Nuclear Weapons in TLWverse
Nuclear Weapons in TLWverse
Nuclear Weapons and World War Three
By Bernard Woolley
Introduction.
The Third World War, like the Second, was effectively ended by the initiation of nuclear weapons. However these weapons, thermonuclear rather than atomic, were far more powerful than anything that ‘Enola Gay’ or ‘Bockscar’ delivered to their Japanese targets.
The world is indeed fortunate that the destruction and death caused by the weapons employed were limited, though we are still living with the effects today, thankfully though ‘The War Game’, ‘Threads’ and ‘The Day After’ were to remain as televisual fiction rather than a prediction of what was to come. Perhaps the great reductions in nuclear arms that took place in the Nineteen Nineties saved humanity, who knows, but certainly the took away the temptation by both sides to use battlefield nuclear weapons when their ground forces were in dire straights.
From details of American and Soviet war plans from the Nineteen Eighties both sides intended to use battlefield weapons early on in any potential conflict.
The threat of nuclear warfare hung heavy over the world for over half a century, having a great impact on both military and civil defence planning, probably to the detriment to planning for a conventional conflict. After all if the conventional phase of a Third World War was to be short, or non-existent, what was the point in building up supplies of ammunition, fuel, spare parts, or even having particularly strong armed forces at all?
This, of course, became a self-fulfilling prophesy and a vicious circle. If one relied on nuclear weapons for defence, then why bother with strong conventional forces, and if conventional forces were weak then one would have to rely on nuclear weapons.
Some observers in the West could not help noticing that despite their massive number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems the USSR still maintained a strong conventional military. Beginning in the late Nineteen Seventies and early Eighties, and marked by the publication of such books as ‘The Third World War’ and ‘The Untold Story’, calls for NATO to strengthen its conventional forces grew ever stronger. Their watchword was to be: ‘If you want nuclear peace, prepare for non-nuclear war: but be ready to pay the price’.
The pressure did have an effect, though exactly how much is impossible to know, and a large conventional build-up did take place during the Nineteen Eighties, forming the foundations for the continued improvements to conventional defences that took place in the Nineteen Nineties and the early years of the Twenty-first century.
START III.
Probably the only positive development to come out of the Nineteen Eighties was the continuation of strategic arms reduction negotiations. It was pretty clear that whatever they said in public President Regan and General Secretary Gorbachev and their successors Bush and Yakolev had a great fear of nuclear war, both sides believing that it would mean an end to civilisation. It was in the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union to continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals.
The START I and START II treaties had begun the process of seriously reducing both sides’ strategic arsenals. As both America and the Soviet Union already had enough weapons to destroy the each other and the world several times over, the cuts of the treaties mentioned above were not too painful, though the removal of weapons systems like the LGM-118A ‘Peacekeeper’ and R-36/SS-18 ‘Satan’ heavy ICBMs were regretted by their respective users. [1]
Within a few years of START II being signed the world had completely changed. Gorbachev was dead, replaced by Andrei Yakolev, who was in turn replaced by Arkady Renko when Yakolev was diagnosed with an inoperable tumour in 1998.
NATO had already decided to concentrate on conventional weapons, which will be discussed below, and the resources soaked up by strategic weapons could be better used elsewhere. Similarly the USSR was struggling to catch up with the technological edge of Western conventional weapons and chose to concentrate resources in this direction.
This was the rather promising background to the negotiation of the START III treaty. The actual progress of negotiations and the precise wording of the treaty are beyond the scope of this work, but the end result of the negotiations was a treaty that called for an immediate cut of 50% in both sides holdings of strategic nuclear arms, and a phase reduction over ten years to a level which would be 25% of the number of warheads available in the year that the treaty was signed.
Both sides would also be limited to an identical number of warheads, and elimination of heavy ICBMs was confirmed by the treaty.
In practise the treaty meant that all LGM-30G missiles would be reconfigured from three re-entry vehicles (RV) to one, using warheads from retired Peacekeeper missiles. [2] Similarly navy D-5 ‘Trident II’ missiles would be limited to two RVs, like their Royal Navy counterparts, and the C-4 ‘Trident I’ would be immediately removed from service. The Ohio class boats designed to carry the C-4 missile would be eventually converted to SSGN configuration.
Strategic Air Command’s bomber force, on the other hand, was to remain undiminished in strength, but around half of it, including the entire B-1B ‘Lancer’ force, was to be devoted solely to conventional missions, the crews of those Bomb Wings not being certified for the carriage of ‘special weapons’.
The Soviet Union was to carry out similar steps, eliminating its remaining rail garrisoned ballistic missiles, retiring its oldest SLBMs and modifying all of the Tu-22M and much of the Tu-95 bomber fleets so that they would no longer be able to carry nuclear weapons.
While START III certainly did much to reduce the number of available nuclear warheads, by 2005 there were still more than enough for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to destroy both themselves and the rest of the world, with weapons to spare. The threat of strategic nuclear escalation was a threat that still hung over the heads of the leaders and ordinary population of both sides.
The Tactical Weapons Treaty.
While treaties like SALT and the various START treaties had dealt with strategic weapons and the Intermediate Nuclear Force, or INF treaty had seen the elimination of such weapons as the GLCM, Pershing II, SS-20 and SS-23, there still remained thousands of tactical, or ‘battlefield’ nuclear weapons, such as artillery shells, or free-fall bombs carried by aircraft in the class of the F-15E, Tornado and Su-24 ‘Fencer’.
To many observers these weapons had the potential to touch off an uncontrollable escalation to strategic weapons. Certainly it was very unlikely that once battlefield nuclear weapons had been employed that the exchange could be kept limited.
In the West Precision Guided Weapons were continuing to increase in accuracy and reliability. Gone were the days when a deep command bunker could only be taken out by a low-yield nuclear weapon, now large conventional bombs such as the GBU-28 ‘Deep Throat’ and the GBU-37 could destroy these targets.
NATO planners began to realise that ‘battlefield’ weapons were becoming increasingly irrelevant; they could do the same job with good old fashioned high explosives without the political and literal fall-out of nuclear weapons. NATO commanders also realised that they could fight and possibly defeat the Red hordes with non-nuclear weapons, such as the MLRS, Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the various PGMs available to both the ground and air forces.
The circumstances in which the employment of ‘battlefield’ weapons would be entertained became even more remote. Yet these warheads remained in their storage bunkers, close to the Inner German Border, vulnerable to being overrun and captured at an early stage of an invasion.
NATO now became rather keen on eliminating these weapons, but would not do so while the Warsaw Pact still had them.
Coincidentally in the East too there was disillusionment with battlefield nuclear weapons. The Soviets had never believed in graduated escalation, had they attacked anytime between the late Fifties and early Nineties they would have used the full spectrum of weapons available to them, conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological, at once in a massive attack.
However beginning in the early Eighties there were some in the military and the party who began to question the wisdom of employing Weapons of Mass Destruction where conventional weapons would be sufficient. There would not be much point in conquering (or ‘liberating’ in Soviet idiom) Western Europe if it was a radioactive charnel house.
Yes, NATO might have a technological advantage in conventional weapons, but the Soviet Union still had a crushing numerical advantage. For example while a NATO tank might be able to destroy five Soviet tanks before itself was destroyed, the Soviets would always be able to pit six, or even ten tanks against their NATO counterparts. The same was true of the situation in the air.
These men argued that the Soviet Union and her allies could win with conventional weapons only, and should tailor their war fighting strategy accordingly. Eliminating tactical weapons would also make it harder, in their view, for NATO to counter the numerical superiority of the Soviet Union.
Luckily for their point of view they found a supporter in General Secretary Yakolev, who had an intense fear of radioactivity, having lived near Chernobyl when the disaster had occurred. During the final negotiations on START III he raised the matter of banning all ‘battlefield’, or tactical nuclear weapons with President Clinton. [3]
Clinton, a member of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, who had nonetheless supported measures to improve conventional forces, jumped on this offer. Clinton had been something of a student radical in the Sixties, having studied at Oxford to avoid the draft, and was extremely keen on the idea of eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons.
While the American President was happy enough to eliminate ‘battlefield’ nuclear weapons, the rest of NATO would also have to be convinced, as many American weapons were earmarked for use by NATO forces in time of war, and both the United Kingdom and France had their own tactical weapons stockpiles.
The British were, in fact, quite keen to eliminate tactical weapons. It would mean that they could cancel development of a successor to the WE.177B and C, and divert the money into the development of a conventional stand-off weapon that would eventually emerge as the Storm Shadow. Redundant nuclear materials could be recycled into warheads for Trident missiles then coming into service with the Royal Navy.
The French, with their doctrine of an independent nuclear force, were a little harder to convince. But they fell into line, not wishing to be blamed for the failure of a nuclear weapons reduction treaty, and on the bright side they too no longer needed to work on a nuclear armed replacement for the ASMP.
The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty was signed in Helsinki on 13th November 1996; a few hours after START III had been signed, a record from proposal to signature in the history of arms treaties.
With the withdrawal of weapons such as Pershing and Lance the American and British Armies began to re-equip regiments with the M270 MLRS, thus strengthening their conventional artillery strength. Both armies also began to withdraw the M110 Self Propelled Howitzer intended mainly as nuclear delivery system, also replacing it with the MLRS.
One regiment of M110s survived in the British Army long enough to see service in the Third World War. Some ‘Peace’ campaigners saw the retention of these howitzers as proof that Britain was flouting the treaty. However the regiment was only issued with HE, sub-munition and smoke rounds, it was also very unlikely that nuclear warheads would have been entrusted to a Territorial Regiment.
Several other NATO, including Spain, Greece and Turkey, and the Japanese, continued to use the M110A2, rather blowing a hole in that argument.
The Soviets too withdrew a number of weapon systems designed to deliver tactical nuclear weapons. However they successfully negotiated the retention of the SS-21 ‘Scarab A/B’, or OTR-21 Tochka and Tochka-U Short Ranged Ballistic Missile, which could be fitted with a nuclear warhead, pointing out that some versions of the MLRS launched ATACMS missile had a greater range, and that they should not be put at a disadvantage by the existence of this conventional weapon system.
The Soviets thus scrapped all of the warheads designed for the ‘Scarab’ missile, and modified the weapons so that they could only be fitted with H.E, sub-munition, or chemical warheads. [4]
Weapons not covered by the treaty.
While the treaty did ban all so-called ‘battlefield’ weapons it did not ban nuclear weapons that could be used in a tactical context, such as cruise missile warheads, or free-fall bombs used by aircraft such as the B-2A, or the Tu-160. Moreover, at a pinch an ICBM or SLBM could be fired at a tactical target, even though they were hardly suitable for the role, and it would be like taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut.
Perhaps surprisingly, though, the treaty did not cover the naval equivalent of the ‘battlefield nuke’, the Nuclear Depth Bomb. While both sides did remove such weapons from their ships to storage ashore, it would not be too hard to get them to where they were needed, and of course they would be easily available to Maritime Patrol Aircraft, or shore based helicopters.
Weapons such as the British WE.177A, the boosted fission version of this weapon with a variable yield of 0.5-10 kT, and the version of the American Sea Lance fitted with a 200 kT W-89 warhead were not outlawed.
Interestingly the WE.177A, for example, could be carried by the Sea Harrier and the Tornado GR.4, and although they were intended to be used by Merlin and Lynx helicopters they could have been issued to the aforementioned aircraft. Indeed there is some evidence that in the final week of the war weapons held by the RN were being modified for use by the RAF although this has never been confirmed.
Similarly the Soviets still maintained stockpiled of Nuclear Depth Bombs that could have been modified for use aboard tactical aircraft.
Why Nuclear Depth Bombs were excluded from both START III and TNWT is something of a mystery. None of the negotiators who took part in the formulation of both treaties have spoken publicly on the matter, and no evidence has come to light that they were deliberately left out.
The historian investigating this matter must be left with only one conclusion, it was an accidental omission which was never rectified, presumably when both sides realised they were too embarrassed to talk of it publicly. Perhaps it was then intended to rectify this matter with a later treaty; however world events meant that this never took place.
The other major weapons not covered by the TNWT were, not surprisingly, Chemical and Biological weapons.
Chemical weapons should have been covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention, however this never came into force for various reasons, which are beyond the scope of a study such as this, though only the United States and the USSR continued to manufacture and stockpile large amounts of chemical weapons, they did hold stocks of chemical weapons for their allies. [5]
Biological weapons were covered by a treaty that banned their development, except in small amounts for defensive research capability. However while the West adhered to the letter of this treaty, the Soviet Union blatantly flouted it; either that or their idea of ‘small amounts’ was vastly different from the rest of the world; while publicly claiming that they were abiding by it, a legacy we are still living with today.
In many ways biological weapons are far more dangerous than either nuclear, or chemical. They are easier to deliver, and most worryingly because they are living organisms they have the potential to mutate uncontrollably into new strains, and has the potential to infect the population of who initially released it.
While nuclear warfare would probably destroy society and civilisation as we know it, biological warfare has the potential to make humanity extinct.
Conclusion.
Before the START III and TNWT treaties were signed it was quite likely that a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would have gone nuclear at a very early stage of any conflict. With the number of nuclear warheads available to both sides this was likely to be disastrous for the world.
After both treaties were signed it was far more likely that while any conflict would be very destructive and result in thousands, if not millions of deaths, civilisation would emerge from it intact. The events of 2005 and the fact that this study is being written in 2007, two years after the end of the Third World War bear this view out.
However despite the massive reductions of both nuclear weapons treaties the threat of nuclear destruction still hangs over the world. There are still thousands of nuclear warheads sitting atop ballistic missiles, or ready to be loaded into the weapons bays of bombers.
More worryingly in the multi-polar world that has emerged from the aftermath of the war nuclear proliferation is a real danger, it is very likely that nuclear weapons may soon end up in the hands of unstable regimes, or even terrorists. In years to come we may look on the Cold War years before 2005 with affectionate nostalgia as a period of relative peace and stability.
***
NOTES
[1] Both the ‘Peacekeeper’ and ‘Satan’ missiles were due to be retired by 2007, something confirmed by START III. However the outbreak of hostilities meant that the programmes initiated to remove these missiles were temporarily halted and not completed until 2008.
[2] The LGM-30G would begin to be replaced by the single warhead MGM-135A ‘Minuteman IV’, or Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (SICBM), from late 2004.
[3] It is believed that the tumour which killed Andrei Yakolev in 2000 may have been caused by radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl disaster.
[4] Details of the SS-21 and all other ballistic missiles mentioned in this work can be found .
[5] For example British artillery gunners in Kuwait were issued with American 155mm Sarin filled shells. The Americans also maintained stocks on behalf of West Germany.
By Bernard Woolley
Introduction.
The Third World War, like the Second, was effectively ended by the initiation of nuclear weapons. However these weapons, thermonuclear rather than atomic, were far more powerful than anything that ‘Enola Gay’ or ‘Bockscar’ delivered to their Japanese targets.
The world is indeed fortunate that the destruction and death caused by the weapons employed were limited, though we are still living with the effects today, thankfully though ‘The War Game’, ‘Threads’ and ‘The Day After’ were to remain as televisual fiction rather than a prediction of what was to come. Perhaps the great reductions in nuclear arms that took place in the Nineteen Nineties saved humanity, who knows, but certainly the took away the temptation by both sides to use battlefield nuclear weapons when their ground forces were in dire straights.
From details of American and Soviet war plans from the Nineteen Eighties both sides intended to use battlefield weapons early on in any potential conflict.
The threat of nuclear warfare hung heavy over the world for over half a century, having a great impact on both military and civil defence planning, probably to the detriment to planning for a conventional conflict. After all if the conventional phase of a Third World War was to be short, or non-existent, what was the point in building up supplies of ammunition, fuel, spare parts, or even having particularly strong armed forces at all?
This, of course, became a self-fulfilling prophesy and a vicious circle. If one relied on nuclear weapons for defence, then why bother with strong conventional forces, and if conventional forces were weak then one would have to rely on nuclear weapons.
Some observers in the West could not help noticing that despite their massive number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems the USSR still maintained a strong conventional military. Beginning in the late Nineteen Seventies and early Eighties, and marked by the publication of such books as ‘The Third World War’ and ‘The Untold Story’, calls for NATO to strengthen its conventional forces grew ever stronger. Their watchword was to be: ‘If you want nuclear peace, prepare for non-nuclear war: but be ready to pay the price’.
The pressure did have an effect, though exactly how much is impossible to know, and a large conventional build-up did take place during the Nineteen Eighties, forming the foundations for the continued improvements to conventional defences that took place in the Nineteen Nineties and the early years of the Twenty-first century.
START III.
Probably the only positive development to come out of the Nineteen Eighties was the continuation of strategic arms reduction negotiations. It was pretty clear that whatever they said in public President Regan and General Secretary Gorbachev and their successors Bush and Yakolev had a great fear of nuclear war, both sides believing that it would mean an end to civilisation. It was in the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union to continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals.
The START I and START II treaties had begun the process of seriously reducing both sides’ strategic arsenals. As both America and the Soviet Union already had enough weapons to destroy the each other and the world several times over, the cuts of the treaties mentioned above were not too painful, though the removal of weapons systems like the LGM-118A ‘Peacekeeper’ and R-36/SS-18 ‘Satan’ heavy ICBMs were regretted by their respective users. [1]
Within a few years of START II being signed the world had completely changed. Gorbachev was dead, replaced by Andrei Yakolev, who was in turn replaced by Arkady Renko when Yakolev was diagnosed with an inoperable tumour in 1998.
NATO had already decided to concentrate on conventional weapons, which will be discussed below, and the resources soaked up by strategic weapons could be better used elsewhere. Similarly the USSR was struggling to catch up with the technological edge of Western conventional weapons and chose to concentrate resources in this direction.
This was the rather promising background to the negotiation of the START III treaty. The actual progress of negotiations and the precise wording of the treaty are beyond the scope of this work, but the end result of the negotiations was a treaty that called for an immediate cut of 50% in both sides holdings of strategic nuclear arms, and a phase reduction over ten years to a level which would be 25% of the number of warheads available in the year that the treaty was signed.
Both sides would also be limited to an identical number of warheads, and elimination of heavy ICBMs was confirmed by the treaty.
In practise the treaty meant that all LGM-30G missiles would be reconfigured from three re-entry vehicles (RV) to one, using warheads from retired Peacekeeper missiles. [2] Similarly navy D-5 ‘Trident II’ missiles would be limited to two RVs, like their Royal Navy counterparts, and the C-4 ‘Trident I’ would be immediately removed from service. The Ohio class boats designed to carry the C-4 missile would be eventually converted to SSGN configuration.
Strategic Air Command’s bomber force, on the other hand, was to remain undiminished in strength, but around half of it, including the entire B-1B ‘Lancer’ force, was to be devoted solely to conventional missions, the crews of those Bomb Wings not being certified for the carriage of ‘special weapons’.
The Soviet Union was to carry out similar steps, eliminating its remaining rail garrisoned ballistic missiles, retiring its oldest SLBMs and modifying all of the Tu-22M and much of the Tu-95 bomber fleets so that they would no longer be able to carry nuclear weapons.
While START III certainly did much to reduce the number of available nuclear warheads, by 2005 there were still more than enough for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to destroy both themselves and the rest of the world, with weapons to spare. The threat of strategic nuclear escalation was a threat that still hung over the heads of the leaders and ordinary population of both sides.
The Tactical Weapons Treaty.
While treaties like SALT and the various START treaties had dealt with strategic weapons and the Intermediate Nuclear Force, or INF treaty had seen the elimination of such weapons as the GLCM, Pershing II, SS-20 and SS-23, there still remained thousands of tactical, or ‘battlefield’ nuclear weapons, such as artillery shells, or free-fall bombs carried by aircraft in the class of the F-15E, Tornado and Su-24 ‘Fencer’.
To many observers these weapons had the potential to touch off an uncontrollable escalation to strategic weapons. Certainly it was very unlikely that once battlefield nuclear weapons had been employed that the exchange could be kept limited.
In the West Precision Guided Weapons were continuing to increase in accuracy and reliability. Gone were the days when a deep command bunker could only be taken out by a low-yield nuclear weapon, now large conventional bombs such as the GBU-28 ‘Deep Throat’ and the GBU-37 could destroy these targets.
NATO planners began to realise that ‘battlefield’ weapons were becoming increasingly irrelevant; they could do the same job with good old fashioned high explosives without the political and literal fall-out of nuclear weapons. NATO commanders also realised that they could fight and possibly defeat the Red hordes with non-nuclear weapons, such as the MLRS, Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the various PGMs available to both the ground and air forces.
The circumstances in which the employment of ‘battlefield’ weapons would be entertained became even more remote. Yet these warheads remained in their storage bunkers, close to the Inner German Border, vulnerable to being overrun and captured at an early stage of an invasion.
NATO now became rather keen on eliminating these weapons, but would not do so while the Warsaw Pact still had them.
Coincidentally in the East too there was disillusionment with battlefield nuclear weapons. The Soviets had never believed in graduated escalation, had they attacked anytime between the late Fifties and early Nineties they would have used the full spectrum of weapons available to them, conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological, at once in a massive attack.
However beginning in the early Eighties there were some in the military and the party who began to question the wisdom of employing Weapons of Mass Destruction where conventional weapons would be sufficient. There would not be much point in conquering (or ‘liberating’ in Soviet idiom) Western Europe if it was a radioactive charnel house.
Yes, NATO might have a technological advantage in conventional weapons, but the Soviet Union still had a crushing numerical advantage. For example while a NATO tank might be able to destroy five Soviet tanks before itself was destroyed, the Soviets would always be able to pit six, or even ten tanks against their NATO counterparts. The same was true of the situation in the air.
These men argued that the Soviet Union and her allies could win with conventional weapons only, and should tailor their war fighting strategy accordingly. Eliminating tactical weapons would also make it harder, in their view, for NATO to counter the numerical superiority of the Soviet Union.
Luckily for their point of view they found a supporter in General Secretary Yakolev, who had an intense fear of radioactivity, having lived near Chernobyl when the disaster had occurred. During the final negotiations on START III he raised the matter of banning all ‘battlefield’, or tactical nuclear weapons with President Clinton. [3]
Clinton, a member of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, who had nonetheless supported measures to improve conventional forces, jumped on this offer. Clinton had been something of a student radical in the Sixties, having studied at Oxford to avoid the draft, and was extremely keen on the idea of eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons.
While the American President was happy enough to eliminate ‘battlefield’ nuclear weapons, the rest of NATO would also have to be convinced, as many American weapons were earmarked for use by NATO forces in time of war, and both the United Kingdom and France had their own tactical weapons stockpiles.
The British were, in fact, quite keen to eliminate tactical weapons. It would mean that they could cancel development of a successor to the WE.177B and C, and divert the money into the development of a conventional stand-off weapon that would eventually emerge as the Storm Shadow. Redundant nuclear materials could be recycled into warheads for Trident missiles then coming into service with the Royal Navy.
The French, with their doctrine of an independent nuclear force, were a little harder to convince. But they fell into line, not wishing to be blamed for the failure of a nuclear weapons reduction treaty, and on the bright side they too no longer needed to work on a nuclear armed replacement for the ASMP.
The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty was signed in Helsinki on 13th November 1996; a few hours after START III had been signed, a record from proposal to signature in the history of arms treaties.
With the withdrawal of weapons such as Pershing and Lance the American and British Armies began to re-equip regiments with the M270 MLRS, thus strengthening their conventional artillery strength. Both armies also began to withdraw the M110 Self Propelled Howitzer intended mainly as nuclear delivery system, also replacing it with the MLRS.
One regiment of M110s survived in the British Army long enough to see service in the Third World War. Some ‘Peace’ campaigners saw the retention of these howitzers as proof that Britain was flouting the treaty. However the regiment was only issued with HE, sub-munition and smoke rounds, it was also very unlikely that nuclear warheads would have been entrusted to a Territorial Regiment.
Several other NATO, including Spain, Greece and Turkey, and the Japanese, continued to use the M110A2, rather blowing a hole in that argument.
The Soviets too withdrew a number of weapon systems designed to deliver tactical nuclear weapons. However they successfully negotiated the retention of the SS-21 ‘Scarab A/B’, or OTR-21 Tochka and Tochka-U Short Ranged Ballistic Missile, which could be fitted with a nuclear warhead, pointing out that some versions of the MLRS launched ATACMS missile had a greater range, and that they should not be put at a disadvantage by the existence of this conventional weapon system.
The Soviets thus scrapped all of the warheads designed for the ‘Scarab’ missile, and modified the weapons so that they could only be fitted with H.E, sub-munition, or chemical warheads. [4]
Weapons not covered by the treaty.
While the treaty did ban all so-called ‘battlefield’ weapons it did not ban nuclear weapons that could be used in a tactical context, such as cruise missile warheads, or free-fall bombs used by aircraft such as the B-2A, or the Tu-160. Moreover, at a pinch an ICBM or SLBM could be fired at a tactical target, even though they were hardly suitable for the role, and it would be like taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut.
Perhaps surprisingly, though, the treaty did not cover the naval equivalent of the ‘battlefield nuke’, the Nuclear Depth Bomb. While both sides did remove such weapons from their ships to storage ashore, it would not be too hard to get them to where they were needed, and of course they would be easily available to Maritime Patrol Aircraft, or shore based helicopters.
Weapons such as the British WE.177A, the boosted fission version of this weapon with a variable yield of 0.5-10 kT, and the version of the American Sea Lance fitted with a 200 kT W-89 warhead were not outlawed.
Interestingly the WE.177A, for example, could be carried by the Sea Harrier and the Tornado GR.4, and although they were intended to be used by Merlin and Lynx helicopters they could have been issued to the aforementioned aircraft. Indeed there is some evidence that in the final week of the war weapons held by the RN were being modified for use by the RAF although this has never been confirmed.
Similarly the Soviets still maintained stockpiled of Nuclear Depth Bombs that could have been modified for use aboard tactical aircraft.
Why Nuclear Depth Bombs were excluded from both START III and TNWT is something of a mystery. None of the negotiators who took part in the formulation of both treaties have spoken publicly on the matter, and no evidence has come to light that they were deliberately left out.
The historian investigating this matter must be left with only one conclusion, it was an accidental omission which was never rectified, presumably when both sides realised they were too embarrassed to talk of it publicly. Perhaps it was then intended to rectify this matter with a later treaty; however world events meant that this never took place.
The other major weapons not covered by the TNWT were, not surprisingly, Chemical and Biological weapons.
Chemical weapons should have been covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention, however this never came into force for various reasons, which are beyond the scope of a study such as this, though only the United States and the USSR continued to manufacture and stockpile large amounts of chemical weapons, they did hold stocks of chemical weapons for their allies. [5]
Biological weapons were covered by a treaty that banned their development, except in small amounts for defensive research capability. However while the West adhered to the letter of this treaty, the Soviet Union blatantly flouted it; either that or their idea of ‘small amounts’ was vastly different from the rest of the world; while publicly claiming that they were abiding by it, a legacy we are still living with today.
In many ways biological weapons are far more dangerous than either nuclear, or chemical. They are easier to deliver, and most worryingly because they are living organisms they have the potential to mutate uncontrollably into new strains, and has the potential to infect the population of who initially released it.
While nuclear warfare would probably destroy society and civilisation as we know it, biological warfare has the potential to make humanity extinct.
Conclusion.
Before the START III and TNWT treaties were signed it was quite likely that a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would have gone nuclear at a very early stage of any conflict. With the number of nuclear warheads available to both sides this was likely to be disastrous for the world.
After both treaties were signed it was far more likely that while any conflict would be very destructive and result in thousands, if not millions of deaths, civilisation would emerge from it intact. The events of 2005 and the fact that this study is being written in 2007, two years after the end of the Third World War bear this view out.
However despite the massive reductions of both nuclear weapons treaties the threat of nuclear destruction still hangs over the world. There are still thousands of nuclear warheads sitting atop ballistic missiles, or ready to be loaded into the weapons bays of bombers.
More worryingly in the multi-polar world that has emerged from the aftermath of the war nuclear proliferation is a real danger, it is very likely that nuclear weapons may soon end up in the hands of unstable regimes, or even terrorists. In years to come we may look on the Cold War years before 2005 with affectionate nostalgia as a period of relative peace and stability.
***
NOTES
[1] Both the ‘Peacekeeper’ and ‘Satan’ missiles were due to be retired by 2007, something confirmed by START III. However the outbreak of hostilities meant that the programmes initiated to remove these missiles were temporarily halted and not completed until 2008.
[2] The LGM-30G would begin to be replaced by the single warhead MGM-135A ‘Minuteman IV’, or Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (SICBM), from late 2004.
[3] It is believed that the tumour which killed Andrei Yakolev in 2000 may have been caused by radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl disaster.
[4] Details of the SS-21 and all other ballistic missiles mentioned in this work can be found .
[5] For example British artillery gunners in Kuwait were issued with American 155mm Sarin filled shells. The Americans also maintained stocks on behalf of West Germany.
Nuclear Weapons in TLWverse - United States
United States Nuclear Weapons
Air launched weapons.
AGM-69 SRAM
A short ranged cruise missile that was carried by the B-52G/H, B-1B, and FB-111A; intended to be used against enemy air defences, such as radar and SAM sites, and fighter bases. Was withdrawn from service in 1995 over concerns with the safety of the rocket motor and W69 warhead.
AGM-86B
Cruise missiles armed with the W80 warhead. It was carried by the B-52J and formerly the B-1B. Most missiles have been converted to conventional ‘C/D’ models. Some remain in the Eduring Stockpile, but will probably be converted to conventional D or E models shortly.
AGM-129A/B
The Stealthy replacement for the AGM-86B armed with the W80 warhead, only carried by the B-52J. Certified for carriage on the B-2A, but deployment has not confirmed.
Problems with reliability and poor quality of parts provided by subcontractors led to production of the A model ending in 1993. The B was originally meant to be a modified missile with structural and software changes and fitted with a different nuclear warhead. Instead, the B model, while incorporating some of the planned structural and software changes, retained the same warhead as the A model and became the main production model of the ACM. Problems with reliability and poor-quality parts from subcontractors were solved with this model. The B model has now replaced the AGM-86B on SAC’s nuclear alert force.
AGM-131A SRAM II
The Replacement for the AGM-69 in US service was armed with the W89 warhead. It is carried by the B-2A and the B-52J; it was planned to integrate the missile with the B-1B, however this was cancelled when that bomber was restricted to conventional ordnance only.
AGM-131B SRAM-T
The tactical variant of the AGM-131, it would have been armed with the W91 warhead. Cancelled following the Theater Weapons Treaty. In US service the AGM-131B would have been carried primarily by the F-15E, F-111, and A-6F. It was also the leading candidate as a replacement for the WE-177 gravity bomb in RAF service (q.v.).
B28
Produced in both tactical and strategic variants. Withdrawn from service in 1992. Replaced by B61 and B83.
B43
Gravity Bomb optimized for low-altitude, high-speed delivery by strategic and tactical aircraft. Withdrawn from service in 1991. Replaced by B61 and B83.
B53
9 Megaton gravity bomb largely withdrawn during the 1990s as the B61 Mod 11 entered service from 1997. Small quantities remain in service for carriage by B-52Js, while additional bombs remain in the Enduring Stockpile. Planned to be fully withdrawn from service by 2008.
B57
Produced as tactical gravity bomb and nuclear depth bomb. Tactical gravity bomb was in the process of being replaced by B61 variants when the ratification of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty accelerated the withdrawal from service. Nuclear depth bomb replaced by B90 variant.
B61
Primary gravity bomb in Strategic Air Command Service. Tactical variants withdrawn from service following ratification of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty. The B61 Mod 11 is an earth penetrator variant deployed during the 1990s to replace the B53 in the “bunker-buster” role, and is carried exclusively by the B-2A.
B83
High yield gravity bomb designed for high-speed delivery. Certified for carriage by Strategic Air Command B-52Js and B-2A.
B90
Current nuclear depth bomb in US service. Tactical gravity bomb variant was cancelled following the ratification of the Theater Nuclear Weapons Treaty.
As well as being used by US Navy ASW aircraft, such as the P-3C and S-3B, the B90 can also be used by NATO ASW aircraft such as the Nimrod and Atlantique 2. It is also planned that the weapon will be cleared for use by the P-8A Poseidon.
Land-Based.
LGM-30F Minuteman II
Was retired from service under the terms of START II; this missile was armed with a single W56 warhead.
LGM-30G Minuteman III
Currently the backbone of the Strategic Air Command ICBM force; as designed, the missile carried three W62 or W78 warheads. However, the missiles have been “downloaded” from three warheads to one warhead under the terms of START II.
LGM-118A Peacekeeper
Fifty LGM-118 missiles are deployed in modified Minuteman silos. It will be withdrawn from service in 2007 under the terms of the START III treaty. A second batch of 50 missiles was planned for rail-mobile deployment under the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison program. Peacekeeper Rail Garrison was cancelled by the Bush (41) administration in January 1992 as a cost savings measure and the missiles themselves remained in storage.
LGM/MGM-134A Minuteman IV
The latest ICBM in United States service is armed with the W87 warhead. The missile is in the process of replacing the Minuteman III on a one-for-one basis. Most of the missiles are deployed in modified Minuteman III silos, but a single squadron are deployed in road-mobile trailers to be dispersed throughout Federally owned lands in the western United States during times of crisis. Production is ongoing.
MGM-31A/B/C Pershing Ia/II
A road-mobile IRBM that was used by the United States and by West Germany with US warheads until July 1989. The Pershing 1a operated by the West German Luftwaffe were armed with the W50 warhead, while the Pershing IIs operated by the US Army were armed with the W85 warhead. Both were withdrawn from service under the terms of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.
MGM-52C Lance
Withdrawn from service by 1992; was deployed by several NATO armies with US W70 warheads under ‘dual-key’ arrangements’. Variants armed with conventional warheads replaced by the MGM-140 family.
It is believed that the Israeli Army still operates nuclear armed versions of the Lance.
Follow-On To Lance
In 1993 Loral Vought Systems was awarded the contract for the FOTL missile with their MGM-140 variant. It was initially planned that FOTL would have been deployed on the M270 launch vehicle. However there was strong opposition from some other NATO members to the missile using the same launcher as MLRS. Production was cancelled due to the TNWT before a decision was taken on an alternative launcher.
BGM-109G Gryphon
A Road-mobile variant of the naval Tomahawk missile that was in US Air Force service until 1991; withdrawn from service under the terms of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. The BGM-109G was deployed with five Tactical Missile Wings in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. A sixth wing in the Netherlands never received any missiles before the withdrawal began. The missiles were armed with the W-84 warhead, which remains in the Enduring Stockpile. The GLCM will forever be associated with anti-nuclear protests of the 1980s and with the ‘Greenham Common Women’ in the UK.
In recent years a US ‘Think Tank’ has proposed two new versions of the GLCM – one a conventional missile armed with similar warheads to the TLAM and a version based on the Tomahawk Anti-Shipping Missile for coastal defence.
Unsurprisingly the USAF has raised objections to the first, pointing out that in order to comply with the TNWT even a conventional GLCM would have to have so short a range as to make it an uneconomic weapons system. The USN has also suggested that since America has the world’s largest navy there is no requirement for a land-based TASM and its export potential would be zero, as countries who do need coastal defence missiles either build their own, or could not afford something so expensive as the proposed TASM variant.
W33
203mm artillery shell; withdrawn from service following the ratification of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty. Like most other US nuclear artillery shells the W33 was made available to NATO allies.
W48
155mm artillery shell; Withdrawn from service following the ratification of the TNWT.
W79
203mm artillery shell; the W79-0 was a fission device with an optional enhanced-radiation mode. The W79-1 deleted the enhanced-radiation mode. It was withdrawn from service following the ratification of the TNWT, although it is believed that Israel has warheads based on both the W79-0 and W79-1.
W82
The planned replacement for the W48 155mm artillery shell, the W82 originally began development in 1977 as the W82-0 dual-purpose warhead, able to function as a standard fission device or as an enhanced radiation device. Development of the W82-0 was cancelled in 1982. In 1986, development of the fission-only W81-1 began. A small quantity were deployed in the early 1990s, but production of further devices was cancelled and those already deployed were withdrawn from service following the ratification of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty. As with the W79 (q.v.) it is believed that Israel has a warhead based on the W82.
Sea-based.
UGM-73A Poseidon
Armed the United States Lafayette class SSBNs. Was retired from service in 1992; the missile could carry up to fourteen W68 warheads.
UGM-96A Trident I
In United States service, armed the first eight Ohio class SSBNs and twelve SSBNs of the Benjamin Franklin class and James Madison class that formerly carried the UGM-73A. Each missile could carry up to eight W76 warheads. Was retired from service in 2004; the Ohio class vessels armed with the C-4 missile have since been converted to SSGN configuration.
UGM-133A Trident II
Forms the main armament of the Ohio class SSBN in United States service and the Vanguard class SSBN in British service; will also form the main armament of the Ohio Replacement Submarine (formerly the SSBN-X Future Follow-on Submarine) Each missile can carry up to fourteen W76 or W88 warheads.
The USN and RN have begun initial studies of what will replace the D-5LE missile, although the replacement will not be needed until at least 2042.
BGM/UGM-109A Tomahawk Land Attack Missile – Nuclear
Surface and submarine launched cruise missile in US Navy service. The missile is armed with the W80 warhead; withdrawn from shipboard deployment in January 1992. All TLAM-Ns are currently held ashore at naval weapons stations. Crews of US Navy battleships, SSGNs, and SSNs maintain nuclear certification. Can be removed from storage and loaded onto certified United States Navy ships within 72 hours.
Rumors that Royal Navy SSNs are certified for TLAM-Ns have never been substantiated.
Future Land Attack Missile – Nuclear
Proposed nuclear-armed variant of the Future Land Attack Missile. Development of this variant has not been funded US Congress.
RUR-5A Mod 5 ASROC
Armed with W44 warhead; withdrawn from service when the last Spruance class destroyer went into the yard to be upgraded with the Mk.41 VLS.
UUM-44A/B SUBROC
Submarine-launched ASW missile carried by Sturgeon and Los Angles class fast attack submarines; armed with the W55 warhead. Between 1991 and 1993 50 missiles were upgraded as a stop-gap pending deployment of the UUM-125A, with the upgraded weapons being designated UUM-44B. The UUM-44B is in the process of being withdrawn from service as of April 2005.
RUM-125A / UUM-125A Sea Lance
The UUM-125A is the replacement for the UUM-44; armed with the W89 warhead. Carried on Los Angeles, Seawolf, and North Carolina class fast attack submarines.
Surface-launched RUM-125A developed, but not deployed.
RUM-139B VL-ASROC
The B model of the VL-ASROC was initially intended as a cheaper replacement for the UUM-44B. It would have been armed with the same W89 warhead as the RUM-125A.
This version of the VL-ASROC was cancelled as a cost-saving measure by the Clinton Administration and the B designation subsequently used by a version of the missile armed with a conventional Mk.50 torpedo. However the USN has continued to study a nuclear armed variant of the VL-ASROC as a way of restoring a nuclear ASW capability to its surface ships. The RN has also expressed interest as a potential partial replacement for the WB.177A NDB (q.v.), so a nuclear variant of the missile may yet see the light of day.
Air launched weapons.
AGM-69 SRAM
A short ranged cruise missile that was carried by the B-52G/H, B-1B, and FB-111A; intended to be used against enemy air defences, such as radar and SAM sites, and fighter bases. Was withdrawn from service in 1995 over concerns with the safety of the rocket motor and W69 warhead.
AGM-86B
Cruise missiles armed with the W80 warhead. It was carried by the B-52J and formerly the B-1B. Most missiles have been converted to conventional ‘C/D’ models. Some remain in the Eduring Stockpile, but will probably be converted to conventional D or E models shortly.
AGM-129A/B
The Stealthy replacement for the AGM-86B armed with the W80 warhead, only carried by the B-52J. Certified for carriage on the B-2A, but deployment has not confirmed.
Problems with reliability and poor quality of parts provided by subcontractors led to production of the A model ending in 1993. The B was originally meant to be a modified missile with structural and software changes and fitted with a different nuclear warhead. Instead, the B model, while incorporating some of the planned structural and software changes, retained the same warhead as the A model and became the main production model of the ACM. Problems with reliability and poor-quality parts from subcontractors were solved with this model. The B model has now replaced the AGM-86B on SAC’s nuclear alert force.
AGM-131A SRAM II
The Replacement for the AGM-69 in US service was armed with the W89 warhead. It is carried by the B-2A and the B-52J; it was planned to integrate the missile with the B-1B, however this was cancelled when that bomber was restricted to conventional ordnance only.
AGM-131B SRAM-T
The tactical variant of the AGM-131, it would have been armed with the W91 warhead. Cancelled following the Theater Weapons Treaty. In US service the AGM-131B would have been carried primarily by the F-15E, F-111, and A-6F. It was also the leading candidate as a replacement for the WE-177 gravity bomb in RAF service (q.v.).
B28
Produced in both tactical and strategic variants. Withdrawn from service in 1992. Replaced by B61 and B83.
B43
Gravity Bomb optimized for low-altitude, high-speed delivery by strategic and tactical aircraft. Withdrawn from service in 1991. Replaced by B61 and B83.
B53
9 Megaton gravity bomb largely withdrawn during the 1990s as the B61 Mod 11 entered service from 1997. Small quantities remain in service for carriage by B-52Js, while additional bombs remain in the Enduring Stockpile. Planned to be fully withdrawn from service by 2008.
B57
Produced as tactical gravity bomb and nuclear depth bomb. Tactical gravity bomb was in the process of being replaced by B61 variants when the ratification of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty accelerated the withdrawal from service. Nuclear depth bomb replaced by B90 variant.
B61
Primary gravity bomb in Strategic Air Command Service. Tactical variants withdrawn from service following ratification of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty. The B61 Mod 11 is an earth penetrator variant deployed during the 1990s to replace the B53 in the “bunker-buster” role, and is carried exclusively by the B-2A.
B83
High yield gravity bomb designed for high-speed delivery. Certified for carriage by Strategic Air Command B-52Js and B-2A.
B90
Current nuclear depth bomb in US service. Tactical gravity bomb variant was cancelled following the ratification of the Theater Nuclear Weapons Treaty.
As well as being used by US Navy ASW aircraft, such as the P-3C and S-3B, the B90 can also be used by NATO ASW aircraft such as the Nimrod and Atlantique 2. It is also planned that the weapon will be cleared for use by the P-8A Poseidon.
Land-Based.
LGM-30F Minuteman II
Was retired from service under the terms of START II; this missile was armed with a single W56 warhead.
LGM-30G Minuteman III
Currently the backbone of the Strategic Air Command ICBM force; as designed, the missile carried three W62 or W78 warheads. However, the missiles have been “downloaded” from three warheads to one warhead under the terms of START II.
LGM-118A Peacekeeper
Fifty LGM-118 missiles are deployed in modified Minuteman silos. It will be withdrawn from service in 2007 under the terms of the START III treaty. A second batch of 50 missiles was planned for rail-mobile deployment under the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison program. Peacekeeper Rail Garrison was cancelled by the Bush (41) administration in January 1992 as a cost savings measure and the missiles themselves remained in storage.
LGM/MGM-134A Minuteman IV
The latest ICBM in United States service is armed with the W87 warhead. The missile is in the process of replacing the Minuteman III on a one-for-one basis. Most of the missiles are deployed in modified Minuteman III silos, but a single squadron are deployed in road-mobile trailers to be dispersed throughout Federally owned lands in the western United States during times of crisis. Production is ongoing.
MGM-31A/B/C Pershing Ia/II
A road-mobile IRBM that was used by the United States and by West Germany with US warheads until July 1989. The Pershing 1a operated by the West German Luftwaffe were armed with the W50 warhead, while the Pershing IIs operated by the US Army were armed with the W85 warhead. Both were withdrawn from service under the terms of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.
MGM-52C Lance
Withdrawn from service by 1992; was deployed by several NATO armies with US W70 warheads under ‘dual-key’ arrangements’. Variants armed with conventional warheads replaced by the MGM-140 family.
It is believed that the Israeli Army still operates nuclear armed versions of the Lance.
Follow-On To Lance
In 1993 Loral Vought Systems was awarded the contract for the FOTL missile with their MGM-140 variant. It was initially planned that FOTL would have been deployed on the M270 launch vehicle. However there was strong opposition from some other NATO members to the missile using the same launcher as MLRS. Production was cancelled due to the TNWT before a decision was taken on an alternative launcher.
BGM-109G Gryphon
A Road-mobile variant of the naval Tomahawk missile that was in US Air Force service until 1991; withdrawn from service under the terms of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. The BGM-109G was deployed with five Tactical Missile Wings in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. A sixth wing in the Netherlands never received any missiles before the withdrawal began. The missiles were armed with the W-84 warhead, which remains in the Enduring Stockpile. The GLCM will forever be associated with anti-nuclear protests of the 1980s and with the ‘Greenham Common Women’ in the UK.
In recent years a US ‘Think Tank’ has proposed two new versions of the GLCM – one a conventional missile armed with similar warheads to the TLAM and a version based on the Tomahawk Anti-Shipping Missile for coastal defence.
Unsurprisingly the USAF has raised objections to the first, pointing out that in order to comply with the TNWT even a conventional GLCM would have to have so short a range as to make it an uneconomic weapons system. The USN has also suggested that since America has the world’s largest navy there is no requirement for a land-based TASM and its export potential would be zero, as countries who do need coastal defence missiles either build their own, or could not afford something so expensive as the proposed TASM variant.
W33
203mm artillery shell; withdrawn from service following the ratification of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty. Like most other US nuclear artillery shells the W33 was made available to NATO allies.
W48
155mm artillery shell; Withdrawn from service following the ratification of the TNWT.
W79
203mm artillery shell; the W79-0 was a fission device with an optional enhanced-radiation mode. The W79-1 deleted the enhanced-radiation mode. It was withdrawn from service following the ratification of the TNWT, although it is believed that Israel has warheads based on both the W79-0 and W79-1.
W82
The planned replacement for the W48 155mm artillery shell, the W82 originally began development in 1977 as the W82-0 dual-purpose warhead, able to function as a standard fission device or as an enhanced radiation device. Development of the W82-0 was cancelled in 1982. In 1986, development of the fission-only W81-1 began. A small quantity were deployed in the early 1990s, but production of further devices was cancelled and those already deployed were withdrawn from service following the ratification of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty. As with the W79 (q.v.) it is believed that Israel has a warhead based on the W82.
Sea-based.
UGM-73A Poseidon
Armed the United States Lafayette class SSBNs. Was retired from service in 1992; the missile could carry up to fourteen W68 warheads.
UGM-96A Trident I
In United States service, armed the first eight Ohio class SSBNs and twelve SSBNs of the Benjamin Franklin class and James Madison class that formerly carried the UGM-73A. Each missile could carry up to eight W76 warheads. Was retired from service in 2004; the Ohio class vessels armed with the C-4 missile have since been converted to SSGN configuration.
UGM-133A Trident II
Forms the main armament of the Ohio class SSBN in United States service and the Vanguard class SSBN in British service; will also form the main armament of the Ohio Replacement Submarine (formerly the SSBN-X Future Follow-on Submarine) Each missile can carry up to fourteen W76 or W88 warheads.
The USN and RN have begun initial studies of what will replace the D-5LE missile, although the replacement will not be needed until at least 2042.
BGM/UGM-109A Tomahawk Land Attack Missile – Nuclear
Surface and submarine launched cruise missile in US Navy service. The missile is armed with the W80 warhead; withdrawn from shipboard deployment in January 1992. All TLAM-Ns are currently held ashore at naval weapons stations. Crews of US Navy battleships, SSGNs, and SSNs maintain nuclear certification. Can be removed from storage and loaded onto certified United States Navy ships within 72 hours.
Rumors that Royal Navy SSNs are certified for TLAM-Ns have never been substantiated.
Future Land Attack Missile – Nuclear
Proposed nuclear-armed variant of the Future Land Attack Missile. Development of this variant has not been funded US Congress.
RUR-5A Mod 5 ASROC
Armed with W44 warhead; withdrawn from service when the last Spruance class destroyer went into the yard to be upgraded with the Mk.41 VLS.
UUM-44A/B SUBROC
Submarine-launched ASW missile carried by Sturgeon and Los Angles class fast attack submarines; armed with the W55 warhead. Between 1991 and 1993 50 missiles were upgraded as a stop-gap pending deployment of the UUM-125A, with the upgraded weapons being designated UUM-44B. The UUM-44B is in the process of being withdrawn from service as of April 2005.
RUM-125A / UUM-125A Sea Lance
The UUM-125A is the replacement for the UUM-44; armed with the W89 warhead. Carried on Los Angeles, Seawolf, and North Carolina class fast attack submarines.
Surface-launched RUM-125A developed, but not deployed.
RUM-139B VL-ASROC
The B model of the VL-ASROC was initially intended as a cheaper replacement for the UUM-44B. It would have been armed with the same W89 warhead as the RUM-125A.
This version of the VL-ASROC was cancelled as a cost-saving measure by the Clinton Administration and the B designation subsequently used by a version of the missile armed with a conventional Mk.50 torpedo. However the USN has continued to study a nuclear armed variant of the VL-ASROC as a way of restoring a nuclear ASW capability to its surface ships. The RN has also expressed interest as a potential partial replacement for the WB.177A NDB (q.v.), so a nuclear variant of the missile may yet see the light of day.
Last edited by James1978 on Thu Dec 01, 2022 4:58 am, edited 1 time in total.
Nuclear Weapons in TLWverse - United Kingdom
United Kingdom Nuclear Weapons
Air-launched weapons.
WE.177A
A boosted-fission weapon with a yield of either 0.5kt, or 10kt; the lower yield was only used when the weapon was configured as a Nuclear Depth Bomb. By 1990 the WE.177A could be used by a number of RN and RAF aircraft, including the Tornado, Jaguar, Buccaneer, Sea Harrier, Sea King and Lynx. For some reason it was never integrated on the Nimrod, which continued to rely on US NDBs; it has been observed that this meant that the Nimrod had no nuclear capability outside the NATO area.
Under the TNWT the gravity bomb versions of the A model were to be withdrawn, however the NDB variant was not covered by the treaty. There is some evidence that although some A models were dismantled and their nuclear materials recycled a number were transferred to the RN and converted to NDBs.
Like other Nuclear Depth Bombs used by the various nuclear powers there was nothing to stop RN held NDBs from being reconfigured to standard gravity bombs. Moreover in theory only the issue of aircrew lacking suitable training would stop RAF and RN jets from carrying the A model.
While the Royal Navy’s stock of NDBs was extensively refurbished in the ‘90s the weapons are now quite old, moreover some concerns have been raised regarding their reliability (i.e. they might not go ‘bang’ when required). The RN is now actively studying a replacement for the WE.177A, with a nuclear armed version of the RUM-139 VL-ASROC being a leading contender as a partial replacement. Development of an air dropped weapon for use by ASW helicopters will be tied to developments in the Trident replacement project.
WE.177B
The first version of the WE.177B to enter service, the B model was a thermonuclear weapon with a fixed yield of 450kt. First carried by RAF Vulcans and later by the Tornado, the B model would have been used in a ‘sub-strategic’ role against targets in Eastern Europe and the Western USSR.
Around 53 B models are believed to have been built and were all retired by 1998 to comply with the TNWT.
WE.177C
The third version of the WE.177, the C model was also a thermonuclear weapon, although it had smaller yield of 190kt. The weapon was solely deployed in RAF Germany, first carried by Jaguars and later by Tornados. The C model would have been used in tactical strike role.
Both the B and C model had an interesting feature when used in the ground-burst retarded mode – the warhead would not initiate on immediately striking the ground, but had a delay of just under a second. Potentially this would give those targeted just long enough to realise that a nuclear weapon had been dropped on them.
Between 48 and 60 C models are said to have been built. Like the B model all were withdrawn by 1998 and their warheads recycled.
Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM)
With the WE.177 becoming increasingly aged combined with improvements in Warsaw Pact air defences the MoD started to study a stand-off guided weapon as a potential replacement. Three missiles were proposed for the role – the Martin Marietta Low Attitude Target, Boeing’s Short Ranged Attack Missile II and the Aerospatiale Air Sol Longue Portee. Whichever missile had been chosen would also have been armed with a new warhead with a similar yield to the B and C model WE.177.
While the TNWT killed the project it is believed that the AGM-131B SRAM-T was the front-runner as it was further ahead in its development phase. Much of the work that went into FGSOW was used in the Conventionally Armed Stand-Off Missile (CASOM) project that led to Storm Shadow.
Land-Based.
Lance
Used by the 50th Missile Regiment Royal Artillery, the Lance missiles themselves were owned by Britain, however the warheads were American and subject to ‘dual-key’ arrangements. While not subject to the INF Treaty the US decided to start withdrawing its Lance missiles from Europe in 1987, with the last gone by 1992. Since US withdrawal left the British Army with missiles but no warhead Britain too decided to withdraw Lance, its role effectively being taken over by the conventional GMLRS. In any case the UK would have had to retire the system when the TNWT came into force.
Nuclear artillery
Under ‘dual-key’ arrangements the BAOR had access to nuclear artillery shells for its M109s and M110s. The last of these weapons were dismantled in 1998.
Sea-based.
UGM-27C Polaris
With the cancellation of the Skybolt ALBM the UK faced the very real prospect of its bomber based deterrent force becoming ineffective, which caused a very real and serious rift in the ‘Special Relationship’ with the United States. Therefore it was with some relief that the UK was able to negotiate the Nassau Agreement with the Kennedy Administration to purchase the Polaris A-3 SLBM; incidentally the sales agreement has also allowed the UK to purchase the successor to Polaris. In British service the Polaris was initially armed with a trio of ET.317 warheads of around 200 kt in yield, which was partially based on the US W-59 warhead (the UK did not consider the W-58 as used on USN Polaris A3 missiles to be safe in some areas).
In the 1970s it was determined that the UK’s Polaris missiles as currently configured were unlikely to be able to penetrate the ABM defences around Moscow; a very important part of the UK’s national targeting considerations. It was also recognised that the missiles would need to be refurbished sometime in the ‘80s. In hindsight it might have been better for the UK to have purchased the UGM-73 Poseidon, however at the time the upgrade project, designated ‘Chevaline’ appeared to be the most cost-effective option. The exact nature of ‘Chevaline’ and its development is beyond this fact-file, although it has been chronicled elsewhere. In short the up-grade added a new British designed front-end to the missile equipped with two hardened ET.317 warheads and a Penetration Aid Carrier equipped with decoys and other penetration aids.
Although never confirmed it has since been suggested that since to look like a warhead a decoy has to been roughly the same shape and size as a warhead the ‘Chevaline’ Polaris dispensed with the decoys and fitted a third warhead instead.
Forming the main armament of the four Resolution class ballistic missile submarines, Polaris was in Royal Navy service between 1968 and 1996.
UGM-133A Trident II
While the ‘Chevaline’ project sought to extend the life of Polaris at the same time the British government recognised that work needed to begin on a replacement. An initial informal agreement was reached between the Carter Administration and the Callaghan government for Britain to purchase the Trident C-4 missile, a formal agreement being reached by the Thatcher government in 1980. In 1982 the agreement was modified to cover the purchase of the more advanced Trident II D-5, giving the RN and USN commonality in SLBM for the first time in many years.
As with Polaris the British Trident missiles are equipped with British designed warheads, known as the Holbrooke Mark 4, which may be based on the US W-76 warhead. As with the ET.317 it is likely that if this is the case that the Holbrooke warhead will only be partially based on its US counterpart. The exact yield of British warheads has not been revealed, but is likely to be around 100kt. While the Trident II can carry up to 14 warheads the British government initially stated that RN missiles would not carry any more than 8, however a later statement suggested that they would not carry any more than the Polaris, either 2, or 3 warheads. Since the UK has a stockpile of between 225 and around 300 warheads there is nothing in theory to stop an increase in the numbers of warheads carried by the RN’s missiles. While the RN also leases 58 Trident missiles from the United States it is also true that in a nuclear war there would be nothing stopping British submarines from re-loading with American missiles.
Trident II D-5 currently forms the main armament of the four Vanguard class ballistic missile submarines, the first boat conducting its initial operational patrol in 1994. It will also form the main armament of the Dreadnought class ballistic missile submarine until at least 2042 in its D-5LE (Life Extension) version.
Air-launched weapons.
WE.177A
A boosted-fission weapon with a yield of either 0.5kt, or 10kt; the lower yield was only used when the weapon was configured as a Nuclear Depth Bomb. By 1990 the WE.177A could be used by a number of RN and RAF aircraft, including the Tornado, Jaguar, Buccaneer, Sea Harrier, Sea King and Lynx. For some reason it was never integrated on the Nimrod, which continued to rely on US NDBs; it has been observed that this meant that the Nimrod had no nuclear capability outside the NATO area.
Under the TNWT the gravity bomb versions of the A model were to be withdrawn, however the NDB variant was not covered by the treaty. There is some evidence that although some A models were dismantled and their nuclear materials recycled a number were transferred to the RN and converted to NDBs.
Like other Nuclear Depth Bombs used by the various nuclear powers there was nothing to stop RN held NDBs from being reconfigured to standard gravity bombs. Moreover in theory only the issue of aircrew lacking suitable training would stop RAF and RN jets from carrying the A model.
While the Royal Navy’s stock of NDBs was extensively refurbished in the ‘90s the weapons are now quite old, moreover some concerns have been raised regarding their reliability (i.e. they might not go ‘bang’ when required). The RN is now actively studying a replacement for the WE.177A, with a nuclear armed version of the RUM-139 VL-ASROC being a leading contender as a partial replacement. Development of an air dropped weapon for use by ASW helicopters will be tied to developments in the Trident replacement project.
WE.177B
The first version of the WE.177B to enter service, the B model was a thermonuclear weapon with a fixed yield of 450kt. First carried by RAF Vulcans and later by the Tornado, the B model would have been used in a ‘sub-strategic’ role against targets in Eastern Europe and the Western USSR.
Around 53 B models are believed to have been built and were all retired by 1998 to comply with the TNWT.
WE.177C
The third version of the WE.177, the C model was also a thermonuclear weapon, although it had smaller yield of 190kt. The weapon was solely deployed in RAF Germany, first carried by Jaguars and later by Tornados. The C model would have been used in tactical strike role.
Both the B and C model had an interesting feature when used in the ground-burst retarded mode – the warhead would not initiate on immediately striking the ground, but had a delay of just under a second. Potentially this would give those targeted just long enough to realise that a nuclear weapon had been dropped on them.
Between 48 and 60 C models are said to have been built. Like the B model all were withdrawn by 1998 and their warheads recycled.
Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM)
With the WE.177 becoming increasingly aged combined with improvements in Warsaw Pact air defences the MoD started to study a stand-off guided weapon as a potential replacement. Three missiles were proposed for the role – the Martin Marietta Low Attitude Target, Boeing’s Short Ranged Attack Missile II and the Aerospatiale Air Sol Longue Portee. Whichever missile had been chosen would also have been armed with a new warhead with a similar yield to the B and C model WE.177.
While the TNWT killed the project it is believed that the AGM-131B SRAM-T was the front-runner as it was further ahead in its development phase. Much of the work that went into FGSOW was used in the Conventionally Armed Stand-Off Missile (CASOM) project that led to Storm Shadow.
Land-Based.
Lance
Used by the 50th Missile Regiment Royal Artillery, the Lance missiles themselves were owned by Britain, however the warheads were American and subject to ‘dual-key’ arrangements. While not subject to the INF Treaty the US decided to start withdrawing its Lance missiles from Europe in 1987, with the last gone by 1992. Since US withdrawal left the British Army with missiles but no warhead Britain too decided to withdraw Lance, its role effectively being taken over by the conventional GMLRS. In any case the UK would have had to retire the system when the TNWT came into force.
Nuclear artillery
Under ‘dual-key’ arrangements the BAOR had access to nuclear artillery shells for its M109s and M110s. The last of these weapons were dismantled in 1998.
Sea-based.
UGM-27C Polaris
With the cancellation of the Skybolt ALBM the UK faced the very real prospect of its bomber based deterrent force becoming ineffective, which caused a very real and serious rift in the ‘Special Relationship’ with the United States. Therefore it was with some relief that the UK was able to negotiate the Nassau Agreement with the Kennedy Administration to purchase the Polaris A-3 SLBM; incidentally the sales agreement has also allowed the UK to purchase the successor to Polaris. In British service the Polaris was initially armed with a trio of ET.317 warheads of around 200 kt in yield, which was partially based on the US W-59 warhead (the UK did not consider the W-58 as used on USN Polaris A3 missiles to be safe in some areas).
In the 1970s it was determined that the UK’s Polaris missiles as currently configured were unlikely to be able to penetrate the ABM defences around Moscow; a very important part of the UK’s national targeting considerations. It was also recognised that the missiles would need to be refurbished sometime in the ‘80s. In hindsight it might have been better for the UK to have purchased the UGM-73 Poseidon, however at the time the upgrade project, designated ‘Chevaline’ appeared to be the most cost-effective option. The exact nature of ‘Chevaline’ and its development is beyond this fact-file, although it has been chronicled elsewhere. In short the up-grade added a new British designed front-end to the missile equipped with two hardened ET.317 warheads and a Penetration Aid Carrier equipped with decoys and other penetration aids.
Although never confirmed it has since been suggested that since to look like a warhead a decoy has to been roughly the same shape and size as a warhead the ‘Chevaline’ Polaris dispensed with the decoys and fitted a third warhead instead.
Forming the main armament of the four Resolution class ballistic missile submarines, Polaris was in Royal Navy service between 1968 and 1996.
UGM-133A Trident II
While the ‘Chevaline’ project sought to extend the life of Polaris at the same time the British government recognised that work needed to begin on a replacement. An initial informal agreement was reached between the Carter Administration and the Callaghan government for Britain to purchase the Trident C-4 missile, a formal agreement being reached by the Thatcher government in 1980. In 1982 the agreement was modified to cover the purchase of the more advanced Trident II D-5, giving the RN and USN commonality in SLBM for the first time in many years.
As with Polaris the British Trident missiles are equipped with British designed warheads, known as the Holbrooke Mark 4, which may be based on the US W-76 warhead. As with the ET.317 it is likely that if this is the case that the Holbrooke warhead will only be partially based on its US counterpart. The exact yield of British warheads has not been revealed, but is likely to be around 100kt. While the Trident II can carry up to 14 warheads the British government initially stated that RN missiles would not carry any more than 8, however a later statement suggested that they would not carry any more than the Polaris, either 2, or 3 warheads. Since the UK has a stockpile of between 225 and around 300 warheads there is nothing in theory to stop an increase in the numbers of warheads carried by the RN’s missiles. While the RN also leases 58 Trident missiles from the United States it is also true that in a nuclear war there would be nothing stopping British submarines from re-loading with American missiles.
Trident II D-5 currently forms the main armament of the four Vanguard class ballistic missile submarines, the first boat conducting its initial operational patrol in 1994. It will also form the main armament of the Dreadnought class ballistic missile submarine until at least 2042 in its D-5LE (Life Extension) version.
Last edited by James1978 on Thu Dec 01, 2022 5:00 am, edited 1 time in total.
Nuclear Weapons in TLWverse - France
French Nuclear Weapons
Air launched weapons.
AN-52
A gravity weapon with a yield of between 6-8kt and 25kt that was carried by French tactical jet aircraft, such as the Jaguar, Mirage IIIE and Super Étendard. It was also briefly the main armament of the Mirage 2000N-K1 pending the introduction of the ASMP (q.v) armed Mirage 2000N-K2. The weapon was withdrawn in 1992 in favour of the ASMP; however some AN-52s were converted into Nuclear Depth Bombs to be employed by the Atlantique 2.
ASMP
The Air-Sol Moyenne Portée formed the main armament of the Mirage 2000N-K2, although it could also be carried by the Super Étendard and Mirage IV; it was a supersonic cruise missile with a TN-81 nuclear warhead with a variable yield of either 150kt or 300kt.
During the negotiations surrounding the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty the French initially tried to argue that the ASMP was a strategic weapon and thus did not fall under the proposed terms of the treaty. As the French intended to use the missile in a ‘pre-strategic’ role as a ‘warning shot’ prior to employing strategic weapons there was some merit to the argument, however since it was unlikely that ASMP armed Mirage 2000s would be able to reach targets in the USSR both Soviet, American and British negotiators regarded the missile as a tactical weapon. In the end the French decided that retaining the ASMP was not worth risking an arms reduction treaty over.
The ASMP was withdrawn as a weapons system in 1998; the TN-81 warheads were dismantled and the nuclear material recycled into the general French stockpile.
Land-based weapons.
Pluton
A road mobile SRBM that used the chassis of an AMX-30; the missile had a choice of two nuclear warheads of either 15, or 25kt, or a conventional high explosive warhead. The Pluton was always something of a bone of contention between France and West Germany as its short range meant that it could only ever be used against targets in West Germany (or France), although that was true of most NATO SRBMs.
The Pluton system started to be withdrawn in 1992 and was fully retired by the following year.
Hadès
The successor to Pluton, Hadès was mounted on a wheeled launcher and had a longer range than its predecessor, allowing it to target the DDR. It had a choice of an 80kt TN-90 nuclear warhead, or a conventional HE warhead.
Hadès was withdrawn under the terms of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty, being fully retired by 1998. The conventional variants were replaced by the arguably more useful MLRS.
S3
An Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile armed with a 1.2Mt warhead; eighteen were deployed in underground silos on the Plateau d’Albion. By the early ‘90s it was clear that the S3 was verging on obsolete and a programme for a replacement, designated the S4 was underway. A land-based version of the M45 SLBM (q.v) would probably have served as the basis for the S4.
As an IRBM the S3 was not technically subject to the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty due to its range, however as part of signing the TNWT the French also declared that they would regard themselves as being bound by the earlier Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty; of course the fact that the S4 project was overrunning its budget had nothing to do with this decision.
Sea-based weapons.
M20
Between 1977 and 1991 the M20, which carried a single 1.2Mt warhead, formed the main armament of the Redoutable class ballistic missile submarines.
M4
The replacement for the ageing M20 as main armament of the Redoutable class (except for Redoutable herself as she was withdrawn in 1991). The M4 was significantly more advanced, for example it had up to six 150kt MIRV warheads rather than a single warhead. The M4 first entered service in 1985 and is still in service aboard the Indomptable and Inflexible.
M45
Currently the main armament of the Triomphant class ballistic missile submarine the M45 is the most advanced SLBM currently in French service. Derived from the M4, the M45 has a longer range, higher level of accuracy and carries up to six new 110kt MIRV warheads. As observed above a land-based version was also briefly developed as a replacement for the S2 IRBM.
M5
The M5 is currently under development as a replacement for the M45. It will have a longer range and be capable of carrying up to ten new generation MIRV nuclear warheads. The missile is expected to enter service in 2008.
A shorter ranged version designated the M51 was briefly proposed in the aftermath of the TNWT, however the French wanted to give their SSBNs as much sea-room to operate in as they would soon become the sole remaining leg of the French deterrent.
Air launched weapons.
AN-52
A gravity weapon with a yield of between 6-8kt and 25kt that was carried by French tactical jet aircraft, such as the Jaguar, Mirage IIIE and Super Étendard. It was also briefly the main armament of the Mirage 2000N-K1 pending the introduction of the ASMP (q.v) armed Mirage 2000N-K2. The weapon was withdrawn in 1992 in favour of the ASMP; however some AN-52s were converted into Nuclear Depth Bombs to be employed by the Atlantique 2.
ASMP
The Air-Sol Moyenne Portée formed the main armament of the Mirage 2000N-K2, although it could also be carried by the Super Étendard and Mirage IV; it was a supersonic cruise missile with a TN-81 nuclear warhead with a variable yield of either 150kt or 300kt.
During the negotiations surrounding the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty the French initially tried to argue that the ASMP was a strategic weapon and thus did not fall under the proposed terms of the treaty. As the French intended to use the missile in a ‘pre-strategic’ role as a ‘warning shot’ prior to employing strategic weapons there was some merit to the argument, however since it was unlikely that ASMP armed Mirage 2000s would be able to reach targets in the USSR both Soviet, American and British negotiators regarded the missile as a tactical weapon. In the end the French decided that retaining the ASMP was not worth risking an arms reduction treaty over.
The ASMP was withdrawn as a weapons system in 1998; the TN-81 warheads were dismantled and the nuclear material recycled into the general French stockpile.
Land-based weapons.
Pluton
A road mobile SRBM that used the chassis of an AMX-30; the missile had a choice of two nuclear warheads of either 15, or 25kt, or a conventional high explosive warhead. The Pluton was always something of a bone of contention between France and West Germany as its short range meant that it could only ever be used against targets in West Germany (or France), although that was true of most NATO SRBMs.
The Pluton system started to be withdrawn in 1992 and was fully retired by the following year.
Hadès
The successor to Pluton, Hadès was mounted on a wheeled launcher and had a longer range than its predecessor, allowing it to target the DDR. It had a choice of an 80kt TN-90 nuclear warhead, or a conventional HE warhead.
Hadès was withdrawn under the terms of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty, being fully retired by 1998. The conventional variants were replaced by the arguably more useful MLRS.
S3
An Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile armed with a 1.2Mt warhead; eighteen were deployed in underground silos on the Plateau d’Albion. By the early ‘90s it was clear that the S3 was verging on obsolete and a programme for a replacement, designated the S4 was underway. A land-based version of the M45 SLBM (q.v) would probably have served as the basis for the S4.
As an IRBM the S3 was not technically subject to the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty due to its range, however as part of signing the TNWT the French also declared that they would regard themselves as being bound by the earlier Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty; of course the fact that the S4 project was overrunning its budget had nothing to do with this decision.
Sea-based weapons.
M20
Between 1977 and 1991 the M20, which carried a single 1.2Mt warhead, formed the main armament of the Redoutable class ballistic missile submarines.
M4
The replacement for the ageing M20 as main armament of the Redoutable class (except for Redoutable herself as she was withdrawn in 1991). The M4 was significantly more advanced, for example it had up to six 150kt MIRV warheads rather than a single warhead. The M4 first entered service in 1985 and is still in service aboard the Indomptable and Inflexible.
M45
Currently the main armament of the Triomphant class ballistic missile submarine the M45 is the most advanced SLBM currently in French service. Derived from the M4, the M45 has a longer range, higher level of accuracy and carries up to six new 110kt MIRV warheads. As observed above a land-based version was also briefly developed as a replacement for the S2 IRBM.
M5
The M5 is currently under development as a replacement for the M45. It will have a longer range and be capable of carrying up to ten new generation MIRV nuclear warheads. The missile is expected to enter service in 2008.
A shorter ranged version designated the M51 was briefly proposed in the aftermath of the TNWT, however the French wanted to give their SSBNs as much sea-room to operate in as they would soon become the sole remaining leg of the French deterrent.
Last edited by James1978 on Thu Dec 01, 2022 5:02 am, edited 1 time in total.
Nuclear Weapons in TLWverse - PRC
People's Republic of China
Re: Nuclear Weapons in TLWverse
SPACE RESERVED
Re: Nuclear Weapons in TLWverse
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Re: Nuclear Weapons in TLWverse
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Re: Nuclear Weapons in TLWverse
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Re: Nuclear Weapons in TLWverse
Question for Bernard.
What happened with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in TLWverse?
It doesn't seem like the kind of thing the TLWverse USSR would sign, let along ratify. Even in @, the US signed, but never ratified it.
Or put another way, have the P5 continued nuclear testing?
What happened with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in TLWverse?
It doesn't seem like the kind of thing the TLWverse USSR would sign, let along ratify. Even in @, the US signed, but never ratified it.
Or put another way, have the P5 continued nuclear testing?
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Re: Nuclear Weapons in TLWverse
Thing to remember is Yakolev’s personal morbid fear of radiation after being close to Chernobyl. I think that under him, the USSR would have signed and ratified it.
“Frankly, I had enjoyed the war… and why do people want peace if the war is so much fun?” - Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart