters. No roros. No LASH ships. No container ships. That means we need large capacity traditional ports fully equipped to handle break bulk. The AKA is four years in the future. Combat loading is an art four years in the future. Supply can come in by the fishing ports but its a tiny volume compared with the needs.
But all of that doesn't matter. Why? BECAUSE THE ROYAL NAVY OWNS THE CHANNEL. We've already seen that the Luftwaffe has only a very limited ability to attack British warships at sea and that ability would be destroyed by attrition very quickly. Once the RN has got itself into the invasion fleet and chewed that up it can then indulge itself in destroying any attempt to get supplies over to the survivors of that invasion fleet. The channel is not a German river that the Wehrmacht can cross at will, it is a very angry, very treacherous strip of sea dominated by a powerful, skilled and extremely angry enemy that will destroy any German assets it can find. The Germans cannot establish a surface ship supply line capable of delivering the volume of supplies needed; the ports at both ends are mined (by British magnetic mines much more sophisticated than the crude German ones) and the supply ships themselves are being hunted and sunk as they attempt the crossing. The best the Germans can do is something like the Tokyo Express - slipping fast units (in this case S-boats or torpedo boats) over on high speed runs, dropping supplies offshore to be carried in by the tide. Maximum capacity - at best a few tons per night.
Oh yes, magnetic mines. The ones the Germans used in 1939 were copies of magnetic mines used by the British off Flanders and in the Baltic from 1917 onwards. They had been in the British inventory for 20 years so we can assume the UK understood all about degaussing. The crucial point about the German mines was that the British had to find which way the fuze worked so they could use the right countermeasure. The British magnetic mines were much more sophisticated than the German weapons.
Your last paragraph is founded on two false premises. Because the British were cracking German codes doesn't mean thay had a global overview of everything the Germans thought and did. Crypography only allows reading a portion of coded material and only in areas covered by the codes to be cracked. Luftwaffe casualty reports, for example, went by landline so were never intercepted. So the British never had an accurate insight in the situation; all they saw was the Luftwaffe coming over day after day; they had no idea of what the situation was like on the German bases. The statement that the Germans were "full of confidence" is simply untrue. if you read Adolf Galland's "The First and the Last" or the other memoirs of German pilots you'll see that German fighter pilot morale was close to breaking. All they saw was the RAF coming up day after day, apparently without diminution in strength while their numbers were whittled down. Its "the other side of teh hill" phenomena in its purest form.
So summarizing we have a situation where both air forces are exhausted; teh Germans restricted to brief interventions from their bases 45 minutes or more flying time away while the RAF is also capable of only intermittant operations but can strike where and when it wants from its bases out of German reach yet only a few minutes from the combat area. To make matters worse the RAF is rebuiding strength much faster than the Germans. We have the survivors of the German invasion force (most of whom were slaughtered in the Channel when the RN went berserk amongst the landing craft) trapped in a narrow strip along the coast desperately short of food, ammunition and everything else they need, being pounded from the sea by the RN heavy units and asking where the Luftwaffe was. And we have the weather closing in that will stop the trickle of airlifted supplies.
I think its reasonably obvious that even on the most charitable assumptions the German invasion force is doomed. The mroe we look into this the more obvious that becomes. If they did try the invasion, the best they could hope for is to stage a Dunkirk style evacuation a few nights later.
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Stuart Slade
Prince of Darkness
Posts: 488
(12/11/00 9:11:01 am )
Re: Airlift capacity
My understanding was this was a personnel lift rather than a cargo lift; witha Ju-52 carring around 20 people at a shot that makes life a lot easier. Also this was not a contested airlift it was secure at all phases. In the BoB we're looking at an airlift that was under constant attack at all three phases (load flight and unload).
One thing we haven't factored in is attrition. In the attack on the Netherlands, the Ju-52 units had 40 percent attrition in a few days. We can easily project that for a cross channel airlift so within a couple of weeks outside, the Ju-52 force is gone.
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Stuart Slade
Prince of Darkness
Posts: 489
(12/11/00 9:18:55 am )
Re: Harbours and the like..
I really don't agree that a July attack was possible regardless of how much advance planning was done. The Luftwaffe and German Army were not going anywhere - they had to regroup, re-equip and rebuild after the fall of France. The Me-109s had fewer aircraft in aggregate than at any time since the beginning of WW2. Even by the end of July they only had 656 aircraft on strength. The Germans needed to rebuild and they had nothing in July to invade with.
Also, even if they had done the advance planning there is a serious problem. They didn't realize the French would collapse so quickly; they were (quite rightly) expecting a much longer campaign. So any pre-planning was moot; it would have been rendered irrelevent by the changed course of events.
Dropping a regiment of paratroops in Southern England isn't a problem. The British police would have arrested them (assuming the poachers and gamekeepers didn't get them first). Hmm, puts an entirely new line on foxhunting.
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Subject: Re: Battle of Britian
Posted By: Seer Stuart - The Prince of Darkness
Posted At: 4/21/02 0:53
Well Done! If anybody has any other bits, please add them in. I suspect this ranks as one of the best debates we ever had.