Command Posts - Hunter or Hunted, with Lt Col. Matt. Arrol, U.S.A. - on Midrats

[jemhouston]

https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/co ... dium=email

Command Posts - Hunter or Hunted, with Lt Col. Matt. Arrol, U.S.A. - on Midrats
precision fires goes both ways

CDR SALAMANDER
APR 29, 2023

For generations, the US military’s senior leadership in the field had no reason to worry about being on the receiving end of enemy fires at their command posts. Even at the company level but especially at higher echelons, we expected that we would be safe and secure in our command posts. Command posts were where one watched, planned, and executed operations – not become player in one.

One of the defining characteristics early in the Russo-Ukrainian War was the high loss rate of Russian General Officers from enemy action. Part of this was due to the top-down traditions in the Russian Army that required direct, forward, and in person direction and guidance – but a significant part of that was the Ukrainian military’s reaching out to eliminate senior leadership where they led the fight - their command posts.

As precision long range conventional fires and the ISR that supports them become more common on even the most primitive battlefield, is it time for the USA and her allies to reconsider their own reliance on large, static, and “noisy” command posts?

Using an article he co-authored in the March issue of the US Army’s “Military Review” titled “The Graveyard of Command Posts” as a starting point for our conversation, our guest this Sunday for the full hour will be Lt. Col. Matthew R. Arrol, U.S. Army, commandant of the U.S. Army Joint Support Team at Hurlburt Field, Florida.

He is a contributing member of NATO’s Integrated Capabilities Group on Indirect Fire. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, and his civil schooling includes a bachelor’s degree in history and political science from Michigan State University and an MBA from Eastern Michigan University. His most recent operational assignment was as the deputy commanding officer of the 19th Battlefield Coordination Detachment in Ramstein, Germany, where he served from 2016 to 2020. Previous tactical assignments include battalion operations officer and executive officer, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment; and G-5 fires planner, 1st Cavalry Division.

Join us live if you can, o you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here. You can find us on almost all your most popular podcast aggregators as well.

[OSCSSW]

https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/co ... dium=email

Command Posts - Hunter or Hunted, with Lt Col. Matt. Arrol, U.S.A. - on Midrats
precision fires goes both ways

CDR SALAMANDER
APR 29, 2023

For generations, the US military’s senior leadership in the field had no reason to worry about being on the receiving end of enemy fires at their command posts. Even at the company level but especially at higher echelons, we expected that we would be safe and secure in our command posts. Command posts were where one watched, planned, and executed operations – not become player in one.

One of the defining characteristics early in the Russo-Ukrainian War was the high loss rate of Russian General Officers from enemy action. Part of this was due to the top-down traditions in the Russian Army that required direct, forward, and in person direction and guidance – but a significant part of that was the Ukrainian military’s reaching out to eliminate senior leadership where they led the fight - their command posts.

As precision long range conventional fires and the ISR that supports them become more common on even the most primitive battlefield, is it time for the USA and her allies to reconsider their own reliance on large, static, and “noisy” command posts?



Using an article he co-authored in the March issue of the US Army’s “Military Review” titled “The Graveyard of Command Posts” as a starting point for our conversation, our guest this Sunday for the full hour will be Lt. Col. Matthew R. Arrol, U.S. Army, commandant of the U.S. Army Joint Support Team at Hurlburt Field, Florida.

He is a contributing member of NATO’s Integrated Capabilities Group on Indirect Fire. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, and his civil schooling includes a bachelor’s degree in history and political science from Michigan State University and an MBA from Eastern Michigan University. His most recent operational assignment was as the deputy commanding officer of the 19th Battlefield Coordination Detachment in Ramstein, Germany, where he served from 2016 to 2020. Previous tactical assignments include battalion operations officer and executive officer, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment; and G-5 fires planner, 1st Cavalry Division.

Join us live if you can, o you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here. You can find us on almost all your most popular podcast aggregators as well.

Your post got me to thinking, always a bad thing.

US admiral KIA : WW II Kidd, USS Callaghan, USS Chandler and USS Scott.
US Admiral KIA in Korea 0
US Admiral KIA in Vietnam War 0

FYI May 12, 1970, when Maj. Gen. John A.B. Dillard Jr. and nine others boarded a Huey helicopter for a mission in the Central Highlands of Vietnam

Worley. Robert F. Worley (October 10, 1919 – July 23, 1968) was a United States Air Force major general and fighter pilot who was killed in action in 1968, in South Vietnam.

Looks like US Army and USAF Generals were far more likely to be KIA

World War II

Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd (U.S Navy)

Commander, Battleship Division One. Killed December 7, 1941 aboard USS ARIZONA (BB-39) during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions.

Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan (U.S. Navy)

Commander, Task Group 67.4. Killed November 13, 1942 aboard USS SAN FRANCISCO (CA-38) at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions.

Rear Admiral Norman Scott (U.S. Navy)

Commander Task Group 67.2. Killed November 13, 1942 aboard USS ATLANTA (CL-51) at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions.

Brigadier General Guy O. Fort (U.S. Army)

Commanding General, 81st Philippine Division. Nothing more is known of Fort’s death, only that he was captured, tortured, and executed by the Japanese in 1942.

Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews (U.S. Army)

Supreme Commander of all U.S. Forces in the ETO. Killed May 3, 1943 in a B-24 Liberator crash on Iceland.

Brigadier General Charles Henry Barth, Jr. (U.S. Army)

Chief of Staff U.S. Forces in the ETO. Killed May 3, 1943 in a B-24 Liberator crash on Iceland.

Brigadier General Charles L. Keerans, Jr. (U.S. Army)

Assistant Division Commander, 101st 82nd Airborne Division. MIA June 11, 1943, later declared dead, when his stick was shot down by friendly fire.

Major General William Peterkin Upshur (U.S. Marine Corps)

Commanding General, Department of the Pacific, U.S. Marine Corps. Killed July 21, 1943 in an aircraft crash near Sitka, Alaska, while on an inspection tour of his command. Awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions as a captain during the 1915 Haitian campaign.

Major General Charles Dodson Barrett (U.S. Marine Corps)

Commanding General, I Marine Amphibious Corps. Died October 8, 1943, following a fall from the second-floor porch of his quarters at Noumea, New Caledonia.

Brigadier General Don F. Pratt (U.S. Army)

Assistant Division Commander, 101st Airborne Division. Killed June 6, 1944 when he was crushed by cargo that had broken its moorings when the glider landed.

Major General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. (U.S. Army)

Commanding General, 90th Division. Died June 12, 1944 of a heart attack the day of his appointment as CG 90th. As Deputy Commanding General, 4th Infantry, awarded the Medal of Honor for his leadership on Utah Beach.

Lieutenant General Leslie J. McNair (U.S. Army)

Commanding General, Army Ground Forces. Killed June 25, 1944 near St Lô, during a pre-attack bombardment by Eight Air Force strategic bombers.

Brigadier General James Edward Wharton (U.S. Army)

Commanding General, 28th Infantry Division. Killed August 12, 1944 by German Sniper while at a regimental command post near Sourdeval, Normandy, France, after being in command of the division for less than 24 hours.

Brigadier General Vicente Lim (U.S. Army)

Commanding General, 41st Philippine Division. Native Filipino, survived the Death March, released by the Japanese, joined the resistance, captured, tortured and executed by the Japanese.

Brigadier General James R. Anderson (U.S. Army)

Chief of Staff (Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Area). MIA and presumed dead February 25, 1945 when his B-24 disappeared between Kwajalein Island and Hawaii.

Lieutenant General Millard Fillmore Harmon, Jr. (U.S. Army Air Force)

Commanding General, Task Force 93 (Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Area). MIA and presumed dead February 25, 1945 when his B-24 disappeared between Kwajalein Island and Hawaii.

Major General Edwin Davies Patrick (U.S. Army)

Commanding General, 6th Infantry Division. Mortally wounded in action on March 14, 1945 by Japanese machine-gun fire while at a regimental forward command post on the island of Luzon, Philippine Islands.

Brigadier General Gustav J. Braun, Jr. (U.S. Army)

Assistant Division Commander, 34th Division. Killed March 17, 1945, shot down by enemy gunfire while flying in a light aircraft on reconnaissance.

Major General Maurice Rose (U.S. Army)

Commanding General, 3d Armored Division. Killed March 30, 1945 near Paderborn by a German tank commander while his jeep was attempting to pass through a German tank column.

Colonel William Orlando Darby (approved by Congress for promotion to Brigadier General before death) (U.S. Army)

Assistant Division Commander, 10th Mountain Division. Killed by artillery fire on April 30, 1945. Earlier he had led U.S. Army Rangers during combat operations in Sicily and Italy.

Brigadier General James Leo Dalton II (U.S. Army)

Assistant Division Commander, 25th Infantry Division. Killed by a Japanese sniper during the Battle of Balete Pass, Luzon, Philippine Islands on May 16, 1945.

Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. (U.S. Army)

Commanding General, Tenth Army. Killed June 18, 1945 by direct fire artillery while inspecting a forward observation post.

Brigadier General Claudius Miller Easley (U.S. Army)

Assistant Division Commander, 96th Infantry Division. Killed June 19, 1945 by a Japanese sniper on the Island of Leyte, Philippine Islands.

Korean War

Lieutenant General Walton Walker (U.S. Army)

Commanding General, Eighth Army. Killed December 23, 1950 when his command jeep collided with a civilian truck near Uijeongbu as he inspected positions north of Seoul.

Major General Bryant E. Moore (U.S. Army)

Commanding General, IX Corps. Died of a heart attack on February 24, 1951, after his helicopter had crashed into the Han River during Operation Killer.



Vietnam War

Brigadier General Alfred Judson Moody (U.S. Army)

Assistant Division Commander, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). March 19, 1967 died of a heart attack in Vietnam.

Major General William Joseph Crumm (U.S. Air Force)

Commanding General, 3rd Air Division, Strategic Air Command. Died on July 7, 1967 when two B52 aircraft collided in mid-air over the South China Sea during a combat mission. The aircraft were approximately 20 miles offshore at the point of Vinh Binh Province when the accident occurred.

Major General Bruno Arthur Hochmuth (U.S. Marine Corps)

Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division. Killed November 14, 1967 when the helicopter, in which he was riding, exploded in mid-air and crashed.

Brigadier General Edward Burke Burdett (U.S. Air Force)

Commanding General, 388th Tactical Fighter Wing, Korat Royal Thai Air Base. MIA November 18, 1967 when shot down while flying a F-105D on a strike mission over Phuc Yen Airfield, North Vietnam. Later declared a prisoner of war, he died in captivity on November 18, 1967.

Major General Robert Franklin Worley (U.S. Air Force)

Vice Commander, Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces. Killed July 23, 1968, when the RF-4C he was piloting was hit by ground fire and crashed approximately 65 miles northwest of Da Nang Air Base.

Major General Keith Lincoln Ware (U.S. Army)

Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division. Killed September 13, 1968 over Loc Ninh near the Cambodian border, when his helicopter was shot down by heavy anti-aircraft fire. Awarded Medal of Honor in 1944.

Brigadier General Charles Jack Girard (U.S. Army)

Commanding General, Capital Military Assistance Command, Saigon, Vietnam. Died January 17, 1970 of illness or disease.

Brigadier General William Ross Bond (U.S. Army)

Commanding General, 199th Light Infantry Brigade. Killed in Action April 1, 1970 by small arms fire along the southeastern edge of war zone D, about 70 miles northeast of Saigon.

Brigadier General Carroll Edward Adams, Jr. (U.S. Army)

Commander, 13th Engineer Bde. Killed on May 12, 1970 when his helicopter was shot down in the Central Highlands of Vietnam.

Major General John Albert B. Dillard, Jr. (U.S. Army)

Chief of Army Engineers in Vietnam. Killed May 12, 1970 when his helicopter was shot down in the Central Highlands of Vietnam.

Major General George William Casey (U.S. Army)

Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division. Killed July 7, 1970 in a helicopter crash in South Vietnam when his UH-1H hit a mountain due to poor weather near Bao Luc.

Rear Admiral Rembrandt C. Robinson (U.S. Navy)

Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Flotilla 11 and Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Vietnam, Seventh Fleet (CTF 75). Killed May 8, 1972 in a helicopter crash in the Gulf of Tonkin during a late night landing approach to his flagship, the guided missile light cruiser USS Providence (CLG-6) immediately preceding the cruiser-destroyer attack on the Don Son Peninsula and Haiphong, North Vietnam.

Brigadier General Richard J. Tallman (U.S. Army)

Deputy Commanding General, 3rd Regional Assistance Cmd, MACV. Mortally Wounded on July 9, 1972 at An Loc when his helicopter was struck by enemy artillery fire.


9/11

Lieutenant General Timothy L. Maude (U.S. Army)

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Killed during the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the Pentagon.


Operation Enduring Freedom

Major General Harold Greene (U.S. Army)

Deputy Commanding General, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan. Assassinated August 5, 2014, by an Afghan dressed in an Afghan soldier’s uniform at a training facility in Kabul.

Robert Sterling Rush, PhD, command sergeant major, USA, (retired) served at every organizational level fro

m squad through army command sergeant major, including assignments in Ranger, light, and mechanized infantry units. Rush has been involved with the Army History Program since 2001 and deployed to Iraq as a historian in 2006 and again in 2009-10 as the I Corps / MNC-I Historian. He is a subject matter expert on unit rotation and individual replacement. His studies on these subjects have elicited great interest among principals in the Department of the Army.

[Johnnie Lyle]

Add RADM Charles Cecil (Formerly CO HELENA and DESRON 2), also lost in a plane crash.

Lots of plane crash deaths.

[kdahm]

Rear Admiral John W. Wilcox, USS Washington. Lost overboard 27 March 1942 in heavy weather.

[jemhouston]

Major General Robert Franklin Worley (U.S. Air Force)

Vice Commander, Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces. Killed July 23, 1968, when the RF-4C he was piloting was hit by ground fire and crashed approximately 65 miles northwest of Da Nang Air Base.

Why in the hell was the Vice Commander, Seventh Air Force flying a combat mission?

[Poohbah]

Back in the latter 1980s, then-CAPT Ralph Peters wrote a piece for Military Review titled "The Era of Fatal Visibility," where he described brigade and higher command posts as "electronic orgies" and said that we needed to change how we did business before we ended up with decapitated major formations.

Nice to see that nobody's done anything about this in the ensuing 35-plus years...

[S. Murray]

RADM Mullinix - KIA USS Liscome Bay, 24 Nov 1943 off the Gilbert Islands.

RADM Chandler - KIA USS Lousiville, 7 Jan 1945, Lingayen Gulf.

[James1978]

Back in the latter 1980s, then-CAPT Ralph Peters wrote a piece for Military Review titled "The Era of Fatal Visibility," where he described brigade and higher command posts as "electronic orgies" and said that we needed to change how we did business before we ended up with decapitated major formations.

August 1988 issue for anyone who wants to read it.

Nice to see that nobody's done anything about this in the ensuing 35-plus years...

We've been complacent.
Iraq, the Taliban, and the assorted lowlifes we've fought didn't have real ISAR/SIGINT capabilities matched with the ability to reach out and touch our CPs. Along with that, we've been able to operate out of massive, fixed fortress base camps and haven't had to worry about things like regular relocation and watching our emissions. We've largely had the luxury of fighting in a way where our leadership and CPs aren't that exposed. Kinda hard to get killed when you don't venture outside the wire that often and the bad guys don't have anything better than mortars and the occasional unguided rocket.

We all have a good laugh at Russian officers getting killed, but in a conventional fight against a peer adversary with semi-competent special ops / stay-behind forces, I'm not so sure we wouldn't see a lot of dead American brigade and division commanders.

I remember reading about a US general in Bosnia. Seems he was a runner, and nothing would stand in the way of his daily run - outside the wire on city streets. His Delta security detail about had a heart attack when the general's aide told them about insistence on the run. How hard would it have been for a special ops team to have taken out a high ranking US general had they really wanted to?

We also have a good laugh about Russian troops taking to social media and being geolocated. Are we sure our 18-21 year olds are any less dumb/careless? I read about a US field exercise where some artilleryman took a selfie with his gun crew and their M109 and posted to his Instagram - an umpire saw him do it and declared it a detectable emission and said the battery was dead.
Anyone else remember the issue with the fitness tracker a few years back on US overseas bases basically providing a map of the bases?
I'd love to know if / how much of an issue cell phones are in Europe and Korea where the troops have a functioning cell network to plug into.

[Nightwatch2]

Back in the latter 1980s, then-CAPT Ralph Peters wrote a piece for Military Review titled "The Era of Fatal Visibility," where he described brigade and higher command posts as "electronic orgies" and said that we needed to change how we did business before we ended up with decapitated major formations.

August 1988 issue for anyone who wants to read it.

Nice to see that nobody's done anything about this in the ensuing 35-plus years...

We've been complacent.
Iraq, the Taliban, and the assorted lowlifes we've fought didn't have real ISAR/SIGINT capabilities matched with the ability to reach out and touch our CPs. Along with that, we've been able to operate out of massive, fixed fortress base camps and haven't had to worry about things like regular relocation and watching our emissions. We've largely had the luxury of fighting in a way where our leadership and CPs aren't that exposed. Kinda hard to get killed when you don't venture outside the wire that often and the bad guys don't have anything better than mortars and the occasional unguided rocket.

We all have a good laugh at Russian officers getting killed, but in a conventional fight against a peer adversary with semi-competent special ops / stay-behind forces, I'm not so sure we wouldn't see a lot of dead American brigade and division commanders.

I remember reading about a US general in Bosnia. Seems he was a runner, and nothing would stand in the way of his daily run - outside the wire on city streets. His Delta security detail about had a heart attack when the general's aide told them about insistence on the run. How hard would it have been for a special ops team to have taken out a high ranking US general had they really wanted to?

We also have a good laugh about Russian troops taking to social media and being geolocated. Are we sure our 18-21 year olds are any less dumb/careless? I read about a US field exercise where some artilleryman took a selfie with his gun crew and their M109 and posted to his Instagram - an umpire saw him do it and declared it a detectable emission and said the battery was dead.
Anyone else remember the issue with the fitness tracker a few years back on US overseas bases basically providing a map of the bases?
I'd love to know if / how much of an issue cell phones are in Europe and Korea where the troops have a functioning cell network to plug into.

Old sea story (and it is absolutely a true no shit!)

two carrier ops in an exercise - one vs one. both ships in emcon with everything shut down and headed towards each other in the far reaches of open ocean.

everything quiet except for one young lad who called home....

full airstrike overhead at dawn!

at the debrief, the recording of the phone call was played for all concerned. follow on "conversations" were not recorded.....

electronic security is absolutely the Achilles Heal of modern warfare both ashore and at sea.

[Poohbah]

Back in the latter 1980s, then-CAPT Ralph Peters wrote a piece for Military Review titled "The Era of Fatal Visibility," where he described brigade and higher command posts as "electronic orgies" and said that we needed to change how we did business before we ended up with decapitated major formations.

August 1988 issue for anyone who wants to read it.

Nice to see that nobody's done anything about this in the ensuing 35-plus years...

We've been complacent.
Iraq, the Taliban, and the assorted lowlifes we've fought didn't have real ISAR/SIGINT capabilities matched with the ability to reach out and touch our CPs. Along with that, we've been able to operate out of massive, fixed fortress base camps and haven't had to worry about things like regular relocation and watching our emissions. We've largely had the luxury of fighting in a way where our leadership and CPs aren't that exposed. Kinda hard to get killed when you don't venture outside the wire that often and the bad guys don't have anything better than mortars and the occasional unguided rocket.

We all have a good laugh at Russian officers getting killed, but in a conventional fight against a peer adversary with semi-competent special ops / stay-behind forces, I'm not so sure we wouldn't see a lot of dead American brigade and division commanders.

I remember reading about a US general in Bosnia. Seems he was a runner, and nothing would stand in the way of his daily run - outside the wire on city streets. His Delta security detail about had a heart attack when the general's aide told them about insistence on the run. How hard would it have been for a special ops team to have taken out a high ranking US general had they really wanted to?

We also have a good laugh about Russian troops taking to social media and being geolocated. Are we sure our 18-21 year olds are any less dumb/careless? I read about a US field exercise where some artilleryman took a selfie with his gun crew and their M109 and posted to his Instagram - an umpire saw him do it and declared it a detectable emission and said the battery was dead.
Anyone else remember the issue with the fitness tracker a few years back on US overseas bases basically providing a map of the bases?
I'd love to know if / how much of an issue cell phones are in Europe and Korea where the troops have a functioning cell network to plug into.

Old sea story (and it is absolutely a true no shit!)

two carrier ops in an exercise - one vs one. both ships in emcon with everything shut down and headed towards each other in the far reaches of open ocean.

everything quiet except for one young lad who called home....

full airstrike overhead at dawn!

at the debrief, the recording of the phone call was played for all concerned. follow on "conversations" were not recorded.....

electronic security is absolutely the Achilles Heal of modern warfare both ashore and at sea.

YGBFSM

[Nightwatch2]

August 1988 issue for anyone who wants to read it.

We've been complacent.
Iraq, the Taliban, and the assorted lowlifes we've fought didn't have real ISAR/SIGINT capabilities matched with the ability to reach out and touch our CPs. Along with that, we've been able to operate out of massive, fixed fortress base camps and haven't had to worry about things like regular relocation and watching our emissions. We've largely had the luxury of fighting in a way where our leadership and CPs aren't that exposed. Kinda hard to get killed when you don't venture outside the wire that often and the bad guys don't have anything better than mortars and the occasional unguided rocket.

We all have a good laugh at Russian officers getting killed, but in a conventional fight against a peer adversary with semi-competent special ops / stay-behind forces, I'm not so sure we wouldn't see a lot of dead American brigade and division commanders.

I remember reading about a US general in Bosnia. Seems he was a runner, and nothing would stand in the way of his daily run - outside the wire on city streets. His Delta security detail about had a heart attack when the general's aide told them about insistence on the run. How hard would it have been for a special ops team to have taken out a high ranking US general had they really wanted to?

We also have a good laugh about Russian troops taking to social media and being geolocated. Are we sure our 18-21 year olds are any less dumb/careless? I read about a US field exercise where some artilleryman took a selfie with his gun crew and their M109 and posted to his Instagram - an umpire saw him do it and declared it a detectable emission and said the battery was dead.
Anyone else remember the issue with the fitness tracker a few years back on US overseas bases basically providing a map of the bases?
I'd love to know if / how much of an issue cell phones are in Europe and Korea where the troops have a functioning cell network to plug into.

Old sea story (and it is absolutely a true no shit!)

two carrier ops in an exercise - one vs one. both ships in emcon with everything shut down and headed towards each other in the far reaches of open ocean.

everything quiet except for one young lad who called home....

full airstrike overhead at dawn!

at the debrief, the recording of the phone call was played for all concerned. follow on "conversations" were not recorded.....

electronic security is absolutely the Achilles Heal of modern warfare both ashore and at sea.

YGBFSM

That was kind of the reaction of the “receiving” Carrier Group Commander and his staff…..



(Glad I was on the other side)

[jemhouston]

Did they toss him overboard?

[Nightwatch2]

Did they toss him overboard?

We (the victors) didn’t hear the follow up….

[Rocket J Squrriel]

Did they toss him overboard?

I'd attach him to a catapult, tell him to put his arms out to pretend he's an airplane, and fire.

[MikeKozlowski]

Did they toss him overboard?

I'd attach him to a catapult, tell him to put his arms out to pretend he's an airplane, and fire.

Nope. As Dad used to say, "That sort of thing is over way too fast."

Instead, put him in a sandwich board that says' "I'M AN IDIOT ASK ME WHY", and have him visit every single compartment on that ship.

Mike

[OSCSSW]

I may not know what I am talking about as I almost always am when I try to address 21st century technology.
Aren't there off the shelf devices called "Cell Phone Jammers" that produce an electronic blackout for a couple of city blocks used by the police? I'd think activating one of those for EMCOM Alfa would be SOP by now.

Commander, how long ago was that? When I transferred to CIVLANT about a century ago,( seems that long anyway) Sat phones were verboten, and had been for quite a while, aboard ship for obvious reasons. If you had a Sat Phone, your communications could not be monitored. BTW, as soon as shit for brains made a call out, the EWs would be aware of your sat phone. Your chief, your Divo and your Dept. Head would all be gunning for you after they XO chewed a good part of the Ops Boss's butt off and he, like all good naval officers, past the compliment down the line.

OK what am I missing?

[Poohbah]

I may not know what I am talking about as I almost always am when I try to address 21st century technology.
Aren't there off the shelf devices called "Cell Phone Jammers" that produce an electronic blackout for a couple of city blocks used by the police? I'd think activating one of those for EMCOM Alfa would be SOP by now.

Commander, how long ago was that? When I transferred to CIVLANT about a century ago,( seems that long anyway) Sat phones were verboten, and had been for quite a while, aboard ship for obvious reasons. If you had a Sat Phone, your communications could not be monitored. BTW, as soon as shit for brains made a call out, the EWs would be aware of your sat phone. Your chief, your Divo and your Dept. Head would all be gunning for you after they XO chewed a good part of the Ops Boss's butt off and he, like all good naval officers, past the compliment down the line.

OK what am I missing?

The cell phone jammer would itself be an emitter that could be location and tracked.

[OSCSSW]

I may not know what I am talking about as I almost always am when I try to address 21st century technology.
Aren't there off the shelf devices called "Cell Phone Jammers" that produce an electronic blackout for a couple of city blocks used by the police? I'd think activating one of those for EMCOM Alfa would be SOP by now.

Commander, how long ago was that? When I transferred to CIVLANT about a century ago,( seems that long anyway) Sat phones were verboten, and had been for quite a while, aboard ship for obvious reasons. If you had a Sat Phone, your communications could not be monitored. BTW, as soon as shit for brains made a call out, the EWs would be aware of your sat phone. Your chief, your Divo and your Dept. Head would all be gunning for you after they XO chewed a good part of the Ops Boss's butt off and he, like all good naval officers, past the compliment down the line.

OK what am I missing?

The cell phone jammer would itself be an emitter that could be location and tracked.

Got it. I used to know things like that Poohbah. Guess I killed too many brain cells, but it sure was fun doing it and a great comfort now.

Put the jammer in a drone, shoot it off axis but within maximum jamming coverage range and use it as bait. Have your CAP and friends positioned to cut the Sierra strike to pieces and have a snooper follow the survivors back to their barn. Have your own Sierra strike primed on deck and send them to hit the Opposition CV during recovery Ops. How about that former staff puke and good shipmate Nightwatch2?

[Poohbah]

I may not know what I am talking about as I almost always am when I try to address 21st century technology.
Aren't there off the shelf devices called "Cell Phone Jammers" that produce an electronic blackout for a couple of city blocks used by the police? I'd think activating one of those for EMCOM Alfa would be SOP by now.

Commander, how long ago was that? When I transferred to CIVLANT about a century ago,( seems that long anyway) Sat phones were verboten, and had been for quite a while, aboard ship for obvious reasons. If you had a Sat Phone, your communications could not be monitored. BTW, as soon as shit for brains made a call out, the EWs would be aware of your sat phone. Your chief, your Divo and your Dept. Head would all be gunning for you after they XO chewed a good part of the Ops Boss's butt off and he, like all good naval officers, past the compliment down the line.

OK what am I missing?

The cell phone jammer would itself be an emitter that could be location and tracked.

Got it. I used to know things like that Poohbah. Guess I killed too many brain cells, but it sure was fun doing it and a great comfort now.

What the Navy IS doing is conducting drills underway and in port where everyone on the ship is expected to shut off their personal electronic devices, and teams from Naval Information Warfare Command are looking for violators.

[Nightwatch2]

The cell phone jammer would itself be an emitter that could be location and tracked.

Got it. I used to know things like that Poohbah. Guess I killed too many brain cells, but it sure was fun doing it and a great comfort now.

What the Navy IS doing is conducting drills underway and in port where everyone on the ship is expected to shut off their personal electronic devices, and teams from Naval Information Warfare Command are looking for violators.

you are spot on, Poohbah.

The answer, Operations Specialist Senior Chief, will truly fry your bacon!

in the early 80's, I forget exactly when. No cell phones or sat phones. Said homesick sailor, Aviation Technician, wanted to call home really badly. So with the entire ship shut down and everyone else playing the game - he wandered out to the flight deck to his squadron's Ready S-3, fired up the power cart to put power to the aircraft, fired up the HF and contacted a shore HF station and requested a phone patch. (which is how we did things waaaay back then). Said shore station having no knowledge or participation in the on going exercise cooperatively established the phone patch, thereby enabling anyone with an HF receiver in the hemisphere to listen in and anyone with an HF DF capability to detect and triangulate the position of the CVN.

It was glorious!

which underscores just how easy it is to find someone who isn't REALLY FOCUSED and COMPETENT about EMCON. I say that because the Midway Battle Group was really focused and competent about EMCON as demonstrated in NORPAC 82 (as previously related)

Which brings to mind one of my on going and continuing concerns. I am gravely concerned that we may have lost that edge with the Ford CVN class and EMALS. I have posed that question several times including to a NAVAIR SYSCOM RADM who was visiting NORTHCOM at a luncheon when I was then a City Councilor (RADM equivalent). He could not, or would not, answer the question. I guess we will see sometime in the future.