I think that the 41-For-Freedom fleet is a residue of the original "From the Sea" USN Deterrence Strategy, which was:
3. It is now technologically possible for the United States, at reasonable cost, to remove its nuclear striking forces from within the United States and to deploy them in mobile bases over the far reaches of the uninhabited global seas. The Polaris missile, now full-developed and operational, and soon to have a range up to 2500 miles, is being installed aboard submarines and surface ships. Modern aircraft carriers, the only mobile air bases our Nation has, have been improved tremendously since World War II, and are capable of operating from their decks the most modern, high performance aircraft technology can provide.
These tactically integrated air-missile striking forces, together with modern amphibious forces and defensive forces capable of denying use of the seas to our enemies, provide our Nation with an oceanic maneuvering and battle area over 35 times as extensive as the United States itself. With our nuclear striking forces deployed at sea the enemy will be forced to devote the bulk of his counterforce effort against them, drawing off nuclear strikes which might otherwise be directed against the United States.
4. Nuclear striking forces on the move at sea cannot be targeted in advance. Their reduced vulnerability to quick destruction discourages enemy planning for surprise attack and reduces the need on our part for hair-trigger response and provocative intelligence gathering.
5. Transfer of U.S. nuclear striking power from its present fixed-base emphasis to a more equitable mix of land-based and sea-based systems would require the procurement of the following forces over the next 5 to 10 year period:
24 Attack aircraft carriers
24 Polaris missile cruisers
45 Polaris submarines
6. The attack carriers, the cruisers, and to some extent the submarines, would have additional capabilities such as antisubmarine, antiair, anti-missile, and mobile command capabilities, as well as capabilities necessary for support of limited war and protection of shipping operations. They would be organized, along with other Naval forces, into three basic Fleets -- the Atlantic Fleet, the Pacific Fleet and the Southern Fleet.
7. The Southern Fleet would eventually operate from a broad complex of logistic, operating, and even construction, bases to be developed in such areas as Australia, New Zealand, South America and South Africa -- far removed from the bases of Sino-Soviet military power.
8. Each Fleet would be commanded from a modern, mobile command ship, each of which would be capable of taking command of the other two Fleets, in event any one or both of the others, together with our fixed-base command facilities, had been knocked out.
It makes more sense for a CGN to have Polaris if the missile is 1500 miles range; because:
1.) The CGN can use Talos to shoot down any incoming missiles after the CGN announces to the world that it's started WW3.
2.) Because the CGN doesn't have to counterbalance the expulsion of a Polaris Missile from a SSBN launch tube, which is then flooded with much denser seawater; the CGN can launch it's missiles in much less time than the SSBN.
3.) The CGN is "in touch" more closely with shore based C3I; and can execute it's EWOs almost immediately, none of this "wait for EAMs to come in on very low frequencies, then slowly rise to launch depth to verify EAM" rigamole.
4. Because the CGN has a substantial anti-air battery, it can start launching almost immediately; even if enemy forces are in the region. What does a Polaris SSBN CO do if they raise the ESM mast(s) to get the EAM and the ESM starts spiking with a Soviet radar associated with Maritime Patrol Aircraft within 25 miles of the sub's location? Do they launch then and there and accept certain suicide; or do they delay and hope the MPA flies off?
I think what happened is that the SSBN force was intended to be a "last ditch" ultimate reserve whose only job was to sit and wait, while the actual plan was:
1.) CGN launched Polaris missiles strike enemy SAM sites as defense suppression, opening up the way for:
2.) Carrier launched heavy attack to strike actual targets.
When Heavy Attack from the CVAs died, and when the Polaris Surface Ships did too; the USN had to hurriedly come up with a rationale for SSBNs; which is why a lot of their Pro-Polaris stuff seems so discombolated and out of odds with their prior statements haranguing the USAF from the B-36 hearings over indiscriminate murder from USAF aerial bombardment of urban-industrial areas.
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.
