History, Politics And Current Affairs

Wolfman wrote: ↑Mon Sep 01, 2025 7:21 pm Nobody ever claimed that the leadership of Venezuela was smart…

The theory was they weren't suicidal, that's in doubt.

jemhouston wrote: ↑Mon Sep 01, 2025 7:55 pm

Wolfman wrote: ↑Mon Sep 01, 2025 7:21 pm Nobody ever claimed that the leadership of Venezuela was smart…

The theory was they weren't suicidal, that's in doubt.

Hmm, good point.

Lordroel wrote: ↑Mon Sep 01, 2025 4:52 pm

Matt Wiser wrote: ↑Thu Aug 28, 2025 7:46 am We're not going to invade Venezuela over this. Maduro has to be more of a pest-like invading the Dutch Caribbean Islands, say, before we start pulling triggers. Now, mining the shipping channel into the oil terminal at Maricaibo and on the Mexican side at Vera Cruz, OTOH.... Different story.

Seems Venezuela with the US Navy doing some interceptions of its Ghost Fleet has decided, instead of angering America it is now going after its neighbor Guyana, claiming it is "trying to create a war front."

Do they want the Royal Navy also to visit their coast as i believe Guyana has some close relation with the UK.

Or France: Maduro's claimed French Guyana as well. There's a difference between "Crazy" and "Suicidal." The Mad Colonel in what was Tripoli happened to be both. Chavez, before he began pushing up daisies, was the same. Maduro knows if he touches French Guyana, it's Game on with the French, and he doesn't want to take on the U.S, Britain, and France at the same time.

France has a couple more options to deal with the Idiots running Venezuela, like, you know, the Foreign Legion?

The China Lake Grenade Launcher has been brought up a time or two.

https://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/chi ... r-44822371

How it came to be.

That's a weapon that has not seen its last combat.

Folks, there's a new book out by Antony Beevor about PRAIRIE FIRE, and though it's not the first (Keegan, Max Hastings, among others have done similar works), Beevor uses sources that were, at the time, unavailable to those authors (Soviet, Cuban, Nicaraguan), and he discovered something. That the occupiers expected the civilian population in those areas to be controlled, subservient, and above all, loyal. And yet, not only did their own intelligence agencies concerned with such things (KGB, PSD, DGI, Stasi, etc.) find quite the opposite, but those agencies, along with the various Army commands, were angry. What were they angry about? That 99.99999% of the population in those areas were ready and waiting to welcome U.S. and Allied Forces with flowers and flags. It was something that the vast majority of Soviet-bloc officers could not or would not understand. Those who did, like Alekseyev and Chibisov, generally kept those thoughts amongst themselves and with officers they knew they could trust.

Matt Wiser wrote: ↑Wed Oct 22, 2025 4:09 am Folks, there's a new book out by Antony Beevor about PRAIRIE FIRE, and though it's not the first (Keegan, Max Hastings, among others have done similar works), Beevor uses sources that were, at the time, unavailable to those authors (Soviet, Cuban, Nicaraguan), and he discovered something. That the occupiers expected the civilian population in those areas to be controlled, subservient, and above all, loyal. And yet, not only did their own intelligence agencies concerned with such things (KGB, PSD, DGI, Stasi, etc.) find quite the opposite, but those agencies, along with the various Army commands, were angry. What were they angry about? That 99.99999% of the population in those areas were ready and waiting to welcome U.S. and Allied Forces with flowers and flags. It was something that the vast majority of Soviet-bloc officers could not or would not understand. Those who did, like Alekseyev and Chibisov, generally kept those thoughts amongst themselves and with officers they knew they could trust.

They were smoking the really bad ditchweed.

Matt Wiser wrote: ↑Wed Oct 22, 2025 4:09 am Folks, there's a new book out by Antony Beevor about PRAIRIE FIRE, and though it's not the first (Keegan, Max Hastings, among others have done similar works), Beevor uses sources that were, at the time, unavailable to those authors (Soviet, Cuban, Nicaraguan), and he discovered something. That the occupiers expected the civilian population in those areas to be controlled, subservient, and above all, loyal. And yet, not only did their own intelligence agencies concerned with such things (KGB, PSD, DGI, Stasi, etc.) find quite the opposite, but those agencies, along with the various Army commands, were angry. What were they angry about? That 99.99999% of the population in those areas were ready and waiting to welcome U.S. and Allied Forces with flowers and flags. It was something that the vast majority of Soviet-bloc officers could not or would not understand. Those who did, like Alekseyev and Chibisov, generally kept those thoughts amongst themselves and with officers they knew they could trust.

They expected people who had been spoon fed 35 years of "The soviets are bad" coupled with the terrible excesses of the soviet occupation to be LOYAL to the new soviet overlords?

What in the holy hell were the soviet three letter agencies thinking?

Or do I not understand what you're saying here?

Belushi TD

The GRU was somewhat skeptical, but the KGB was all in on the idea.

Poohbah wrote: ↑Wed Oct 22, 2025 5:30 am

Matt Wiser wrote: ↑Wed Oct 22, 2025 4:09 am Folks, there's a new book out by Antony Beevor about PRAIRIE FIRE, and though it's not the first (Keegan, Max Hastings, among others have done similar works), Beevor uses sources that were, at the time, unavailable to those authors (Soviet, Cuban, Nicaraguan), and he discovered something. That the occupiers expected the civilian population in those areas to be controlled, subservient, and above all, loyal. And yet, not only did their own intelligence agencies concerned with such things (KGB, PSD, DGI, Stasi, etc.) find quite the opposite, but those agencies, along with the various Army commands, were angry. What were they angry about? That 99.99999% of the population in those areas were ready and waiting to welcome U.S. and Allied Forces with flowers and flags. It was something that the vast majority of Soviet-bloc officers could not or would not understand. Those who did, like Alekseyev and Chibisov, generally kept those thoughts amongst themselves and with officers they knew they could trust.

They were smoking the really bad ditchweed.

It was spiked with LSD and peyote.

Wolfman wrote: ↑Wed Oct 22, 2025 1:46 pm The GRU was somewhat skeptical, but the KGB was all in on the idea.

The KGB was telling the seniors officers posting to America that everything was fine, just some minor bandit problems.

One of those officers got a Welcome to New Mexico Party thrown for him by The Phantom Blooper. He tended to not believe anything the KGB told him after that.

Another guy got welcomed to Amarillo by The Pilgrim; the guy blew up his ride as it was rolling up to the aircraft.

Belushi TD wrote: ↑Wed Oct 22, 2025 12:36 pm

They expected people who had been spoon fed 35 years of "The soviets are bad" coupled with the terrible excesses of the soviet occupation to be LOYAL to the new soviet overlords?

What in the holy hell were the soviet three letter agencies thinking?

Or do I not understand what you're saying here?

Belushi TD

Those at the local (county) regional (the KGB divided states into several regions-Texas especially), and State level were convinced that those behind the lines should be "Grateful for their liberation from Capitalist Oppression", without question. They were disappointed that they were not. They were also upset that ethnic groups that they considered "Oppressed" didn't come out to support the occupation (Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, American Indians, especially) by and large were loyal to the U.S. The Cubans and Mexicans, especially, expected a lot of cooperation from the Mexican-American community in New Mexico and especially Texas, to give one high-profile example. They were disappointed in the lack of it. All the propaganda at those groups, by and large, didn't work. Which frustrated them to no end. The fact that the vast majority cooperated unwillingly should have told them something. They weren't listening.

The GRU was very cynical, and quite the opposite. So were KGB Officers who had done tours here prewar, either as illegals or those under diplomatic cover. Especially Gen. Oleg Kalugin, the longtime Station Chief in Washington. He sent several memoranda to Kosov, warning that the situation behind the lines would not be as what those who were going to North America imagined it would be. So did several others who had served here, with the rank of Colonel. Kosov's response was to thank them for their efforts, their reports were filed away, and that was that. Kalugin's frustration with that, and with Russia stuck in a war she could not win led to his defection, as we all know, in early 1987. Several others also defected, either in 1986 or in '87. And as we know now, MI-6 extracted Gordievsky and his family in 1985, a few weeks prior, and he wound up running a network inside the Soviet Union on behalf of MI-6 and the CIA.

For Bernard: Did Gordievsky try to warn London, and thus, Washington, of what was coming? Some accounts say he did, but others say he wasn't cleared.

Wasn’t there an issue in US intelligence downplaying any info about the invasion since they knew the Soviets weren't going to invade. They were afraid if Reagan found out he would take action to stop it, including shooting first.

jemhouston wrote: ↑Thu Oct 23, 2025 2:55 am Wasn’t there an issue in US intelligence downplaying any info about the invasion since they knew the Soviets weren't going to invade. They were afraid if Reagan found out he would take action to stop it, including shooting first.

Yeah, there was that, in part. (Reminding self to redo Round Perdition's Flames.)

CIA Director Bill Casey was given two SNIEs (Special National Intelligence Estimates); one downplayed the possibility of invasion, the other predicted it. Casey felt the latter was more likely, and a White House meeting to discuss the SNIE with the National Security Council was on tap for the afternoon of 4 Sep 85: about 12 hours too late.

Poohbah wrote: ↑Thu Oct 23, 2025 3:39 am

jemhouston wrote: ↑Thu Oct 23, 2025 2:55 am Wasn’t there an issue in US intelligence downplaying any info about the invasion since they knew the Soviets weren't going to invade. They were afraid if Reagan found out he would take action to stop it, including shooting first.

Yeah, there was that, in part. (Reminding self to redo Round Perdition's Flames.)

Don't over extend yourself.

Navy just beat Army!

Got two questions, which allied fighter had the best win to lost ratio and which Warsaw Pact had the best win to lost ratio.

F-15 had the best for the Allies. Toss-up between MiG-29 and Su-27 for the bad guys. The MiG-29s would've been far more lethal if their helmet-mounted sight and the AA-11 (R-73) AAM were both operational. And again, you had no business messing with a Flanker in anything less than a "Teenage" fighter.