Balance of Power 1957 (Incomplete)

[MKSheppard]

I don't have the original anymore; just this very cut down text version.

I believe that I only saved Stuart's responses in that thread.

To make up for it, I've appended a thread from another board that ended up discussing Stuart's post; and there's this youtube video I found discussing 1957 by Covert Cabal:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PbD1kEc8WiM

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Seer Stuart

Balance of power; 1957

Sometime earlier we looked at what may have happened in 1957 if the Soviet plans for an attack had gone though. I found the following inventory of strategic forces that might be interesting.

US

4 heavy bomb wings with 127 B-36,
7 heavy bomb wings with 243 B-52
28 Medium bomb wings with 1,285 B-47s
4 strategic recon wings with 216 RB-47s
5 heavy air refuelling squadrons with 24 KC-135
35 air refuelling squadrons with 742 KC-97
3 Atlas-D squadrons with 18 missiles (marginally operational)
5 units with 16 Regulus-1 missiles.

Soviet Union

12 Tu-20 Bear-A
10 M-4 Bison-A
72 Tu-16 Badger-A*
800 Tu-4 Bull**

*Could only reach the US coast on a one-way mission. More probably targeted on the UK

** Copy of US B-29 bomber. Could only reach the US on a one-way mission. Very few of these aircraft (probably no more than 36 - 108 ) were nuclear-capable.

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Seer Stuart

My word yes; the US carriers were very definately integrated into the SIOP for many years (I think from 1953 through to the mid-1960s). They only stopped being so when the Kennedy-Johnson emphasis on conventional warfare put the carriers into that bracket. The problem was that once we have nukes on a ship we have to treat every weapon on the ship as if its a nuke. Thats bad for business.

Primary delivery tools for the carrier-based nukes were first the North American AJ-1 Savage (later the A-2B). By 1957, 64 were in service for the nuclear strike role. They were being replaced by the Douglas A3D-2 (later the A-3B). These were just entering service in 1957, one squadron with 16 aircraft being in full service. On the horizon was the A3J-1 Vigilante that entered service in 1960 and became the A-5A. The A-5A gave the Soviets conniptions; there was no way they could stop it. That was done by teh shift to a conventional role for the carriers

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Seer Stuart

The B-36 remained a swine to intercept right to the end. A combination of altitude and speed gave Soviet fighters fairly marginal performance against it. Add to the fact it was bristling with radar controlled 20mm guns and flew in formations of three (called Hometown with the arcs of fire interlocking). It was really SAMs that spelt the end for the aluminum overcast rather than fighters. For most of the 1950s, B-36s were wandering all over the Soviet Union almost at will without too much risk. A few were shot down but not many.

A lot of what happened is still classified but some details have been released in recent years. Basically RB-36 bombers did penetration recon missions over the Soviet Union froma round 1952/53 through to 1957. They stayed away from heavily defended areas (they were covered by RB-45s and RB-57s) but could enter via the Arctic and then wander almost at will. Once through the border defenses, there was virtually no way the Soviets could track them. They were primarily taking details of radar and radio transmissions, monitoring how the Soviet fighter intercept systems worked and plotting how and when the Soviets reacted to them. As long as the Soviets were using First generation jets (YaK-23s, MiG-15s and MiG-9s etc), the RB-36s were safe unless they were unlucky. Their most important role was taking radar pictures of potential targets so bombers doing strikes would know what the radar image of the target would look like.

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Seer Stuart

Eisenhower's basic concept was that any confrontation between the superpowers would eventually go nuclear and there was no plausible intermediate stage between no-nukes and a full strategic exchange. In short, once one nuke was used, they all would be and that escalation was very fast. IMNVHO this was perfectly correct. I've seen conflict simulations and crisis management simulations run many times (even bene in a few myself) and they have NEVER stopped with the exchange of just a few weapons or one being fired to send a message and everybody backing down. One fired all fired; it always happened that way.

Therefore the policy was to deter the enemy from taking the first step that would start the chain leading to the holocaust. If the US Army was weak, it could only resist an attack using nuclear weapons and that would start the holocaust. So any attack on the US Army meant the holocaust so the Soviets wouldn't do it. On the other hand a strong US Army offered the possibility that somebody would think they could fight a conventional war that wouldn't go nuclear. Eisenhower didn't believe that could happen and a conventional war between the superpowers would inevitably go nuclear. So a weak US Army was better than a strong one. There were a lot of economic factors built in there as well.

We know now that the US position was much stronger than it seemed but it wasn't so obvious then. On paper the Russian bomber force is quite impressive; especially when we realize the US assumed that the Tu-4s had been built for nuclear delivery and were closer to a B-50 than a B-29 (in fact they were substantially inferior in terms of range and payload to a B-29). What the US policy makers did realize was that economically they were vastly stronger than the Soviets so all they had to do was to contain the USSR until its economy collapsed. Kennan came up with that idea and, extracting the hiatus of the 1960s and 1970s, it worked.

Remember strategic paralysis. The effect that nuclear weapons have on decision making. That makes it very difficult to undertake any active initiatives in the presence of nuclear weapons for fear of where those intiatives might lead. The beauty of containment was that it didn't need any initiatives; it worked quite well without any.

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Unknown

Amen...... Brave men who were lost fighting a battle whose existance was never admitted. Its fairly certain there were survivors from some of the RB-50 and RB-36 crews who spent the rest of their lives in captivity in the Soviet Union; I can't help but feel I would rather have ridden the bomber in.

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Seer Stuart

The coup that deposed Khruschev was largely a product of the failure of his strategic missile programs. He promised a defense policy that cut back on conventional arms and their supporting infrastructure in favor of strategic nuclear weapons - then failed to deliver the nukes. He was deposed by a cabal that was founded on a deal - the military would put Brezhnev into power if Brezhnev gave the military a free hand in procuremen

That translated to the Military buying more of everything regardless of relative cost-effectiveness. They had no means of measuring cost in their economy (a Su-27 "cost the same" as a YaK-30 basic trainer) so there was no way of measuring what the costs of the military built up was. They bought everything they wanted and the civilian sector had to supply it. As a result, all the slack and unused capacity in their economy and most of the civilian capacity went into supportinga large conventional military and a large strategic force. That left nothing to reply to the Reagan offensive of the mid-1980s and the crippled economy couldn't take the strain. Gorbachev tried to buy time to modernize the economy to cope with the increased demands of precision weapons and SDI (thats what Glasnost and Perestroika was) but in doing so he tore down the things that made the Command economy work.

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How effective was the Soviet nuclear arsenal during that [Cuban Missle Crisis, 1962] period?

Deployable against the United States? Virtually nil.

Their ICBM was the R-7, a missile that had a detectable reaction time of 20 hours (the detection bit was in the hands of the U-2 and some other assets). By 1961, the R-7 force had grown enormously from its initila deployment level in 1959. By the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis there were no fewer than six R-7s in service. The follow-on to the R-7 didn't enter service until after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The Soviet bomber force had also changed dramatically since its early days in the 1950s. The most effective weapon the Russian Air Force had was the Tu-95M/Kh-20 combination. There were 15 of these in service by the time Cuba boiled. Unfortunately, they'd have to fly through the NORAD air defense system for two hours before getting to a release point. There were also 25 free-fall Tu-95 bombers and 50 Myaschiev bombers but they were regarded as beinge asy meat for fighters and the Myaschievs were already being relegated to tanker work.

The Russians didn't have any seaborne ballistic nukes; the subs were so unreliable the missiles had explosive warheads. The cruise-missile carrying subs didn't have the range to get over the atlantic; they were tasked against European targets only. The Russians were so desperate they seriously planned nuclear delivery by firing nuclear tipped torpedoes into US ports.

By way of comparison, the US had 1 heavy bomb wing with 45 B-52 aircraft, two with 30 B-52s each and eight with 15 B-52s each, 22 Heavy Strategic Wings with 15 B-52s each and three heavy aerospace wings with a total of 75 B-52s (for a total of 630 B-52s with 547 Hound Dog missiles) 17 medium bomb wings with 45 B-47s each and 3 medium aerospace wings also with 45 B-47s each (for a total of 900 B-47s) to which we should also add 144 Atlas ICBMs, 62 Titan 1s and 20 Minutemen

We shouldn't forget the Navy of course; they brought 144 dedicated carrier-based nuclear strike aircraft and four SSBNs with 64 missiles to the party.

By my maths that gives the US a total of 1,674 nuclear strike aircraft and 290 missiles against 100 Soviet bombers and six missiles.

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From another Board:

I didn't know the US had such overwhelming superiority over the Soviets in terms of nuclear capabilities. Was this fact known to American government and military leaders during 1953, 1957, and 1962? Or did they believe Soviet propaganda inflating the quality and quantity of the Soviet nuclear arsenal?

I didn't know the US had such overwhelming superiority over the Soviets in terms of nuclear capabilities. Was this fact known to American government and military leaders during 1953, 1957, and 1962? Or did they believe Soviet propaganda inflating the quality and quantity of the Soviet nuclear arsenal?

The situation was, for what it is worth, completely reversed by the 1980s--the Soviets had systematic superiourity to us in every single area in that period, and they even had a reasonably effective ABM capability through illegal enhancements to their nuclear-tipped SAMs. If we had fought WWIII in 1986, the Soviets would have won, fullstop.

However, before 1969, when the Soviet computerized, integrated air defense and launch-response network came on, the USA would have won any war against the Soviets hands-down with basically no damage to the continental USA at all, though Europe would have been pasted.

We didn't know this, however; the Soviets were quite good at convincing otherwise, as it gave them a stronger hand on the world stage.

The situation was, for what it is worth, completely reversed by the 1980s--the Soviets had systematic superiourity to us in every single area in that period

More like very rough parity... Our ABM was not enough to hold over the strike. And why didn't you raise a fuss about our "illegal" nuclear ABMs if they were illegal? Didn't you pursue a similar program once?

If we had fought WWIII in 1986, the Soviets would have won, fullstop.

No, both would've been very dead. We would've "won" only in the sense that we would have reduced a First World nation to cinders and you only destroyed a Second World one.

We didn't know this, however

Dunno. The nuclear planning documents from the US (including teh "gaze ya from the earth!" plans) does not indicate a lack of knowledge about the USSR; though I'm sure Stuart could weigh on this.

The situation was, for what it is worth, completely reversed by the 1980s--the Soviets had systematic superiourity to us in every single area in that period

More like very rough parity... Our ABM was not enough to hold over the strike. And why didn't you raise a fuss about our "illegal" nuclear ABMs if they were illegal? Didn't you pursue a similar program once?

While Reagan initiated research with SDI, he never actually deployed any systems (though it was clearly intended to, at which point he would've been forced to withdraw from the treaty, as Bush did). The hue and cry over the Soviet system was that it was already deployed. As for effectiveness, anything except Moscow's dedicated system was of questionable use, but probably could bag an few RVs here and there.

The main issue was Soviet air-defense, which was more more comprehensive than its American counterpart. Sending in B-52Hs at low level, even nuking their way through and taking out C4ISR nodes, does not exactly inspire confidence.

Dunno. The nuclear planning documents from the US (including teh "gaze ya from the earth!" plans) does not indicate a lack of knowledge about the USSR; though I'm sure Stuart could weigh on this.

I don't have it on me right now, but I remember reading Dropshot, and it consistently overestimated both Soviet air-defenses and strategic strike capability.

The hue and cry over the Soviet system was that it was already deployed.

You had an opportunity to deploy one too; the treaty allowed for one system. And I know Reagan's SDI was bullshit to the core and nothing was deployed, the thing just being a financial hole.

The main issue was Soviet air-defense, which was more more comprehensive than its American counterpart.

Well, our air offense wasn't as powerful as yours too

I remember reading Dropshot, and it consistently overestimated both Soviet air-defenses and strategic strike capability

I thought it was just making some unrealistic projections; usually those plans had a "go-ahead" date for the proposed conflict, to simulate the enemy's nuclear force development for some term.

The hue and cry over the Soviet system was that it was already deployed.

You had an opportunity to deploy one too; the treaty allowed for one system. And I know Reagan's SDI was bullshit to the core and nothing was deployed, the thing just being a financial hole.

Marina wasn't referring to the Moscow system, but rather the many S-200 batteries tied into a battle-management system capable of engaging incoming RVs.

But that system was aimed at high probability kills of <2000 and <3500 kph targets.

The situation was, for what it is worth, completely reversed by the 1980s--the Soviets had systematic superiourity to us in every single area in that period

More like very rough parity... Our ABM was not enough to hold over the strike. And why didn't you raise a fuss about our "illegal" nuclear ABMs if they were illegal? Didn't you pursue a similar program once?

If we had fought WWIII in 1986, the Soviets would have won, fullstop.

No, both would've been very dead. We would've "won" only in the sense that we would have reduced a First World nation to cinders and you only destroyed a Second World one.

We didn't know this, however

Dunno. The nuclear planning documents from the US (including teh "gaze ya from the earth!" plans) does not indicate a lack of knowledge about the USSR; though I'm sure Stuart could weigh on this.

The Soviet Union, despite having a larger population than the USA, would have suffered half as many casualties in a 1980s nuclear exchange than the USA, and would have lost maybe a third as much of its industry as we would, due not only to American targeting plans but due to the inherent weakness of our attack compared with your's, and due to your ability to systematically intercept all of our bombers while still leaving over the nuclear tipped SA-10s and the SA-12s that had intrinsic anti-missile capabilities.

I say illegal because it was banned by the treaty; I however compliment you on having deployed some 15,000 of them, because I would not want to see more people killed in a nuclear war, and find anti-missile defences fundamentally humanitarian. So, I was not trying to criticize the USSR in any way; I believe it was a testament to your systematic development of capability that your nation was far more survivable than our's in the Cold War, and that you took defence seriously instead of playing games with it like we did.

Was this fact known to American government and military leaders during 1953, 1957, and 1962?

Yes, it was. Eisenhower did not make a big deal of this fact however, on the grounds that publicly embarrassing the Soviets over their strategic inferiority might make them do something irrational (though it was always assumed they would catch up eventually). JFK, on the other hand blatantly lied about Soviet nuclear capabilities (remember the "missile gap?") to help him win the 1960 election, which convinced the Soviets that he was a dangerous fanatic who wanted to launch a first strike, likely contributing to their decision to deploy missiles in Cuba.

Yes, it was. Eisenhower did not make a big deal of this fact however, on the grounds that publicly embarrassing the Soviets over their strategic inferiority might make them do something irrational (though it was always assumed they would catch up eventually).

IIRC, the next stage of the plan was to finish up the US air-defense system and then implement the missile defenses right at the time the USSR was beginning its own strategic buildup. Continued development of other strategic weapons systems (i.e. B-70) would have put further pressure on the USSR.

JFK, on the other hand blatantly lied about Soviet nuclear capabilities (remember the "missile gap?") to help him win the 1960 election, which convinced the Soviets that he was a dangerous fanatic who wanted to launch a first strike, likely contributing to their decision to deploy missiles in Cuba.

Kennedy's poor showing at Vienna probably didn't help matters, either.

The Soviet Union, despite having a larger population than the USA, would have suffered half as many casualties in a 1980s nuclear exchange than the USA, and would have lost maybe a third as much of its industry as we would, due not only to American targeting plans but due to the inherent weakness of our attack compared with your's, and due to your ability to systematically intercept all of our bombers while still leaving over the nuclear tipped SA-10s and the SA-12s that had intrinsic anti-missile capabilities.

Wait, what? How did you compute that? And we had less industry to begin with; sparse populations, larger territories. And "the ability to systematically intercept all bombers"? Aren't you wanking our SAMs too much?

And it's ABM capabilities were complimentary really; the SAM and ABM function on different principles as Stuart mentioned many times; ABM and ASAT are more similar.

We also had (and still have) drills in case of nuclear attack, maintain at least around 50% of the shelters (many of them are slowly being restored after the 1991-2001 hiatus) for urban zones. Hell, we could've bankrupted our economy since we built so many nuclear shelters it's not even funny; city construction normatives, even for a small town, included them obligatory and in large numbers. Of course this would increase survivability too.

Yes, we took our defense a little more seriously instead of publishing "duck and cover", that I give you indeedy

Wait, what? How did you compute that? And we had less industry to begin with; sparse populations, larger territories. And "the ability to systematically intercept all bombers"? Aren't you wanking our SAMs too much?

Indeed, and the idea of 15,000 nuclear-tipped quasi ABM/SAMs? That seems absurdly high. How many S-200s and S-300s did the PVO deploy in total?

Wait, what? How did you compute that? And we had less industry to begin with; sparse populations, larger territories. And "the ability to systematically intercept all bombers"? Aren't you wanking our SAMs too much?

Indeed, and the idea of 15,000 nuclear-tipped quasi ABM/SAMs? That seems absurdly high. How many S-200s and S-300s did the PVO deploy in total?

In 1986 the Soviets had 10,212 offensively tasked strategic nuclear warheads. They had about 22,000 tactical nuclear warheads. Their total warhead strength was 45,000 warheads, and 51% were identified as being strategic.

That means there are around 12,000 nuclear warheads for strategic purposes that were not offensively tasked.

12,000 defensively tasked strategic nukes--i.e., SAM and ABM warheads. We know, after all, that the SA-10 / SA-12 had in total about 15,000 deployed (the numbers for the SA-10 alone were 10,000 in the early 1980s), and at the very least a very large number of these must have nuclear-tipped.

This is scarcely a large number; the USA planned 15,000 nuclear-tipped Nike-Hercules and 10,500 of the more advanced nuclear-tipped Nike-Zeus in the early 60's, with the programme intended to reach fruition by the mid-70s.

We know, after all, that the SA-10 / SA-12 had in total about 15,000 deployed (the numbers for the SA-10 alone were 10,000 in the early 1980s), and at the very least a very large number of these must have nuclear-tipped.

No, you compute wrongly. Only S-200M "Vega-M" and S-200D "Dubna" had nuclear payloads. In fact S-200M "Vega-M" arrived only post 1970 and S-200D only arrived in 1976.

Then - what the hell is "total deployment"? You know full well that the peak number of actively deployed S-200 systems was 130 sites and 1,950 launchers in mid-1980s - and not all of them (though by that time probably most) were of the Dubna and Vega variety.

So in short, your numbers are totally wrong. Total deployed over the years from 1967 to 1991 is not the number of units deployed at any given time, and the first "many thousands" of such units produced were not nuclear-tipped.

Was this fact known to American government and military leaders during 1953, 1957, and 1962?

Yes, it was. Eisenhower did not make a big deal of this fact however, on the grounds that publicly embarrassing the Soviets over their strategic inferiority might make them do something irrational (though it was always assumed they would catch up eventually). JFK, on the other hand blatantly lied about Soviet nuclear capabilities (remember the "missile gap?") to help him win the 1960 election, which convinced the Soviets that he was a dangerous fanatic who wanted to launch a first strike, likely contributing to their decision to deploy missiles in Cuba.

According to Norman Friedman, Khrushcev thought that there were two dominant strains in US strategic thinking - those prepared to compromise and fanatics looking to destroy the Soviet Union. Kennedy was seen as being someone who could be manipulated by both camps rather than an outright member of either.

Numbers for S-200M Vega-M and the successor system S-200D Dubna nuclear warheads, IOC 1971 and 1978 accordingly, from Robert Johnston listing:
S-200M Vega-M 700 to 1000
S-200D Dubna 200 - 1000
Considering peak S-200 deployment in 1985 with 1950-2030 S-200 units, even if they all were of the Vega-M and Dubna variety, there's hardly anywhere close to the 15,000 claimed.

The math with nuclear warheads in the USSR is also striking me as wrong. In 1985, the USSR had 10012 strategically tasked warheads. Not "offensively". The 45,000 number probably includes tons of reserve warheads lying on military bases and so on.

The USSR did NOT count ABM warheads as strategic - they were tac nukes (and also fell under liquidation hammer). The numbers are below:

The post-Soviet liquidation of tacnukes treaty exposed teh number of tac nukes:

http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/NSNW_print_v2d.pdf
RAN issue on de-armament

The USSR had 21700 tacnukes, 6700 for the Army, 7000 for Front Aviation, 5000 in the Navy and 3000 tacnukes in the PVO (air defense).

Considering the number of active S-200 complexes is even less than the number of tactical nukes available to the PVO,

Yes, it was. Eisenhower did not make a big deal of this fact however, on the grounds that publicly embarrassing the Soviets over their strategic inferiority might make them do something irrational (though it was always assumed they would catch up eventually). JFK, on the other hand blatantly lied about Soviet nuclear capabilities (remember the "missile gap?") to help him win the 1960 election

Actually, no.

The intelligence that the Soviets were actually far far behind us in all types of strategic weaponry (Bombers, missiles) was a closely held national secret; with only Ike and the top military leaders knowing about it.

Why?

Because it was being gathered by the highly secret U-2 program which was overflying Russia at the time. (and possibly by even more secret and dangerous RB-36 overflights of Siberia - which can be inferred from by the Soviet emphasis on heavy long ranged interceptors for Siberia)

Saying publically that the Soviets have no missiles would lead to the question:

"Bulls--t. Where's this information coming from?"

from Congress and everyone else; and to make it credible, you have to announce the fact that yes, you've been violating Russian Airspace with the U-2, which is going to be politically explosive both domestically and internationally.

Just after Kennedy won the election, he tasked "Strange' to go study the U-2 photographs from the overflights (since the Kennedy gang was now the president elect gang, they now could get clearance); and of course Strange comes to the same conclusion that Ike did - that the missile gap was all made up.

EDIT: And yes, I know the U-2 was shot down in May 1960 or thereabouts, but Kennedy didn't become POTUS Elect until November 1960; and it's not like the full extent of what we got from the U-2 overflights of Russia immediately became declassified information when Francis Gary Powers showed up on Moscow TV.

Wait, what?

They flew strategic nuclear bombers over Siberia?

There's never been any hard evidence to back this up, but if you read Yefim Gordon's "Red Star" series monograph on Russian Heavy Jet Interceptors from Midland press; you'll see that the Soviets were constantly pressuring and agitating for a heavy interceptor specifically to defend Siberia; which makes you wonder what was going on there.

Hrm... that makes Russia's dickery with their Tu-95s more understandable, now that it seems that they were the ones who got dicked first.

On the night of April 29, 1954; several USAF RB-45Cs fly over Moscow. Technically, they weren't USAF aircraft, because at the time, they were being flown by RAF crews.

In May 1955, six RB-47s flew straight past the Urals mountain and into the Soviet heartland,

In May 1956, three RB-57s did a simultaneously overflight of Vladviostock, getting us holiday snaps from 3 different directions.

And here's a Story from a RB-47 crewmember:

http://www.rb-29.net/HTML/31HAustinB-47/31harb-47.htm

By this time, we had covered two more major airfield targets near Arkhangelsk and were turning to the Southwest toward our last two targets. We had been over Soviet territory an hour and were at 40,000 feet. We had been briefed by Intel that the Mig-15 would not be able to do any damage to us at 40,000 feet with our true air speed on the order of 440 knots.

Well, you can imagine what we called those Intelligence weenies as the first Soviet Mig-17, not Mig-15, made a firing pass on us from the left rear, and we saw cannon tracer shells going both above and below our aircraft. And, the Mig was still moving out rather smartly as he passed under us in front. So enough of this 40,000 feet stuff, I pushed the RB-47 over, descending a couple of thousand feet picking up about 20 knots indicated airspeed in the process. The second Mig-17 made his firing pass and I don’t care who knows, it was scary watching tracers go over and under our aircraft. This guy had almost come up our tailpipes.

Fortunately, when the third Mig started his pursuit pass, our guns burped for a couple of seconds. General LeMay did not believe in tracers for our guns, but the Soviet pilots must have seen something because the third guy broke off his pass and the flight of six, and the next flight which joined us later, stayed out about 30 to 40 degrees to side, out of the effective envelope of our guns. Of course, the Migs didn’t know that our guns would not fire again, even though the Co-pilot pleaded, and I believe he did, at least, kick the panel trying to get them to work.

The fourth Mig of this flight made a firing pass and made a lucky hit through the top of our left wing, about 8 feet from the fuselage through the wing flap. It exploded into the fuselage in the area of the #1 main tank and knocked out our intercom. We felt a good whap and all three of us were a little bit anxious (scared) but doing our mission as briefed, basically because of habit. I firmly believe that’s what good, tough, LeMay-type, SAC training did for his combat crews. Later we also found out, it hit our UHF radio in a way that it would not channelize but was stuck on channel 13, our command post common.

By now we had covered our last photo target and had turned due west toward Finland to get the hell out of there. That flight of six ran out of range I guess and, we were near the Finland border. Real soon another three Migs showed up. Two Migs of this flight made individual firing passes but our added speed obviously made it a bit tougher or I am pretty sure I would not be here writing about this mission today. After those two made passes, on of the Migs came up on our right side, close enough to shake hands and sat there for two or three minutes. Two more Migs tried firing passes, but without hitting us, by this time we were well out of Soviet territory. At the debriefing in Omaha, General LeMay asked, ?Why were you not shot down?? My answer was that there was no doubt in my mind the Mig-17 pilots could have shot us down, if they had been willing to come right up our tailpipes! He made a statement that he was “convinced that most fighter pilots are basically cowards anyway.” General LeMay also said, “There are probably several openings today in command positions there, since you were not shot down.”

Our excitement for this mission was not over. An airborne stand-by KC-97 tanker was holding for us about 50 miles from Stavanger, Norway. We really weren’t sure how the damage to our left wing and fuselage would effect fuel consumption. Initially it didn’t look that bad. As we came into radio range of our airborne tanker I heard him calling (garbled) in the blind on command post common, the only working part of our UHF radio. We were running about 30 minutes behind schedule; I heard the tanker state he was leaving the orbit area at the appointed time. I tried to acknowledge his call but he later said he never heard me transmit anything. Of course they had not been briefed on our mission, but were aware that three B-47’s went through refueling areas that morning and only two had returned.

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2025 Edit: I found out about this overflight involving a B-36J-III:

http://www.zianet.com/tmorris/b36.html

Aircrews were designated featherweight or standard, reflecting the crew complement required by the Emergency War Order (EWO) aircraft assignment. Our aircrew, S-02, was assigned B-36J-75 (III) number 52-2821. The (III) denoted featherweight, and our crew was manned accordingly. Aircraft 52-2821 was the sixth from the last of 383 B/RB-36 aircraft produced by Convair between 1946-1954.

...

Many interesting missions were flown during the typical deployment. During the 6th BW(H) 1955 90 day rotational deployment to Guam, aircrew S-02 was assigned an upper-air sampling mission over the Siberian Sea and northern Russia. Special equipment was installed into the forward bomb bays, with various probes extending into the slip stream through specially modified bomb bay doors. After a 20 plus hour mission, much of it above 35,000 on oxygen, we landed for special debriefings and postflight servicing at Misawa AB on northern Honshu Island, Japan.

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Even if there was a thwarted flyby or provocation, I'm sure USSR would get all up in arms about it. I don't know about RB-36 flybys (there are lots of PVO operators and they readily tell about even more recent flyovers, but no info on RB-36 flybys has surfaced so far which is why I conclude that looks more like a legend).

The intelligence that the Soviets were actually far far behind us in all types of strategic weaponry (Bombers, missiles) was a closely held national secret

Of course. Else you'd embarrass yourselves, but also totally prove there's no "misile gap" and that shit Kennedy's been peddling. Your leaders knew all that but you just chose to keep the sheeple in the dark. Neither did you seriously explain how badly you outclassed us even after we downed a U-2, nor after the CMC.

don't know about RB-36 flybys (there are lots of PVO operators and they readily tell about even more recent flyovers, but no info on RB-36 flybys has surfaced so far which is why I conclude that looks more like a legend).

It's quite possible that RB-36 Featherweights were used on shallow coastal flyovers of your siberian coastline; at the 50,000 foot photographic altitude of a RB-36, you can see 270~ miles into Russia; which should be sufficient to map the exterior air defenses of the Siberian coastline, which means that you can stay in "international waters" 12 miles from the Russian Coastline, and still see far in.

Of course. Else you'd embarrass yourselves, but also totally prove there's no "misile gap" and that shit Kennedy's been peddling.

It wasn't just Kennedy who was peddling that stuff; it was a LOT of other people who were in hysterics over the Red Menace.

Your leaders knew all that but you just chose to keep the sheeple in the dark.

Ike really took a lot of flak and got blamed for "losing our strategic superiority" to "teh Reds" from all sides during that period, and while he could have released all that information to save political face; he didn't, which I have to give him credit for.

Neither did you seriously explain how badly you outclassed us even after we downed a U-2, nor after the CMC.

*shrugs* I dunno?

We know, after all, that the SA-10 / SA-12 had in total about 15,000 deployed (the numbers for the SA-10 alone were 10,000 in the early 1980s), and at the very least a very large number of these must have nuclear-tipped.

No, you compute wrongly. Only S-200M "Vega-M" and S-200D "Dubna" had nuclear payloads. In fact S-200M "Vega-M" arrived only post 1970 and S-200D only arrived in 1976.

Then - what the hell is "total deployment"? You know full well that the peak number of actively deployed S-200 systems was 130 sites and 1,950 launchers in mid-1980s - and not all of them (though by that time probably most) were of the Dubna and Vega variety.

So in short, your numbers are totally wrong. Total deployed over the years from 1967 to 1991 is not the number of units deployed at any given time, and the first "many thousands" of such units produced were not nuclear-tipped.

Well, since I don't doubt you, it's probable that the sources I'm going by quoted numbers that were from Team B, i.e., they're what Paul Nitze convinced the Reagan administration that you had.

Well, since I don't doubt you, it's probable that the sources I'm going by quoted numbers that were from Team B.

Quite probable. It was enough to even hear that the unit was tested in ABM capability to get uppity I guess. In 1985-91, nuclear stockpiles were counted and... well, I already detailed the results.

About the destruction of industry however... even the destruction of half our industry and urban centers with housing would prove disastrous since Russia has very harsh climate conditions.

Let's say it that way, the US can devolve to tribes with sticks and still have good natural conditions. In Russia, destruction would lead to a more massive dieoff.

Even if there was a thwarted flyby or provocation, I'm sure USSR would get all up in arms about it. I don't know about RB-36 flybys (there are lots of PVO operators and they readily tell about even more recent flyovers, but no info on RB-36 flybys has surfaced so far which is why I conclude that looks more like a legend).

They might not have been sure of their purpose. The US and the Shah collaborated on overflights in the '70s using RF-4Cs and when one got knocked down (a MiG-21 pilot rammed it), the crew claimed they had been on a navigation mission and got lost....and the Soviets believed them, because they were released relatively quickly.