COMMENTA Brief History of the F-14D Acquisition Program
Excerpted from
Modification Of The F-14: A Case Study In Decisions Affecting A Major Systems Upgrade
By Perry J. Delahoussaye
March 1994
The original plan called for 304 new production F-14Ds. That changed in 1986. Even with the Cold War raging, budgets weren’t infinite, in fact they were projected to go down. On 17 September 1986. SECNAV Lehman restructured the program and directed that new production F-14Ds would be supplemented by remanufactured F-14As. [The remanufacturing is also known as Conversion In Lieu Of Production (CILOP).] The hope was that the change would speed the introduction of the F-14D and ease fiscal pressures.
On 25 November 1986, A Program Change Approval Document was signed, changing the total quantity of F-14D aircraft to be procured from 304 to 527. To execute Lehman's guidance in the most effective manner, the Navy cut its purchase of 304 new Grumman F-14Ds to a buy of 127. The Navy's new procurement schedule called for the purchase of seven F-14Ds in FY 88 and then annual procurement of 12 aircraft through 1998. The Navy's request for 12 new F-14Ds per year was based on the need to offset projected attrition of fleet aircraft and to maintain a minimum economic production rate at Grumman's Long Island, NY facilities.
The Navy also planned to remanufacture 400 F-14As into the F-14D configuration beginning in 1990. Under the F-14D remanufacturing program, selected F-14A aircraft would be stricken administratively from the Navy's inventory and provided as government furnished material to the contractor. The remanufacture of the F-14A would include rewiring, overhaul, and service-life extension as well as the installation and integration of the new radar, avionics, and engine. The remanufactured F-14D would be identical in performance and configuration to a new-production aircraft.
The Navy also viewed the remanufacture program as an opportunity to introduce competition into the F-14D program. This was done not only to lower the overall cost of the program but to address criticism levied by some members of congress during past deliberations. The acquisition strategy directed that the first lot of six aircraft would be split between Grumman and a second source. Grumman was noncompetitively awarded a contract to remanufacture four aircraft with the sole purpose of developing a technical data package. The two remaining aircraft of the first lot would be remanufactured by the second source to validate the data package. To assure a wartime mobilization base, lot 2 would be equally split between Grumman and the second source. The remaining lots were to be competed between Grumman and the second source on a yearly basis.
The new procurement profile for the F-14D program, which included 127 new production aircraft and 400 remanufactured aircraft represented a 73% increase in the number of F-14Ds available for combat at an estimated 19% increase in cost versus the previous profile of 304 new production aircraft. Lehman believed the new F-14D aircraft mix obtained the greatest warfighting capability for each year's budget and was the least costly option available for obtaining an all F-14D force.
By late 1988, opposition to the F-14D program began to emerge in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The opposition was led by David Chu, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). As Assistant Secretary for PA&E, Chu's job was to analyze the relative costs and merits of the major weapon systems purchased by DoD.
The influence of the PA&E office within the OSD had grown significantly during the budget-conscious years of the late 1980s. As a member of the Defense Resources and Planning Board (DRPB) and the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), the two primary decision-making forums for the OSD, Chu was in a powerful position to influence acquisition decisions. With the defense budget continuing to decrease in terms of real growth, Chu’s recommendations to cut waste and eliminate uneconomical programs gathered support.
Chu was opposed to new F-14D production. He believed that in an attempt to keep the Grumman production line open, DoD was deliberately buying aircraft in low quantities. The effect of this policy was to drive up the unit cost of each aircraft. Chu estimated that the 12 F-14D aircraft scheduled for production in FY 89 would cost the government nearly $75 million each. This cost was three times greater than the $23 million price paid for the Navy's other carrier-based fighter, the F/A-18 Hornet.
Chu favored the continued remanufacturing of F-14 aircraft as a cost-effective means to upgrade the fighter fleet. Remanufacturing, he believed, invested scarce dollars into areas of the F-14 which needed the most improvement: engines, radar, and avionics. With the Navy scheduled to receive an aircraft-carrier version of the Air Force's Advanced Tactical Fighter (NATF) by the year 2000, Chu also cautioned against procuring airframe life that would not be used. A newly built F-14D with an estimated 25-30 year lifespan, would be replaced by the NATF long before its airframe fatigue life had expired. A remanufactured F-14D with an expected 10-15 year life however, would phase out nicely with the arrival of NATF.
Now obviously the geopolitical situation changes in December 1989 with the POD for TLWverse. And given the number of F-14Ds in service in TLWverse, something changed. But was that “something” enough to undo the plan for the F-14D program? While Congress seemed generally supportive of the F-14D, the same could not be said of the proposed new build production rate of 12 per year. That was the minimum economic production rate. It kept Grumman in business, but it led to per unit prices that weren’t exactly a good deal.
Some Numbers
* The Navy’s pre-POD program of record was 527 F-14D - 127 new built and 400 CILOP. That number accounted for anticipated peacetime attrition.
** I can also get to that 527 number with the 89 F-14Bs + 438 F-14D. In @ there were some F-14B options that I’m assuming were taken, leading to 89 total F-14B being built.
* I looked up the @ airframe losses through 1998. Between peacetime attrition and F-14A => F-14B CILOPS, there aren’t 400 F-14As to rebuild. It’s more like 348, at best.
* I’ve got one source that says the CILOP program aimed to hit 60 aircraft per year. In which case, rebuilds were done by 1998. Hell, I can hit the rebuild number by 1999 maxing out at 48 aircraft per year. And I’ve read that the entire program was supposed to wrap up by 1998.
* I calculated the PAA F-14B and F-14D fleet in TLWverse 2004 at around 405. That does not include aircraft in depot maintenance, or a small attrition / war reserve. That assumes 10 aircraft per line squadron. I mention that because in @ 1989, the Navy shrank F-14 squadrons from 12 aircraft to 10 aircraft - which reduces the required aircraft by 60. The logic there was that the F/A-18s replacing the A-7 could do air defense and attack, so the air wing didn’t need as many F-14s or A-6s. [NOTE 1] And even if we hand waived the 12 to 10 away, spot factors kind of force it once the Super Hornet shows up.
* So the number I’m working with is 348 F-14A => F-14D CILOP, and 127 new build F-14D for a total build of 475 F-14D. Yea, it’s short of the 527 goal, but overall the numbers still work.
I’m forced to admit that Chu makes a very good point in one regard - why buy lots of brand new aircraft with a 25-30 year life when they will be replaced before they wear out? In that case, there is a strong case for the F-14A => F-14D CILOP. Consider that at the POD, NATF is still a thing in TLWerse and likely remains so until around 1993. JTAT got going in 1994, and Northrup-Grumman and Lockheed-Martin won JTAT-Heavy in 1999. The F-25 is going to replace both the F-14 and the A-6 . . . and it’s in production. The LANTFLT FRS is already equipped, with the first USAF training squadron getting its first aircraft in May 2005. The first Navy combat squadron is scheduled to start converting in late 2005 - early 2006. It’s later than NATF’s projected 2000 arrival, but still not far off for a fifth generation program. And Chu’s logic is likely to find adherents in the Clinton Pentagon during the late 1990s.
On a related note, Chu Logic would seem to apply to the A-6F as well. So if most of the F-14 fleet are rebuilds, it seems likely that Navy F-25s will replace F-14s before A-6Fs, which are all new builds. But Chu Logic supports other TLWverse decisions - like not fully replacing the F-111 with F-15Es.
Now of interest is that the F-14D CILOP was planned to have a second source for competition, and this did happen in @. Much like how General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas split annual Tomahawk cruise missile production, Grumman shared the CILOP work with Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk. Each was guaranteed a certain number of rebuilds, and completed annually for the balance. From what I’ve read, the rebuild took 15 months, but that may have just been the first batch.
So where am I going with all of this?
1) I’m not sure there are any F-14As left at AMARC by TLWverse 2005. In fact, they were probably gone by 1998-1999 at the very latest. . . if there were ever many of them to begin with. To maintain the number of F-14 squadrons, they needed every F-14A they could get. So Iran may get some leftover “A” model parts that got replaced during CILOP, but there may not be any airframes to pick over. And as a side note, the Air Force probably grabbed the best of the TF30 engines + spares to keep the F-111 fleet going.
2) Absent an export order, I think production of new F-14 airframes ended in 1995, 1998 at the latest. But probably 1995 to get annual build rates above 12.
3) Assuming that the two squadrons that were on USS America lost all their aircraft, there are just barely enough F-14Bs for them to reequip . . . eventually, since some of the spare F-14Bs will be in depot maintenance.
4) 1 + 2 above = no new wartime F-14 squadrons, and the only spare aircraft will come from the small attrition / war reserve, raiding the training squadrons, or aircraft coming out of depot maintenance. Which means that the combined F-14 squadron in Alaska from the USS United States is more likely to get broken up than rebuilt.
Not all doom and gloom
There are, of course, alternatives.
We can increase the annual production of new F-14Ds during the second Bush term and into the Clinton years. In fact, that’s what I had to do to get to 527 total F-14Ds and get around the life support production rate issue. But that still leaves zero F-14A in AMARC, and assumes that the Clinton administration doesn’t take an ax to the last batches of new builds. But if we go with 179 new builds for a fleet total of 527, then there are enough that the four reserve F-14 squadrons really ought to have F-14Ds instead of F-14Bs - which I’m not necessarily opposed to. Whether the F-14Bs were CILOP into F-14Ds in that scenario is up for debate. But those squadrons having F-14Bs seems to answer the question about continued new builds.
Now I’ve always assumed that the F-25 line is at Grumman’s Long Island factory. In which case, the F-14D program is done by 1998-99, and the A-6F production by say 2003 at the latest. Unless someone can think of anyone who wants to buy a single role theater bomber in TLWverse?
A Wrinkle - Tailhook
In @, the F-14 did have a strong camp within the Navy. In fact, that camp hoped to get a true multirole F-14E derived from one of Grumman’s many proposals to replace the older F-14s and the A-6. Then the Tailhook Scandal happened . . . and the fallout gutted the F-14 camp in the Navy. It did not, however, gut the F/A-18 camp.
Now in TLWverse, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet still happened. And it’s cheaper to be sure.
The multirole F-14E probably got examined during Cheney’s Unified Major Aircraft Review as an alternative to the canceled A-12, and got passed over in favor of the A-6F because $$$$ . . . and Tailhook.
Possible Exports
The list of countries that have both the money and are likely to get cleared to buy new F-14s during the TLWverse 1990s is not large. And most of them bought F-15E derivatives or are hoping for F-22s.
Now I’m sure I can come up with one or two potential buyers that would be a stretch, if that interests anyone.
Random Thoughts Regarding the F-25
F-14 First: In 2006, the oldest F-14D rebuild will be nearing their end of life. For the sake of discussion, figure four F-14 squadrons convert to the F-25 per year - that takes seven (2006-2012) years and wraps up in 2012, with the four reserve squadrons getting the youngest new build F-14Ds. In 2012 the oldest A-6F will be 19-19 years old.
A-6F First: In 2006, the oldest A-6F will be 12-13 years old. Unless the threat projections say the A-6F is meat on the table, aircraft age dictates the F-14s get replaced first.
Brief Tangent: This is also a knock on effect with the Super Hornet. In @, the A-6E was gone by 1997 and the F-14 by the end of 2006. With the full F-14D buy happening as well as new build A-6F, where is the urgency for the Super Hornet? And the number of Super Hornets the Navy would have to buy every year from 1999 onward to have two training squadrons and 27 line squadrons converted and at FOC no later than early 2005 argues against anything more than tiny attrition buys of new build F-14s and A-6s - the very kind of uneconomic buys Congress disliked. And with all those new F-14Ds, A-6F, and Super Hornets, what is the rationale for the F-24C (@ F-35C) in TLWverse? Knock out the F-24C, and the “commonality” rationale for the F-24 goes out the window. At that point you might as well keep the Harrier replacement (ASTOVL) separate.]
NOTES
1) Naval Aviation News, November-December 1989, p.7-9