Marine Corps to eliminate Scout Snipers

[Craiglxviii]

For opposed landings, instead of the organic tanks and artillery the landing force will rely on NGFS with the battleships and cruisers laying on all that heavy bombardment.

oh, wait.......

We have aviation for that. Much safer and cheaper for all but the pilot and the enemy.

Leaving aside the “except for the pilot”.

A much heavier volume and weight of sustained fire can be delivered down range from NGFS than aviation. If the objective is in range.

One lesson re-learned from the current unpleasantness is that heavy volumes of sustained fire is critical.

That means artillery. Real artillery is 16”

We learnt this lesson hard down south in 1982. Ok, so we were short in aviation but it was available… it was no replacement for a twin 4.5” mount giving it maximum effort from 9nm though.

Out of interest, did you ever serve on the BBs?

[Simon Darkshade]

The USMC shift towards Littoral Regiments and their very focused missions is of course very much of the Pacific and confrontation with China. But what of the 2nd Marine Division and its role in the Atlantic, particularly Norway/Scandinavia? I would think some of the prepositioned equipment stocks in Norway included tanks, artillery and heavier vehicles.

[Nightwatch2]

We have aviation for that. Much safer and cheaper for all but the pilot and the enemy.

Leaving aside the “except for the pilot”.

A much heavier volume and weight of sustained fire can be delivered down range from NGFS than aviation. If the objective is in range.

One lesson re-learned from the current unpleasantness is that heavy volumes of sustained fire is critical.

That means artillery. Real artillery is 16”

We learnt this lesson hard down south in 1982. Ok, so we were short in aviation but it was available… it was no replacement for a twin 4.5” mount giving it maximum effort from 9nm though.

Out of interest, did you ever serve on the BBs?

USS Iowa, BB-61.

The 6th Fleet Staff rode the Iowa for about 3 months in 1989 while Belknap was in a French yard for some maintenance and upgrades. We sat off of Lebanon during that period and prepared to "voice our displeasure" at the murder of a US officer kidnapped from a UN peacekeeping force.

[Nightwatch2]

We have aviation for that. Much safer and cheaper for all but the pilot and the enemy.

Leaving aside the “except for the pilot”.

Being absolutely cold-blooded, it’s better to write one letter than several. A horrible day for an aviation squadron is a light day for surface, subsurface and especially for infantry.

Being snarky, submariners and surface sailors are cuter. Though I have seen some hot Zoomies.

A much heavier volume and weight of sustained fire can be delivered down range from NGFS than aviation. If the objective is in range.

One lesson re-learned from the current unpleasantness is that heavy volumes of sustained fire is critical.

That means artillery. Real artillery is 16”

That may have been true as recently as the 1990s or early 2000s, but cheap smart munitions and vastly improved surveillance and accuracy means that the days-long bombardments of WWII, Korea and Vietnam are unnecessary. Nor is sustained fire by a fixed unit on a single target used anymore - that’s a good way to get located, counterbatteried, and hit with a bad case of dead. Nor does sustained fire do much in the way of killing. At best, it neutralizes. The real killing power is in the first salvos. By salvo six or so, the target is dead or in cover.

The name of the game with land artillery is shoot and scoot. I’sd argue the real benefit of tube or rocket artillery vs aircraft is responsiveness. Tube arty can be on target in minutes. Airpower can do that only if they’re already loitering.

Fortunately, air support has vastly greater loiter time than previously, especially once we kill enemy air defenses. Stuart pointed out years ago that it’s now targets per sortie, not sorties per target. That massively increases an air group’s ability to absolutely kill ground targets at 30,000 feet and generate the responsiveness of tube arty with vastly greater oompf. Said loiter is even easier by reconfiguring our carriers and doctrine around a continuous stream of aircraft instead of a giant alpha-strike.

The biggest gap in our arsenal is probably the small air groups. 48 ac/CVN doesn’t generate the killing power we need. Double it.

not quite. The one letter for a pilot vs zero for a NGFS (if in range).

The volume of fire is being demonstrated in Ukraine right now. Tube artillery is still critical.

It's not an either/or. Both are needed for the battlefields that we don't yet know we will fight on. The current unpleasantness in Ukraine is providing a whole lot of lessons learned and re-learned on fighting a massive, real war in a modern and technically sophisticated bloodletting.

[Craiglxviii]

Leaving aside the “except for the pilot”.

A much heavier volume and weight of sustained fire can be delivered down range from NGFS than aviation. If the objective is in range.

One lesson re-learned from the current unpleasantness is that heavy volumes of sustained fire is critical.

That means artillery. Real artillery is 16”

We learnt this lesson hard down south in 1982. Ok, so we were short in aviation but it was available… it was no replacement for a twin 4.5” mount giving it maximum effort from 9nm though.

Out of interest, did you ever serve on the BBs?

USS Iowa, BB-61.

The 6th Fleet Staff rode the Iowa for about 3 months in 1989 while Belknap was in a French yard for some maintenance and upgrades. We sat off of Lebanon during that period and prepared to "voice our displeasure" at the murder of a US officer kidnapped from a UN peacekeeping force.

Thank you- most interesting!

[Johnnie Lyle]

Leaving aside the “except for the pilot”.

Being absolutely cold-blooded, it’s better to write one letter than several. A horrible day for an aviation squadron is a light day for surface, subsurface and especially for infantry.

Being snarky, submariners and surface sailors are cuter. Though I have seen some hot Zoomies.

A much heavier volume and weight of sustained fire can be delivered down range from NGFS than aviation. If the objective is in range.

One lesson re-learned from the current unpleasantness is that heavy volumes of sustained fire is critical.

That means artillery. Real artillery is 16”

That may have been true as recently as the 1990s or early 2000s, but cheap smart munitions and vastly improved surveillance and accuracy means that the days-long bombardments of WWII, Korea and Vietnam are unnecessary. Nor is sustained fire by a fixed unit on a single target used anymore - that’s a good way to get located, counterbatteried, and hit with a bad case of dead. Nor does sustained fire do much in the way of killing. At best, it neutralizes. The real killing power is in the first salvos. By salvo six or so, the target is dead or in cover.

The name of the game with land artillery is shoot and scoot. I’sd argue the real benefit of tube or rocket artillery vs aircraft is responsiveness. Tube arty can be on target in minutes. Airpower can do that only if they’re already loitering.

Fortunately, air support has vastly greater loiter time than previously, especially once we kill enemy air defenses. Stuart pointed out years ago that it’s now targets per sortie, not sorties per target. That massively increases an air group’s ability to absolutely kill ground targets at 30,000 feet and generate the responsiveness of tube arty with vastly greater oompf. Said loiter is even easier by reconfiguring our carriers and doctrine around a continuous stream of aircraft instead of a giant alpha-strike.

The biggest gap in our arsenal is probably the small air groups. 48 ac/CVN doesn’t generate the killing power we need. Double it.

not quite. The one letter for a pilot vs zero for a NGFS (if in range).

The volume of fire is being demonstrated in Ukraine right now. Tube artillery is still critical.

It's not an either/or. Both are needed for the battlefields that we don't yet know we will fight on. The current unpleasantness in Ukraine is providing a whole lot of lessons learned and re-learned on fighting a massive, real war in a modern and technically sophisticated bloodletting.

NFGS is not risk free. Especially given submarines, prominent mine assets and anti-shipping missiles and artillery. Most modern warships are highly vulnerable on the gunline. Even the more heavily armored cruisers and destroyers took hits and lost crews providing NGFS in the good old days when warships were prettier.

I am also very skeptical about whether massed artillery is truly absolutely essential independent of airpower in the Ukraine, or is instead substituting for lack of airpower, making it look more powerful than it would be if they had overwhelming modern air power.

[Nightwatch2]

Being absolutely cold-blooded, it’s better to write one letter than several. A horrible day for an aviation squadron is a light day for surface, subsurface and especially for infantry.

Being snarky, submariners and surface sailors are cuter. Though I have seen some hot Zoomies.


That may have been true as recently as the 1990s or early 2000s, but cheap smart munitions and vastly improved surveillance and accuracy means that the days-long bombardments of WWII, Korea and Vietnam are unnecessary. Nor is sustained fire by a fixed unit on a single target used anymore - that’s a good way to get located, counterbatteried, and hit with a bad case of dead. Nor does sustained fire do much in the way of killing. At best, it neutralizes. The real killing power is in the first salvos. By salvo six or so, the target is dead or in cover.

The name of the game with land artillery is shoot and scoot. I’sd argue the real benefit of tube or rocket artillery vs aircraft is responsiveness. Tube arty can be on target in minutes. Airpower can do that only if they’re already loitering.

Fortunately, air support has vastly greater loiter time than previously, especially once we kill enemy air defenses. Stuart pointed out years ago that it’s now targets per sortie, not sorties per target. That massively increases an air group’s ability to absolutely kill ground targets at 30,000 feet and generate the responsiveness of tube arty with vastly greater oompf. Said loiter is even easier by reconfiguring our carriers and doctrine around a continuous stream of aircraft instead of a giant alpha-strike.

The biggest gap in our arsenal is probably the small air groups. 48 ac/CVN doesn’t generate the killing power we need. Double it.

not quite. The one letter for a pilot vs zero for a NGFS (if in range).

The volume of fire is being demonstrated in Ukraine right now. Tube artillery is still critical.

It's not an either/or. Both are needed for the battlefields that we don't yet know we will fight on. The current unpleasantness in Ukraine is providing a whole lot of lessons learned and re-learned on fighting a massive, real war in a modern and technically sophisticated bloodletting.

NFGS is not risk free. Especially given submarines, prominent mine assets and anti-shipping missiles and artillery. Most modern warships are highly vulnerable on the gunline. Even the more heavily armored cruisers and destroyers took hits and lost crews providing NGFS in the good old days when warships were prettier.

I am also very skeptical about whether massed artillery is truly absolutely essential independent of airpower in the Ukraine, or is instead substituting for lack of airpower, making it look more powerful than it would be if they had overwhelming modern air power.

I think that’s kinda my point.

The lack of air superiority by either side has driven to artillery.

Sea power with kaliber cruise missiles has substituted for air strikes. (The loss of Moskva goes to your point)

The abject failure of the Russian AF will be the subject of much analysis. But that also drives home the need for artillery, both land and sea based.

We will need it all backed up by A LOT of ammunition

On carrier decks, I’ve said for years that we need to fill the decks with more strike aircraft. Our decks are only 2/3 full. They need to fill the deck multiple if we are going to be serious

[Micael]

not quite. The one letter for a pilot vs zero for a NGFS (if in range).

The volume of fire is being demonstrated in Ukraine right now. Tube artillery is still critical.

It's not an either/or. Both are needed for the battlefields that we don't yet know we will fight on. The current unpleasantness in Ukraine is providing a whole lot of lessons learned and re-learned on fighting a massive, real war in a modern and technically sophisticated bloodletting.

NFGS is not risk free. Especially given submarines, prominent mine assets and anti-shipping missiles and artillery. Most modern warships are highly vulnerable on the gunline. Even the more heavily armored cruisers and destroyers took hits and lost crews providing NGFS in the good old days when warships were prettier.

I am also very skeptical about whether massed artillery is truly absolutely essential independent of airpower in the Ukraine, or is instead substituting for lack of airpower, making it look more powerful than it would be if they had overwhelming modern air power.

I think that’s kinda my point.

The lack of air superiority by either side has driven to artillery.

Sea power with kaliber cruise missiles has substituted for air strikes. (The loss of Moskva goes to your point)

The abject failure of the Russian AF will be the subject of much analysis. But that also drives home the need for artillery, both land and sea based.

We will need it all backed up by A LOT of ammunition

On carrier decks, I’ve said for years that we need to fill the decks with more strike aircraft. Our decks are only 2/3 full. They need to fill the deck multiple if we are going to be serious

Yes. More strike aircraft, a high end air dominance fighter, and a fixed wing ASW aircraft and max out the carriers. And max out the LHDs/LHAs with F-35s too. I’m afraid that you may be needing them.

[Johnnie Lyle]

Russia has lost more than MOSKVA, though. Quite a few of their amphibious ships were lost trying to supply land forces. I think think it demonstrates the wisdom of the old over the horizon location of the amphibs, and especially the importance of vertical envelopment in opposed amphibious landings on anything bigger than a coral atoll. The ships, especially the amphibs, absolutely need their mobility to hide their location, and the warships on the gunline will be extremely vulnerable if distracted.

Personally, my general preference for any kind of littoral operation is increasingly ships stay the hell out to sea and send in aircraft and helicopters to kill people and break things. They’ve just got so much of a greater onion of protection that way. The strategic mobility and safety from prying eyes is crucial, especially if we have got satellites and they have not. Get in close or confined waters and you’re in a shooting gallery with short response times. Sometimes it has to be done, but often helos and fast movers are infinitely better platforms for ops within sight of unfriendly shores.

Concur on more aircraft and munitions; the western way of war is expend bullets, not men. That means we need cheap, easily guided ones with big booms. Emphasis on cheap. Money is the sinew of war, and thus we need to make sure our ammo is sufficiently inexpensive we don’t run into big problems sustaining munitions. No point in relying on multi-million dollar munitions.

[cbg]

I think that’s kinda my point.

The lack of air superiority by either side has driven to artillery.

Sea power with kaliber cruise missiles has substituted for air strikes. (The loss of Moskva goes to your point)

The abject failure of the Russian AF will be the subject of much analysis. But that also drives home the need for artillery, both land and sea based.

Note what this artillery is being used for...
Trench warfare with masses of infantry backed by well hidden AA assets and own mass artillery.
Island campaigns will not have that, no one will bring and then supply such masses of infantry and artillery onto the islands, and if someone does, you suppress their long range systems with precision munitions, sink the supply ships, and let time do the rest.
With smaller islands even hiding the larger, more capable long range systems will be hard.

Russia has lost more than MOSKVA, though. Quite a few of their amphibious ships were lost trying to supply land forces. I think think it demonstrates the wisdom of the old over the horizon location of the amphibs, and especially the importance of vertical envelopment in opposed amphibious landings on anything bigger than a coral atoll. The ships, especially the amphibs, absolutely need their mobility to hide their location, and the warships on the gunline will be extremely vulnerable if distracted.

Personally, my general preference for any kind of littoral operation is increasingly ships stay the hell out to sea and send in aircraft and helicopters to kill people and break things. They’ve just got so much of a greater onion of protection that way. The strategic mobility and safety from prying eyes is crucial, especially if we have got satellites and they have not. Get in close or confined waters and you’re in a shooting gallery with short response times. Sometimes it has to be done, but often helos and fast movers are infinitely better platforms for ops within sight of unfriendly shores.

Concur on more aircraft and munitions; the western way of war is expend bullets, not men. That means we need cheap, easily guided ones with big booms. Emphasis on cheap. Money is the sinew of war, and thus we need to make sure our ammo is sufficiently inexpensive we don’t run into big problems sustaining munitions. No point in relying on multi-million dollar munitions.

Note that a lot of the amphibs got hit while loading/unloading. Between drones and precision munitions, amphibs are hard enough to hide that they can get hit on the beach at any moment if the whole 30+km depth of the beach wasn't cleared of enemy FIRES and surveillance first.

[Poohbah]

Leaving aside the “except for the pilot”.

A much heavier volume and weight of sustained fire can be delivered down range from NGFS than aviation. If the objective is in range.

One lesson re-learned from the current unpleasantness is that heavy volumes of sustained fire is critical.

That means artillery. Real artillery is 16”

We learnt this lesson hard down south in 1982. Ok, so we were short in aviation but it was available… it was no replacement for a twin 4.5” mount giving it maximum effort from 9nm though.

Out of interest, did you ever serve on the BBs?

USS Iowa, BB-61.

The 6th Fleet Staff rode the Iowa for about 3 months in 1989 while Belknap was in a French yard for some maintenance and upgrades. We sat off of Lebanon during that period and prepared to "voice our displeasure" at the murder of a US officer kidnapped from a UN peacekeeping force.

I was with 451 on the Coral Maru.

I wish we'd just nuked Beirut to voice our displeasure.

[Vendetta]

Note what this artillery is being used for...
Trench warfare with masses of infantry backed by well hidden AA assets and own mass artillery.
Island campaigns will not have that, no one will bring and then supply such masses of infantry and artillery onto the islands, and if someone does, you suppress their long range systems with precision munitions, sink the supply ships, and let time do the rest.
With smaller islands even hiding the larger, more capable long range systems will be hard.

Two can play at that game of course, which is why I'm skeptical of this concept, at least as they're pitching it. If their boat gets sunk, they're stranded on a tiny island, and if the Chinese are able to contest control of the air and sea effectively, it may be impossible for resupply or rescue to reach them. Without resupply, they quickly exhaust their anti-ship missiles and thereafter become useless. And a few Stinger missiles are not going to be much of a defense if the Chinese start launching long range missiles or sending their own planes to go hammer these islands.

Deploy this same regiment on a large island (like Taiwan proper) where they can have large pre-positioned stocks of supplies and munitions, an IADS to operate under, plenty of room to maneuver and hide in, suddenly this idea seems more sensible.

[David Newton]

China has absolutely no serious capability to operate beyond the first island chain at all. Its navy is green water at best.

[Vendetta]

China has the world's second largest and second strongest navy, by any metric, and the second strongest air force as well. There can be, and there is, of course, a long way between second best and the best. But they are also the world's fastest growing fleet. China in 2023 is much more powerful than China in the early 2010s, orders of magnitude more powerful than the China of the year 2000. The China of 2035 will be much more powerful than the China of today. So any strategy being devised today has to take that into account.

China's navy is only as much a "green water" fleet as the High Seas Fleet was. It's a world class navy, that just happens to be constrained by an even larger world class navy. In tonnage terms, the current PLAAN outweighs the German navy at any point in its history, as well as the French navy, the Italian navy, and even the Imperial Japanese Navy at its peak - all of which were considered major historical naval powers.

Not a force to be dismissed out of hand, even if the US Navy is still the much stronger fleet for now.

[David Newton]

Second largest? Yes. Second strongest? Absolutely not.

Japanese fleet is far more powerful than the Chinese fleet. Royal Navy, Marine Nationale and Indian Navy are more powerful in their ability to operate away from home.

[Vendetta]

Second largest? Yes. Second strongest? Absolutely not.

Japanese fleet is far more powerful than the Chinese fleet. Royal Navy, Marine Nationale and Indian Navy are more powerful in their ability to operate away from home.

By what measure?

The JMSDF has eight big destroyers of the Kongo, Atago, and Maya class, with 96 VLS cells each. The PLAN matches them with seven big Type 055 destroyers with 112 VLS apiece, with an eighth vessel fitting out and orders in place for eight more. Japan has twenty more small destroyers with 32 VLS cells each, the Asahi, Shiranui, Takanami, and Murasame classes, plus eight Asagari class with just an 8 cell Sea Sparrow launcher. China has 25 modern destroyers of the Type 052D class, with at least six more fitting out or under construction - each with 64 VLS cells. It also has fourteen less capable destroyers of the Sovremenny, Type 51C, Type 52B, and Type 052C classes, with 48 VLS cells, a Type 051B with 32 cells, and two Type 052s with 16 cells.

Just counting up VLS cells, the Japanese destroyer fleet has 1,512 of them, and the Chinese fleet has 3,008. If I add up all types of missile fittings, the Japanese have 1,800 and the Chinese have 3,912. The Japanese destroyer fleet is outnumbered by 4 to 3 in ships and outgunned by 2 to 1 in missiles. Beyond destroyers, the JMSDF fields ten frigates and six corvettes. The Chinese have around fifty frigates, seventy corvettes, and over a hundred missile boats. Adding in small vessels only tips the scales further in China's favor, by a very large margin.

The PLAN has two, going on three full sized fleet carriers, with plans to build many more. The JMSDF has none. It has four helicopter carriers, two of which it hopes to retrofit as small VTOL carriers (but hasn't yet). Once more, points in favor of the PLAN.

Perhaps you expect the submarines to make up the difference? Japan's are well-respected designs, considered very advanced, while most of China's are not. Quality is certainly a factor on Japan's side this time. On the other hand, Japan only has 22 submarines, while China has somewhere between 58 and 75, depending on who you ask, and intend to build many more of improved designs in the coming years. Quantity does favor the Chinese again.

On the whole, I'm not seeing how the Japanese fleet is more powerful than the Chinese fleet, let alone far more powerful. That's not even getting into a comparison of their respective air forces, and the impact they would have on a battle at sea. The prevailing estimates right now are that China has over 200 J-20 fighters in service, which thoroughly outclass the JASDF's fourth generation fighters, and continue to build several dozen of them per year. Japan has 123 F-35's on order, of which only a third have been delivered. Maybe you're counting on the F-35 to be a lot better than the J-20, but I don't think one F-35 is a match for seven or eight J-20's. Beyond that, the Chinese have well over 1,000 fourth generation fighters of the J-10 and J-11 families in service, versus a little over 200 Japanese F-15s and F-2s.

In a Sino-Japanese war with no American involvement, the PLAAF could be expected to win control of the skies, giving them a decisive advantage in the war at sea. On top of that, the PLAAF fields over 200 H-6 heavy bombers, many of them equipped to launch anti-ship cruise missiles. They also have the H-20 stealth bomber under development, which will probably begin to arrive in service by the end of the decade. Japan has no bombers and no plans to develop any. China also has the DF-21D and DF-26 ASBMs in their arsenal. Their capabilities have yet to be proven through operational use, but it's another factor to consider. Japan has no comparable weapon in service.

If you disagree with that analysis, what is yours?

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________


As for these other fleets, they're not even worth mentioning. A British Type 45 destroyer, with its 48 VLS cells, is not even in the same class as a Chinese Type 052D with its 64 cells, never mind a Type 055 with 112. The Royal Navy has six destroyers, the Chinese have fifty. European states are not major naval powers anymore, plain and simple. India probably will be one day, but for now, their fleet is not even as strong as Japan's.

I doubt whether the notion that China's fleet is incapable of making expeditionary deployments still holds water in the wake of the massive expansion the PLAN began in the 2010s, which continues unabated to this very moment. Would you be able to list what types of logistical assets necessary to support these types of missions are present in these other navies, but absent in the PLAN?

[James1978]

Second largest? Yes. Second strongest? Absolutely not.

Japanese fleet is far more powerful than the Chinese fleet. Royal Navy, Marine Nationale and Indian Navy are more powerful in their ability to operate away from home.

What metrics are you using to include the Indian Navy as being "more powerful in their ability to operate away from home." than the PLA-N?
A quick glance at the respective number of underway replenishment ships makes me question that proposition.

[Johnnie Lyle]

Second largest? Yes. Second strongest? Absolutely not.

Japanese fleet is far more powerful than the Chinese fleet. Royal Navy, Marine Nationale and Indian Navy are more powerful in their ability to operate away from home.

What metrics are you using to include the Indian Navy as being "more powerful in their ability to operate away from home." than the PLA-N?
A quick glance at the respective number of underway replenishment ships makes me question that proposition.

I suspect it’s less about UNREP and more personnel and especially experience. The Indian Navy has been operating carriers for three generations now, and have slowly built up rather than rapidly expanded.

Vendetta’s response counted hulls and airframes, but hulls and airframes don’t matter much if the officers and senior enlisted don’t know their business. China’s rapid expansion has to be stressing their officer and NCO corps, and putting lots of people into positions they lack the experience for, or crews that are a lot less experienced than their Western counterparts. It’s going to take time to build that tradition, a tradition Western navies take for granted because we’ve been in continuous existence for decades to centuries.

[James1978]

Second largest? Yes. Second strongest? Absolutely not.

Japanese fleet is far more powerful than the Chinese fleet. Royal Navy, Marine Nationale and Indian Navy are more powerful in their ability to operate away from home.

What metrics are you using to include the Indian Navy as being "more powerful in their ability to operate away from home." than the PLA-N?
A quick glance at the respective number of underway replenishment ships makes me question that proposition.

I suspect it’s less about UNREP and more personnel and especially experience. The Indian Navy has been operating carriers for three generations now, and have slowly built up rather than rapidly expanded.

And the relationship between having aircraft carriers for three generations and being "more powerful in their ability to operate away from home." is what exactly?

Last I checked, the PLA-N is deploying small task groups 10,000km from home for 180 days+ at a stretch on a regular basis. Is the Indian Navy doing that?

[Johnnie Lyle]

What metrics are you using to include the Indian Navy as being "more powerful in their ability to operate away from home." than the PLA-N?
A quick glance at the respective number of underway replenishment ships makes me question that proposition.

I suspect it’s less about UNREP and more personnel and especially experience. The Indian Navy has been operating carriers for three generations now, and have slowly built up rather than rapidly expanded.

And the relationship between having aircraft carriers for three generations and being "more powerful in their ability to operate away from home." is what exactly?

Last I checked, the PLA-N is deploying small task groups 10,000km from home for 180 days+ at a stretch on a regular basis. Is the Indian Navy doing that?

Rather depends on what you plan to do with them.

The PLAN has very little actual war fighting experience. They may be deployed from home for half a year, but the purpose is to learn how to do that, not to project power. It certainly doesn’t have the bone deep understanding of what a navy is and how it works that their potential opponents have.

Above all, they are learning, taking advantage of a permissive environment to do so. They’re not really ready yet to tangle with somebody in their own bailiwick.

That’s the big difference between the Indian Navy and the PLAN - the Indians have focused on the Indian Ocean and their ability to operate their naval aviation. They may not be able to go pillage the seas of China, but they will dominate the Chinese if they visit the Indian Ocean.